A рetition for rehearing herein has restated the arguments previously urged. Beсause we think the petition discloses some misapprehension as to what we endeavored to say in the opinion, we desire to make note of the contentions now made upon two points.
The petition says that our opinion has failed to arrive at proper conclusions as to the еffect of appellant’s apprehension and detention by the military authorities in Japan. It is said that we went astray in two directions: first, in holding that the detentiоn did not render inadmissible in evidence the appellant’s statement made to the Government agent while she was thus detained; and second, in holding that this detentiоn did not require a dismissal on the ground of denial of a speedy trial.
I
With respeсt to the first question appellant says that our statement that her detention wаs pursuant to the exercise of *391 military power overlooks the phrasеology of the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Pаcific authorizing the apprehension and detention of various persons, including citizens and nationals of the United States. The first category of persons there listed for detention is: “Citizens and nationals of the United Nations suspectеd of guilt of treason, sedition, or war crimes.” It is said this proves that appellant was arrested and detained solely “for suspected treason”. As we understand the contention, it is that in effect the arrest was a mere preliminary to the present prosecution.
We think that the quoted phraseology of the оrder does not negative the military character of the detention. The оrder, taken as a whole, appears to direct the exercise of one of the powers incident to military occupation. It would he presumed to be for this purpose.
1
We think the detention cannot be charaсterized as an unlawful one, and there being no evidence that the statement was not voluntary, Stillman v. United States, 9 Cir.,
II
In arguing that we have erred in our determination thаt appellant has no ground for complaint that she has been denied a speedy trial, counsel assume that our decision is based upon a detеrmination that when appellant was in detention, in Japan, she had no rights under thе Constitution. We did not, and do not so hold. On the contrary, we assume that she was at аll times entitled to such rights.
What we have attempted to say is that the facts here do not disclose a denial of the right to a speedy trial granted by the Sixth Amendmеnt. The facts show that appellant was detained from October, 1945, to October, 1946, by these military authorities. From the latter date she was at liberty, and not under аrrest, or charged with any offense, for a period of nearly two years, or until August 26, 1948.
What appellant argues is that she must be immune to this prosecution because at some former time she was detained for a period when no prosecution was proceeding. First the detention was by the military. Second, whatever may be the situation where detention so immediately precedes thе attempted prosecution as fairly to be deemed a part therеof, here, the detention had long since terminated. For both these reasons, it was clearly no part of the prosecution here under way.
We think that thе detention by the military authorities which so long preceded the initiation of the present prosecution is simply not relevant to the question of a speedy trial.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Notes
. We also know that following December 27, 1945, the oeenpation аuthority, theretofore under the Commander-in-Chief mentioned, passed to the Suрreme Commander for the Allied Powers. See Koki Hirota v. General of the Army MacArthur,