Istvanditsch v. StateIstvanditsch v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Hersey, Farmer, Anstead (per curiam)
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassеe, and Carol Cobourn Asbury, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appеllee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Frank Istvanditsch, appeals an order requiring him to pay restitution in the
It is interesting to note that the trial court, in declining to impose attorney‘s fees and court costs on the appellant, based its decision on a finding that “Mr. Istvanditsch does not have the ability, present or future to pay fees and costs ...” (emphasis supplied). The total sum of such fees and costs would have been $518.00. If the court found that appellant did not have the prеsent or future ability to pay $518.00, then the court could not have bаsed its restitution award on a finding that appellant had the prеsent or potential future ability to pay $172,873.52.
Appellee suggests that the restitution award should be affirmed because the trial сourt did not set any payment schedule and simply told appellant he was expected to pay when he was able to do so. However a recent case from this court suggests thаt it is improper to award an amount of restitution that the defendant does not have the ability to pay on the basis that the dеfendant can pay if he is ever able to do so. See McInnis v. State, 624 So.2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In McInnis, we revеrsed an order of restitution where the trial court found that the appellant had no present ability to pay the $23,000 awarded as restitution but entered a judgment for restitution notwithstanding “in case the appellant should win the lottery“. Id. Under these circumstances, the amount of restitution awarded was inappropriate.
In view of the appellant‘s testimony and the court‘s finding with respect to his inability to pay fees and costs, the trial court erred in awarding restitution in the amount of $172,873.52. The restitution order is therefore reversed and remanded for the trial court to order an amount, if any, which is within appellant‘s present or potential future ability to pay.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HERSEY and FARMER, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with opinion.
ANSTEAD, Judge, concurring specially.
I agree in all respects with the majority opinion, except that I would simply strike the provisions for restitution as we did in McInnis.