CITY OF IRONTON, OHIO v. BETH RIST
Case No. 10CA10
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
Released 10/25/10
2010-Ohio-5292
Harsha, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BETH RIST,
Defendant-Appellant.1
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Warren N. Morford, Jr., South Point, Ohio, for appellant.
R. Alan Lemons, MILLER, SEARL & FITCH, LPA, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
Harsha, J.
{1} Bеth Rist appeals the judgment of the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court that vacated an arbitration award against the City of Ironton. The arbitrator found that the City lacked just cause to discharge Rist from her position as a sergeant with the Ironton Police Department (“IPD“) after she falsified a report, so the arbitrator reinstated her without back pay. The City appealed, and the trial court vacated the arbitrator‘s award after the court concluded that Rist‘s reinstatement violated public policy.
{2} Initially, Rist complains that the trial court erred when it vacated the award without a transcript or unspecified exhibits from the arbitration proceedings. However, those portions of the record were not necessary for the trial court to resolve the City‘s public policy argument. Therefore, we reject this claim.
{3} Rist also contends that the trial court erred in various ways when it found that her reinstatement violated public policy. However, truthful reports from оfficers are
I. Facts
{4} Rist worked as a sergeant for the IPD until October 2008 when she was fired for making a false report. Rist filed a grievance under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA“) between the City and her union, the Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. Because the parties were unable to settle the grievance, they submitted it for binding arbitration in accordance with the CBA.
{5} The arbitrator found that in August 2008, Rist initiated a routine traffic stop. After Rist learned that the driver of the stopped vehicle, Dolly Newcombe, had expired tags and no driver‘s license, Rist called Newcombe‘s daughter, Jamie Sparks, and asked her to come to the scene. When Sparks arrived, “shе was directed to sit behind the steering wheel.” Rist issued Sparks a ticket for driving with expired tags and indicated on the ticket that Sparks lacked proof of insurance. After Sparks paid a fine, she lost her driving privileges and unsuccessfully tried to contact Rist. In September 2008, both Sparks and Rist reported the incident to officials at the police department. In an interview with Detective Jim Akers, Rist acknowledged falsifying the ticket.
{6} The City argued that Rist lied about knowing Newcombe before the traffic stop occurred. However, the arbitrator could not find “with positive assurance” that Rist was acquainted with Newcombe prior to this incident. The arbitrator also found that Rist did not аct with “harmful intent” but was simply acting to “do a favor to the
{7} The City filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in various ways under
{8} The trial court adopted the City‘s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the City‘s motion to vacate the arbitration award. The court denied Rist‘s apрlication to confirm the award. This appeal followed.
II. Assignments of Error
{9} Rist assigns the following errors for our review:
The appellant, Beth Rist for her first assignment of error, asserts that the trial court erred, to her material prejudice, when it determined that the
binding decision of the arbitrator, Dr. Harry Graham, was against public policy. The trial court erred, to the material prejudicе of the appellant Beth Rist, when it vacated the binding arbitration decision of Dr. Harry Graham without having the record of the arbitration proceedings or all of the evidence presented to the arbitrator, especially including the testimony of the witnesses and all of the exhibits received into evidence.
The trial court erred, to the material prejudice of the appellant Beth Rist, when it misapplied the test for vacation of an arbitration award under
R.C. §2711.10(D) .The trial court erred, to the material prejudice of the appellant Beth Rist, when it set aside the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement and attempted to determine the rights of the parties based upon its own notions of industrial justice and/or “fairness[.“]
The trial court erred, to the material prejudice of the appellant Beth Rist, and abused its discretion in granting appellee‘s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award.
The trial court erred, to the material prejudice of appellant, when it refusеd to grant her Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award.
{10} Rist presents only one argument for her six assignments of error.
III. Vacation of Arbitration Award
A. Standard of Review
{11} Rist contends that the trial court erred when it found that the arbitrator‘s
{12} Arbitration awards are presumed valid, thus a trial court‘s power to vacate a final, binding arbitration award is limited. Id. at ¶¶23-24. “Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator‘s view of the facts and the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. To resоlve disputes about the application of a collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply because it disagrees with them. The same is true of the arbitrator‘s interpretation of the contract.” Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627, 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 2001-Ohio-294, 742 N.E.2d 630, quoting United Pаperworkers Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. (1987), 484 U.S. 29, 37-38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286.
{13} “The legislature has specified the narrow circumstances under which a trial court may vacate an arbitration award.” Athens, supra, at ¶24, citing
{14} In her brief, Rist sets out arguments addressing how the arbitration award met each of these requirements. Howеver, in the City‘s proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, which the trial court adopted, the City did not argue that the arbitration award failed to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement or that it was arbitrary or capricious. Instead the City claimed, and the trial court ultimately concluded, that the аward reinstating Rist was unlawful because it violated public policy.2
{15} The Supreme Court of Ohio has found that if an arbitrator‘s reinstatement of an employee violates public policy, the award is unlawful and unenforceable. See SORTA, supra, at 112, citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Internatl. Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am. (1983), 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298. “[V]acating an arbitration award pursuant to public
{16} The issue of whether, in light of the arbitrator‘s factual findings, an employee‘s reinstatement violates public policy presents a question of law. See Akron Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Local 2517, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO, 161 Ohio App.3d 594, 2005-Ohio-2965, 831 N.E.2d 493, at ¶7. See, e.g. SORTA at 112. Thus, we review the trial court‘s judgment vacating the arbitration award on that basis under a de novo standard. Akron at ¶7; See, also, Jackson Cty., Ohio Sheriff v. The Fraternal Order of Police Ohio Labor Council, Inc., Jackson App. No. 02CA15, 2004-Ohio-3535, at ¶19 (noting that “appellate review [of an arbitration award] focuses upon the order issued by the trial court“). Accordingly, we must examine the “laws and legal precedеnts” in order to determine if there is any public policy that would render the award reinstating Rist unenforceable. SORTA at 112.
B. Record of Arbitration Proceedings
{17} Initially, we must address Rist‘s argument that the trial court could not vacate the arbitration award on public policy grounds without a complete record of the arbitration proceedings before it. She complains thаt the trial court lacked a transcript of
{18} However, the omitted portions of the record in this case are not necessary for resolution of Rist‘s assigned errors. The primary issue in this appeal is whether Rist‘s reinstatement violated a dominant, well-defined public policy. Resolution of this issue presents a purely legal inquiry; therefore, the hearing transcript and exhibits are not required to resolve it. See In re Self, Stark App. No. 2004CA00199, 2004-Ohio-6822, at ¶6. Thus, we reject this argument.
C. Public Policy Analysis
{19} Although Rist attempts to frame her assignments of error in different ways, the crux of her argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it vacated the arbitration award because her reinstatement did not violate public policy. Rist admitted that she falsified the ticket given to Sparks. And although the arbitrator did not specifically mention it in his findings of fact, the limited record from the arbitration proceedings shows that Rist pleaded guilty to first-degree misdemеanor falsification, in violation of
{20} The City argues that a dominant, well-defined public policy prohibits the reinstatement of a police officer who falsifies a report. We agree. The police force of a municipal corporation is obligated to “preserve the peace, proteсt persons and property, and obey and enforce *** all criminal laws of the state and the United States * * *.”
[I]t is settled public policy * * * that police officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than the general public. * * * Law enforcement officials carry upon their shoulders the cloak of authority of the state. For them to command the respect of the public, it is necessary then for these officers even when off duty to comport themselves in a manner that brings credit, not disrespect, upon their department.
Jones v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 555 N.E.2d 940 (internal citations omitted).
{21} Based on this statute and these legal authorities, we conclude that Ohio has a dominant, well-defined public policy against the reinstatement of an officer who falsifies a pоlice report. And in this case, it is undisputed that Rist committed such an act. Rist violated the law and comported herself in a manner that could not bring anything but disrepute upon the department. Contrary to Rist‘s assertions, the fact that she did not gain anything from her dishonesty in this case does not make her conduct any less egregious. Given Rist‘s willingness to lie аnd break the law for an apparent
{22} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err when it found that Rist‘s reinstatement violated public policy, vacated the arbitration award, and denied Rist‘s application for confirmation of that award. See, e.g., Jones, supra, at 43 (Supreme Court of Ohio held that State Personnel Board of Review improperly reinstated deputy sheriff who engaged in off-duty vigilante activity that “could not bring anything but disrepute upon the sheriff‘s department.“). We overrule her assignments of error and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.3
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
McFarland, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ______________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge