Ishola v. StateIshola v. State
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This appeal presents the question of whether the use of a fictitious name is tantamount to assuming “the identity of another” with fraudulent intent.
The prosecution and conviction of appellant, Kazeem Adeshina Ishola, is predicated on his alleged violation of Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law, § 8-301, which provides, in relevant part:
(a) (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) “Payment device number” has the meaning stated in § 8-213 of this title.
(3) “Personal identifying information” means a name, address, telephone number, driver’s license number, Social Security number, place of employment, employee identification number, mother’s maiden name, bank or other financial institution account number, date of birth, personal identification number, credit card number, or other payment device number.
(b) Prohibited — Obtaining personal identifying information without consent. A person may not knowingly, willfully, and with fraudulent intent possess, obtain, or help another to possess or obtain any personal identifying information of an individual, without the consent of the individual, in order to use, sell, or transfer the information to get a benefit, credit, good, service, or other thing of value in the name of the individual.
(c) Prohibited — Assuming the identity of another. A person may not knowingly and willfully assume the identity of another:
(1) to avoid identification, apprehension, or prosecution for a crime; or
(2) with fraudulent intent to:
(i) get a benefit, credit, good, service, or other thing of value; or
(Ü) avoid the payment of debt or other legal obligation.
*204 Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Howard County, appellant was convicted of two counts of assuming the identity of another, in violation of Md.Code, Crim. Law § 8-301(c), and sentenced to two years imprisonment. In his timely appeal, appellant raises a single question for our review:
Does Crim. Law § 8-301(c) encompass the possibility of prosecution for the assumption of a fictitious identity and if not, was the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for assuming the identity of another?
Because we find that the circuit court correctly interpreted
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying appellant’s prosecution are uncomplicated and not in substantial dispute.
On March 19, 2003, appellant visited two branches of Branch, Banking & Trust (“BB&T”) in Howard County and, in each instance, attempted to use a false identity to open a bank account. At both branches, he presented a Florida driver’s license bearing the name “Christopher J. Pitera.” Appellant first called at the Elkridge office of the bank. There an employee became suspicious because the face of the license presented by appellant did not match the sample Florida driver’s license displayed in the bank’s identification guide. Relying on this discrepancy, a bank officer told appellant that he could not open an account.
Later that day, appellant appeared at a second BB&T branch, in Columbia, and again attempted to open an account. The Columbia branch had been alerted to the earlier attempt to open an account using the purported Florida driver’s license as identification. As a result of the bank officer’s suspicion, police were contacted. Further investigation revealed that appellant opened an account under another identity, “James P. Nicholas,” about two months earlier.
*205 After speaking with staff at the bank, police placed appellant under arrest for “providing fraudulent information to obtain goods and services.” A search of appellant incident to his arrest revealed the following: (1) a CitiBank Mastercard, bearing the name “Christopher Pitera”; (2) a check registry bearing the names “Christopher Pitera” and “James Nicholas”, with account numbers; (3) a photograph of appellant; (4) a piece of paper on which was written “C. J. Pitera” and an address in Howard County; (5) a BG & E bill; and (6) a credit report relating to “Christopher Pitera.” In the continuing investigation, police were never able to locate persons named either “Christopher Pitera” or “James Nicholas.” 1
On March 20, 2003, appellant was charged with two counts of obtaining personal identifying information without consent, and two counts of assuming the identity of another. A one day jury trial commenced on May 16, 2005. At the close of the evidence, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal on all charges, arguing the issues that are now presented to this Court. The circuit court granted appellant’s motion as to the two counts of obtaining personal identifying information without consent, but denied the motion as to the two counts of assuming the identity of another. The remaining counts were submitted to the jury, resulting in guilty verdicts, as we have noted.
Additional facts will be set forth below as they become necessary to our discussion of the issues.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the circuit court wrongfully denied his motion for acquittal on the two counts of assuming the identity of another. He contends that the State “failed to prove that James P. Nicholas and Christopher J. Pitera were people that [sic] actually exist.” Therefore, appellant contends, the State failed to satisfy the elements of the crime as set forth in Md.Code, Crim. Law
Because the issue of sufficiency turns on the definition of “another”, we shall first address the circuit court’s interpretation of
Statutory Construction
The circuit court’s construction of the meaning of the statutory language is a question of law, which we review
de novo.
See
Davis v. Slater,
383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78 (2004). Because we can find no prior authority addressing the meaning of “another” in
As this Court recently explained in a similar situation,
[w]e must construe . . . [C.L. § 7-205] to discern the actual intent of the legislature in enacting it. See Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443-44, 903 A.2d 388 (2006). We discern the legislature’s intent by application of the usual rules of statutory construction. See id. Those rules require first and foremost an examination of the language of the statute itself, and, absent an ambiguity in the statutory text, we ‘will neither look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent nor add to or delete words from *207 the statute/ ” Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 182, 887 A.2d 1078 (2005). That is to say, “ ‘[w]here the words of [the] statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning,” the Court will give effect to the statute as the language is written/ ” Id. at 184, 887 A.2d 1078 (quoting Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557 (2003).
Allen v. State, 171 Md.App. 544, 549, 911 A.2d 453 (2006).
Appellant first argues that
We begin by examining the plain language of the statute. Id. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not search further. Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 341, 914 A.2d 25 (2006). If the language does not clearly convey the legislature’s intent, we may look to legislative history, or other sources, for evidence of legislative intent. Id.
Appellant’s argument is constructed by reference to the use of “individual” in
In contrast to appellant’s interpretation of the statute, the State argues that
Under appellant’s interpretation, the use of an identity other than one’s own “(1) to avoid identification, apprehension, or prosecution for a crime; or (2) with fraudulent intent to: (i) get a benefit, credit, good, service, or other thing of value; or (ii) avoid the payment or debt or other legal obligation” is proscribed only when the State can prove that the appropriated identity is that of an actual person. We do not find support for that conclusion in our literal reading of the statute. To apply appellant’s reasoning would reach the illogical result that a perpetrator need only assume a clearly fictitious identity to escape prosecution.
Appellant has called our attention to several cases of our sister states to support his statutory construction argument. Because we find no ambiguity in
Legislative History
While our conclusion that
In his review of legislative history, appellant relies on testimony of several victims of identity theft before the House Judiciary Committee. He further cites the following excerpt from the Bill Analysis accompanying then House Bill No. 334:
This bill makes it a misdemeanor for a person to knowingly and willfully obtain, attempt to obtain, or aid another person in obtaining or attempting to obtain personal identifying *209 information of an individual, without the authorization of that individual, and sell, transfer, or use that information to obtain, attempt to obtain credit, goods, or services in the name of the individual without the consent of that individual.
Finally, appellant quotes language from a report of the Committee stating that the bill “is the result of an effort involving various government agencies and citizens focused on creating a clear and concise law that will protect the people of Maryland.”
The committee testimony and bill analysis cited by appellant do not address the use of false identities for fraudulent purposes; rather, the cited sources relate only to the legislative purpose in the enactment of subsection (b), which was plainly written to protect citizens from identity theft.
That protection would be thwarted if the State, in a prosecution under subsection (c), is required to prove that the identities used for fraudulent pursuits are those of actual, living people. We do not believe that the legislature intended, or that the statute mandates, that the State, to successfully prosecute appellant, was required to exhaust every database, or produce every person whose name is “Christopher J. Pitera” or “James P. Nicholas.” We agree with the State’s assertion that “the harm of identity theft is [not only] to the individuals whose identity has been appropriated, but also to the individuals and institutions who are victimized by the ensuing fraudulent use of assumed identities.”
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In light of our interpretation of
The State presented evidence that appellant twice attempted to use an identity that was not his own to open bank accounts.
2
Further, the State presented testimonial and documentary evidence that appellant had previously opened an account with BB&T under yet another fictitious identity. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational fact-finder could find each element of
Because we find no error in the circuit court’s interpretation of the statute, and we find the evidence sufficient to support the guilty verdict, we affirm appellant’s convictions.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.