*1
41
nell,
Cir., 1939,
10
106
the burden
F.2d 979. So it
more than
This is
sub. c.
For was
going
also
to loss of assets.
evidence.
Re
forward with
“
*
* *
Shapiro Ornish, N.D.Tex.1929,
bankrupt
risk
&
now has
37 F.2d
403,
Cir.,
ultimately
5
persuading
affirmed
digenous foundering, to a financial “ * * * prima once facie case laboring pears, passes his oar bring
hands and he boat Er- shore.” Federal v. Provision Co. COMPANY, ISTHMIAN STEAMSHIP showsky, Cir., 574, 2 94 F.2d Corporation,Appellant, v. CA Second, the 47 terms of General Order L explicit. ordinarily are Referee IFORNIA SPRAY-CHEMICALCOR findings make, here, as he did “his PORATION, Corporation, Appellee. fact and conclusions of law.” And when No. 16812. judge done, accept “the shall his find- so ings clearly erroneous,” of fact unless Appeals United States Court of U.S.C.A, following 47, 11 Ninth General Order Circuit. Collier, Bankruptcy 2 section 53. 26, 1962. 39.- § Jan. Third, at 1473. we review the action Judge District whose affirmance of brings the application play Referee’s order into stage judicial to this proceeding principles “clearly akin to the concept.
erroneous” Cf. United States Company
v. Twin Cities Power
of Geor-
gia, Cir., 1958,
5
There was evidence which finding
warranted the Referee’s Bankrupt satisfactorily had not overcome showing. piima Indeed, facie there enough quite to warrant the Ref ^ finding eree s affirmative that the books inadequate
and records were in serious respects, and substantial and that Bankrupt explain had failed to satisfac
torily exceeding the diminution in assets $100,000. equally It is clear that as to sufficiency of the books the Referee light evaluated facts legal standards. See In re Under- hill, Cir., 1936, 258; 2 82 F.2d Nix v. Sternberg, Cir., 1930, 611; 8 38 F.2d In Lewine,
ternational Cir., Shoe Co. v. 517; Marx, Cir., 68 F.2d In Re 335; Leichter, F.2d In Re Cir., 1952,197 955; Hedges F.2d v. Bush- *2 McCutchen, Doyle, Enersen, Brown & MacKey Bryant A. Russell K. Zimmerman, Francisco, Cal., San for
appellant.
Hall, Henry,
McReavy, by
Oliver &
Henry
Lyman
Stephen McReavy
Francisco, Cal.,
appellee.
San
POPE, BARNES,
Before
and HAM-
Judges.
LIN, Circuit
rehearing
petition
On
vigorous
filed a
and extensive1 brief.
petition
rehearing
Appellant’s
reargument
1.
filed
this case was a
longer
pages
opening
appeal.
than its
eleven
brief
In addition to the seventeen cases
closing
appellant’s original
brief combined.
which were cited in
frequency
increasing
opening brief,
thirty
With
counsel seem
and the additional
confusing
petition
reply brief,
the function of a
in his
seventeen additional
rehearing
rehearing itself,
petition
were cited on the
cases
for rehear-
hearing
petition
ing.
627, particularly
a'sec-
See
Cal.L.Rev.
petition
appeal.
rehearing
p.
ond
made,
been
regarding
Once
all
questions
raises
It
liability,
however,
as far
the carrier’s
before
which were
main issues
concerned,
at an end.
the Harter Act is
original
consideration
(cid:127),
is,
determine
rehearing,
therefore essential
granted
peal. We
*3
delivery is,
proper
when such
length,
what
argued
again
at
matter was
completed.
court below
The
judgment
again
below.
affirm
appeal
and this court on
held
Lighterage
Validity of the
1.
general
by
proper delivery, as defined
Clauses.
cargo
law,
occurred when
maritime
rested,
essential-
This court’s
deposited
proper
upon
was
a fit and
reasoning
ly, upon
embodied
there
wharf.
contends
decisions
Both
decision.
trial court’s
no
was
or maritime rule
common law
contract,
by
cannot,
hold that
quiring
such
and chides
negligent
injury
liability
avoid
discovering
rely-
court for
rule
such a
cargo
injury
before
occurs
such
ing upon a dictum in
Hi v. United
Tan
prop-
cargo
a fit
is delivered to
States, N.D.Cal.1950,
F.Supp. 432.
94
an
from
This result stems
er wharf.
true
cite and
this court did
Act,
1 of
plication of Section
rely upon
Hi,
Tan
but Tan Hi in turn
190.
46 U.S.C. §
upon
only
cases,
relies
numerous
one
adopted
Harter Act was
The
by appel-'
which is cited or discussed
“ * * *
remedy
which
abuses
lant. These cases establish the existence
through
the efforts
had arisen
(maritime)
of a common law
engaged
shipowners
car-
in common
part
deposit
on the
of the carrier to
or
riage
unreasonably their ob-
limit
goods
“land” the
on a wharf. As stat
goods.
ligations
Sec-
as carriers
Mary Washington,
ed in The
16 Fed.
190,
(46
1 and 2
U.S.C.A. §§
tions
page 1006,
9,229,
duty
Cas.
No.
“The
191)
them-
forbid them to relieve
of a carrier
water is not fulfilled
responsibilities
from certain
selves
transportation
port
port.
from
The
public calling, even
to their
incident
by
goods
delivered,
must be
or at
least
shippers
with
contract
* *
Eddy,
landed
And in The
* *
(Koppers Connecticut
1886,
481, 495,
495,
481,
5 Wall.
72 U.S.
McWilliams
Co. v. James
Coke
486,
18 L.Ed.
it was said: “Where the
1937,
Line,
AR
language
ery,
upon
forty-eight
relied
and the
urges
pure
appellant
dictum.
charge”
obiter
part
tariff—
“no
hour
rule
maritime
this court
accept
which
that statement.
and we
Exhibit
is,
the court below relied we continue
printed in
only part
of Exhibit
strong authority
believe, supported by
13)
(p.
appeal
transcript
on
of record
by any
quay
carriage
which is not
diminished
author-
from one
lates
ity
argument
presented
appellant.
dis-
her
effected
the steamer
“where
charge,”
quays.
provision
That
to other
point
again
At this
would
applicable.
is not here
position
insist
that his
has been mis-
represented.
by
point is,
His
as evidenced
rehearing appel-
petition for
On the
heading
argument
page
of his
great
places
on a case
reliance
lant
eight
petition
rehearing,
many
(with
others)
appear
general
recognized
maritime law
& Co.
opening
R.
brief: W.
Grace
lighterage agreements and that
there-
Co., Inc., supra.
&
v. Frank Waterhouse
fore the
require
common
did
law
goods con-
That involved the
signed
delivery.
wharf
suggested,
Thus it is
California,
Francisco,
to San
“proper delivery”
referred
Seattle, Washington,
were
where
*5
permits agreements
Harter Act
delayed by
and dam-
a stevedore’s strike
provide
lighters
delivery
to
as well
aged.
parties
The
knew there had
delivery
to a wharf.
transshipment,
Fran-
a
because San
such
port
ves-
not a
call for the
cisco was
But the Harter Act
be
Egypt,
Alexandria,
interpreted
light
San
sel.
Francisco,
unlike
in
law
common
“beyond
port
was,
by
was not
a
as it
agreements
unmodified
the
transshipment,
permitted.
call.”
there
no
seen,
Here
was
which it
As we have
on-carriage contemplated
re-
very
no
purpose
of the Harter
—
Act was
quired beyond
port
prevent
The
to
avoiding
call.
the carrier from
its
—
port
Alexandria,
responsibilities by
call here was
common law
the de
carriage
which,
farther,
securing “agreements”
con-
and
vice of
which in
by
templated
parties
exculpatory
both
contract.
cluded
clauses. To define
the common
imposed
law standards
Appellant
authority which
cites some
the Harter Act
reference to
con
suggests that
in-
the carrier was not
tractual modifications which the common
variably required to deliver to a wharf.
permitted,
destroy
obviously
law
would
Tangier (Rich-
it is
Thus
stated in The
say
the
permits
To
Act.
that the Harter Act
Goddard),
ardson v.
23 How.
“agree”
parties
U.S.
L.Ed.
that the carrier
delivery
per
because the common law
“is not bound to
deliver at
warehouse
“agreements,”
mitted
perpetu
such
is to
consignee;
duty
it is the
sought
ate
eradicate;
evil
which the Act
consignee
goods
receive the
out of
viz. the cession
“contract”
ship
(Id.
39.)
p.
This
wharf.”
rights
which would
exist.
otherwise
when,
dictum, however, does not tell us
brings
consignee
is,
may
us to what
our
where or how the
be
quired
goods
opinion,
point
ship.”
pe
main
“receive
out
in its
rehearing.
Appellant
phrase
merely
tition for
Indeed the
mean
contends
that
consignee
(at
32-37)
might
pp. 24-27
and
in some
Section
instances
delivery directly
of the Harter Act does not deal
off
with the
take
ship
scope
of the carrier’s
docked
to de
it has
at a wharf.
Act,
nothing
appellant asserts,
There is
liver.
in that
to in-
whether,
general
dicate
a
determine
when or where
carrier under
cargo.
maritime
must deliver the
law and in the
the carrier
absence of a
agreement
avoiding
special
only prevents the carrier from
could terminate his
arising
obligation by
negligence
liability
depositing
from
for loss
delivery,
has,
fact,
when the
ease deals
cargo.
requirements
proper
of a
deliver
wharf deliv- undertaken
contention,
supersedes
Acceptance
Act,
we
such a
Harter
the Har-
but
Act,
during
believe,
applicable
pe-
and ter Act
weakens the
is still
following discharge
purpose.
spirit
riod
runs counter
de-
before
may livery.
If,
delivery”
provides
however, “proper
the carrier
The Act
liability
completed
due
for loss
is
not relieve itself of
as soon as the
leaves
negligence
ship’s
custody,
tackle
care
and is received
delivery
cargo.
proper
lighterman,
have
provisions
As
the Harter Act
seen,
accomplished
proper
is
can
operative.
never become
logically
placed
position
wharf.
asserts
when the
on a fit
is
that this
in-
;
discharge
which correct
In the
it
instant
maintains that
caused the loss occurred
often
“at
occur
in-
same
before
If,
delivery'
stant,
accomplished.
proper
different
[that]
involve
then,
obligations
(Petition, p.
clause involved
bill
functions.”
16.)
Appellant points
harm-
out,
example,
here is
sufficient
save
less,
will
circumvent-
if
Act
have been
were to deliver to
“wrong party,”
ed.
carrier will. have inserted
it would be liable for
* *
*
* *
whereby
“improper delivery.”
hand,
“clause
it [was]
On the other
* *
*
directly
consignee,
relieved from
for loss
delivered
arising
negligence, fault,
there
proper
or failure
would
immedi-
* * *
ately
care,
custody,
upon discharge
de-
time
without
**
livery
period
operate.
for the Harter
toAct
say
appel-
accept appellant’s
do
Let
We
not intend to
us
contention
position
unreasonably
lant’s
assumed that
often occur
*6
entirely
simultaneously
plausible
merit.
It is
without
that
Act
Harter
argue
appellant
operate
its
for
that
period
since
then does not
over
of
its
operative
ended
contract with
time but does have
effect with
undertaking
transportation
respect
responsibility
as
as soon
to the function and
cargo
deposited
“delivery.”
been
the
lighters,
had
of
But even this limited
any injury
scope
not
for
it is
liable
for
Harter
Act
not ex-
does
which occurred after such
appellant’s
ist
the instant
under
difficulty
theory.
appellant’s position
in-
with this
It is
that all
terpretation
obligations
that the Harter Act seems of its
terminated
it
contemplate
liability
lighterman
a carrier
which transferred the
to the
delivery”
lighterman
up
“proper
continues
until
its
of
choice. If the
there-
regardless
effected,
consignee,
been
of when the
after
not deliver
to the
transport
wrongfully
par-
carrier’s
the but
delivers to another
ty,
appellant’s
ceases.
is the office of the Act
that
is none of
affair.
lading
nullify any
Appellant has,
thus, successfully
bill of
clauses which
con-
destroy
liability.
diminish or
Since
tracted in such manner
as to avoid
only provide
liability
delivery.
issue not
improper
the clauses in
for
for
all
Not
lighterage,
only
during
appellant
period”
also relieve
there
“time
negligence during
liability for
from
lighterage,
operate,
which the Harter
can
Act
there
they
pro-
run
responsibility”
counter
to the
is also no “function
upon
the Harter
operate.
visions of
Act. The
clauses
Act can
We
are, therefore,
purpose
invalid insofar as
think it clear
lighterage
purport
appellant
liability
to relieve
of
clauses in issue here is to at-
negligence during light-
tempt
responsibility
due to
for losses
to avoid carrier
for
erage.
delivery.
improper
But the Harter Act
all
attempts.
makes unlawful
such
appellee contended
As
and as this
pointed
opinion,
out in
Appellant
its'
appel-
further attacks the court's
position
scope
holding’
appli-
lant’s
leaves no
opinion claus-
Carriage
“entirely
cation
Act. The
void.”
es
contends
large
of Goods
Sea Act in
measure
the clauses are valid
to the extent
then,
short,
pp.
(Petition,
this court did not ren-
they are reasonable
that
20-24),
appellant
der the broad decision which
claus-
without
that even
arrange
apparently
authority
thinks it rendered. The court
es, appellant had
30-32).
say
prohibited
did
on-earriage
that a carrier is
(pp.
necessary
securing lighterage agreements
peti
portion of
say
agreements
it did not
that such
are
misreading
upon a
is based
tion
unlawful or invalid. It said
did
opinion, for the court
court’s
agree-
exculpatory provisions of such
invalid
purport
hold the clauses
given
ments are void and can be
no ef-
opinion did
entirety.
court’s
their
fect whatsoever—-for such is the com-
believe,
appellant
seems
hold, as
mand of the Harter Act.
for author
contract
a carrier cannot
There is one other consideration
cargo at
lightering
arrange
ity
importance. Appellant points
out that
only that
expense;
held
shipper’s
it
it would not be
liable
the bill of
relieve itself
cannot
a carrier
Egyptian
had called for
to the
lightering
during
occurring
Stevedoring
Shipping Company,
delivery. To
any time before
Perhaps
on-carrier.
is so and it
clarify
and make
this fact
interesting point. Appellant
raises an
agreed
suggest
opin
certain,
more
stevedore,
not to deliver to the
adding
should
amended
ion
port
but to
deliver
of Alexandria.
of”
exculpatory provisions
“the
words
By
general applicability
broad clause
42 on
line
“think”
the word
after
right
reserved
all of
F.2d,
word
after
page 489
delivering
responsibility
page 491 of
“entirely”
19 on
line
pres
on-carrier
its choice. The
hereby
are
opinion.
amendments
Such
ence of this standardized clause in the
represent
agree
made.
contract does not
an
ment
shipper.
between
and the
intimated that
This court
clauses
simply
unilaterally
It is
a condition
im
lieving
liability during
a carrier
posed
shipper;
necessary lighterage, might, conceivably,
scholars,
in the words
some
it is an
under
held valid
the Harter Act.-
*7
contract,”
“adhesion
viz. a contract “in
point.
point-
not decide the
But it did
party’s participation
which one
consists
the clauses involved here
ed out that
(Ehrenzweig,
of his mere ‘adherence’.”
necessary
limited to
on-car-
were
Adhesion
Contracts in
Conflict of
riage,
exculpatory
that since
Laws,
1072, 1075;
53 Colum.L.Rev.
see
written,
provisions, as
are void under
Dessler,
Adhesion,
also
Contracts of
43
Act,
simply
be
Harter
cannot
already
629.)
have
Colum.L.Rev.
We
conceivably
applied
a case where a
adopted
the Harter Act
seen that
might
exculpatory
apply.
clause
valid
just
agree
prevent
use of
such
false
“Any
clear on this:
Harter Act is
The
* *
ments which make “freedom of contract”
**
*
import
of such
clauses
an illusion.
null and void and
no effect.”
be
shall
carrier, by
exculpatory provisions
In the instant
Thus,
invalid
lading
contract,
of such an adhesion
could
use
has
bill of
be
in
“you
shipper,
will
authorize
given
result
is
said
no effect. This
lighterage
obtain
&
us to
whenever we
R. Grace
Co. v. Frank
with W.
war
much,
Co., Inc., supra,
it desirable.” This
&
deem
have
or Tat-
Waterhouse
seen, does not conflict with the Harter
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Rob-
Kisen
summa
opinion
1929, Cir.,
Co.,
the court’s
does
9
not tam-
I2. doubt whether the cases cited in wharf had to do really port freight. of this dictum hold. so For of the lien for instance, Eddy, in The 5 Wall.
5J regard I to mistake would it be a Egyptian the Storage Petroleum Com- pany now hold and thus us to undertake to by to be received there that com- precedent proposition that pany agent set for the a as for the Customs Authori- here, “lighterage clauses” the so-called April 2, 1952, ties and company on including I paragraph invalid. are Egyptian acknowledged Customs agree prepared this time to at ceipt am not packages appel- of the from the appellant’s conten- rejection of the a Trading to agent, lant’s American-Eastern agree to de- parties could that the Shipping tion Company. and just point of a wharf some short at liver quotes opinion from the letter stipu- attempt long to do as not so appellant written behalf of liable be not carrier should late consignee suggesting that latter the point. delivery at lighter arrange its own could to have agreement to particular an ease In this stating ready to receive upon lighter not and aon make appellant would be not done reasonable, and appear be would wharf charge obliged appellee with the be undertaking make such master’s the lighters hours of hire of the after of the abuse not an would discharge. ship’s the 15, for in clause mentioned discretion sufficiently circumstances of these All lighterage ab- where case this suggested that, in the demonstrate opinion, any necessary. find solutely I cannot lighter elected the what held ever which decision lighters or craft or with “in the respect opinion with proposed in the This is it”. operated or controlled lighter- invalidating a Act the Harter to age it was the fact confirmed further as this. clause such ship which the master the However, I am in accord with those lighters prior to inspect the undertook opinion note portions which tha-t of the loading following immediately the and under the circumstances lighter had lighter, the and after particular appel- the made this Inspec- during storm. loose broken under- did in truth and fact lant not mooring lines made of tion was also privileges or its dis- exercise take mooring. loading and after purportedly reserved it cretion My is that this own conclusion case paragraph of 15. As the clause first present situation where notes, receipts were taken obliged pass upon question are lighterman appellant from validity part paragraph the first discharged shipments onto the were appellant the reason that the did 15 for bills of cov- The order any privileges, to utilize undertake ering shipment were rights purportedly reserved discretion appellant at that surrendered to the paragraph. in that follows that to it time. appellant’s attempted defense under appears from the It also record that paragraph 15 fail because of a lighters procured at Alexandria were appellant to establish that failure lighterage per- services were pur- do what this clause undertake following formed manner: Ameri- portedly authorized. The result of all Trading Shipping can-Eastern pany, Com- operating those was that represented which agents appellant, were its re- Alexandria, requested Egyptian Ste- sponsibility follows from a loss under vedoring Shipping Company, an in- speak circumstances for them- contractor, dependent perform ground ste- selves. affirmance of vedoring judgment services. It re- court’s trial seems to be so quested Sons, E. Barber operators & prefer of plain I would to leave such debata- lighter, lighter. furnish the question The ble as the effect of the Harter Egyptian Regulations Customs required Act on these clauses for decision at shipment quay landed on necessary time when was to reach it. notes commissions or omissions forbidding the construe cases general ordi- nature of the use failure to delivery.2 agree upon place of parties nary majority opinion care. The seems appellant is the say delivery” that I am convinced “proper to livery de- that means right 1 of the that in its contention § aon wharf. scope the not deal with Harter Act does any I opinion cannot find in the an- place of as to carrier’s of the delivery; appellant’s position swer to the that there deter- that the Act does pow- upon is no limitation in the the Act how, the carrier when or where mine stipu- parties er of the to contract or only prevents deliver the but delivery made, provid- late where is to be avoiding liability for from the carrier ing attempted stipulation there is arising negligence in loss negligent or be made in a place has in fact the carrier to such enough improper Clearly the manner. cargo. the undertaken to deliver may agree parties shall whether rejects the con- court’s Rotterdam, Liverpool or be made at or ground just mentioned on the tention They might stipulate Calais. that cer- accept the “weakens Harter that Act, goods tain were to be delivered to an- spirit and counter to its and runs ship at sea. And no other conceivable my purpose.” It is view agreeing prevent judged their reason would purposes must be Act and its language Act; might I not sub- the do onto made any lighter goods notice, question without 18 L.Ed. the sole U.S. ship part thereof, shipowner to or from the was whether and re- had making expense goods. goods shipped of the risk arrangements tained a lien on secure lighterage freight. payment or use of of the The master had craft, goods upon wharf, he con- the carrier or master shall noti- unloaded agent solely fying consignees consignment sidered any consignee responsi- ready payment and without be delivered bility they freight, pay freight shall not whatsoever. refused to damage responsible goods expense loss or would be stored at their lighter goods appellants pay while on such or craft and risk. “The refused to custody lightermen freight, who or in the and the master declined independent possession goods. part contrac- shall be considered He including, limitation, tors, discharged wharf, gave but without re- of, condition, sponsibility consignees, for the choice notice to the due manning lighter pay freight, claiming of such seaworthiness fused they right, by usages or craft. had goods port, If carrier elects to to remove the to their store for lighters operated inspection, paying freight.” (p. with or craft in or without by it, court, sustaining shipown- 496) controlled shall have lien, merely of all benefit the terms of this bill er’s claim of held that he was respect possession to such to deliver
