J. A. C. v. StateJ. A. C. v. State
Tо what extent may a juvenile court judge direct and participate in the proceedings of a dеlinquency trial? That is the unique question presented by this appeal in which counsel representing four boys ruled delinquent for vandalism of school property objected to the trial "based upon the fact thаt there is no prosecutor in this court; that as a matter of law, the judge cannot act as both questioner and prosecutor and also as judge.” (T. 26). Other enumerations question the validity of alleged confessions and sufficiency of the evidence in corroboration thereof.
1. What should be the role of the judge in juvenile court proceedings? The answer must depend upon recognition of the evolution in thе concept of that important tribunal which has occurred in recent years. This history is dealt with effeсtively by Georgia Professor Samuel M. Davis in his recently published book, "Rights of Juveniles — The Juvenile Justice System.” His first chapter entitled "Philosophy of the Juvenile Court” traces the change whereby the original parens рatriae presentation of a non-adversary proceeding in which the judge was a father-figure has now been re-defined to provide for juveniles those constitutional due process standards peculiarly applicable to such courts. The professor’s wise conclusion is that "Only by assuring a child of рrocedural fairness will a court that purports to represent that child’s interests impart to him an unjaundiced view of a system of justice that is fair and benevolent.” P. 5. This does not necessitate a conflict bеtween the "father-figure” and the magistrate.
Essentially, there can be no objection where the judge conducts a trial with complete impartiality. This is true whether the defendant be an adult or juvenile. Thus, in T. L. T. v. State of Ga.,
We used the words "most important” in recognition of the uniqueness of the juvenile court jurist in the administration of justice.
"Basically, the [juvenile] judge has three primary obligations: (1) to protect the community, (2) to act in the best interest and welfare of the child appearing beforе him, and (3) to uphold the dignity of the law and the public’s faith in the judicial system.” 23 Juvenile Court Journal 8, 9 (1972). These three obligations can be performed in the absence of a prosecutor so long as the magistrate remains impartial. When, as, and if he departs from the requirement of neutral judiciousness and into advocacy he subjects himself to a reversal upon appeal.
Our examination of the transcript shows that the trial judge conducted the hearing in a fair and impartial manner. The record before us conforms to those standards which our court found to have existed in Avakian v. State,
2. We find no merit in the second enumeration which charges that the rights of the juveniles were violated because оf the absence of any Miranda warnings. In making their investigation of the vandalism the police
The facts here differentiate this case from Freeman v. Wilcox,
3. The remaining enumerations contend that even if the admissions of wrongdoing by the boys were valid that there is an absence of corroborating evidence as required by Code § 24A-2002 (b) and that the evidence is not sufficient to the court to find "beyond a reasonable doubt” as stated in Code § 24A-2201 (b) that they had committed the acts. We think there is sufficient corroboration from the witnesses who saw the boys at the school that Saturday morning. We are also satisfied the proof meets the reasonable doubt test.
Judgment affirmed.