39 Iowa 124 | Iowa | 1874
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff in these suits alleges that it has paid all the taxes legally chargeable and levied upon its property for the years 1870 and 1871, and complains that certain illegal taxes have been levied thereon, and that the treasurer of the county is about to sell the plaintiff’s lands for such illegal taxes and costs charged thereon, and asks that such sale may be enjoined.
I. The first tax complained of as illegal is the road tax for 1870.
The defendant gave in evidence the following extract from the records of the township trustees of oue of the townships of the county, viz:
“ State of Iowa, 1 Sac County, April 11, 1870. j
Trustees met according to law for the purpose of levying road taxes for the year 1870. Present, E. A. Cobb, J. Jones, W. "V. Lagorgue, Trustees. On motion, resolved to levy three mills on a dollar.
O. J. Dart, Town Olería.”
It was stipulated on the trial, that each of the other townships of the county have similar records of the levying of road taxes by the respective boards of trustees of each of said townships, and the introduction of such records is waived, and the fact admitted, that such records, if produced, would be, in substance, the same as the above.
It is also shown by the evidence that the township clerks of the different townships sent up certified lists to the treasurer, showing that the road taxes levied upon the lands of plaintiff for the year 3870, had not been paid, and that these lists have been lost. Parol evidence was admitted, after showing the loss of the certified lists, by which it was made to appear that the lists sent up did not show the amount of road taxes levied against particular tracts of land, but stated that the road taxes had not been paid on the lands mentioned in the lists, without stating any amounts of taxes; that the lists, in some instances, described whole townships in one descrip
It is further shown that in making the tax book .for 1870, the road tax was carried out thereon as a part of the consolidated tax at the time the book was made out.
III. It appears by the record that, among the taxes for which the treasurer has advertised plaintiff’s lands for sale, is a tax of ten mills on the dollar upon the assessment of 1871, for the purpose of paying off the ordinary county indebtedness. This tax appellant claims is illegal. The question arises only in the second case which was decided on a demurrer to the petition.
The Minute Book of the Board of Supervisors, under date of September 4th, 1871, contains the following:
“Whereas, The warrants of the county are at a depreciated value: therefore,
“ Resolved, By the Board of Supervisors of Sac County, in the State of Iowa, that the question whether a tax of ten (10) mills above that provided by law, shall be levied upon the taxable property of the county, to pay off the ordinary county indebtedness, shall be submitted to the voters of the several townships of the county at the next general election, to be held on the 10th day of October, 1871.
“The manner of voting shall be, each voting for or against the same shall deposit a ‘ballot’ on which shall be written or printed, ‘ Eor the special tax to pay off the county indebtedness,’ or ‘Against the special tax to pay off the county indebtedness.’ And if a majority of the legal voters of said county, voting for or against said proposition, vote for said proposition, then said tax shall be levied as other county taxes, and collected in like manner, but not otherwise, and it is ordered that the clerk of this Board make and publish a proclamation of the time of said election, and of the proposition therein contained, to be submitted, etc., as usual, and said vote shall be canvassed and returned at the same time that other votes at said election are canvassed. Approved.
Howard Pierce, Chairman.”
“Resolved, That the County Auditor is hereby authorized and empowered to place the said ten mill tax on the tax books of 1871, and place his warrant on the same, and that the same be collected by the county treasurer as other taxes are.”
It is insisted by appellant’s counsel that these proceedings conferred no power on the Board of Supervisors to levy this special tax upon the assessment for 1871. '
• Section 251 provides: “ The mode of submitting such questions to the people shall be the following: the whole question, including the sum desired to be raised, or the amount of tax desired to be levied, or the rate per annum, and the whole regulation, including the time of its tahing effect or having operation, if it be of a nature to be set forth * * * is to be published at least four weeks in some newspaper printed in the county. If there be no such newspaper, the publication is to be made by being posted up in at least one of the most public places in each township, &c.”
Sections 255 and 312, further provide that the Board of Supervisors, “ on being satisfied that the above requirements have been substantially complied with, and that a majority of
The effect of these several provisions of the statute, when complied with, is to clothe the Board of Supervisors with powers which it does not otherwise possess by law. The board may be empowered to levy a tax “ of a higher rate than that provided by law,” “when the warrants of the county are at a depreciated value.” In order, therefore, that the board may acquire this power, a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute must be had. See Schroder v. Crary, 11 Iowa, 555.
It is urged that the proposition, as adopted or determined upon by the Board of Supervisors at their September meeting, did not fix or specify for what year the special tax was to be levied if ratified by the votes of the electors of the county, and that therefore the proceedings conferred no power on the board to levy the tax, and especially that no power was conferred to levy the tax for the year 1871, the regular time for levying taxes for that year having past prior to the election. It will be observed, however, that in the record made by the board on the 17th day of October, 1871, it is recited that the proposition submitted to the voters of the county was, “ shall a tax of ten mills on the taxable property of Sac county, Iowa, be levied for the year 1871.” There is nothing in the record except this recital, to show what the proposition actually submitted was.
The resolution passed by the board in September previous to the election does not name the year in which it was proposed to levy the tax, yet the published proposition may have named it as recited in the record of the board at their Octo
IY. It is alleged and shown by the record 'that in addition to a county tax of four mills on the dollar levied for 1870 and also for 1871, and other lawful taxes, the Board of Supervisors also levied, for the year 1870, a special judgment tax at the rate of ten mills on the dollar, to be applied in payment of four several judgments against the county, and also a like tax of ten mills on the dollar for 1871, to be applied on the same judgments. It is averred that these judgments were obtained on the ordinary warrants of the county issued for ordinary county expenses, such as the payment of the salaries of county officers, jurors’ fees, the support of the poor and the like, and it is claimed by appellant that four mills on the dollar is the maximum rate of taxation, which the Board of Supervisors ivas authorized to levy for the ordinary expenses of the county, and for the payment of said judgments, and that, having levied in each year such maximum tax, the board had no power or authority to levy the additional tax of ten mills for the payment of the judgments.
The general question here involved has been several times passed upon by this court. Clark, Dodge & Co. v. The City of Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494, was an action of mandamus to compel the city to levy a specific tax, sufficient to pay off a judgment rendered against it in favor of the plaintiffs. The city charter provided that “ the city council shall have power and authority to levy and collect taxes upon all taxable property, real, personal and mixed within said city, not exceeding one-half of one per centum per annum upon the assessed value thereof.” By an amendment to the charter it was provided, “ that whenever there is a deficiency in the ordinary revenue of the city, after payment of the ordinary city expenses, to pay the semi-annual interest on the debt already created, the city council shall levy a specific tax upon the assessment of the current year to pay said interest.” It was set up in the answer that the city council had exhausted its power to levy taxes, under the power granted to the city in these provisions of its charter. It was claimed by plain
It is held, also, that a municipal-corporation can exercise the power of taxation, only when expressly conferred by the legislature.
Section 3274 of the Eevision exempts from execution the public buildings and other 'public property of civil corporations, and also exempts the property of private citizens from being levied upon to pay a debt of a civil corporation. Section 3275 is as follows: “In case no property is found on which to levy, which is not exempt by the last section, or if the judgment creditor elect not to issue execution against such corporation, he is entitled to the amount of his judgment and costs, in the ordinary evidences of indebtedness issued by that corporation. And if the debtor corporation issues no scrip or evidences of debt, a tax must be levied as early as practicable, sufficient to pay off the judgment with interest and costs.”
It was held, in the case referred to, that this last section conferred no independent power upon the city to levy a specific tax to pay off a judgment against it.
In Coy v. The City Council of Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1, also a proceeding by mandamus to compel the levy of a special tax to pay a judgment against the city, the same doctrine is recognized.
in the opinion, says: “The plaintiff holds his judgment, and has demanded payment and the levy of a tax to satisfy it, and brings his action for mandamus to compel such levy. The defendant shows, in defense, that the city council has no authority to levy exceeding a certain rate per cent, which may not, in one year, satisfy the judgment. The object of the suit is to compel payment, and the defense only shows an inability under the law to levy sufficient to
Oswald v. Thedinga, 17 Iowa, 13, was an action against tbe, Mayor and City Council of Dubuque to make them personally liable for a refusal to levy a tax to pay a judgment which the, plaintiff recovered against the city, and it is held that the plaintiff having obtained his judgment, it became the duty of the city council under the law, as early as practicable, to levy and collect a tax for its payment, but that it would be a legal excuse for refusing to levy the tax, if the taxing power had been • fully exhausted before the demand to do so was made. ,
Porter v. Thompson, 22 Iowa, 391, was a case similar to the one last named, and it was held that the officers were liable, after a demand to levy the taxes, if within their power under the law, and a refusal to comply with such demand. And it was further said in that case that, ‘£ if the taxing power was. at the time, or for that year exhausted, there would be no liability for the failure. For the statute must be construed in connection with the taxing power of the corporation. It was not intended that a special levy should be made, which, with prior or existing levies, would exceed the maximum rate or per centum fixed in the charter.” And it is also said in that case, that should the necessary current expenses of the corporation ££ absorb the whole taxes which the officers are allowed by law to levy, they would not be bound to comply with the demand. That is to say, if the actual necessary expenses of running the city government required a levy of one per cent (the maximum rate allowed), there would be nd liability for refusing to levy more.”
In the case of Coffin v. The City Council of Davenport, 26 Iowa, 515, the same general doctrine was held and practF cally applied in the modification of the judgment of the court below.
It is claimed, however, by counsel for appellees, that all these cases arose under acts or charters where the power of taxation -was limited to a certain specific rate in the aggregate. This is true, and yet it is difficult to see why the principle established by the decisions referred to does not apply equally to a county as to a city corporation, for, by the law conferring the power of taxation upon the Board of Supervisors, the maximum rate they may levy, for the several purposes named, is also fixed. See Section 710, Revision of 1860, which is as follows:
“That the Board of Supervisors of each county in this state fehall annually, as hereinafter provided, levy the following taxes upon the assessed value of the taxable property in the county:
1. For state revenue one and one-half (now two and one-half) mills on a dollar, etc.
2. For ordinary county revenue, including the support of the poor, not,more tTianfour mills on a dollar, and a poll tax of fifty cents. _ '
3.. For support of schools, not less than one nor more than two mills on a dollar.
4. For making and repairing bridges, not more than one mill on the dollar, whenever the Board of Supervisors shall deem it necessary.”
It will be observed that the law no where confers upon counties, as such, the power to levy any taxes whatever. The Board of Supervisors have conferred upon it, by the above provisions, the power to levy the state taxes within a certain limitation, as well as the county and school taxes with like limitations. These provisions contain and confer the only power that is given by law to the Board of Supervisors to levy
The board is authorized to levy for ordinary county revenue, including the support of the poor, not more than four mills on a dolla/r, and a poll tax of fifty cents; also, if they deem it necessary, they may levy a bridge tax of not more them one mill on the dollar. This section confers the only authority to levy county taxes, and limits the power therein conferred, just as plainly as a provision in a city charter conferring authority on the corporation to levy taxes not exceeding a fixed rate. But it is said that section 3275 requires, when a judgment is rendered against a county, that a tax shall be levied to pay it, and since section 7Í0 confers authority only to levy taxes for specific purposes, without naming a tax to pay off judgments against the county, the power-to do so must be found in section 3275. ¥e think this argument is not tenable, for one of the evident purposes of ordinary county revenue is for the payment of its debts, whether arising upon county warrants or upon judgments obtained on such warrants.
It is manifest that section 710 was intended to confer authority on the Board of Supervisors, to levy all the taxes proper.to enable the counties of the State to raise revenue for all needful purposes, and that no further power of taxation was intended to be given by. that section, than is therein expressed. If, then, section 3275 gives no independent power of taxation, but only calls that power into exercise when it is elsewhere given by law, then we must look to section 710 for the power to tax; when we do this, we find it there limited, and we can see no solid reason why the limitations contained therein have not the same controlling operation as if contained in a city charter. To our minds there is no difference in principle.
We are aware that the Supreme Court of the United States in Butz v. The City of Muscatine, 8 Wallace, 575, construed section 3275 of the Revision to confer an independent power to levy a tax to pay a judgment against the city, which is in direct conflict with the decisions of this court in the cases before cited. That case arose in the Federal Courts, and was
It is further urged that the law confers upon county municipalities the power to contract debts which may exceed its, ability to pay, and at the same time meet the ordinary current: expenses of the county government, with a tax of four mills on a dollar on the taxable property within the county; that, the revenue of the county thus obtained may all be absorbed-in defraying these current expenses, and, in such case, the creditor of the county will be practically denied a remedy for the collection of his debt. There is some force in this argument,, and yet not as much as would seem on first blush; for when the creditor of the county becomes such, he does so in view of what the law is at the time.' He is supposed to know the law,; and what are his rights and remedies, under it. But, if the. law is defective in this respect, the remedy is with the legislature, and not with the courts.
The Board of Supervisors having levied the maximum rate of tax which the law authorized, it had no authority to levy the additional so called judgment taxes for the years 1870’ and 1871. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to a decree enjoining the sale of its lands for such taxes, and for costs of advertising beyond those herein, indicated, which decree will be rendered in this court if plaintiff so elects, or the cause will be remanded, for that purpose, to the District Court.
Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
Our statute, under the title “ Revenue,” enacts: “ Sec. 710. That the Board of Supervisors of each county in this State shall annually, as hereinafter provided, levy the following taxes upon the assessed value of the taxable property in the county: 1. For State revenue, one and one-lialf mills on a dol; lar. * * * 2. For ordinary county revenue, including the support of the poor, not more than four mills on a dollar. 3. For support of schools, not less than one nor more -than three mills on a dollar. 4. For making and repairing bridges, not more than three mills on the dollar, (as amended Sec. 1, Ch. 87, Laws 1866).” And under the title “ Executions,” our statute also enacts: “Sec. 3274. IPublic buildings owned by the State, or any county, city, school district, or other civil corporation, * * * * * are exempt from execution. The property of a private citizen can in no case be levied upon to pay the debt of a civil corporation. Sec. 3275. In case no property is found on which to levy, which is not exempted -by the last section, or if the judgment creditor elect not to issue execution against such corporation, he is entitled to the amount of his judgment and costs, in the ordinary evidences of indebtedness issued by that corporation. And if the debtor corporation issues no scrip or evidences of debt, a tax must be levied as early as practicable, sufficient to pay off the judgment with intérest and costs.”
It was held by this court in Clark, Dodge & Co. v. The City of Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494, that this section of our statute last quoted conferred no power or authority upon the officers of the defendant, the city of Davenport, to levy any tax; and that, having already levied a tax of one-half of one per cent, (the maximum of their power under the city charter,) they could not be required by mandamus to levy any further tax to pay a judgment. The doctrine of this case has been recognized or followed in the following cases also: Coy v. The City Council of Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1; Oswald v. Thedinga,
All these cases related to cities organized under special charters, and not under our general municipal incorporation act.
Now, if the powers of the Board of Supervisors respecting the levy of taxes is not other and different from the powers of the several city councils, in the cases cited, then those cases become conclusive upon us, and would lead us inevitably to negative the power to levy the tax.
But, the learned judge who prepared the opinion of the court in the first and leading case above cited, proceeds to show that § 3275 does not apply to the defendant in that case, or to any city organized under a special charter. He says: “This section is found in the Code of 1851, in a general .statute relating to executions. It applies to all corporations as organized under the general statutes passed at the same time this provision was. This law was passed, however, when there was a constitutional provision in force, which prohibited the creation of corporations, by special legislation, except for political and municipal purposes. It was under this constitution that the charter of the defendant was granted. The defendant is a municipal corporation, and was created by a special law, could not constitutionally exist except by special legislation, and if not, no statute, general in its provisions, could apply to it, or regulate or control its process. If this general provision would control the defendant, why the necessity of an amendment to its charter, giving it the power to levy a special tax to meet the interest on bonds issued prior to January, 1855? This section occurs incidentally in the chapter in relation to executions. It does not purport to be an amendment to the charter of. defendant; nor does it specially relate to corporations for city purposes, * *
But suppose, as might be inferred from some of the language used in one or more of the opinio ns. in the cases cited, that the court considered section 3275 as applying to those cases; and concede, for the purpose of the discussion,'that it does apply equally to cities under special charters, and under the general law, and to counties.
It will be observed that the charters of the cities referred to limit the power of taxation in the aggregate to the per centum specified. That is to say, those cities might levy taxes for the various legitimate purposes, and at such rate for each purpose, as the proper officers might determine, but all such levies could not in the aggregate exceed the limit prescribed. And hence, if the limit had been reached, no further levy could be made, even for the purpose of paying a judgment. But as respects the Board of Supervisors, there is no limit fixed for the aggregate of the levies of taxes they may make, but a limit prescribed to the tax for each purpose, save the one. That is to say. they must levy annually, first, for State revenue not exceeding two mills; second, for ordinary county revenue, etc., not more than four mills; third, for support of schools not more than two mills; fourth, for making and repairing bridges not more than three mills on the dollar, (Rev., Sec. 710, and Sec. 1, Ch. 87, of Laws 1866); and, then, also a t$x sufficient to pay off any judgment with interest and costs.' (Sec. 3275). Thus it will be seen that while there is a.
Nor is there, to our mind, any force or validity in the argument, that since the judgments were rendered upon warrants issued for the one or the other of the two purposes, ordinary revenue or bridges, and the maximum tax for those had been levied, therefore no tax could be levied to pay off such judgments. It is enough that they are judgments, for thereby is created the necessity for the exercise of the power to levy a tax to pay them, which section 3275 has conferred. If the warrants upon which the judgments were rendered, were issued wrongfully, or in excess of any authority so to do, this might constitute a defense to the action upon them; (Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 213, and Clark v. Polk Co., Ib., 248); and, if it had been then interposed, might have defeated the recovery of the judgments. But that stage of the controversy is passed, and the judgments are now verities, and absolutely conclusive that the warrants were valid and properly issued; and that the county justly owes the amount. The State ex rel. v. Beloit, 20 Wis., 79; The Mayor v. Lord, 9 Wall., 409; Supervisors etc. v. United States, 4 Wall., 435.
In the case of The State ex rel. Hasbrouck v. The City of Milwaukee, 25 Wis., 122, Cole, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says, on page 133: “Still this general proposition may be maintainable upon the authorities that, where a municipal corporation has the power to contract the debt, it has, by necessary implication, authority to resort to the usual mode of raising money to pay it, which, undoubtedly, is taxation.” And in the same case Dixon, Ch. J., says, on page 142: “ But if I had not this plain ground to stand upon, namely, the power of taxation expressly given by the statutes authorizing the city to contract the debt, I should still hesitate long before holding that the creditor by judgment in such case had no remedy for its collection. I can hardly conceive it possible that such a state of things can exist under the constitution of this State, as I have had reason to observe on several occasions heretofore. Phelps v. Rooney, 12 Wis., 698; Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis., 37; Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis., 237. The raising of money by taxation being the usual, and, I may say, the only means by which the payment of such debts can be made or enforced, the power to tax in the ordinary methods,, if not expressly given would, as it seems to me, be most clearly and necessarily implied from the power to contract the debt itself, and would run with the debt, creating a continuous and irrepealable obligation and duty to exercise it so long as the debt, or any part of it, remained unpaid. Such appears to be' the doctrine of the Pennsylvania decisions upon this point, and it appears to me sound, wholesome and just.” See also, Crane v. The City of Fond du Lac, 16 Wis., 196. To the same effect are the cases of The People ex rel., &c., v. San Francisco, 21 Cal., 668, and cases cited; also, The City of Chicago v. Halsey, 25 Ills., 595; Olney v. Harvey, 50 Ills., 453; Schaffer v. Cadwallader, 36 Pa. St., 126. The same doctrine is also held in other States, and in the Federal Court, see Butz v. Muscatine, 8th Wall., 575, and .cases there cited.
This opinion is already too extended, and may best be concluded by a recapitulation of the grounds of my dissent,
Rehearing
OPINION ON REHEARING.
After the filing of the foregoing opinions, and within the time allowed by law and the rules of court, the plaintiff filed a petition for a rehearing upon the questions relating to the-special county tax of ten mills on tlie-dollar of valuation, levied for the purpose of paying county indebtedness. The usual order granting a re-hearing was made, the question re-argued and submitted at the April term, 1874, at Dubuque.
By section 250 of the Revision the Board of Supervisors were authorized, when the warrants of the county were at a depreciated value, to submit the question to the people of the county, at a regular or special election, “ whether a tax of a higher rate than that provided’by law- shall be levied.” The
The next section (251) provided that the mode of submitting such questions to the people shall be the following: “ The whole question, including the sum desired to be raised or the amount of tax desired to be levied, or the rate per annum, and the whole regulation, including the time of its taking effect or having operation, if it be of a nature to be set forth, and the penalty for its violation, if there be one, is to be published at least four weeks in some'newspaper printed in the county. If there be no such newspaper, the publication is to be made by being posted up in one of the most public places in each township in the county, and in all such cases in at least five among- the most public places in the county including the above, and one of them in all cases at the door of the court house, during at least thirty days prior to .the time of taking the vote. All such notices shall name the time when such question will be voted upon, and the form in which the question shall be taken, and a copy of the question submitted shall be posted up at each place of voting during the day of the election.”
In pursuance of the authority thus given by the statute, the Board of Supervisors of Sac County, on the 4th of September, 1871, adopted the following preamble and resolution:
“ Whereas, The warrants of the county are at a depreciated value, therefore,
Resolved, By the Board of Supervisors of.the county of Sac, in the State of Iowa, that the question whether a tax of ten mills above that provided by law shall be levied upon the taxable property of the county to pay off the ordinary county indebtedness, shall be submitted to the voters of the several townships of the county at the next general election, to be held on the 10th day of October, 1871. The manner of voting shall be, each voting for or against the same shall deposit a ‘ballot’ on which shall be written or printed, ‘ For the special tax to pay off the ordinary county indebtedness; ’ or, ‘ Against the special tax to pay off the ordinary county indebtedness.’ And if a majority of the legal voters of said county, voting for or
Howard Pierce, Chairman.”
The power or authority to levy the tax in question could be obtained only by a compliance with the provisions of the statute. The record does not show what publication was made prior to the election, or whether the proposition resolved to be submitted as above set out was published as the statute requires. But conceding that a notice of the submission was ■ published, wTe are not authorized to presume that any other or different proposition than the one determined upon by the board was in fact published. There would be no authority for publishing any other. It was only the question or proposition determined upon that could lawfully be submitted to the voters of the county. The resolution adopted by the board contained the only proposition which could be submitted to such vote, and it authorized the clerk to publish a proclamation of the time of the election and of the proposition therein contained to be submitted, and none other. So that we must conclude that the proposition contained in the resolution was the one submitted and voted upon by the people.
The record further shows that on the 17 th day of October, 1871, the Board of Supervisors met, canvassed the votes, and declared the proposition canned, and then also adopted the further resolution directing the county auditor “ to place the said ten mills tax on the tax books of 1871.”
The objection is made that the proposition which the Board of Supervisors adopted and submitted failed to specify the year for or in which' the proposed tax should be levied, and that the board had no power to levy it for 1871.
As to the effect of the act upon this case, we are of ojnnion that, since no judgment was rendered herein upon the filing of the majority opinion, and a rehearing having been granted and the cause being pending thereon when the act took effect, the case must be regarded precisely as if no opinion had been previously filed therein, and that it is our duty to apply the
On the other questions discussed and determined, in the majority opinion heretofore filed herein, and not re-examined in this opinion, we are content to adhere thereto. That opinion, as herein modified, will be re-filed herewith.
The costs of this court and those of the court below will be taxed in equal portions against both parties. Judgment may be rendered in this court if either party moves therefor, otherwise the cause will be remanded to the District Court with directions to render judgment not inconsistent with the opinions herein.
Beversed.