Isley v. StateIsley v. State
Isley appeals from a judgment and sentence adjudicating him guilty of first degree murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment. He raises three points on appeal.
Firstly, Isley contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge pursuant to the Speedy Trial Rule (
Secondly, Isley contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. We agree. One of the grounds for the motion was that the trial court had denied the jury‘s request for a copy of the jury instructions without Isley or his counsel being present or receiving notice. In Ivory v. State, 351 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1977), decided while this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court held:
“... [I]t is prejudicial error for a trial judge to respond to a request from the jury without the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant‘s counsel being present and having the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the action to be taken on the jury‘s request. This right to participate includes the right to place objections on record as well as the right to make full argument as to the reasons the jury‘s request should or should not be honored.”
The final point on appeal is whether the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. We think so. In Roberts v. State, 335 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1976), the Supreme Court expressly adopted the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725 (1957), which held that “... whenever ... the defense of insanity is fairly raised, the trial judge shall instruct the jury as to the legal meaning of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity... .” The State contends that the Roberts decision merely holds that when a jury is fully instructed on the possible ramifications of a guilty verdict, the jury must also be instructed on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. However, if the Supreme Court had intended its holding to be so limited, it would not have adopted Lyles and would not have expressly declined to limit its holding to the facts of the case.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur.