Dеfendant was tried before a jury and found guilty of a single count of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. The evidence revealed the following:
On the evening of February 6, 1994, Special Agent Michael Anthony Oliver, a narcotics agent with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, along with Special Agent Dalton, used a confidential informant (“Cl”), who “pоinted out [defendant’s] . . . brown- or rust-colored Cadillac ... at the red light. . ., and said that he knew who it was and that he was probably holding something, . . . meaning that he [defendant] might have some crаck cocaine on him. . . . [T]he Cl hollered out the window to [defendant], [who was] sitting on the passenger side. It was a . . . female driving with real short hair. [Defendant] leaned up and lookеd over to see who was calling him, and that’s when the Cl asked him did he have anything, meaning . . . did he have any crack cocaine. . . . [Defendant] told us to follow him. . . . [Special Agent Oliver] observed the tag number [on defendant’s car] which was PWK466.”
“[They] arrived at Whispering Pines Trailer Park. Both vehicles *859 parked. [Defendant] got out of his car, walked up to . . . Agent Dalton’s vehicle. [Agent Oliver] and the Cl got out. The Cl introduced [Agent Oliver] to [defendant] as his cousin, . . . and said, . . . that [the cousin] wanted a sixteenth, which means a sixteenth of a[n] ounce of crack сocaine. [Defendant] stated that he didn’t have a whole piece, meaning one solid piece that weighed up to a sixteenth of a[n] ounce . . ., but he had five pieces that he would let the agent have for a hundred dollars. . . . Once he stated that, [Agent Oliver] and the Cl and [defendant] walked over to [defendant’s] vehicle. [Defendant] sat down in thе passenger seat of his vehicle, reached up under the seat and pulled out a brown piece of paper . . . [which] contained five pieces of off-white substance of suspected crack cocaine.” Defendant gave the brown piece of paper containing the crack cocaine to Agent Oliver, who then gave defendant one “hundred dollars in official state funds.” Katherine Lee, a forensic chemist with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation State Crime Laboratory in Maсon identified the five off-white cubes as crack cocaine. Hazel Kersey of the Houston County Tax Commissioner’s Office confirmed that Georgia Tag number PWK466 is registered to “a 1980 Cadillac Eldorado belonging to [defendant].”
Defendant presented evidence that, in early February 1994, his car was not operable “because it didn’t have a motor in it, . . . [and that] on the 6th, that was that Sunday when [he] went to Powersville [with friends].” Nevertheless, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. A prior appeal was dismissed as untimely. Pursuant to the grant of an out-оf-time appeal, defendant appeals from the order of the trial court denying his motion for new trial. Held:
1. Defendant first enumerates the general grounds.
“The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a faсt.” OCGA § 24-4-8. In the case sub judice, Special Agent Oliver’s in-court identification of defendant as the seller is sufficient under the standard of
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his written pretrial motion to require thе State to reveal the identity of the confidential informant, because that person was a participant and not a mere tipster. The trial court conducted thе in camera interview with the confidential informant contemplated in
Moore v. State,
*860
“In determining if the Cl’s identity should be revealed by the State, the trial court must conduct a two-step hearing. Initially, the trial court shоuld hear evidence to determine: (a) that the confidential informant is an alleged informer-witness or informer participant whose testimony appears to be material to the defense on the issue of guilt or punishment; (b) that the testimony for the prosecution and the defense is or will be in conflict; and (c) that the Cl was the only available witness who could amplify or contradict the testimony of these witnesses. Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the Cl’s testimony [and apрly the balancing test] set forth in
Thornton [v. State,
In the case sub judice, defendant’s female friend was the driver of defendant’s vehicle and was in a position to be an additional witness as defendant returned to the vehicle and removed the cocaine from under the seat of the car. “Therefore, while there was evidence that the Cl was either an informer-witness or informer-participant, and that the testimony of the prosecution and the defense was in conflict, the Cl was not the only witness in a position to amplify or contradiсt the testimony of the defendant and the [special agent]. . . . The threshold requirements of the first step of the [inquiry] were not met, and there was no error in the trial court’s refusal to rеquire the State to reveal the identity of the CL” (Emphasis omitted.)
Grant v. State,
3. Defendant proffered impeachment evidence from Travis Williams that, at 4:55 p.m., i.e., at the same time defendant was allegedly selling crack cocaine to Special Agent Oliver at the Whispering Pines Trailer Park, Travis Williams sold marijuana to Agent Dalton accompanied by Agent Williams at Travis Williams’ residence “[a]t 113 Jackson Street. . . [o]ff Welborn Road about pretty close to Russell Parkway . . . [which is] six or seven miles . . . [and about] 20 minutes . . .” from Whispering Pines Trailer Park. It was undisputed that these two sales were transacted consecutively on February 6, 1994, but Travis Williams had no independent “personal recollection of what time ... it [the sale] was[,]” but relied on the time of day stated on his indictment. The trial court excluded Travis Williams’ testimony as irrelevant and this evidentiary ruling is enumerated as error.
“[A] witness must have actual knowledge of a fact before it is
*861
proper to allow him to testify positively as to the existence of such fact. Cоde [Ann.] § 38-301 [now OCGA § 24-3-1].”
State Hwy. Dept. v. Wilkes,
4. Defendant’s fourth enumeration contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial on the special ground of ineffective assistance оf trial counsel. He complains that trial counsel (defendant’s third lawyer in the case) did riot file pretrial motions, did not give him copies of those motions, did not interview the pоlice, and did not call the confidential informant and other witnesses.
“When inadequate representation is alleged, the critical factual inquiry ordinarily relates to whethеr the defendant had a defense which was not presented; whether trial counsel consulted sufficiently with the accused, and adequately investigated the facts and the law; and whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy. Generally, the burden is on the defendant ... to establish (1) his attorney’s representation in specified instances fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The trial court’s determination that an aсcused has not been denied effective assistance of counsel will be affirmed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Johnson v. State,
“In the case sub judice, ‘it is not necessary to address specifically and individually each and every one of (defendant’s) numerous instances of challenged trial tactics. It is sufficient to note that “strategic choices (made) after thorough investigation . . . are virtually unchallengeable.”
Strickland (v. Washington,
Judgment affirmed.