151 Ind. 476 | Ind. | 1898
Appellee was employed by the appellant company in mining coal, and has brought this action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the company in suffering coal to fall upon him from the roof of the mine in which he was at work. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of appellee, assessing his damages at $4,500. They also returned answers to interrogatories. The questions discussed by counsel may best be considered in connection with the action of the court in refusing to give judgment to appellant on these answers to interrogatories, notwithstanding the general verdict. From the answers to interrogatories it appears:. That on the 16th day of October, 1895, and previous thereto, the appellant company was engaged in mining coal near Linton, in Greene county; that on said day, and for more than a year before, appellee was employed in the company’s mine known as No. 2, his business being to run a cutting machine, in' which work he was assisted by one Sherwood; that there were a number of openings in the mine called work rooms, each connected with a passage way, or entry, the rooms being from twenty to twenty-six feet in width; that after a room was started at a given width it was usual for the miners to work at the face of the vein,
It is not contended that these facts show contributory negligence on the part of appellee; but counsel for appellant do contend that the facts so found show that appellee assumed all risk of danger from the falling of the top coal. Counsel for appellee, on the other hand,- contend that the danger was not obvious but concealed or latent, and that as to such danger there is no assumption of risk. It is true that the danger was concealed, but it was concealed from 'appellant as well as from appellee. And while the duty of inspection rested upon the company, and it was required to furnish a reasonably safe place for its employes to work, yet we think the facts show that the duty so resting upon appellant was performed as fully as was reasonably possible. It is to be remem
In Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Howell, 147 Ind. 266, an employe was injured by reason of the parting of a coupling pin between two cars. The employe was at the time standing on the front of the engine holding the shackle bar in his hands, and it was unsuccessfully sought to charge him with having assumed the risk of the danger occasioned by the defective coupling pin. “Had he coupled the; cars between which the link was used,” said the court in that case, “and thus handled the defective appliance and so had opportunity to observe it, there might be some propriety in holding him accountable for a knowledge of its condition. Employes are rightly held chargeable with knowledge of the condition of the tools and parts of machinery and appliances which they use or with which they come in contact.” The same is true of the places in which employes are at work and with which they are in immediate contact. The condition and dangers of such places are liable to change from hour to hour, as the work progresses, and the employe himself has much better means of knowing of such condition and dangers than his em: ployer possibly can have. An important consideration in such cases, as said by the supreme court of Iowa, in Corson v. Coal Hill Co., 101 Ia. 224, 70 N. W. 185, is whether the structure, appliance or instrumentality is one which has been furnished for. the work in which the employes are to be engaged, or whether the furnishing and preparation of it is itself
The jury here find that both appellant and appellee knew that a part of the top coal was left adhering to the roof of the place where appellee began work. Appellee found the coal, as he and his assistant believed, to be so fast to the roof as “to be absolutely safe and free from danger.” In this it turned out that they were mistaken, whether the defect then existed or was brought about by causes arising after appellee and his assistant had begun their work. Having equal or better opportunities than appellant for knowing the danger threatening him, it would seem that appellee could have no right of action. Were it not for the provisions of the statute above cited, and the failure of the jury to find whether the overhanging coal could be propped or timbered without undue interference with the work, the case would hardly admit of doubt. We are of opinion, however, from a consideration of the whole case as presented, that justice will best be promoted by granting a new trial, rather than by ordering judgment on the an