Iverson v. IversonIverson v. Iverson
This action for the partition of 1280 acres of land located in Jones County, South Dakota, was commenced by Edwin Iverson (Edwin) against John Iverson, also known as John N. Iverson (John), by the filing of a summons and complaint and the recording of a lis pendens pursuant to
Edwin and John were brothers. In the late 1930’s they were engaged in farming as a partnership or joint venture. In 1939 they contracted to purchase the land in question, which included certain land that had been lost by their father by mortgage foreclosure under the Rural Credits program, from the State of South Dakota. Edwin participated in the making of the down payment on the land and also participated in the partnership or joint venture of the farming operation at the time the land was purchased. In 1940 Edwin left the farm and moved to Murdo, South Dakota; subsequent to that time he received no income from the land nor made any claim thereto. At various times over the years Edwin signed waivers so that John could receive payments under various Federal farm programs. Subsequent to the down payment, all further payments on the land were made by John alone. In 1944, after 40% of the purchase price had been paid, the State of South Dakota, acting through the Rural Credit Board, conveyed the property to Edwin and John as tenants in common and took back mortgages from them to secure the balance of the purchase price. On April 2, 1969, John recorded a notice in the office of the Register of Deeds in Jones County claiming the entire ownership of the land in question. The following month Edwin commenced the present action for partition.
The trial court held that the property was owned by Edwin and John as tenants in common and that Edwin’s interest in the land was subject to the mortgage to the Jones County State Bank.
After making these findings on the issue of ownership, the court permitted the parties to submit evidence regarding the claim for reimbursement for the value of improvements that John had allegedly made to the property. The court then entered additional findings,to the effect that John had had full use of and had retained all profits from the land in question during his lifetime; from this the court concluded that John’s estate was not entitled on equitable principles to reimbursement for any of the improvements. The court also found that the premises could not be partitioned in kind without prejudice to the owners and that therefore the property would have to be partitioned by sale. The executor of John’s estate has appealed from the judgment.
The trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and will not be set aside by this court in the light of the record.
Appellant’s contention that Edwin’s claim to a one-half interest in the land must be barred under the principles of equitable estoppel was correctly held by the trial court to be without merit. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is bottomed on principles of morality and fair dealing and is intended to subserve
the ends of justice. It seeks to accomplish that which is fair between man and man. First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Revell,
Likewise, the trial court was correct in holding that because Edwin participated in the making of the down payment on the land and in the partnership or joint venture of the farming operation at the time the land was purchased no trust resulted in favor of John.
The trial court correctly rejected appellant’s contention that John had acquired sole ownership of the property by adverse possession. The execution of the joint notes and mortgages and the taking of title as tenants in common clearly established a cotenancy in 1944. From 1944 to the spring of 1969 there was no change in
The trial court concluded that because John had received all the income from the land in question since 1940 and had increased his farm holdings from the 1,280 acres, which in 1940 would not support two families, to approximately 6,240 acres, his estate was not entitled on equitable principles to reimbursement for any of the improvements made on the 1,280 acres.
Although in a given case it is within the trial court’s discretion to deny entirely any award for the value of improvements in a partition action, see, e. g., Johnson v. Hendrickson,
Accordingly, insofar as the judgment provides that the property in question was owned by Edwin and John as tenants in common, that the land be partitioned by sale, and that Edwin’s interest in the land be subject to the mortgage to the Jones County Bank, the judgment is affirmed. Insofar as the judgment provides that no offset be allowed for improvements made upon the land, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court with instructions that the trial court consider the matter of reimbursement for improvements in accordance with this opinion.
Notes
The Jones County State Bank was added as a party defendant because of a mortgage that was recorded against the property subsequent to the commencement of the partition action. Edwin died on August 1, 1972, during the pendency of this appeal, and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties Nellie Iverson was substituted as party plaintiff.