183 P. 780 | Or. | 1919
Lead Opinion
“All expenses incurred and disbursements made by or under the direction of the district attorney, or the prosecutor appointed by the Governor, in obtaining or attempting to obtain evidence, or otherwise, in prosecuting violators of this act, shall be paid by the County Court of the county in which violation shall be alleged to have been committed, upon the voucher of said district attorney or prosecutor appointed by the Governor, out of the general fund of said county.”
The alleged services were performed at the instance and request of the district attorney and not by a prosecutor appointed by the Governor.
There was a general denial of the contract and the performance of services. The casé was tried without a jury by the court, which found for the defendant. Assuming, without deciding, that all expenses incurred by the district attorney should be paid by the County Court, the statute does not authorize the district attorney as the agent of the county to make a specific contract for such services or to define 'or specify the amount which the county shall pay, and in the absence of statutory provision the district attorney would not have the legal right to execute a contract which would be binding on the county. Section 937, L. O. L., enacted in 1862, provides that the County Court has the authority and powers pertaining to county commissioners to transact county business and that it shall have “the general care and management of the county property, funds and business where the law does not otherwise expressly provide.” Without
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
AeEIRMED.
Concurrence Opinion
Concurring in Result — I concur in the result reached b.y Mr. Justice JohNS.
It was not, it seems to me, the intention of the legislature to give the district attorney power, under this clause, to employ agents by the month to travel over the country in the ferreting out of possible offenders of this kind.
If the district attorney has this power it must also . belong to any of the special prosecutors appointed by the Governor, as the two are coupled together in the
It seems to me this construction should not be given to the act unless the language employed by the legislature is entirely plain and compelling. If the legislature had intended anything of this kind it would no doubt have plainly provided that the district attorney might appoint and employ other agents. Any such authority to involve the counties in liability by the wholesale ought not to be implied from any doubtful or uncertain words.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting. — This appeal is taken by the plaintiff. It involves the payment of expenses incurred in 1916 under the direction of the district attorney for that county in obtaining or attempting to obtain evidence of a violation of Chapter 141, Laws of 1915, relating ,to intoxicating liquors. The district attorney employed certain persons to act as detectives. They were to make an investigation knd endeavor to obtain such evidence. That officer duly certified to the claims for such expenses, and the same were presented to the County Court for that county and disallowed, whereupon an assignment of the claims was made to the plaintiff, and an action instituted to collect the amounts. As indicated in the brief on behalf of defendant, there is no dispute in regard to facts. The defendant contends that the claims are not legal claims against the county, principally for the reason that they were never authorized by the County Court. It is
It is also -asserted on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff failed to show that there had been violations of the prohibition law in Klamath County, or that the reg-ular officers of the county, and City of Klamath Falls refused or failed to assist the prosecutor in the enforcement of the law.
It seems that it is a sufficient answer to the contention made on behalf of the defendant that the very language- of the act, Section 25, plainly requires the County Court to pay such expenses “upon the voucher” of the district attorney or prosecutor, appointed by the Governor, out of the general fund of the county. That section, inter alia commands that:
“All expenses incurred and disbursements made by or under the direction of the District Attorney, or the prosecutor appointed by the Governor, in obtaining or attempting to obtain evidence, or otherwise, in prosecuting violators of this Act, shall be paid by the County Court of the county in which violation shall be alleged to have been committed, upon the voucher of said District Attorney or prosecutor appointed by the Governor, out of the general fund of said county.”
In other words, the statute is mandatory and the County Court under its terms, when such expenses have been incurred and properly certified to and vouched for by the district attorney or prosecutor, has no other recourse except to allow them to pay the same. It is urged on behalf of the county that the
“Where the claim is properly presented in the manner hereinbefore indicated, we think the County Court has no discretion to refuse to allow it. Section 6619, L. O. L., is mandatory. It provides that upon the presentation by the water-master of his claim, approved by the division superintendent and accompanied by the written demand of the water users, the County Court shall allow it. A claim so approved and accompanied with the demand, if the services were rendered upon the demand of the water users, is absolutely conclusive upon the County Court. If the services were rendered upon the order of the division superintendent, the claim, if approved by him, is likewise conclusive, and the court cannot go behind such approval. ’ ’
The same question was before this court again in Brewster v. Crook County, 81 Or. 435 (159 Pac. 1031), and the principle annunciated by Mr. Justice Eaicin was applied and the statute enforced. As to the act being a judicial one for the County Court instead of for the district attorney, a similar question was passed upon by this court in Evanhoff v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 78 Or. 503 (154 Pac. 106). In that case it was urged that the act in question conferred judicial and legislative functions upon the
“This identical question is passed upon adversely to plaintiff’s contention in Re Willow Greek, at pages 610, 611 of 74 Or. (144 Pac. 505, 146 Pac. 475), and that opinion and the authorities there cited are so conclusive as to render further discussion of the subject unnecessary.”
On page 516 of 78 Or. (on page 110 of 154 Pac.), the same learned jurist said after quoting Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution, as amended in 1911 (see Laws of 1911, page 7):
“It would appear that the power of the legislature or of the people to confer judicial powers upon any tribunal which it or they may select is, by the force of this amendment, practically an unlimited one so long as the different functions of government, executive, legislative and judicial are not so blended as to contravene Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution, which, as shown in the case last cited, is not the case here. ’ ’
We apprehend that the same rule of construction would be adopted in considering a státute enacted for the purpose of decreasing the use of whisky as a beverage, that would be applied to one passed to facilitate the use of water. Indeed, Section 937, L. O. L., providing that the County Court shall have authority and powers pertaining to county commissioners to transact county business, and that it shall have “the general care and management of the county property, funds, and business, where the law does not otherwise expressly provide” seems to contemplate that the legislature may at any time enact a law for the man
“Whenever a power is given by statute, everything necessary to make it effectual is implied. It is a well-established principle that statutes containing grants of power are to be construed so as to include the authority to do all things necessary to accomplish the object of the grant. The grant of an express power carries with it by necessary implication every other power necessary and proper to the execution of the power expressly granted: Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 508.”
As to the contention that the district attorney could only incur such expenses after an indictment was returned or a complaint filed and a prosecution was actually pending for a violation of the statute, a reading of the statute indicates that it contemplates that the investigation to be made, or the endeavor to obtain evidence of the violation of the law, is for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there has been an infraction of the statute; and if a breach of the law is detected that the evidence thus obtained will be used in the prosecution of the violator. While it may be true that the law-breakers would desire that no means be afforded for obtaining evidence of a violation , of the prohibition law before a criminal action was aetu
It seems to the writer that it was plainly the intent of the lawmakers not only to require a diligent investigation and enforcement of the prohibition law, but also to provide the means of defraying expenses thereby incurred by the prosecutor. The result of the efforts made under the direction of the district attorney and some of the prosecutions instituted are mentioned in the record. The reasonableness of the amount of the expenses incurred is not questioned in this proceeding. The facts are practically undisputed.
• Under the authority of the cases above cited heretofore presented to 1¡his court, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and judgment entered as prayed for in the complaint.