James P. IRETON, Jr., v. Lore CHAMBERS.
No. 1038, Sept. Term, 2015.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
July 28, 2016.
143 A.3d 215
Victoria M. Shearer (Kevin Karpinski, Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp, PA, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Brian Auchincloss (Neil E. Duke, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: GRAEFF, KEHOE, ARTHUR, JJ.
OPINION
ARTHUR, J.
One could say that this case is a case about nothing. More precisely, it is a case about whether a court can enter a judgment for nothing in damages against a defendant who has qualified immunity from “civil liability.”
A jury found that the Mayor of Salisbury had committed a civil assault, but had
Factual and Procedural History
Dr. Lore L. Chambers is the former assistant city administrator of Salisbury, Maryland, a municipal corporation located in Wicomico County. James P. Ireton, Jr., was the mayor of Salisbury at the time.
After an incident, the details of which are not entirely clear,1 Dr. Chambers was fired. She sued Mayor Ireton for assault. Among other defenses, the mayor claimed that, under
At the end of a two-day trial on Dеcember 9, 2014, the parties agreed on a verdict sheet. Question 1 of the verdict sheet read, “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mayor Ireton assaulted Plaintiff Chambers?” The jury checked, “Yes.” Question 2 read, “If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 1, do you find that Mayor Ireton acted with actual malice?” The jury checked, “No.” Question 3 instructed the jury to “go no further” if it answered no to Question 2. The jury complied with the instruction and did not reach the next questions, which concerned damages.
On December 19, 2014, the clerk docketed a judgment in favor of Dr. Chambers, and against Mayor Ireton, for $0.00. On December 29, 2014, Mayor Ireton moved to revise the judgment, arguing that the court should have enterеd judg-ment in his favor. In an order filed on January 15, 2015, the judge granted that motion and ordered that the clerk enter judgment in favor of Mayor Ireton. The clerk entered the revised judgment on the docket on January 21, 2015.
On February 20, 2015, Dr. Chambers filed what she called a motion to “vacate” the court‘s previous order (and thus to reinstate the original zero-dollar judgment). The court granted that motion on April 1, 2015, and on the following day the clerk docketed an order reinstating the original judgment.
On April 10, 2015, Mayor Ireton moved to alter or amend that revised order. On July 6, 2015, the court finally ended the back-and-forth motions, denying the mayor‘s motion and leaving the zero-dollar judgment intact.
Mayor Ireton noted this timely appeal on July 17, 2015.
Question Presented
While the parties dispute both how to reach the questiоn and to frame the standard of review, they both agree that the
Discussion
I. Scope and Standard of Review
The parties disagree as to the precise standard of review. Mayor Ireton contends that the case presents a legal question, subject to de novo review, as it involves the interpretation of a statute. Dr. Chambers contends that we are reviewing the circuit court‘s decision not to revise the judgment and, hence, mаy consider only whether the court abused its discretion. To determine the standard of review, then, we must determine what exactly we are reviewing.
In this case, the court initially entered its judgment on December 19, 2014. Mayor Ireton filed a timely motion to alter or amend that judgment, which effectively deprived the judgment of finality until the court had decided his motion. Seе
After the court granted the mayor‘s motion to alter or amend, the clerk entered a revised judgment on January 21, 2015. Exactly 30 days thereafter, on February 20, Dr. Chambers filed what she called a motion to “vacate,” but which in substance was a motion to revise the revised judgment under
When a party files a revisory motion more than 10 days after the judgment, and the cоurt revises its earlier ruling, the revised ruling becomes the final judgment. See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. at 651 (citing Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219, 240-41, 503 A.2d 239 (1986)). Therefore, when the court granted Dr. Chambers‘s revisory motion and re-revised the judgment on April 1, 2015, that ruling, upon its entry on the docket, became the new final judgment.
When Mayor Ireton filed a second, timely motion to alter or amend, that motion effectively deprived the new judgment of finality until the сourt had decided it. See
When a court enters a judgment against a party, as the circuit court did when it granted Dr. Chambers‘s revisory motion on April 1, 2015, the party does not forfeit the right to challenge that judgment on appeal merely by filing a timely motion to alter or amend. Hence, when the circuit court denied the mayor‘s second, timely post-judgment motion, he became entitled to appeal the final judgment itself (
For these reasons, the issue before us is not limited to whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Mayor Ireton‘s second motion to alter or amend the re-revised judgment for zero dollars in damages. Instead, we have the power to review the court‘s decision to
II. Analysis
Both sides agree that, absent malice, Mayor Ireton is “immune as an official or individual from any civil liability” for his tortious conduct (
Mayor Ireton insists that immunity from “civil liability” equals immunity from any civil judgment, even one for zero dollars. Dr. Chambers responds by chаracterizing
We must decide whether the qualified immunity from “civil liability,” within the meaning of
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we generally undertake on a de novo basis. Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142, 46 A.3d 443 (2012) (citing Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 385 Md. 492, 496, 869 A.2d 852 (2005)). “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.” See, e.g., Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274, 987 A.2d 18 (2010) (citations omitted).
The language of
The meaning of “civil liability” is not the only ambiguous feature of this statute. It is also unclear from the statute whether a plaintiff must prove malice as an additional element of her case-in-chief or whether the absence of malice is an affirmative defense that an official must raise and prove.8 In either event, however, a finding of no malice would be fatal to the plaintiff‘s case. If the plaintiff failed to prove malice as an element of her case, the court would be obligated to enter judgment against her. By the same token, if the defendant established the absence of malice in an affirmative defense that trumped the plaintiff‘s claims, the court would be obligated to enter judgment against her notwithstanding that she had proved all of the elements of her case. In short, because Dr. Chambers was not entitled to a judgment in her favor unless the jury found malice, the court should not have entered judgment against Mayor Ireton—even for zero dollars.9
Had Mayor Ireton prevailed on summary judgment on the ground that Dr. Chambers had failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact about whether he had acted with malice, the court would, presumably, have directed the entry of judgment in his favor; it would not have entered judgment against him for zero dollars. See, e.g., Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md.App. 268, 311, 762 A.2d 172 (2000) (affirming entry of summary judgment against plaintiff who failed to offer evidence that Mayor of Hyattsville, and others, acted with malice); Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md.App. 440, 460, 688 A.2d 448 (1997) (affirming entry of summary judgment against plaintiff who failed to provide evidence legally sufficient to permit inference of malice on part of Mayor of Annapolis, among others). Likewise, had Mayor Ireton prevailed on a motion for judgment either at the end of the plaintiff‘s case or at the end of all the evidence because Dr. Chambers did not
In equating immunity from civil liability with immunity from an award of damages, Dr. Chambers fails to recognize that the concept of “civil liability” is not confined to liability for damages: it may also include liability for equitable relief, such as an injunction. This prompts the question of what would happen if a plaintiff requested damages for an official‘s past misconduct, as well as an injunctiоn against future misconduct. Under Dr. Chambers‘s theory, it appears that the official‘s immunity from “civil liability” would not protect against liability for equitable relief, because it would not entail an award of damages. Because we find it exceedingly improbable that the General Assembly intended to create an immunity from “civil liability” that excludes an entire catеgory of civil remedies, we reject Dr. Chambers‘s interpretation.
Finally, it is readily apparent that when the General Assembly intends to create an immunity only from an award of damages, it knows how to do so. For an example, one need read no farther than the next subparagraph of
In summary, the circuit court should not have entered judgment against Mayor Ireton, even for zero dollars. Once the jury found that the mayor did not act with malice, his qualified immunity from “civil liability” required the court to enter judgment in his favor and against Dr. Chambers.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WICOMICO COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST LORE CHAMBERS AND IN FAVOR OF JAMES P. IRETON, JR. APPELLEE TO PAY ALL COSTS.