125 Ind. 94 | Ind. | 1890
— In May, 1882, William H. Schooley became a member of Hoke Lodge, Ho. 177, Knights of Honor. A beneficiary certificate for $2,000 was issued to him by the supreme lodge payable to his wife, Ida M. Schooley, at his death. William H. Schooley died October 31st, 1886. Ida M. Schooley, the wife and beneficiary named in the certificate, brought suit in the Clark Circuit Court against the Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor to recover the fund, $2,000. The supreme lodge appeared by attorney and alleged that Edward G. Isgrigg, Ida M. Schooley and David Eodman were each claiming the fund, and asked an order that said lodge be permitted to pay said fund into court and that said parties be required to litigate between themselves and determine their rights to the fund, and that said lodge upon the payment of the fund into court be discharged. An order was accordingly made and the supreme lodge paid the money into court and was discharged. Eodman disclaimed any interest in the fund, and- the said Edward G. Isgrigg filed a cross-complaint claiming the right to the funds as executor of the last will of said William H. Schooley, deceased. The cross-complaint of Isgrigg alleges the death of William H. Schooley, and that the said Isgrigg was duly appointed as executor of his last will and testament; the issuing of the certificate in which his wife, Ida M., was named as beneficiary; that by the by-laws of the order the beneficiary could be changed by the member and another substituted ; that more than two years prior to the death of William H. Schooley, his wife, Ida M., abandoned him and
It is the general rule that a member of a benefit society, holding a certificate of insurance, and desiring to change the beneficiary named therein, must make an application and procure the change in accordance with the by-laws of the society providing the manner in which such change may be made.
In the case of Holland v. Taylor, 111 Ind. 121, it is held that a person who becomes a member of a mutual benefit association is bound to take notice of the by-laws, and that the by-laws become a part of the contract, the same as if written in the certificate, and that the beneficiary named in such certificate, providing for a change of the beneficiary, does not, during the life of the member, have an indefeasible right in the contract or fund, but such beneficiary has an interest which can only be defeated by a change effected in the manner provided by the by-laws, and such is the universal doctrine held by this court and courts in general. But there are exceptions to this general doctrine. Equity will aid imperfect changes of beneficiaries, and it considers that done which ought to have been done, and never requires impossibilities.
The facts as pleaded in each paragraph of the cross-complaint show that by the terms of the certificate and the bylaws of the association the member had the right to change the beneficiary named in the certificate, by making application to the local lodge of which he was a member, and sur
The benefit society, the Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honor, has paid the money into court; it makes no question as to its liability to pay the money due on the certificate, and the question presented is as to rights of Ida M. Schooley, the beneficiary named in the original certificate, and Edward G. Isgrigg, the person named in the application of the member, ¥m. H. Schooley, in his application and demand for a change of beneficiaries.
When the certificate was issued there was vested in William H. Schooley, the member whose life was insured, by
“ It is claimed by counsel that the law must give it to
Equity will consider that done which ought to have been done.
“ For the purpose of determining the rights between these defendants, the proceeding is governed by equitable principles. The fund is held in trust by the order for the person to whom it belongs; and it is true in this, as in every other case, equity follows the law, so far as the law goes in securing the rights of the parties, and no further; and, when the law stops short of securing this object, equity continues the remedy until complete justice is done. In other words, equity is the perfection of the law, and is always open to those who have just rights to enforce where the law is inadequate. Any other conclusion would show our system of jurisprudence
What we have quoted is decisive of the question in this case. The right of the assured to make a change in the bneficiary existed as soon as the certificate was issued; by the conditions in the by-laws a mode of making such change was prescribed, which it was the duty of the member to follow while it was within his power to do so, but whenever a state of circumstances existed which deprived him of the power of formally complying with them, then he was relieved of a literal compliance with the rules governing the change, but was not divested of the right to make a change. The by-laws having provided a mode of making a change, while it was within his power to comply with the by-laws he could not make the change in some other way. The bylaw providing thak the change should be made by application to the o^-der, he could not omit to make an application to the order and make the change by will. And so it has been held by this court. Holland v. Taylor, supra. But having done all that he could toward complying with the by-laws in making the change, and having been prevented from a formal compliance by the appellee, she can not now set up her own wrongful act to prevent a recovery for the benefit of the new beneficiary.
The facts stated in each paragraph of the cross-complaint show such a compliance with the by-laws in changing the beneficiary as entitles the new beneficiary, Edward G. Isgrigg, to recover the funds.
Some formal objection is made to these paragraphs for the reason that no copy of the certificate is filed with them, but they refer to a copy set out with appellee’s complaint, and this objection is not tenable. Wadkins v. Hill, 106 Ind. 543.
It follows from the conclusion we have reached that the
Judgment reversed, at costs of appellee, with instructions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.