Isassi v. StateIsassi v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Barajas
OPINION
RICHARD BARAJAS, Chief Justice.This is аn appeal from a conviction for the offense of possession of cocaine. The court assessed punishment at three (3) years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We affirm thе judgment of the trial court.
I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
On March 18, 1999, Officer Carlos Contreras of the El Paso Police Department and his partner stopped Appellant for a defective brake light. When Officer Contreras reached the driver’s side window, he nоticed “a clear plastic baggie” with a “white hard powdery substance” sitting on the center console in plain view. Believing the substance to be cocaine, Officer Contreras asked the Appellant to-step out of the vehicle, and he then retrieved the baggie. The substance field tested positive for cocaine, and the officers placed the Appellant under arrest. After searching the Appellant incident to his arrest, as wеll as his car, the officers found more cocaine.
At trial, William Todson, a criminalist with the Texas Department of Publiс Safety, testified that he conducted several tests on the substances. The substances once *809 again tested positive for cocaine. The total weight of the substances equaled 9.99 grams.
After the State rested, Appellаnt moved for a directed verdict. He argued that the State failed to carry its burden of proving the allegations in thе indictment because: (1) the State produced no evidence of any adulterants and dilutanls; and (2) the State failed to show that the controlled substance plus any adulterant and dilutant weighed more than four grams. The trial court denied the motion for directed verdict.
II. DISCUSSION
In his sole point of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not grаnting his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was no evidence, either factual or legal, of the еxistence of any adulterants or dilutants. We have previously noted the well-settled law that a challenge on appeal to the denial of a motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency, not the factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Noyola v. State, 25 S.W.3d 18, 19 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.); see also Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Thus, in reviewing thе legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, we are constrained to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense as alleged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
Our role is not to ascertаin whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990); Dwyer v. State, 836 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref’d). We do not rеsolve any conflict in fact, weigh any evidence or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, and thus, the fact-finding results of a criminal jury trial are given great deference. Menchaca v. State, 901 S.W.2d 640, 651 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d); Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Leyva v. State, 840 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref’d); Bennett v. State, 831 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no pet.). Instead, our only duty is to determine if both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in thе fight most favorable to the verdict. Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 421-22. In so doing, we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the vеrdict. Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 843 (quoting Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1988)).
Appellant contends that because the State did not present evidence regarding the identity or the amount of the adulterants and dilutants, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict оr acquittal. We disagree.
A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly possesses a сontrolled substance fisted in Penalty Group 1.
See
According to Apрellant, the State was required to specifically identify the adulterants and dilutants. Additionally, Appellant asserts that thе State was required to prove the total weight of the adulterants and dilutants. Appellant relies on cases that have been superceded by statute.
1
Because of changes in statutory definitions in 1994, Appellant’s assertion nо longer has merit. Particularly, “adulterant or dilutant” is now defined to mean “any material that increases the bulk or quantity of a controlled substance, regardless of its effect on the chemical activity of the controlled substanсe.”
See
Having overruled Appellant’s sole point of error, we affirm the judgment оf the trial court.
Notes
. See Reeves v. State, 806 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Cawthon v. State, 849 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). These two cases and their progeny held that when adulterants and dilutants constitute a part of the weight utilized to increase punishment, the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the named illegal substance; (2) that the added remainder (adulterants and/or dilutants) has not af-fecled the сhemical activity of the named illegal substance; (3) that the remainder (adulterants and/or dilutants) was added to the named illegal substance with the intent to increase the bulk or quantity of the final product; and (4) the weight of the illegal substance, including any adulterants and/or dilutants. Cawthon, 849 S.W.2d at 348-49; Reeves, 806 S.W.2d at 542.