J.C., Plaintiff, -v.- ROBERT ALLEN ZIMMERMAN, AKA BOB DYLAN, Defendant-Appellee, -v.- DANIEL W. ISAACS, PETER J. GLEASON, Respondents-Appellants.
No. 23-7492
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August 13, 2025
August Term 2024 (Argued: November 25, 2024)
Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, CALABRESI, and MERRIAM, Circuit Judges.
23-7492
Isaacs v. Zimmerman
* The Clerk is respectfully instructed to amend the caption as set forth above.
FOR RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS: NATHANIEL B. SMITH, Law Office of Nathaniel B. Smith, New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: BRIAN ASCHER (Orin Snyder, Jeremy Bunting, Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Carolyn Ye on the brief), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York, NY.
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge:
The question in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing modest monetary sanctions pursuant to
BACKGROUND
In August 2021, plaintiff J.C. filed a complaint in state court alleging that defendant Robert Allen Zimmerman (AKA Bob Dylan) “sexually abused” her for a six-week period “between April and May of 1965” when she was 12 years old.1 J. App‘x at 16–28. She was represented by respondents-appellants Daniel W. Isaacs and Peter J. Gleason. J.C. specifically alleged that Zimmerman “befriended and established an emotional connection with [her] to lower her inhibitions with the object of sexually abusing her, which he did, coupled with the provision of drugs, alcohol[,] and[] threats of physical violence.” J. App‘x at 17. J.C. filed an amended complaint on December 27, 2021, which modified the period of alleged abuse to “the spring of 1965.” J. App‘x at 32. Zimmerman, represented by Orin Snyder, as well as other attorneys from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, removed the case to federal court.
On March 18, 2022, the district court held a preliminary conference and adopted the parties’ proposed
Zimmerman served his first request for production of documents (“RFPDs“) and interrogatories on March 18, 2022—the same day the district court entered its scheduling order. One month later, on April 17, 2022—the deadline for J.C.‘s responses to the RFPDs and interrogatories under
Construing Isaacs’ response as a motion for an extension of time, the district court granted that motion on May 24, 2022, and issued an order (the “May 24 Order“) providing:
The Court is in receipt of Defendant‘s May 16, 2022 letter and Plaintiff‘s . . . responsive letter. Plaintiff shall serve her responses on or before May 30, 2022. More broadly, Plaintiff is cautioned that future failures to meet the discovery deadlines set forth in the parties’ case management plan or this Court‘s rules of individual practice will not be tolerated.
Id. at 88 (emphasis in original).
II. Second Missed Deadline and June 2 Order
On May 30, Isaacs served responses and objections to Zimmerman‘s first set of interrogatories but failed to respond to Zimmerman‘s RFPDs, which were by then six weeks past due. The next day, Zimmerman requested a conference with the district court to address J.C.‘s continued failure to meet her discovery obligations. Isaacs finally provided responses to the RFPDs on the following day, June 1, at which point Zimmerman sent a letter to the district court withdrawing his request for a conference.2
On June 2, 2022, the district court issued an order (the “June 2 Order“) stating:
The Court is in receipt of Defendant‘s June 1, 2022, and May 31, 2022 letters which follow Defendant‘s May 16, 2022 letter raising similar issues related to Plaintiff‘s noncompliance with the discovery deadlines in this case. The Court has previously warned Plaintiff that failure to abide by the discovery deadlines will not be tolerated. The Court expects that Plaintiff will heed that warning and meet her obligations in this case without
Court intervention. If, however, Plaintiff continues to neglect her responsibilities in this case, the Court will take appropriate action at that time.
Id. at 92 (internal citations omitted).
III. Third Missed Deadline and July 15 Order
Two weeks later, on June 16, the parties agreed that J.C.‘s document production would be “substantial[ly] complet[ed]” by June 30, 2022—“some ten months after the [c]omplaint was first filed,” and well over three months after the service of Zimmerman‘s initial set of RFPDs. Id. at 94. When that date arrived, however, Isaacs produced, according to a letter motion filed by Zimmerman, only “a paltry 49 pages of documents” that omitted “material documents” Zimmerman‘s counsel knew to exist based on the third-party discovery that counsel had undertaken. Id. For example, “[J.C.] did not produce a single email or text to or from anyone,” despite the fact that Zimmerman was “aware of many responsive and relevant email communications [J.C.] has exchanged with at least six individuals related to her claims, many of which cast doubt on the veracity of her claims.” Id. These email exchanges were directly responsive to a request in the first set of RFPDs for “[a]ny and all written communications (including, but not limited to, e-mails, letters, voicemails, and text messages) between Plaintiff and anyone . . . related to Plaintiff‘s claims in this matter . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original).
On July 1, 2022, Zimmerman‘s counsel wrote to the court once again seeking judicial intervention. Defense counsel expressed concern regarding “the adequacy of [Isaacs and Gleason‘s] pre-suit investigation” and expressly noted that J.C.‘s production was “far from complete and omits material documents we know exist.” Id. at 94. Isaacs filed a responsive letter in which he represented that Gleason had “conduct[ed] multiple interviews” of J.C., and “review[ed] her documents.” Id. at 97. Isaacs confirmed that he himself had “independently reviewed these materials.” Id. Isaacs added, inter alia, that he and Gleason were “continu[ing] to diligently search for additional documents responsive to [Zimmerman‘s] production demand” and noted that “discovery is an ongoing process.” Id. at 98. The district court ordered the parties to appear for a telephonic conference on July 15.
At the conference, the district court asked Isaacs whether “there [are] now [any responsive] texts or emails in [J.C.‘s] possession, custody, or control.” Id. at 102. In response, Isaacs admitted that J.C. had produced several more responsive texts and/or emails to him in the last few days. He represented that “once I give [defense counsel] these last few text messages, which I just received, we have nothing other, at this point, to provide.” Id. at 103. He also confirmed that it was the July 1 letter from Zimmerman that (as the court put it) “clued [Isaacs and Gleason] into the fact that [J.C.] may have responsive texts or emails,” reiterating that J.C. had “some texts, a couple of emails, but not much,” and that he would “send them.” Id. at 105.
Zimmerman‘s counsel, Snyder, then represented that he was aware of “dozens” of responsive emails “directly relevant to this case” which he had received from third parties, “including . . . the plaintiff‘s relatives.” Id. at 107. Snyder argued that Isaacs’ claim that he was unaware that any responsive emails existed was implausible, given that the third-party emails in Snyder‘s possession had been produced to Isaacs “weeks ago” in accordance with the rules for third-party production. Id. at 118. In fact, at a deposition on the preceding day (which Isaacs attended) defense counsel had offered many of these emails into
The court expressed concern that Isaacs was “not pushing back enough with [his] client” and noted that it “[did not] think it[] [was] Mr. Snyder and his team‘s job to identify . . . what you and your client should already know to produce.” Id. at 115. It further noted:
[A]t some point, I actually have to abide by the written warnings that I give, and so I‘ve tried, as hard as I can, to give you latitude and space to work out these discovery issues, but at some point, I‘m just going to come to believe that you are not abiding by my orders or that your client is incapable of providing truthful responses to discovery issues. And that will be a problem, and you have to know that that‘s the case.
I don‘t know how to tell you that there is a line that you‘re about to cross, but I am saying – and I think this is something I‘m comfortable saying right now – if it turns out that you start producing things after the 22nd of July, or you start producing things beyond the 15th of August, I absolutely am going to entertain sanctions motions because I think it‘s ridiculous.
Id. at 117. Although defense counsel moved for sanctions; the court ultimately “deferr[ed]” its decision, noting:
I‘m not going to do it today. I have every reason to believe, although I really hope to be proven wrong, that sometime around the 23rd of July or the 11th of August or the 6th of August, [] defense counsel is going to believe either that there are things that have not been produced, and therefore that sanctions are warranted, or that so much has been produced that should have been produced before today‘s date, that sanctions are warranted. So I have every expectation that there‘s a sanctions motion in the offing. I would just like to have one and not two.
Id. at 121. It ended the conference with an explicit warning:
I don‘t know, Mr. Isaacs, how to tell you more strongly and more honestly that I am disappointed and dissatisfied with the productions that have been made and with your and your client‘s conduct in discovery. I leave it at that. You‘ve had every warning. You‘ve had it oral, you‘ve had it written, you don‘t need me to repeat it again. For the love of God, produce these materials because you understand the consequences if you don‘t.
Id. at 122.
After the conference, the district court ordered:
- That Plaintiff will produce all documents responsive to Defendant‘s First Set of Requests for Production on or before July 22, 2022;
- That Plaintiff will respond to Defendant‘s Second Set of Requests for Production on or before August 10, 2022; and
- That Plaintiff will produce all documents responsive to Defendant‘s Second Set of Requests for Production on or before August 15, 2022.
Id. at 123 (the “July 15 Order“).
IV. Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice
On July 19, 2022—four days later, and only three days before all documents responsive to Zimmerman‘s initial set of RFPDs were required to be produced—Isaacs informed the court that he and Gleason had been “discharged by [J.C.] as her attorneys.” Id. at 124. The court
Following this explanation, the district court reminded Isaacs and Gleason that “the real issue” was the discovery deadlines “that weren‘t complied with.” Id. at 144. The court made clear that “it‘s not as though the slate is wiped clean and we start again. New counsel succeeds to the state of the case that we are in now.” Id. at 159–60. After an exchange with Snyder, the court noted that it was “waiting” on “the issue of sanctions,” and that “[r]ight now, before me, [J.C. is] still [Isaacs and Gleason‘s] client.” Id. at 159. The court permitted a recess for Isaacs and Gleason to consult with J.C., who was present in the courtroom, after which Isaacs advised the court that J.C. sought to withdraw her complaint with prejudice. After confirming with J.C. herself that she desired to discontinue her action with prejudice, the district court ordered that the case be dismissed and gave defense counsel a week to bring any motion for sanctions.
V. Sanctions
Zimmerman subsequently filed a motion seeking sanctions in the amount of $50,000 against Isaacs and Gleason (but not against J.C. herself). The district court granted in part Zimmerman‘s request for sanctions under
The district court expressly declined to predicate sanctions on the July 15 Order because, drawing all permissible inferences
Applying the factors we identified in Agiwal as potentially useful in evaluating a district court‘s exercise of discretion under
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Isaacs and Gleason argue that the district court (1) abused its discretion by imposing
I. Imposition of Rule 37 Sanctions
The crux of Isaacs and Gleason‘s first argument is that the district court (1) did not premise the sanctions on a clearly articulated order requiring specified discovery; and (2) improperly concluded that the Agiwal factors all weighed in favor of imposing sanctions. We disagree.
We review a district court‘s imposition of sanctions pursuant to
In doing so, we must remain “mindful of the Supreme Court‘s repeated admonition that this standard of review means what it says: that ‘[t]he question, of course, is not whether [we] would as an original matter have [applied the sanction]; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.‘” S. New England Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Nat‘l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per curiam)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or renders a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Yukos Cap. S.A.R.L., 977 F.3d at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have previously outlined several factors—the so-called Agiwal factors—that are potentially “‘useful [when] evaluating a district court‘s exercise of discretion’ to impose [Rule 37] sanctions . . . , including ‘(1) the willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period of noncompliance[;] and (4) whether the non-compliant party had been warned of the consequences of noncompliance.‘” Id. (quoting Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302). These factors “are not exclusive, and they need not each be resolved against the party challenging the district court‘s sanctions for us to conclude that those sanctions were within the court‘s discretion.” Kyros, 78 F.4th at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Isaacs and Gleason first argue that they “did not violate any discovery order.” Appellant‘s Br. at 19 (emphasis added) (capitalization omitted). Not so. The district court‘s May 24 Order explicitly directed Isaacs and Gleason to “serve [J.C.‘s] responses [to Zimmerman‘s interrogatories and RFPDs] on or before May 30, 2022.” J. App‘x at 88. It also warned that “future failures to meet the discovery deadlines set forth in the parties’ case management plan or this Court‘s rules . . . will not be tolerated.” Id. Yet, Isaacs and Gleason admit that they “[did] not serve[]” “responses to the document demands . . . [on] May 30,” and instead produced responses
Isaacs and Gleason next argue that even if they were one day late in serving responses, that delay alone does not justify the imposition of
Here, straws abound, as the record is replete with instances of Isaacs and Gleason “fail[ing] to discharge their discovery obligations under the relevant law and [the district] [c]ourt‘s orders.” Special App‘x at 23. Prior to violating the court‘s May 24 Order, Isaacs and Gleason had already missed the original 30-day deadline to respond to Zimmerman‘s interrogatories and RFPDs pursuant to
The record also plainly supports the district court‘s conclusion that “the Agiwal factors support[] the . . . imposition of some sanction on [J.C.‘s] [a]ttorneys.” Id. at 23. The court made the following determinations:
[Isaacs and Gleason‘s] blasé attitude towards their discovery obligations (and to the Court‘s May 24 Order in particular) over a period of months, despite multiple directives from the Court, and despite multiple detailed explanations from defense counsel concerning what materials were missing, constitutes willfulness.
On the issue of the efficacy of lesser sanctions, it is of course the case that [J.C.‘s] withdrawal of the action with prejudice removes the option of terminal sanctions from the Court‘s consideration. That said, the monetary sanction the Court proposes [of $5,000 and $3,000 respectively] is but a fraction of the fees and expenses incurred by [Zimmerman], [and] is at the less severe end of the sanction spectrum. See Thani v. Hanke, No. 20-cv-4765, 2023 WL 5744288, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2023) (discussing the appropriateness of monetary sanctions, described as “the mildest of sanctions” (citations omitted)).
As for the remaining factors, the procedural history of this case makes clear that [Isaacs and Gleason‘s] noncompliance with the Court‘s orders persisted over a period of weeks, if not months, in the face of numerous warnings from the Court. (See, e.g., [Dist. Ct.] Dkt. #27 at 2 (“Plaintiff is cautioned that future failures to meet the discovery deadlines set forth in the parties’ case management plan or this Court‘s rules of individual practice will not be tolerated.“); [Dist. Ct.] Dkt. #30 at 2 (“If, however, Plaintiff
continues to neglect her responsibilities in this case, the Court will take appropriate action at that time.“)). All of the Agiwal factors, therefore, counsel in favor of sanctions.
Special App‘x at 23–24.
We see no error in the district court‘s reasoning. While the court acknowledged that it could not fault Isaacs and Gleason for their failure to produce documents outside of their control, it also noted that it “consider[ed] the run-up and content of the July 15 conference in making . . . findings under the Agiwal factors.” Id. at 22 n.10. It did not err in determining that the record evinced a “blasé attitude” towards counsels’ obligations to produce responses and documents on a timely basis and in accordance with agreed upon discovery deadlines. Id. at 23. It is particularly telling that Isaacs and Gleason only became aware that J.C. was in possession of responsive documents after Zimmerman informed the district court of the likely existence of such documents, based on evidence that defense counsel had obtained through third-party subpoenas. Had Zimmerman‘s counsel not sought this third-party discovery, it is probable that responsive communications in J.C.‘s possession might never have come to light. And all of this transpired despite the district court‘s repeated, emphatic warnings that “future failures to meet the discovery deadlines . . . will not be tolerated.” J. App‘x at 88; see also id. at 92 (warning that the court “will take appropriate action” if “[p]laintiff continues to neglect her responsibilities in this case“); id. at 122 (“You‘ve had every warning. You‘ve had it oral, you‘ve had it written, you don‘t need me to repeat it again.“). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
II. Apportionment
Nor did the district court err in its apportionment of fault. “We have frequently asked the district courts, in imposing sanctions, to make careful apportionment of the costs among the responsible parties.” In re Yellen & Herstic, 804 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1986). Here, the court ultimately imposed a $5,000 sanction against Isaacs and a $3,000 sanction against Gleason after determining that:
[w]hile the bulk of the discovery component of the litigation was handled by Mr. Isaacs, Mr. Gleason was copied on the relevant correspondence, participated in the relevant conferences, and appeared in the litigation as co-counsel. There is no basis to refrain from sanctioning Mr. Gleason for his actions, or inaction, in this matter, although the amount of his sanction is less than that imposed on Mr. Isaacs because of the difference in first-chair responsibilities.
Special App‘x at 27–28 n.13. In sum, the district court considered the relative responsibilities of the two attorneys and apportioned sanctions accordingly. We see no abuse of discretion here.
III. Lack of Evidentiary Hearing
We also easily dispose of Isaacs and Gleason‘s argument regarding the lack of an evidentiary hearing prior to the imposition of sanctions. As we have said before, “a motion for sanctions does not automatically require an evidentiary hearing.” Rossbach v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 81 F.4th 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2023). Here, it is clear that Isaacs and Gleason failed to satisfy various discovery obligations and deadlines. See, e.g., J. App‘x at 87 (Isaacs admitting he “had promised to provide responses but failed to do so” due to various professional obligations as well as a trip to Ghana). While an evidentiary hearing may be desirable when further
IV. Unjustness of Sanctions
Isaacs and Gleason‘s final argument is that the imposition of sanctions is unjust in this case because they “did not personally violate the July 15 Order, did not counsel the violation of any court order, and took steps in good faith to secure compliance by their client of the July 15 Order.” Appellant‘s Br. at 38. Regardless of the veracity of these assertions, they are beside the point. The district court explicitly “decline[d] to predicate sanctions on the July 15 Order.” Special App‘x at 22 n.10. Instead, it determined that sanctions were warranted because, inter alia, counsel displayed a “blasé attitude towards their discovery obligations (and to the Court‘s May 24 Order in particular) over a period of months, despite multiple directives from the Court, and despite multiple detailed explanations from defense counsel concerning what materials were missing.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Thus, Isaacs and Gleason have failed to meet their burden of showing that the imposition of sanctions was unjust under the circumstances of this case. See Novak v. Wolpoff & Abramson LLP, 536 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he burden [is] on the disobedient party to avoid expenses by showing that his failure is justified or that special circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” (internal citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $5,000 sanction on Isaacs and a $3,000 sanction on Gleason for their failure to meet their discovery obligations in this case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court‘s decision to impose
Notes
Instead of or in addition to [such orders], the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney‘s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The district court further noted that, while it recognized its authority to impose sanctions under its “inherent power” or pursuant to