| Mo. Ct. App. | Nov 27, 1877
delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.
The case presents the same question determined by this court in tbe case of Keber v. Mercantile Bank, recently decided by this court. Tbe plaintiff seeks to avail itself of its common-law remedy for damages arising from an injunction, but does not charge that tbe injunction was an abuse of tbe process of tbe court through malice and without probable cause. In this case the demurrer of defendant was overruled by the court, and plaintiff obtained judgment. In the Keber case the demurrer was sustained. Otherwise, the cases are the same.
• The Circuit Court erred in overruling the demurrer of defendant, and the judgment cannot be sustained. There can be no recovery of damages arising from an injunction, except in an action on the bond, unless it be averred and shown that the process of the court was abused maliciously and without probable cause.
Counsel for respondent argues that, if this be so, there can be no recovery against a corporation for damages caused by an injunction, except upon the bond, because, he says, a corporation is incapable of malice. A corporation, however, is liable for torts ; it can commit trespass and dissei-zin, and it is now held in Missouri, as generally elsewhere, that a corporation may be liable for the malicious acts of its agents. Gillett v. Railroad Co., 55 Mo. 318. A corporation may be liable for a malicious prosecution commenced by its agents in the scope of their employment. 'There has been a complete change in the rulings in this