68 A. 23 | Md. | 1907
The appellants, as owners of the premises at the northwest corner of Baltimore and Hanover streets, in the city of Baltimore, filed a petition in the Baltimore City Court praying that the assessment of the improvements, made by the Appeal Tax Court for the year 1907, be rescinded. The petitioners allege that on November 22d 1906, the Appeal Tax Court assessed these improvements for the year 1907 at $180,000 and that said assessment was illegal for the reason that the improvements *481 were not completed on October 1st, 1906, in many important respects and especially as to the plastering and inside wood-work. They relied on Ordinance No. 170, passed in 1899, by which "The Appeal Tax Court is authorized and directed to have assessed, for taxable purposes, all new improvements finished on or before the first day of October of every year; the said improvements to be construed as finished, when plastering and inside wood-work are completed." Testimony was taken and after a hearing in the lower Court, an order was passed, as follows:
"The above entitled cause coming on to be heard, and testimony having been given upon behalf of each of the parties, and the cause having been submitted by counsel for the appellant and for the city, and it appearing to the Court that the property in question as shown by the evidence was so far completed on the first day of October, 1906, as to be liable to assessment, and was legally assessed for taxation in Baltimore City for the year 1907, but that the amount of such assessment was erroneous, it is thereupon,
Ordered by the Baltimore City Court this 15th day of April, 1907, that the assessment on the improvements upon the lot mentioned in the petition in this case be and the same is hereby reduced from the sum of $180,000, to the sum of $150,000."
The only exception in the record is thus stated: "To the passing of which order the petitioners excepted, and prayed the Court to sign and seal this bill of exceptions, which is accordingly done," etc.
The appellee made a motion to dismiss the appeal and assigned as reasons therefor: "(1) Because the case involves nothing more than a question of fact, and the Court of Appeals will not review the Baltimore City Court's finding upon a question of fact, and (2) even if the appeal did involve a question which the Court of Appeals could pass upon still such question could not be raised by an exception taken only to the order passed by the lower Court."
We held in Baltimore City v. Bonaparte,
There was undoubtedly a question of fact in this case to be determined by the lower Court, which this Court is not authorized to review — that is to say, whether the property was so far completed on the first day of October, 1906, as to be liable to assessment, but there was also a question of law involved, namely, whether under the ordinance referred to these improvements could be assessed for the year 1907, if the plastering and inside woodwork were substantially, but not enlirely completed. The difficulty is that the order appealed from does not specifically pass on the latter question, but simply reduces the assessment from $180,000 to $150,000. It is true that in the recital it is said "it appearing to the Court that the property in question as shown by the evidence was so far completed on the first day of October, 1906, as to be liable to assessment, and was legally assessed for taxation," etc., but that would require this Court to review that question of fact and does not distinctly present a question of law. We might differ with the Court below as to the fact, but under Bonaparte's case we could not review its finding. The proper way to present the question was to submit a prayer, or to have the order in such form as would properly present the question of law passed on.
In Skinner Dry Dock Co. v. Balto. City,
As the question argued is one of importance, and one in which the public is concerned, we will briefly state our conclusion on the merits of the case. We are of the opinion that *484 the ordinance must be construed to mean that new improvements are to be assessed when the plastering and inside wood-work are substantially completed by October 1st, and that this record shows they were in this instance. There was a formal opening of the building on November 1st, 1906 — two months before the period began for which the taxes were to be paid and on October 6th the appellants began the installation of the store fixtures, although the building was not then entirely completed. $150,000 (the amount fixed by the Court at which the property was to be assessed) had actually been expended by October 1st, and while there was still some work to be done on the plastering and inside woodwork on and after that date, it was not of a character to justify us in holding that it was not completed within the meaning of the ordinance. The principles applied in Skinner DryDock Co. v. Balto. City, supra, is applicable here, and if this appeal was properly before us we would not hesitate to affirm the action of the lower Court.
Appeal dismissed, the appellants to pay the costs.