Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Royce D. TurnerIowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Royce D. Turner
On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission.
The grievance commission found violations of numerous rules and recommended respondent’s license be suspended for three months. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Tara van Brederode and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for complainant.
Alfredo Parrish of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Gentry, Brown & Bergmann LLP, Des Moines (until withdrawal), and then Royce D. Turner, West Des Moines, pro se, for respondent.
Royce D. Turner, over a span of twenty months, was repeatedly rebuked by state and federal judges for missing hearings and violating court rules. He was found in contempt several times. Three of his clients were arrested and two were jailed for missing hearings he overlooked. Despite an ongoing audit, Turner continued to flout basic requirements for client trust accounts.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a complaint against Turner alleging multiple violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. He delayed responding to the Board’s inquiries and complaints. Our court imposed a five-month interim suspension to protect the public. We permitted Turner’s return to practice with the help of an experienced attorney under stipulated limitations pending resolution of the disciplinary charges.
The parties submitted a stipulation of facts. A division of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission found violations of numerous rules. Noting Turner’s inexperience and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), the commission recommended a three-month suspension of his license to practice law with conditions on his reinstatement. The Board recommends a suspension of twelve to eighteen months. Based on our de novo review, we now suspend Turner’s license to practice law for one year from the date of this opinion with conditions on his reinstatement.
Inexperienced sole practitioners who lack mentors and take on cases without the requisite experience are at greater risk of making mistakes. Any Iowa lawyer should be concerned about receiving one rebuke
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Turner obtained his Iowa law license in 2013 and began a solo practice in Polk County. He suffers from ADHD and depression. Turner receives treatment and takes medication for those conditions. This case arises from Turner’s representation of many clients. We find the following facts as stipulated or otherwise established in the record and review them in the sequence alleged in the Board’s second amended complaint.
A. Untimely Response to Complaint (Count I).
On January 26, 2015, Turner received from the Board a complete copy of an ethiсs complaint filed by K.D. regarding Turner’s relationship with W.B. After Turner failed to respond, the Board mailed him a second copy by certified mail that the postal service returned after Turner declined to retrieve it. On May 7, at Turner’s request, the Board mailed Turner a third copy and extended his deadline to respond to May 29. Turner still did not respond by this extended deadline.
On July 23, the Board informed Turner by email that it would seek a suspension of his law license due to his failure to respond. The next day, the Board filed a certificate of noncompliance with this court stating that Turner failed to respond and asking the court to issue a notice of possible temporary suspension of Turner’s license. Turner replied to the Board’s email, stating he had not yet received a complete copy of the complaint. The Board sent Turner a fourth copy. Turner substantively responded to the complaint on July 28—six months after he first received it. Turner admits he knowingly failed to respond to the Board’s lawful demand for information. He attributed his lack of responsiveness during this period to his ADHD and depression.
B. The Philip and Jackson Representations (Count II).
In September 2014, Agok Philip retained Turner to represent him in four criminal cases in Polk County. Philip made seven payments to Turner totaling $1075, but Turner failed to deposit any of these sums in his client trust account. Turner stipulated that he was “not completely familiar with the trust account process” at that time. Turner initially filed appearances in only two of Philip’s four cases, prompting judicial inquiries into his role in the other two. He belatedly filed one appeаrance only after repeated reminders by the court and even then without the requisite certificate of service.
Russell Jackson retained Turner to represent him in two criminal cases in Polk County scheduled for a plea hearing on December 10. Jackson made fourteen payments to Turner totaling $1880, but none were deposited into Turner’s client trust account. On December 9, Turner filed motions to continue but did not bring these motions to the assigned judge’s attention. Neither Jackson nor Turner appeared at the scheduled plea hearing the next day. The judge denied the motions to continue and issued warrants for Jackson’s arrest.
On March 9, 2015, Turner received the Board’s complaint regarding his representations of Philip and Jackson. Turner failed to respond. On April 7, the Board sent Turner a second notice of the complaint by restricted certified mail. Turner failed to claim this letter. On June 2, the Board again served the complaint by certified mail, and Turner again failed to claim the letter. The Polk County Sheriff personally served Turner with the complaint on July 9. Turner claimed he had already responded to this complaint, and the Board replied that it had not received his response. The Board extended Turner’s response deadline to July 21 at his request, but Turner missed the extended deadline. He substantively responded to this complaint only after the Board filed its certificate of noncompliance with this court on July 24, more than four months after first reсeiving it. Turner concedes he knowingly failed to respond to the Board’s lawful demand for information.
C. Bankruptcy Cases (Count III).
Turner admits he “was not as familiar as he should have been with bankruptcy cases.” On May 5, 2014, he presented paper bankruptcy petitions for seven individuals, even though electronic filing in that forum has been mandatory since 2000. His subsequent rule violations and failure to attend hearings led to a number of rebukes, dismissals, and other sanctions, as follows.
Turner filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for Steve Cummings. Turner reported that his fee was $875. The U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss the bankruptcy action and to order Turner to refund the fees. The court scheduled a hearing on these motions. Turner failed to attend the hearing, and the court granted both motions. A week later, Turner filed a second bankruptcy petition for Cummings that omitted the required listing of creditors, schedules, and statement of financial affairs. The U.S. Trustee moved for an order to show cause for Turner to “explain his failure to comply with the Order of this Court, the continued deficiencies with his filing[s] . . . , his failure to appear at hearings and his overall practice before the Court.” Following a hearing, the court ordered Turner to “supply the bankruptcy schedules bearing his clients’ signatures” and to deliver “the original power of attorney documents that were executed involving any” of the clients identified in the order by the next day. The court extended by six days the deadline for Turner to refund the $875 fee to Cummings. Two days after the deadline for refunding Cummings’s fee, Turner moved to vacate the refund order. The U.S. Trustee then filеd a status report noting Turner’s noncompliance.
Turner filed a separate Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for Laura Cummings without her required signatures, and the court scheduled a hearing after Turner failed to correct these omissions. Neither Turner nor Cummings attended the hearing, and the court dismissed the case. The court ordered Turner to attend training on the court’s electronic filing system. Turner moved for relief from the order dismissing the case, stating he missed the hearing due to illness. The U.S. Trustee objected due to other problems in documents submitted by Turner. The court scheduled a hearing on the motion. Turner also filed a motion to reinstate the case. Neither Turner nor Cummings attended the hearing, and the court denied Turner’s motions. Turner then filed a second bankruptcy case but omitted the filing fee or application to pay the fee in installments and omitted the requisite schedules, statement of financial affairs, credit counseling certificate, and listing of creditors. The bankruptcy trustee responded with a motion for order to
Turner filed a Chapter 7 petition for Kelly Willard. The U.S. Trustee moved to compel the filing of additional and corrected documents and then moved to dismiss because Willard had not obtained the requisite credit counseling. Turner objected to the motion to dismiss, and the court scheduled a hearing. A day before the hearing, Turner filed a motion to withdraw Willard’s petition. The court granted the motion to dismiss.
After filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases for Walter Anhorn and Lasandra Kearney, Turner filed reaffirmation agreements between his clients and several creditors. The U.S. Trustee objected to the reaffirmation agreements. Turner then moved to withdraw the agreements. The U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss Anhorn’s case because Anhorn had not obtained credit counseling as required. Turner objected to the motion to dismiss and moved to withdraw Anhorn’s petition one day before the hearing, which Turner failed to attend. The court dismissed the case. A new lawyer took over Anhorn’s matter.
In Kearney’s case, Turner filed a motion to dismiss, stating that Kearney did not qualify under Chapter 7 and planned to file under Chapter 11. After a hearing that Turner failed to attend, Kearney appeared and stated she had not authorized Turner to file the motion to dismiss. The court ordered the motion to dismiss withdrawn and ordered Turner to refund $800 to Kearney that month. The court dismissed Kearney’s case after she failed to meet its deadline to obtain new counsel.
Turner filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases for Fred Leaming and Rick Andreas. The U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss both cases and sought refunds of fees paid to Turner and an order directing Turner to pay the fees associated with refiling each case. The court dismissed both cases. Turner then moved to reinstate the cases. He also filed a second bankruptcy petition in each case. Following a hearing, the court ordered Turner to refund $497.50 to Leaming. Turner did not comply, so the U.S. Trustee moved for an order to show cause and to dismiss Leaming’s second case. The bankruptcy trustee also moved for order to show cause, in part because Turner failed to appear for the meeting of creditors and provided no verified, justifiable excuse for his absence. After a hearing, which Turner failed to attend, the court dismissed Leaming’s second case. The court entered judgment in favor of Leaming and against Turner for $497.50. In Andreas’s second case, the court ordered Turner to “address the deficiencies discussed on the record and [to] take all steps necessary to ensure that he is able to represent clients in bankruptcy cases in this forum in a competent fashion.” Andreas received his discharge in bankruptcy a few months later.
On December 5, 2014, the bankruptcy court judge filed an order for Turner to show cause regarding cases he filed for Cummings, Willard, Anhorn, and Kearney. The court identified multiple problems, including that Turner filed documents that violated electronic filing rules, lacked required information and signatures, contained inaccurate information, or lacked his client’s authorization. The court also noted Turner failed to appear at four court hearings, failed to abide by court orders to produce records and refund fees, and may have made misrepresentations to the court. The judge determined that that Turner’s conduct violated
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]
D. The Lindemann Representation (Count IV).
Lowell Lindemann retained Turner to represent him in a criminal case in Polk County. Lindemann made nine payments to Turner totaling $2190. Turner failed to deposit any of those payments into his client trust account. Turner admits he “was unaware of the rule that unearned fees had to be deposited into his trust account.” Turner failed to appear for the pretrial conference and status hearing. Three days before the next pretrial conference, Turner filed a motion to continue. The court denied the motion. Turner and Lindemann failed to appear at the pretrial conference, and the judge issued a warrant for Lindemann’s arrest. Lindemann was arrested and had to post a $5000 cash-only bond to be released from jail. Turner filed a motion to suppress but did not attend the hearing on the motion, so the court deemed the motion withdrawn. The court accepted Lindemann’s guilty plea two days later and scheduled his sentencing hearing. Turner failed to attend Lindemann’s sentencing hearing. Lindemann waived representation by counsel and proceeded with the sentencing pro se.
E. The Guisinger Representation (Count V).
In May 2015, Todd Guisinger retained Turner to represent him in a Polk County criminal case (third offense operating while intoxicated (OWI)). Turner’s fee agreement with Guisinger stated, “Attorney Appearance fee shall be $600. Payments of $130 shall be paid on 5/30/15, after the receipt of attorney appearance fee, every Friday . . . for the duration of the proceedings.” This fee agreement did not set a cap on the fees or establish a flat fee. Guisinger made thirteen payments to Turner totaling $2190, but Turner deposited none of the payments into his client trust account because “he was fully unaware of the rule that unearned fees had to be deposited into his trust account.”
The court rescheduled the pretrial conference three times at Turner’s request due to his “scheduling conflicts.” The court then appоinted a public defender to represent Guisinger, who had terminated Turner as his lawyer. When asked to provide an accounting of the services provided to Guisinger, Turner responded that he “would not be able to provide invoices because [he] rendered services to [Guisinger] on a flat fee as opposed to rendering services on an hourly basis.”
Mark Kemp retained Turner in March 2015 to represent him in a Polk County criminal case. Kemp made twenty-six payments by October totaling $3505. Turner did not deposit any payments from Kemp into his client trust account because he was “unaware of the rules.” Turner filed a motion to suppress fifteen days late and a motion for depositions at state expense thirty-eight days late. The state resisted both motions as untimely. The court denied the motion to suppress as untimely, noting Turner “made no argument to justify the late filing.” After Turner failed to appear for a change of plea hearing, the court appointed a public defender to represent Kemp.
G. Contempt in Mahaska County (Count VII).
Turner tried a case in Mahaska County, which the judge submitted to the jury late afternoon. The next day, the jury reported it was deadlocked. Because the judge was unable to contact Turner, she declared a mistrial and rescheduled the jury trial for a few months later. The judge conducted a hearing in which Turner participated by phone. The judge found Turner in contempt of court and ordered him to complete forty hours of community service in Mahaska County and to pay the costs. At the compliance hearing ten days later, the judge found Turner in contempt of court for not complying with the previous order. The court ordered Turner to serve thirty days in jail with the opportunity to purge this contempt by completing the previously ordered community service within two months. Turner complied by completing the community service, and the judge dismissed the contempt action at his cost. At the time of the commission’s hearing, Turner had not paid the costs.
H. The Robinson and Dean Representations (Count VIII).
Jordan Robinson retained Turner to represent him in a criminal case in Story County. They failed to attend a pretrial conference, and the court issued a bench warrant for Robinson’s arrest. The next day, Turner filed a motion to recall the warrant. The sole reason he gave for filing the motion was “[t]hat the Court submitted a bench warrant.” The court found no good cause existed to recall the warrant and denied the motion. The sheriff arrested Robinson, who was then released without bond. Turner failed to appear for the second day of Robinson’s jury trial. The court declared a mistrial and rescheduled the trial. Jordan Dean retained Turner to represent him in a criminal case in Story County. Turner and Dean failed to attend the arraignment, and Turner neglected to file a written arraignment. The court issued a bench warrant for Dean’s arrest. Turner then filed a motion to recall the bench warrant and later filed a written arraignment and plea of not guilty. The court canceled the arrest warrant.
I. Contempt in Story County (Count IX).
The district court entered an order, requiring Turner to “show cause, if any, why he should not be found in contempt for having failed to appear” for the second day of Robinson’s jury trial in March 2016. Turner moved to continue the hearing, which the court denied. Turner failed to appear, and the court ordered a warrant for Turner’s arrest. Turner was arrested and released on bond. Another judge found Turner in contempt. The court ordered Turner to pay the jury costs of $1920.75 and a $500 fine. The order provided that the payments were due immediately and would be considered delinquent if not paid within thirty days. At the time of the commission’s hearing, Turner had not yet made these payments.
J. The Ramsey Representation (Count X).
In January 2016, Brian Ramsey retained
Attorney’s retainer shall be $1000 and will vest with Turner Law Office immediately upon receipt. The rate for representation shall be $1000. Client shall pay $2,000 total. $500 of the rate for representation shall vest 2/5/16. The remaining $500 shall vest 2/12/16.
Ramsey pled guilty to second offense OWI. His plea agreement stated that Ramsey would serve his sentence at the Fort Des Moines Correctional Facility, but noted the court was not bound by the agreement and could impose the maximum sentence. The court sentenced Ramsey to prison for up to two years and set the appeal bond at $2000, cash only. On April 29, 2016, Turner moved for an order “Pro Nunc Tunc,” asking the court to strike the sentencing order “due to all parties involved misunderstanding [Ramsey’s] eligibility for the Fort Des Moines Program.” The motion asked that Ramsey be released and “that a new pretrial conference be set to determine thе direction of [Ramsey’s] proceedings accordingly.” The court scheduled a hearing on this motion for May 13. On May 2, Turner filed a notice of appeal.
On May 13, the district court denied Turner’s motion, stating, “After discussing this matter, in the absence of [Turner], the record establishes that the case has been appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court. Since the case is . . . pending appeal, this Court no longer has jurisdiction of this matter.” The order noted that Turner arrived at the hearing forty-five minutes late.
On May 18, Turner and Ramsey entered into a second fee agreement. Turner agreed to “represent [Ramsey’s] interests . . . whereby the following will be filed[:] withdraw of appeal, motion to vacate judgment, and motion to suppress.” The agreement provided that a flat fee of $500 would “vest with [Turner] immediately upon receipt.”
Because Turner failed to file the combined certificate and to pay the filing fee, the appellate clerk sent Turner a “Notice of Default and Assessment of Penalty” on June 1. Turner did not cure the default, so we dismissed Ramsey’s appeal. Turner then filed a motion to reconsider the district court’s judgment, and the district court scheduled a hearing for July 18. On that date, the appellate clerk issued procedendo. The district court established a briefing schedule and scheduled a hearing for August 8. Ramsey and Turner then entered into a third fee agreement providing that Turner would represent Ramsey for the sentencing hearing for a flat fee of $750.
After the hearing on August 8, the district court denied Ramsey’s motion to reconsider the sentence, noting “the court is not bound by any determination of counsel by any plea negotiations.” The court stated, “I know that I did not promise you that you would be going to the Fort Des Moines facility.” The court explained, “I just don’t believe that that was an understanding at the time, that you would not be going to prison if you couldn’t get into the Fort Des Moines.”
K. The Dondo Representation (Count XI).
Comfort Dondo retained Turner to represent her in a Polk County criminal case in January 2016. Turner filed three consecutive motions to continue the pretrial conference. The court granted the first two but denied the third. The court ordered Dondo and Turner to personally appear on March 21. Turner failed to appear. After waiting an hour and twenty-five minutes, the court made a record with Dondo and the prosecutor. The court set a hearing on the state’s oral motion for sanctions against Turner based on his failure to
Turner violated his obligation to appear or to inform the court he would not be appearing. To date, he has not presented any adequate excuse for failing to do so. This dereliction of duty constitutes a willful neglect or violation of duty and a violation of the process of the court. It was a volitional act done by one who should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful. [Turner’s] nonappearancе resulted in obstruction of the administration of justice. Further, it is obvious similar conduct has occurred in several cases and jurisdictions in the past.
The court ordered Turner “to implement a docket-control system to track key deadlines and obligations” and fined him $250. Turner had not paid this fine at the time of the commission’s hearing.
L. Client Trust Account Audit (Count XII).
In his 2014 Client Security Commission Combined Statement and Questionnaire, Turner falsely answered “yes” to these questions, “Do you keep all funds of clients for matters involving the practice of law in Iowa in separate interest-bearing trust accounts located in Iowa?” and “Are all retainers . . . deposited in your trust account?” Turner asserts he misread the questions without deliberately intending to mislead the Client Security Commission.
In his 2015 questionnaire, Turner answered “NA” (“Not applicable”) to those questions, as well as questions such as, “Are reconciliations of your trust account balances with bank statement balances and individual client ledger balances performed monthly?” While Turner had opened a client trust account at U.S. Bank in September 2014, Turner’s questionnaire failed to identify any financial institution in which he maintained such an account.
In August 2015, Charles Brinkmeyer began an audit of Turner’s client trust account. Brinkmeyer introduced himself as a Client Security Commission auditor and requested a meeting. Because Turner asked for a list of topics to be discussed at the meeting, Brinkmeyer sent a more detailed message about the audit process. They agreed on a time to meet, yet at their initial meeting, Turner provided minimal responses to Brinkmeyer аnd argued he had received inadequate notice. Turner identified his client trust account at U.S. Bank, but the Office of Professional Regulation had no records that this account was an Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA). Turner told Brinkmeyer that he issued notices and accountings to clients when he withdrew funds from the client trust account and that he maintained a client ledger. He produced a spreadsheet as his client ledger. This was his only record of client payments and expenses.
Turner and Brinkmeyer agreed to meet again in September. Brinkmeyer agreed to send Turner a written request for records he wanted to review and sent this request on August 18. The same email also reminded Turner of their next meeting.
On August 27, the Client Security Commission issued a Notice of Delinquency to Turner. The notice alleged that Turner failed to cooperate with the audit and that he failed to comply with requests for information needed to complete the audit.
Turner and Brinkmeyer met again on September 14 at Turner’s office. Turner stated that he had to leave soon to attend a court hearing in Carroll County that started in an hour and a half. Turner explained that he had not put the meeting on his calendar and had been unable to
The following day, Turner wrote to the assistant director for the Supreme Court Boards and Commissions. He stated, “Provided the type of work I do for clients the money I recеive vests immediately where I have no reason to place money in a trust account.” Turner later wrote to Brinkmeyer, noting,
The vast majority of cases I’ve taken since the beginning of my practice involved an agreement that provided the money I received from payments vested with me immediately thus making the need for me to hold money in my attorney trust account not required. However, from this experience I have learned the proper way to account for my funds in an instance where such an agreement is not in place.
The Client Security Commission issued another Notice of Delinquency to Turner alleging that he failed to comply with requests for information.
Turner filed an affidavit on December 17, in which he stated that when he began his law practice, he opened a client trust account at Wells Fargo Bank but no longer had access to those account records. He also stated that he opened his current client trust account at U.S. Bank in September 2014. He acknowledged that he did not create or maintain any three-way reconciliations from September 2013 to September 2015 because he believed that under his fee agreements, he did not need to deposit client funds in a client trust account. For the same reason, he did not create or maintain client subaccount ledgers from March through September 2015. Turner’s affidavit also stated that he did not create or maintain retainer agreements, invoices, accountings, or notices for several of his clients, nor did he сreate or maintain a receipt book.
On May 13, 2016, Turner responded to Brinkmeyer’s document request regarding eight clients by stating, in part,
I collect an appearance fee to begin working on someone’s case then begin collecting weekly installments for the flat rate I’m charging in a given case. I don’t charge by the hour. I don’t accept money that I haven’t earned.
The Client Security Commission issued Turner another Notice of Delinquency on July 15. The same month, the Board opened its investigation into Turner’s compliance with the client trust account rules. Turner responded to the Board’s notice of investigation on August 31. He reported that some of the documents requested by the Client Security Commission did not exist and acknowledged that his recordkeeping practices could have been “better.” He asserted that he had not intentionally destroyed any records. Turner also reported that he used flat fee agreements. He stated that he “perform[ed] work on [the clients’] respective cases each week, and at the end of each week, payment for [his] services would be due.” He denied commingling client funds with his funds, relying on court rule 45.10 (flat fee) for the proposition that he only had to deposit advance payments into the client trust account. He then explained that his clients never made advance payments:
[W]hen my clients pay me, it is for work that I have already provided. Therefore, the funds are placed into my own account because those funds have been earned. My only qualm, however, concerns my failure to maintain a complete accounting of records.
Turner further explained that he
did not provide the Commission with copies of the monthly three-way trust
account reconciliations or client sub-account ledgers because [he] did not create or maintain such records. [He] did not believe it was necessary to create the reconciliations because [he] never received advance fees and expense payment that would require [him] to deposit certain funds into the client trust account. . . . Because [he] earned the weekly payments from [his] clients, those payments did not need to be deposited in the trust account. . . . Per [his] agreements with each client, all funds received in those weekly payments served as compensation for the services [he] rendered in the previous week, and [he] would deduct each payment from the total quoted price for [his] legal services.
In his 2016 Combined Statement and Questionnaire, Turner answered “NA” to several questions, including “Do you keep all funds of clients for matters involving the practice of law in Iowa in separate interest-bearing trust accounts located in Iowa?” and “Are all retainers . . . deposited in your trust account?” On December 6, 2016, the Client Security Commission issued a Notice of Delinquency alleging that Turner failed to comply with requests for information.
During the audit, Turner provided documentation to Brinkmeyer about some of Turner’s clients. This documentation showed that Turner’s fee agreements did not establish a flat fee оr set a cap on what the client’s fees would be. For example, the fee agreement for Travon Lackland stated, “Attorney’s retainer fee is $400. Remaining fee shall be $150 a week for the duration of the proceedings.”
Turner’s fee agreement for Billy McKinney provided for an “appearance fee”:
Attorney appearance fee of $750 shall be paid to Turner Law Office PLLC US Bank Account. $175 will be paid each Friday to Turner Law Office PLLC US Bank Account following the receipt of appearance fee starting 5/1/15 until the completion of the case.
This fee agreement provided for payment to Turner’s operating account, not a client trust account.
Turner’s fee agreements with Nakeisha Brown and Calvin Lacey similarly failed to establish a flat fee or set a cap on fees. Turner did not deposit any payments from Lackland, McKinney, Brown, or Lacey into his client trust account. His fee agreement with Tabatha Carlson stated, “Appearance (start) fee shall be $650. Attorney fee shall be $1900. Payments of $300 shall be paid bi-weekly beginning 10/18/2016 until outstanding balance is paid. All payments vest upon receipt. . . .”
Brinkmeyer’s April 24, 2017 report noted that while Turner’s records for 2015 disclosed that he received over $92,000 in client fees, he deposited only $1376 into his client trust account. Based on the records Turner provided, the auditor concluded Turner had not prepared or retained any form of check register, client ledgers, client invoices, notices and accountings preparеd contemporaneously with withdrawal of funds from the client trust account, or other records required under court rules. With regard to his client trust account, Turner had not prepared monthly triple reconciliations, maintained records to show the source of deposits, retained records for electronic transfers, or retained bank statements. Turner also had withdrawn cash from the client trust account on at least two occasions. Some of Turner’s fee agreements required weekly payments to Turner regardless of what services he provided or directed payments to Turner’s operating account, rather than his client trust account.
M. Disciplinary Proceedings.
We suspended Turner’s law license on the Board’s motion on December 28, 2016, pursuant to
On November 8, 2017, the Board filed a second amended complaint. The parties submitted a joint stipulation, which the commission accepted on November 13. The commission held a hearing on the issue of sanctions the same day, and the parties submitted posthearing briefs. The commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations on February 26, 2018. The commission found Turner violated the rules as charged in the Board‘s second amended complaint and recommended we impose an additional three-month suspension with several conditions for reinstatement. While acknowledging the “seriousness of the offenses,” the commission relied in mitigation on Turner‘s “relative lack of experience in the practice of law” and his “medical conditions and mental health issues.”
II. Scope of Review.
“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Silich, 872 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 2015). “The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morse, 887 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d 627, 634-35 (Iowa 2015)). While we give the commission‘s findings and recommendations respectful consideration, we are not bound by them. Id.
Stipulations of fact are binding on the parties, but we are not bound by stipulations of violations or sanctions. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 2013). Instead, we review the stipulation and record to determine whether a violation occurred and what sanction is appropriate. Id.
III. Ethical Violations.
The parties stipulated to the foregoing facts and to Turner‘s violation of several rules. Upon our de novo review, we conclude Turner violated multiple disciplinary rules.
A. Neglect.
While “[o]ur rules of professional responsibility no longer expressly refer[ence] . . . neglect, . . . we continue to
1. Due diligence.
2. Client communication.
If these rules require that a partiсular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client‘s consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take.
The commission also found Turner violated subparagraph 3, which requires an attorney to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.”
We have also found an attorney violated this rule by failing to inform clients of upcoming court dates in civil cases. See Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 209 (noting that the attorney did not inform his client of an
Additionally, an attorney “shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
Additionally, the misunderstanding with regard to Ramsey‘s plea agreement evinces a lack of communication on Turner‘s part that prevented Ramsey from making informed decisions. The court sentenced Ramsey to prison and rejected the contention therе was anunderstanding he would avoid prison. We conclude Turner violated
3. Expediting litigation. An attorney “shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
B. Trust Account Violations.
The commission found Turner violated multiple provisions of
The commission found Turner violated
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer‘s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer‘s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.
The commission found Turner violated
The commission also found Turner violated
“Rule 32:1.15 incorporates Iowa Court Rule 45.7, which directs a lawyer as to how to handle a retainer.” Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 655 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 596, 607 (Iowa 2012)).
Turner retained copies of retainer agreements as required by
Additionally, an attorney “may not charge a nonrefundable special retainer or withdraw unearned fees.”
Under
C. Other Violations.
The commission found Turner violated several other rules.
1. Competence.
The commission determined Turner violated
2. Unreasonable fees.
Several of Turner‘s fee agreements for individual cases did not establish a flat fee,3 retainer agreement,4 or set a cap on the clients’ fees. Instead, these fee agreements provided for weekly or biweekly payments until the completion of the case, regardless of whether Turner worked on the case each week. One fee agreement provided for payment to Turner‘s operating account, not a client trust account. Another agreement stated that “[a]ll payments vest upon receipt” regardless of whether Turner actually worked on that case and contrary to his obligation to return unearned fees. See
3. Frivolous claims and contentions.
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis
in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
4. Candor toward the tribunal.
5. Demand for information from the Board.
6. Misconduct. The commission concluded Turner violated
We have held an attorney engaged in conduct involving dishonesty by falsely answering the Client Security Commission
Additionally, when Turner met with Brinkmeyer, Turner stated that he issued notices and accountings to clients when he withdrew funds from the client trust account and that he maintained a client ledger, but in a subsequent affidavit, Turner admitted he did not do so for some clients. In response to the Board‘s investigation, Turner falsely reported that he used flat fee agreements when the agreements actually required ongoing weekly payments, not a flat fee. He also falsely stated that his clients “never made advance рayments.” Brinkmeyer‘s audit report concluded that Turner had not prepared or retained client ledgers and that several of Turner‘s fee agreements provided for an “appearance fee” that Turner falsely claimed as earned immediately before he provided services. We conclude Turner violated
7. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The commission found Turner violated
“Conduct that wastes judicial resources violates this rule.” Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 191. Neglect of an appeal resulting in its dismissal constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, as does “[i]gnoring deadlines and orders, which results in default notices from the clerk of court.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2011). “An attorney‘s failure to timely cooperate with disciplinary authorities is prejudicial to the administration of justice, violating not only
Turner failed to attend multiple hearings and arrived late for others, and he failed to timely file various motions. He made improper filings in bankruptcy court, delaying the proceedings. Turner was found in contempt of court in three Iowa counties. He did not cure a default in one client‘s appeal, which the clerk then dismissed.
8. Investigations and audits by the Client Security Commission. The commission found Turner violated
Turner failed to provide some records requested in Brinkmeyer‘s audit and was slow to produce other records. The Client Security Commission issued five notices of delinquency to Turner during its audit. Brinkmeyer‘s audit concluded Turner had not maintained records to show the source of deposits to the client trust account, retained bank statements or records for electronic transfer, or prepared or retained notices and accountings prepared contemporaneously with withdrawal of funds from the client trust account. Turner acknowledged that he failed to maintain records as required by the Iowa Court Rules. Turner also admitted that “he provided factually incorrect information” on the questionnaires. We conclude Turner violated rules
IV. Sanction.
We must determine the appropriate sanction. Over a prolonged period, Turner violated multiple disciplinary rules involving trust account requirements, dishonesty, and incompetence, resulting in client harm as well as wasted court time. His pattern of misconduct continued despite an ongoing audit of his trust accounts and repeated judicial sanctions, including several rulings finding him in contempt. The commission,considering his inexperience and ADHD as mitigating factors,5 recommended that we suspend Turner‘s law license for three months, with his reinstatement subject to his completion of ten hours of continuing legal education (CLE) on legal ethics and law practice management and therapy with a licensed mental health professional who attests to Turner‘s fitness to practice law. The Board urges us to impose a suspension of twelve to eighteen months with those same conditions on his reinstatement. Turner asks that we impose no new suspension and lift the restrictions imposed in his prior stipulation.
“We give the commission‘s recommendation respectful consideration, but may impose a greater or lesser sanction.” Morse, 887 N.W.2d at 143. We weigh several factors, including
[t]he nature of the violations, the attorney‘s fitness to continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Id. (quoting Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 192). We seek consistency with our prior cases. Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 192. However, “[t]here is no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct,” and we “craft an appropriate sanction in light of each case‘s unique circumstances.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hearity, 812 N.W.2d 614, 622 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 441 (Iowa 2012)).
Turnеr‘s trust account violations alone would warrant a suspension, perhaps of several months. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘yDisciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 830 N.W.2d 355, 358-59 (Iowa 2013) (collecting cases and imposing a three-month suspension for “improperly removing client funds from a trust account and failing to deposit advance fees into the trust account“). Turner‘s ignorance of the rules governing trust accounts cannot excuse his flagrant long-standing violations. Moreover, we have increased the length of suspension when trust account violations are accompanied by misrepresentations, neglect, or other violations. See, e.g., Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 655-63 (imposing one-year suspension when experienced attorney violated trust account rules, neglected clients matters, and charged an unreasonable fee); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 531-35 (Iowa 2011) (one-year suspension for neglect, trust account violations, and misrepresentations); see also Morse, 887 N.W.2d at 145 (noting that “suspensions of several months” were imposed for trust account and accounting violations that “were compounded by severe neglect, misrepresentation, or failure to cooperate” (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cross, 861 N.W.2d 211, 225 (Iowa 2015))).
Turner made misrepresentations to the court, which “constitutes a serious breach of professional ethics, warranting a more severe sanction than neglect.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 821 (Iowa 2007); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 466-67 (Iowa 2014) (imposing a six-month suspension for misrepresentations when the attorney persisted in perpetuating his lie over discovery in a civil case); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 288-89 (Iowa 2009) (concluding attorney‘s “misrepresentations to the court and to his clients also weigh in favor of a more severe sanction” and imposing a six-month suspension for neglect, misrepresentations, trust
account violations, and failure to respond to the board). “Dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation by a lawyer are abhorrent concepts to the legal profession[] and can give rise to the full spectrum of sanctions, including revocation.” Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 437 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 2007)) (imposing six-month suspension when attorney violated trust account rules and “engaged in dishonesty in representing that he regularly reconciled his trust account“).
We have imposed suspensions of varying lengths for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when compounded by additional violations. See, e.g., Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d at 488 (imposing sixty-day suspension for pressing frivolous claims, knowingly disobeying court orders, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541, 554 (Iowa 2012) (imposing eighteen-month suspension on attorney who “committed numerous ethical violations involving neglect of client matters, misrepresentation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice“); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Iowa 2012)
We must consider Turner‘s other violations. He made frivolous filings in bankruptcy court. We have “suspended lawyers from the practice of law for filing frivolous matters, although these cases have
been accompanied by other unethical conduct.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Daniels, 838 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Iowa 2013); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof‘l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohnbaum, 554 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1996) (imposing three-month suspension for making misleаding statements and persisting in a “patently frivolous” position). “We have imposed suspensions ranging from sixty days to two years for violations of the rule prohibiting excessive” or unreasonable fees. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Laing, 832 N.W.2d 366, 374 (Iowa 2013) (collecting cases). “Sanctions for an attorney‘s violation of a court order vary in light of the accompanying misconduct.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers, 823 N.W.2d 1, 16-17 (Iowa 2012) (imposing ninety-day suspension when attorney was found in contempt, made unauthorized ex parte contact with a party he knew was represented by counsel, and “attempted to extort a $100,000 donation to a charity in his wife‘s name“).
We consider harm to the client as an aggravating factor. Morse, 887 N.W.2d at 144. Turner‘s misconduct harmed several of his clients: three of his clients were arrested and two were jailed because he missed hearings, and several clients had to retain other counsel. See Kingery, 871 N.W.2d at 122, 125 (noting that “[a]rrests and jail time certainly constitute harm” and imposing sixty-day suspension); Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 660, 663 (imposing one-year disciplinary suspension and concluding that “[t]he serious harm [Clarity‘s] clients suffered as a result of his misconduct is . . . aggravating: three clients were arrested and jailed, an appeal was dismissed with prejudice, clients had to retain other counsel, and retainers were not returned“).
“A pattern of misconduct is an aggravating factor.” Boles, 808 N.W.2d at 442. We have a pattern of misconduct here. Turner
habitually failed to deposit payments from clients into his client trust account as required. “[M]ultiple violations of disciplinary rules generally support enhanced sanctions.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 860 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Iowa 2015). Turner violated multiple rules of professional conduct.
We have held an attorney‘s failure to learn from an earlier audit is an aggravating factor. See Santiago, 869 N.W.2d at 174, 183 (noting that while the auditor completing the 2011 audit of attorney‘s records helped the attorney comply with the trust account requirements, the attorney “failed to take the lessons to heart” and committed additional trust account violations in 2013). We consider as an aggravating factor Turner‘s failure to learn during his twenty-month audit and take prompt corrective measures in response to the auditor‘s ongoing input.
An attorney‘s “[f]ailure to respond to and cooperate with the Board‘s investigation is also an aggravating factor.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 841 N.W.2d 114, 128 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 551Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d 689, 700 (Iowa 2014). Turner was uncooperative at times during Brinkmeyer‘s audit.
Apart from his interim suspension in these proceedings, our court has not previously disciplined Turner. Prior discipline can be an aggravating factor but not when it is intertwined with the current case. Powell, 830 N.W.2d at 359. We therefore do not consider Turner‘s twenty-week interim suspension as an aggravating factor because that
suspension arose from the same conduct that forms the basis for this decision. Rather, “an interim suspension for conduct involved in a case can be considered as a mitigating factor in determining the length and adequacy of a suspension as a sanction in the case.” Id.; see also Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 662 (noting the difference between disability suspensions and disciplinary suspensions and explaining we “can consider an interim suspension arising from the same conduct when calibrating the disciplinary suspension“).
We consider lengthy experience as an aggravating factor. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Smith, 904 N.W.2d 154, 161 (Iowa 2017) (“The only aggravating factor here is Smith‘s lengthy experience as an attorney.“); Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 436 (considering a “seasoned” attorney‘s twenty-five years of practice as an aggravating factor); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 381 (Iowa 2005) (noting that an attоrney with almost thirty years of experience “should have known better” than to violate conflict-of-interest rules). Turner is inexperienced. Even before we adopted the rules of professional conduct, we considered inexperience to be a mitigating factor. See In re Disbarment of DeCaro, 220 Iowa 176, 185, 162 N.W. 132, 137 (1935) (“What we might say or do with an attorney of larger experience, mature years, is not necessarily what would be just to this young man.“). Other courts have regarded inexperience as a mitigating factor. See, e.g., Ligon v. Tapp, 519 S.W.3d 315, 323 (Ark. 2017) (recognizing “inexperience in the practice of law” as a mitigating factor); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass‘n v. Kerr, 291 P.3d 198, 199 (Okla. 2012) (viewing fact that attorney had not been licensed a full year as a mitigating factor).
Nevertheless, Turner repeatedly missed court hearings and made misrepresentations to the court. Lawyers of any level of experience would understand that such actions are deplorable. See, e.g., In re Cleland, 2 P.3d 700, 705 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (considering inexperience as a mitigating factor but noting “inexperience does not go far . . . to excuse or to mitigate dishonesty, misrepresentation, or misappropriation” because “[l]ittle experience in the practice of law is necessary to appreciate such actual wrongdoing“); In re Powell, 76 N.E.3d 130, 135 n.3 (Ind. 2017) (per curiam) (noting inexperience will generally not be a mitigating factor in cases involving dishonesty or misappropriation); In re Disciplinary Action Against Klotz, 909 N.W.2d 327, 339 (Minn. 2018) (per curiam) (recognizing “that limited years in practice can mitigate misconduct that is related to an attorney‘s inexperience” but explaining that “inexperience does not mitigate acts of dishonesty” (quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against Michael, 836 N.W.2d 753, 767 (Minn. 2013))); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 579 S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 2003) (viewing inexperience as a mitigating factor but emphasizing that the attorney‘s inexperience had nothing to do
Turner received multiple warnings from Iowa district court judges and the federal bankruptcy court through orders to show cause, sanctions, and rulings finding him in contempt. Brinkmeyer‘s ongoing audit should have led Turner to quickly resolve the problems with his bookkeeping practices, yet he failed to do so. Turner disregarded many wake-up calls to clean up his act.
We consider mitigating factors as well. Turner suffers from depression and ADHD. He argues that his ADHD explains his violations. He submitted the report of a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. William Logan,
who confirmed the diagnoses of ADHD and depression. Dr. Logan‘s report stated,
Turner‘s difficulties with his law practice are related primarily to his longstanding Attention Deficit Disorder causing problems with focus, concentration and task organization. It is recommended he have monthly therapy for both depressive symptoms and his Attention Deficit problems and continue to take medication. Problems seem to occur when he was receiving medication at any quarterly intervals or was without medication and did not make time to talk about daily difficulties with time, scheduling and case load management. With the proposed modifications, including consultation with a mo[r]e experienced attorney on a regular basis, it is likely that future similar difficulties will be avoided.
We have recognized that “[p]ersonal illnesses, such as depression or attention deficit disorder, do not excuse a lawyer‘s misconduct but can be mitigating factors.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 703 (Iowa 2008). The key for mitigation is that the lawyer proactively seeks treatment to address the condition and avoid reoccurrence of the misconduct. See Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 661 (“To be considered in mitigation, the alcoholism must have contributed to the ethical misconduct, and the lawyer must undertake rehabilitative efforts to control his addiction.“); see also Dolezal, 841 N.W.2d at 129 (noting that when an attorney receives treatment for an illness, “his efforts to get healthy must be considered in fashioning an appropriate sanction” (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 2010))). Because Turner attends counseling sessions and takes medication, we consider his depression and ADHD in mitigation.
Another mitigating factor is acceptance of responsibility and acknowledgment of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Kingery, 871 N.W.2d at 122 (considering an attorney‘s “sincere acceptance of responsibility as a mitigating factor“); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof‘l Ethics & Conduct v.Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Iowa 2004) (considering “the attorney‘s recognition of some wrongdoing” as a mitigating factor). To his credit, Turner, while represented by counsel, stipulated to the violations and underlying facts before the commission hearing. We weigh this mitigating factor against his prior delays in responding to the Board and his spotty cooperation with the auditor. But, we note a lack of contrition in Turner‘s statement filed pro se shortly before submission of his case to our court.
We have considered efforts to correct and prevent billing and accounting problems as a mitigating circumstance. See Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 589. Turner took business classes and worked with an experienced lawyer to mentor him with regard to trust account compliance and client management. He also reports relying on his girlfriend, an accountant, for assistance.
On balance, noting that Turner has already served a twenty-week interim suspension for these violations, we hold a one-year disciplinary suspension to run from the date of this opinion is appropriate. Prior to reinstatement, Turner must provide an evaluation from a licensed mental health professional verifying his fitness to practice law. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d 659, 678 (Iowa 2013) (imposing a similar requirement).
We note that Turner has not yet paid court-ordered sanctions, fines, and costs and owes the following amounts (plus interest, if applicable):
| Fred Leaming | $497.50 |
| Steve Cummings | $875.00 |
| Laura Cummings | $875.00 |
| Kelly Willard | $1000.00 |
| Walter Anhorn | $1000.00 |
| Lasandra Kearney | $800.00 |
| Mahaska County court costs | $260.00 |
| Story County jury costs | $1920.75 |
| Story County fine | $500.00 |
| Polk County fine | $250.00 |
| Total | $7978.25 |
Prior to reinstatement, Turner must provide proof he has paid off all of the foregoing sums. See, e.g., Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 653, 663 (conditioning reinstatement on attorney satisfying judgment a client obtained against him in small claims court); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 792 N.W.2d 674, 683 (Iowa 2010) (requiring attorney to provide proof of compliance with bankruptcy court order to return money to clients); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806, 810-11, 816-17 (Iowa 2007) (conditioning reinstatement on attorney satisfying judgment and reimbursing tax clients for penalty).
Turner also must complete five hours of CLE on law firm manаgement and five hours of CLE on ethics. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ryan, 863 N.W.2d 20, 33 (Iowa 2015) (requiring “proof of completion of two hours of ethics CLE and two hours of trust account CLE” before reinstatement); Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 590 (requiring attorney to attend “continuing education with respect to billing, timekeeping practices, and client trust accounts, and to submit proof of his attendance to the court prior to reinstatement“).
While we encourage Turner to seek guidance from a licensed Iowa attorney mentor, we decline to require such supervision going forward. See Hedgecoth, 862 N.W.2d at 366-67, 367 n.2 (declining to impose a supervision requirement); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att‘y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 901 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 2017)
V. Disposition.
We suspend Turner‘s license to practice law with no possibility of reinstatement for one year from the filing of this opinion. This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
All justices concur except Hecht and Christensen, JJ., who take no part.
Notes
is a fee for agreeing to make legal services available when needed during a specified time period. In form it is an option contract; the fee is earned by the attorney when paid since the attorney is entitled to the money regardless of whether he actually performs any services for the client.Id. at 54 (quoting Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 647, 649 n.13 (1989)). In contrast, a special retainer
covers payment of funds for a specific service. If the client and attorney agree that the attorney shall receive the special retainer payment in advance of performing the services, then the payment is commonly referred to as an “advance fee payment.”Id. at 55 (citation omitted). “[L]awyers must deposit all advance fee payments into a client trust account.” Id. at 56.