98 N.J.L. 483 | N.J. | 1923
The opinion of the court was delivered by
'The sole question for determination is whether a judgment of damages for breach of promise of marriage, without seduction, is released by the defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy.
The facts appearing in the suit were that defendant represented himself as an unmarried man though he was in fact married, and in that guise paid his attentions to plaintiff. The result was an understanding between them which the court instructed the jury could be considered, and which the jury evidently did consider, as an agreement to many. The suit was brought after discovery of the real facts and plaintiff had a judgment. Under the act of 1915, page 470, as supplemented and amended, plaintiff obtained an execution against defendant’s salary, and served it oh the Shaw Insulator Compan]»', his employer, which paid instalments for several weeks and then ceased paying, because defendant had been discharged in bankruptcy. The judgment was regularly scheduled in the bankruptcy proceedings and no technical question of procedure arises. The company, on the return of the rule to show cause, showed these facts, and the rule was thereupon discharged, and this is the judicial action alleged for error.
Assuming for present purposes, without deciding, that a proceeding! in contempt was proper procedure (the statute seems to contemplate a suit against the source of income qua garnishee), and assuming also that the discharge of the rule
By the Bankruptcy act of 1898, there wore excepted from discharge, among other debts and liabilities not now relevant
(2) “Judgments in actions for fraud, or obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.” (Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 17; 30 ü. S. Slat, p. 550.)
This was changed in 1903 to read:
“Liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another, or for alimony due or to become due, or for maintainance or support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation.” 32 U. S. Stat., p. 798.
Still later, in 1917, the clause was further’ amended, and at the time of the accrual of the cause of action read, and still reads, as follows:
“Liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another, or for alimony due or to become due, or for maintainance or support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversation.” 39 U. 8. Stat., p. 999.
It is not claimed that any other subdivision of section 17 is applicable, and the entire argument for appellant rests on the proposition that the judgment in the cause is exempted from the effect of the act because it is a judgment for, or at least includes an award for, “willful and malicious injuries” to the person of the plaintiff. We are absolutely unable to see any merit in this claim: In the first place, no injury to plaintiff’s person was alleged in the complaint, or, so far as appears, testified to in the evidence; so that the argument that defendant by having induced plaintiff to consent to being caressed and fondled under fraudulent representation as to
The judicial action brought up is accordingly affirmed.
For affirmance — The Chancellor, Swayze, Trenchabd, Parker, Bergen, Kalisch, Black, Katzenbach, White, Gardner, Ackerson, Van Buskirk, JJ. 12.
For reversal — None.