Case Information
*1 Before H AMILTON S CUDDER , and K IRSCH , Circuit Judges
. P ER C URIAM . August admit ted hospital where su ered stroke and eventually passed away. Her daughter, Isabella Nartey, sued ‐ hospital, alleging its treatment comply with fed ‐ eral and state law. dismissed the but allowed Nartey days to fi le amended one. Nartey missed the deadline, leading the to enter judg ‐ ment against her. failed to le a formal notice of ap peal within the initial limit prescribed Federal Rule Appellate Procedure 4, causing us question our jurisdiction hear appeal. But we can still reach merits Nar tey’s arguments she gave su ffi cient notice her in tent other post lings. end, though, we agree failed state claim, and so we a ffi rm dismissal her complaint.
I
A During afternoon August paramedics rushed Millicent hospital complained being unable support her weight. She arrived at Francis can Health Olympia Fields, designated acute stroke ready hospital, husband and children, including daughter Isabella Nartey. Finding Millicent at risk stroke, hospital transferred its intensive care unit.
Three later, Millicent su ered stroke. Her condition deteriorated quickly, was put life support. Over next few days, family expressed concern about ad equacy care Franciscan sought transfer facility. Franciscan assisted submi trans fer paperwork two other hospitals. both declined requests insurance reasons. On August while third transfer request pending, advised family that brain dead and that hospital had de ‐ cided stop treatment and cancel outstanding transfer request.
Nearly two years later, Nartey reviewed mother’s medical records from Franciscan. She claimed records lacked transfer paperwork and some test results, includ ‐ MRI and CT scan. On August Nartey, acting pro se sued hospital alleging numerous claims state federal law.
The court grouped Nartey’s count amended complaint into three overarching claims. First, Nartey alleged that Franciscan violated federal Emergency Medical Treatment Active Labor Act (often shorthanded as EMTALA) failing provide adequate care mother, or alternatively transfer hospital. U.S.C. § 1395dd. Second, contended Franciscan violated Title VI Civil Rights Act, prohibits fed erally funded programs from discriminating basis race, color, national origin. U.S.C. § 2000d. Third, alleged fraudulently concealed test re sults, preventing bringing medical mal practice claim.
B
The court granted Franciscan’s dismiss each claims. The determined Nartey’s own factual allegations, even if accepted true, did es tablish violation EMTALA. Nor, added, assert anything more than conclu sory allegations discrimination. de termined fraudulent concealment claim rooted ‐ itself allegations of medical malpractice. Nar tey failed to adhere to an Illinois law requires a plainti ff to support medical malpractice claims a ffi davit af fi rming consultation a medical expert, district court dismissed claim. See ILCS 5/2 622(a). dismissing Nartey’s complaint, district a ff orded days fi le a second amended complaint.
On last day do so, sought permission add new parties, but failed only a ach a proposed amended pleading naming them, but fi le a notice of presentment required by Local Rule 5.3(b). The denied motion for these procedural failings entered fi nal judgment against her. ensuing post judgment fi lings were model
of clarity, but for now we need note only denying Rule 59(e) 60(b) motions, granted extension time within appeal, dead line complied with.
II
Before turning merits appeal, we pause (as we must) address our appellate jurisdiction. question arises against backdrop extension appeal orded court.
Most civil litigants ha ve days from entry judg ment fi le notice court. U.S.C. § 2107(a); F ED . R. A PP . P. 4(a)(1)(A). This period automati cally extended upon ling rst post certain rules, including Federal Rule Civil Procedure 59(e). F ED . R. A PP . P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)–(v). know Bowles Russell ‐ 3342 5 “timely fi ling of a notice of appeal a civil is a jurisdic tional requirement.” U.S. 205, (2007).
After the entered fi nal judgment dismiss ing on August 29, 2019, fi led timely Rule 59(e) motion on September 7. denied motion on September 13, leaving Nartey until October appeal both the fi nal judgment the denial Rule 59(e) motion.
On September 25, Nartey fi led second post judgment motion, this time under Rule 60(b). But Rule 59(e) motion had already extended appellate deadline, Rule 60(b) motion provide automatic exten sion. Armstrong Louden 2016) (“Successive post judgment motions do allow an e ective extension time appeal.”). What this means here deadline appeal court’s fi nal remained October 14.
On November requested more time appeal, explaining remained process trying retain new counsel was unfamiliar rules se time appeal. This was Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(i), allows party seek such extension “no later than days prescribed this Rule 4(a) expires.” Again, Rule 4(a) deadline here, was October less than prior November ling. Out “an abundance caution”—presumably, regarding whether extension was needed—the granted day extension November 22. led notice last day extension, November 22. whether grant extension itself correct, gives us pause. 19 3342
We review district court’s decision extend time appeal for an abuse discretion. See Mayle v. Illinois , F.3d (7th Cir. 2020). A district court may exercise its dis cretion extend appellate deadline only upon litigant’s demonstrating good cause or excusable neglect. See U.S.C. § 2107(c); see also F ED . R. A PP . P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). district court found need for more as sought retain new counsel amounted good cause.
We acknowledge our case law in this area is messy. Compare Mayle , F.3d Nestorovic Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. Greater Chicago , F.3d But two broader interrelated observations seem unobjectionable. First, district courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether litigant’s explanation missing deadline amounts “good cause” or “excusable neglect.” , e.g. , Mayle , F.3d at (“The judge not have abused his discretion if he had denied extension, but he not abuse his discretion granting it.”). Second, review, our role micromanage exercises discretion area. Nestorovic at 431–32 (explaining we will only nd abuse discretion “when record contains no evidence on [the court] could rationally based its decision or when decision rests erroneous view law”). are sure see future appeals presenting hard questions outer bounds what constitutes good cause excusable ne glect. today’s does require any such di ffi cult line
drawing post judgme nt statements l ings provided enough notice intent satisfy our jurisdictional inquiry.
Conduct that evinces litigant’s intent to appeal, includ ‐ ing other motions fi led within the allo ed for an appeal, can serve as proper notice. Owens Godinez 434, signaled her ultimate wish to appeal multiple times, including in statements she made in open where she clearly expressed her intention appeal and her desire that her remain closed. So, too, in her Rule 60(b) motion fi led September say that “understands has days from this Honorable Court’s September order appeal any part of fi nal judgment .” motion also requested relief the denial Rule 59(e) motion, signaling her intent appeal that rul ‐ addition the fi nal judgment. these circumstances, and mindful Nartey’s status as pro se litigant, was enough—her appeal was timely. jurisdiction review court’s de
nial Nartey’s Rule 60(b) motion. Nartey’s November re quest extension le appeal signaled speci fi c tent appeal court’s denial Rule 60(b) and led within court’s judgment dis missing Rule 60(b) motion. This amounts adequate no tice Owens allows us hear well.
III
Turning appeal’s merits, we follow court’s grouping claims. Beginning EMTALA claims, we agree operative complaint alleges no facts establish violation statute. To contrary, acknowledges met Act’s screening requirement examining mother de termining emergency condition existed. U.S.C. *8 8 19 3342 § 1395dd(a). At point, Act required that Franciscan ei ther provide further treatment transfer Nartey’s mother accordance certain parameters. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1). Franciscan met its obligation choosing former—admit ting mother into ICU. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i). Indeed, Act discourages transferring patients instead providing treatment. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A)–(B); see Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp. Marion Cnty., Ind. , 703 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 2012). is dissatis ed quality scope
treatment mother received Franciscan, but EMTALA is malpractice statute covering treatment emergency patient screened admi tt ed. therefore join chorus circuits concluded EMTALA cannot be used challenge quality medical care. See, e.g. , Smith v. Crisp Reg’l Hosp., Inc. , 985 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2021); Williams v. Dimensions Health Corp. , 952 F.3d 531, 538 (4th Cir. 2020); Torre i v. Main Line Hosps., Inc. , F.3d 168, (3d Cir. 2009); Hunt ex rel. Hunt v. Lincoln Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. , F.3d (8th Cir. 2003); St. An thony Hosp. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. , F.3d (10th Cir. 2002); Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W. , F.3d , Cir. 2002); Hardy N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp. 792–93 (2d
Nor Franciscan’s inability transfer mother violate Title VI. While presents some statistical evi dence hospital transfers are less common among racial minorities, own establishes Franciscan responsible remaining there. sisted requesting transfers, but receiving hospi tals denied those requests. And even if state law were relevant 3342 9 to alleged Title VI violation, is mistaken Illinois law required Franciscan to transfer to a specialized facility. As the EMTALA, Illinois law provides hospitals option admi tt ing patient for appropriate care transferring patient facility. See ILCS 50/3.117(b)(3)(B), (b)(3)(H).
Finally, properly dismissed fraud claims for failing allege necessary elements fraudulent concealment. To be sure, erred in dismissing claims for failing a tt ach a ffi davit from a medical professional required under Illinois medi cal malpractice law. See ILCS 5/2 622(a)(1); see also McDonald v. Lipov , N.E.3d (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). We instructed courts not dismiss a complaint pleading stage for failing a tt ach a 5/2 a ffi davit. See Young v. United States , 2019) . More it, not type requirement apply: sought damages for concealment test results, not for medical malpractice.
But also dismissed these counts Nar tey’s they not state a fraudulent con cealment claim. agree. Fraudulent concealment occurs when defendant intentionally induces false belief through concealment material fact while duty speak. Abazari Rosalind Franklin Univ. Med. & Sci. N.E.3d (Ill. App. Ct. For concealment be fraudulent, it must be discoverable through reasona ble inquiry. id. alleged intended hide certain test results omi them mother’s records so could uncover alleged malpractice. pleadings established knew look certain test results her mother’s records doctors who ran tests told her about them. short, reasonable inquiry have discovered alleged concealment. challenges court’s refusal allow again amend complaint before or after it entered judgment. She passes over fact dis missed “corrected” amended (her third plead ing) without prejudice, allowing le amended complaint. It entered only failed amend, explain why could comply deadline comply local rules regarding pre sentment motions. Such e orts accommodation do show abused its discretion denying motion. Hinterberger City Indianapolis considered other arguments deter mined they lack merit.
AFFIRMED
[*] agreed decide without oral argument briefs record adequately present facts and legal arguments, oral argument significantly aid court. F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).