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Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, and Iowa Water Environment Association
850 N.W.2d 403
Iowa
2014
Check Treatment

*1 by that Iowa Light requirement able defendant.” Elec. tion of the improvidently here Co., v. & Power Co. Gen. Elec. 352 N.W.2d easily forsakes our clear and applied prin- (Iowa 1984); also, e.g., see Rossell ciples of factual causation. I in- would Am., Volkswagen 147 Ariz. apply stead our traditional principles of (1985) P.2d “an inter- (explaining factual causation in this case and conclude vening superseding force becomes a cause Huck has advanced evidence sufficient to only when operation its was both unfore- jury allow a to find alleged the brands’ seeable when with and the benefit of ‘hind- negligence awas but-for of the harm cause sight’ may it be described as abnormal or she has suffered here. I would therefore extraordinary” applying and rule in case of entry reverse the district court’s of sum- negligent placement battery); of car Lar- mary judgment on Huck’s claims with re- Mach., Wallace, son Inc. v. 268 Ark. spect to the brands and remand for trial. 600 S.W.2d (explaining “[t]he mere fact that other causes intervene be- APPEL, JJ., WIGGINS and join this tween original negligence act of and in part concurrence in part. dissent the injury recovery sought for which original sufficient relieve the actor if liability, injury is the natural and probable consequence original negli-

gent act or might omission and is such as

reasonably apply- have been foreseen” and

ing rule in spreader); ease of fertilizer (“[T]he

Weyerhaeuser, 620 N.W.2d at 831 resulting explosion fire and ... FEDERATION, were fore- IOWA FARM BUREAU intervening product’s seeable causes Association, [of Iowa Renewable Fuels supersede that did not defect] [defen- and Iowa Water Environment Associ responsibility.”); Zacher v. Budd ation, Appellants, dant’s Co., (S.D.1986) (ex- plaining “even if plaintiff is assumed contributorily negligent, whether that in- Agribusiness Iowa, Association of Asso

tervening supersedes force the defendant’s Industry, ciation of Business negligence is for the jury to decide” and Association, Iowa Cattlemen’s Iowa applying rule in case of wheel explosion). Cooperatives, Institute for Iowa Lime short,

In imaginable Association, universe of sce- stone Producers Iowa narios in which an actor who man- has not Association, Pork Producers Iowa ufactured a product may Poultry or sold neverthe- Association, Turkey less both cause and be damages liable for Federation, and Iowa Corn Growers caused is enormous. The majority’s pro- Association, Appellants, posed “product-identification re- causation quirement” does no work to address the ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION majority

vast of these scenarios. See Bo- Department COMMISSION and Iowa lin, (“Taken 2014 WL at *8 out of Resources, Appellees, Natural context, language product identification ... may cases well appear support argument. truth, GSK’s the principles

for which Policy line of cases stands are Environmental Law & Center here.”). inapposite Midwest, majority’s invoca- Iowa Environmental *2 Club, Appel Council, Sierra

lees.

No. 12-0827. of Iowa.

Supreme Court

July *3 Protection Commission

Environmental of Natural Resources. Department Illinois, Klein, Chicago, Bradley D. Moines, Mandelbaum, Des T. Joshua Law & Environmental intervenor-appellee Center, Taylor, L. Ce- Policy Wallace appellee Sierra Club. Rapids, dar CADY, Justice. Chief *4 issues decide two appeal, we In this qualifications persons concerning the commis- on government serve state who First, rulemaking. engage sions who an Iowan must decide whether we disqualified to was on a commission served regula- a rule and adoption of vote on the in activities in her engaged tion when she rule. Sec- support employment rule ond, whether a we must decide was invalid after by a commission adopted par- member who that a it was discovered actually voting in the ticipated be- on the commission qualified to serve as an elector lost her status cause she had in Iowa. by the of the decision

On our review court, the nature of we conclude district a commis- rulemaking disqualify does not adopt rules voting member from sion sup- personally professionally and she disqual- conclude that the We also ported. member does not of a commission ification taken the commis- invalidate the action disqualification particular when the sion integrity not undermine did sup- interest process and when the dis- validating despite the rule ports the decision of We affirm qualification. T. L. Mock and Karl Olson Michael court. the district McNeill, P.L.C., Parker, West Simons & Moines, Vyskocil L. and Julia Des Proceed- Background Facts I. Swanson & Beving, L. McAfee of Eldon ings.

Forrest, P.C., Moines, appellants. Des Protection Commis- The Environmental General, Miller, protect Iowa’s environment Attorney exists to J. sion

Thomas resources. One of Steward, its natural and conserve and David S. David R. Sheridan policies General, duties is to establish primary its Attorneys appellees Assistant governing Vernon, and make rules the environ- College Cornell in Mount and she ment, including the adoption accompanied of rules to him when he left Iowa on a implement pro- federal environmental teaching Seur, sabbatical in Montana. La 455A.6(6)(a) grams. however, continued to own home in (2009). The Commission is composed during Mount Vernon the sabbatical and nine appointed by members the Governor continued serve on the Commission. to senate confirmation. Id. She to Iowa returned for Commission 455A.6(1). The members serve stag- meetings appeared by telephone confer- gered four-year terms. Id. The Commis- ence call. sion meets at throughout numerous times La Seur obtained a Montana drivers’ year, usually monthly, the mem- license after moving registered to vote receive per compensation bers diem in ad- July in Montana in 2009. She was previ- expenses. dition reimbursement for Id. ously registered to vote in Iowa. The sab- (4). 455A.6(3), on Membership the batical permanent turned into a move after Commission is not a full-time position. La Seur’s husband accepted joba offer to usually Members have other careers and work Montana in January 2010. *5 employment, join but hundreds of other Heathcote La and Seur served on the participate Iowans to in the operation of during Commission a critical period of government by serving on various boards time when it adoption considered the and opera- commissions assist in the prevent rules to the degradation of exist government. tion of ing quality water of Iowa’s water re In March Governor Chet Culver sources. The United States Environmen appointed Susan Heathcote to the Com- (EPA) tal Agency Protection promulgated mission. The appointment was confirmed regulation required which states by the senate. employed Heathcote was adopt to policies aimed at preventing deg by the Iowa Environmental Council. The radation of existing quality water and con Iowa Environmental nonprofit Council is a with sistent federal criteria. See 48 Fed. corporation located in Des Moines. Its (Nov. 51, 400-01 1983) (codified Reg. at function protect is to work to Iowa’s natu- (2010)). § 40 C.F.R. 131.6 pro The EPA ral environment. Heathcote posi- held the mulgated the regulation pursuant to the Program tion of Water Director and was Federal Act, Water Pollution Control responsible for researching environmental which is better known the as Clean Water issues, advising the Environmental Council (CWA). 1313(a)(3)(A) § Act See 33 U.S.C. on policy, and representing advisory it on (2006) (requiring states to establish water groups. Heathcote began working for the standards). quality component One Council state’s quality water standards submission In May appoint- Governor Culver antidegradation “[a]n policy consistent ed Carrie La Seur to the Commission. 131.6(d). §with 131.12.” 40 C.F.R. For appointment Her by also confirmed an antidegradation policy to be consistent the Vernon, senate. She lived Mount criteria, must, with federal it at a mini Iowa, at the time of her appointment. La mum, maintain protect existing certain lawyer Seur is a organization and ran an 131.12(a)(1). uses of waterways. Id. called Plains Justice. She served as secre- similarly Iowa law requires the Iowa De

tary of the Commission. partment (IDNR), of Natural Resources July In La Seur through Commission, moved to Mon- “[establish, tana. Her professor husband was a modify, standards, at or repeal quality water groups advocat- among the environmental standards, and effluent stan

pretreatment 455B.173(2). petition. first for the ing dards.” workshops The IDNR held numerous to the federal respond was slow Iowa af- meetings with various stakeholders au- by federal efforts despite regulation, It also solic- petitions were filed. ter the spur Iowa to years over thorities held comments and various public ited July process. implementation begin the hearings. advocated in Heathcote ulti- finally initiated what IDNR stages all petition support first three-year process mately would process. the federal implement rules to adopting process The be- program. antidegradation petitions considering After individu- meeting rulemaking process, between with gan provided input IDNR, Environmental antidegrada- Iowa from proposed als the IDNR drafted a Club, state, Council, Chapter proposed the Sierra well as tion rule for Association, procedures. proposed Fly Fishing Hawkeye implementation eventually be procedures rules and would Policy Center. Environmental Law & approval. to the recom- submitted Commission rulemaking with petitions Two the IDNR differed The rules drafted subse- rules were antidegradation mended peti- rules the two proposed from the support IDNR in quently submitted tions, they closely aligned more but were antide- development appropriate proposals petition. in the first petition first standards. The gradation by a coali- in October 2007 was submitted ap- In December the Commission consisting of quality groups tion of water antidegradation the final rules and proved *6 Council, Iowa the Iowa Environmental by a of six to two. Heath- procedures vote Club, Hawkeye Chapter of the Sierra and approve cote and La Seur voted to In June Fly Fishing Association. rules, and one member of the Commission Farm Bureau and other Iowa Federation abstained. interests filed a agribusiness and industrial approved by The rules and procedures sought petition rulemaking for

second approved by then the Commission were stan- antidegradation a different set submitted to the legislative committee and advocat- antidegradation The rules dards. approval. EPA for review Iowa’s an- and petition generally in more ed the first were procedures and were tidegradation rules than the stringent rules advocated by approved September the EPA in 2010. petition. second In October Iowa Farm Bureau role in played Heathcote an active her and Federation two other associations filed with Environmental employment the Iowa judicial under for review section petition in developing proposed Council rules 17A.19 Iowa Administrative Proce- in the submitted to IDNR October (LAPA).1 sought petition Act The dure by her and the other petition employer Antidegradation Stan- overturn Iowa also active in groups. coalition She was Implementation Procedures. dards the IDNR to initiate the rulemak- pushing allege by taken They Com- action involved ing process, and she remained was Heathcote was mission invalid because followed after the to a conflict process disqualified IDNR vote due interest, disqualified La were filed. Seur was petitions rulemaking at the time she recognized person was as a lead serve on Commission Heathcote collectively opinion Bureau. petitioners will referred to in this as Farm First, satisfy appealed because she did not the re- and raised three voted issues. it to be quirement for Commission members by claims the district court erred granting eligible Iowa electors. summary judgment prior to the close of Second, discovery. it claims the district April the Commission filed a by court erred granting summary judg- summary judgment response motion for ment to the on Farm Commission Bureau’s petition judicial to the review. It claim that Heathcote had a conflict of in- claimed neither Heathcote nor La Seur required terest vacating the antide- disqualified voting from as a matter of gradation policy. Finally, Farm Bureau law. Farm Bureau responded to the mo- contends the district court by grant- erred by tion requesting reply time to so that it ing summary judgment to the Commission pursue discovery could of facts and infor- regarding Farm claim Bureau’s that La- mation relevant to summary judgment registration Seur’s to vote in Montana It proceedings. compel also moved to dis- voided her status eligible as an covery from the Iowa Environmental elector and that she inwas turn no longer Council, which had intervened in the case. qualified to serve on the Commission. Ac- Farm Bureau had previously obtained ex- cordingly, Farm argues Bureau the district tensive documents and materials from the court also erred vacating the anti- Commission, IDNR, and Iowa Environ- degradation policy ground. on this pursuant mental Council to subpoenas and other discovery, methods of but wanted Scope II. of Review. production additional of internal records relating documents to Heathcote’s em- We review a deny decision to dis ployment and other activities related to covery by the district court for abuse of employment, her Ellsworth, as well as all other com- discretion. Kulish v. (Iowa 1997). munications Heathcote relating to the N.W.2d We review process the adoption antidegra- decision the district court grant sum dation request rule. This included emails mary judgment for correction of errors at staff, and other communications between law. Rucker v. Cmty. Humboldt Sch. *7 donors, Dist., attorneys, (Iowa 2007); and others. The Iowa Environmental Council claimed the R.App. discov- Iowa P. 6.907. ery request sought pro- confidential and Discovery Summary III. Prior to

tected information overly and was burden- Judgment. some and largely unnecessary to resolve the issues. substantive deny The decision to grant or a summary continuance of a motion for judg

The district court denied the motion to ment pursue discovery to lies within the compel discovery granted and the motion Kulish, discretion of the trial court. quash by to filed the Iowa Environmental N.W.2d at 889. Generally, party to a Council. Farm Bureau eventually filed a lawsuit should be allowed to complete dis resistance to the summary judgment mo- covery before summary judgment is con tion sought summary judgment and on the Co., sidered. Miller v. Cont’l Ins. involving disqualification issue the of La (Iowa 1986). Seur. The district granted summary court Although a continuance would ordi Commission, judgment for the narily denied sum- appropriate in a case of this mary judgment Bureau, nature, sought by Farm it is clear the salient facts relevant and the petition. dismissed Farm Bureau to the claim that Heathcote was disquali- structure, the governmental the Within our voting emerged by time had

fied from ap- by As is administered a director was filed. an IDNR summary judgment the Governor, subject to senate by the pointed Environmental the Iowa employee § 455A.3. The played Council, unquestionably confirmation. Code Heathcote IDNR of the Gov- urging pleasure the serves the role director an active the antidegradation rules has Generally, forward with ernor. Id. the director move actively partici- IDNR duty and she and procedures power administer and petition filing promoting by legislature. and Id. provided pated however, rulemaking IDNR. She also legislature, with the also for 455A.4. Our employer her for on behalf of Protection advocated the Environmental established by the advo- stringent proposed rules perform certain overview Commission peti- responsible filing for cacy groups to es- including duty responsibilities, in the es- engaged process and was tion and for the effective policy tablish rules by the to address both tablished IDNR Id. IDNR. administration advo- rulemaking. Heathcote petitions 455A.6(6)(a). stringent propose the IDNR cated with with- most commissions Consistent procedures antidegradation rules government, in the executive branch of Commission, served, which she upon composed panel. of a citizen Commission approval. Farm Bureau had obtained approach part larger This venera- discovery ample pursue legal its chal- governmental process partic- of citizen ble in this case. lenge democracy that ipation and voice in our claim of Importantly, the structural together participation pub- with direct conflict of interest Farm Bu- asserted licly strength elected marks the officials reau was not based on hidden conduct vibrancy democracy. of our the Iowa Environmental Council Instead, squarely

IDNR. claims cen- branch component As a of the executive very visible dual open tered on role government, members of the Com- performed Heathcote as an advocate Governor, appointed by mission adjudicator. There were and ultimate am- to senate confirmation. Id. by the ple considerations to balance dis- 455A.6(1). strength integrity and court, trict it was within court’s by the participation citizen is established deny discovery. discretion to composition membership required must be the Commission. All members Disqualification IV. of Commission- *8 of Iowa members must electors and all er Heathcote. knowledge subjects embraced have spe- More governing under laws. Id. requires The resolution case of this first cifically,three members of Commission process a full of the fol- understanding actively in and engaged must be livestock government implement lowed in our to farming, one member must be grain regulations within the executive branch. blush, manufacturing compa- of a manager active At first of an idea individual actively one must be serving ny, as both an and member advocate and decision- commerce. Id. contrary general gov- working maker seems to our finance or 455A.6(l)(a), (6), (c). remaining approach. § ernmental must decide if We any specific deeper initial true four members do not need response rings upon this than to background, into the function or other inquiry rulemaking employment of the knowledge an elector and have government. be 4H subject matter of the Commission. Id. elections is deeply embedded within 455A.6(l)(d). § person An elector is a eli- legislative executive and branches of Const, gible government. to vote in Iowa. See Iowa art.

II, § 1. background This does not or undermine may appoint- oppose

The Governor not make by the claim asserted Farm Bureau ments to the on politi- Commission based in this that case Heathcote should have considerations, cal Instead, other than to meet the been disqualified. it permits it. general requirements for the membership See id. 17A.19. One of the specific appointive boards and in grounds judicial commissions review of ac- satisfy this state to political the balance of tion permits to grant courts relief from an affiliation under Iowa Code section 69.16. action by taken an agency when it was 455A.6(1). Yet, this statuto- product “[t]he making decision under- ry requirement does not infringe upon by taken persons who were improperly prerogative a governor to otherwise ap- constituted as a decision-making body, point individuals to a may commission who were by motivated an improper purpose, share the governor views of the on the or subject were disqualification.” Id. subject 17A.19(10)(e). matter of a commission or individ- Accordingly, Farm Bu- may uals who publicly even advocate those reau uses the IAPA to frame its core claim personal professional views their life. its rights were prejudiced by the All individuals who work in particular Commission action in this case because discipline acquire special knowledge and Heathcote by an improper “motivated develop perspectives purpose” and views about vari- have disqualified should been By ous issues. requiring some members voting. from Id. specifically Commission to work The claim by Farm Bureau that certain areas requiring all mem- Commission rulemaking action was moti- bers to have special knowledge of the sub- vated an improper purpose and was

ject Commission, matter of the legisla- disqualification on the based tive appears scheme contemplate dual role of strong Heathcote as a views, perspectives, individual and knowl- advocate, active both personally and on edge are strengths. desired employer, behalf of her before the IDNR

Moreover, governor, top-elected as the at the same time as she was a member of representative people, always has the Commission that ultimately would ability had the shape the overall per- responsible approve an antidegradation spective and direction of commissions rule developed by the IDNR. More specifi- through the power appointment. Thus, cally, Farm Bureau argued the actions “political considerations” excluded Heathcote violated the conflict-of-interest from the appointment process by statute statute that employment restricts outside normally do not ability extend to the and activities a person who is employed *9 governor appoint to by commission members the state or otherwise serves the state. who have particular (b). views about subjects 68B.2A(l)(a), § See id. This statute expected to come before a commission prohibits that a employee state or other person may be consistent with the serving views of the the engaging state from in outside governor political party or the gov- employment of the activity or that conflicts with Instead, ernor. concept this the person’s reflects the official responsibili- duties and 68B.2A(1). basic nature governing through public § ties. See id. entity employed by he an plan whether a because was a determination

To in aid project real in the area activity or that owned estate employment outside particular interest, by benefit the renewal directly that would unacceptable conflict an creates Wilson, Fur- 165 N.W.2d at 823. types project. three identified legislature the thermore, to expected the councilman See id. One situa- unacceptable conflicts. on employment the in his city or activ- work with employment outside tion concerns project. state time or various interests in the renewal use of ity that involves employ- Id. nature of the use state We found the or the identification resources disqualifying per- a gives person advantage an or ment duties created interest, though there was no general public. sonal even benefit not available to 68B.2A(l)(a). to advantage financial the council- § Another situation direct Id. recognized at conflict the man. Id. 821-23. We unacceptable an deemed had interests at outside councilman dual stake— legislature employ- is when the activity employer consideration re- duties to his duties ment or involves city that his dual interests ceived from someone council—and employee a state disqualifying to performing potential present other than the state for work had a responsibil- emphasized Id. at that is a duties and conflict. 823. We part employer Id. the councilman’s had an “unusual employment. ities state 68B.2A(1)(6). interest in renew- and direct” financial ex- employer al had the proceedings: his a past We have in the determined that purchase some land right clusive statutory disqualify conflict can serve city condemned. Id. governmental vote of member 68B.2A(l)(a) council v. Iowa Farm Bureau avers section or commission. Wilson (Iowa 1969). (b) City, provides applicable statutory Wilson, pro- disqualification a statute that standard for the of Heath- we confronted Yet, underly- hibited from in case. unlike public acquiring official cote this Wilson, ing in personal pro- interest an renewal statute in section does urban 68B.2A and, ject not from specifically, disqualified prohibit officials members of commissions with they unacceptable such an from if conflict voting voting interest on have 817; (l)(a) (6); project. Id. at in see also Iowa Code defined subsections instead, (prohibiting requires 403.16 offi- it merely interested the official cials in urban participating employment activity.” from renewal “cease the or 68B.2A(2)(2009). proceedings).2 city We held a councilman not to Code This is say violated disqualified support this statute and was section 68B.2A does not dis- voting approve qualification from an urban renewal of those who have officials interest, indirect, part: provided, years, any any 2. That section in relevant direct or in property knows is included or which he employee No official or of a munici- planned to be in an renewal included urban pality, or board or ... commission thereof project, immediately he this shall disclose voluntarily any personal acquire shall est, inter- writing governing body, fact in to the local indirect, any direct or urban renewal upon be and such disclosure shall entered any project, property or included or any governing body; the minutes planned any included in urban renew- official, employee commissioner or such project municipality, any al of such or in any participate shall action proposed contract or contract in connec- municipality, or commission or board project.... tion with such urban renewal If thereof, official, affecting any or renewal employ- or urban such commissioner controls, presently property. ee owns or owned such has *10 preceding § or controlled within the two Iowa Code 403.16. does, unacceptable lobbying conflicts of interest. It respect “any particular with just case, the conflict of not for interest Farm proceeding, or application with re- alleges disqualified Bureau should have spect person to which the is directly con- (providing Heathcote. id. officials cerned personally participates part employment whose outside creates a con- person’s employment.” Id. (l)(c) flict under either subsection or else a 68B.5A(3). § All three subsections create promulgated by pur- rule the ethics board exception permits limited an individ- suant to subsection shall “refrain from ual to if lobby specifically designated by taking any official performing action or agency for which the individual works. any duty detrimentally official that would 68B.5A(l)-(3). §Id.

affect or create a benefit for the outside However, a member of a board or a employment activity” if the official does commission does not fall any into of these activity). not cease the The violations of statutory categories. A member of a section 68B.2A claimed Farm Bureau “official,” board or commission is an a term necessarily support do not automatic dis- that consists of a specific enumeration of qualification remedy as a for violation. 68B.2(17). positions. § Id. Notably, recognize We also chapter 68B includes many of the individuals who constitute the a specific lobbying by ban on state officials class of “officials” are in identified 68B.5A; § before certain boards. Id. see outright ban lobbying on contained sec- Bd., City City Des Moines v. Dev. 68B.5A(1), tion with the notable exceptions (Iowa 2001) (discuss- N.W.2d 311-12 major of the heads of subunits of depart- ing relationship general between agencies ments or and members of boards statutes). specific The Government Ethics 68B.5A(1). § or commissions. See id. Of Act, however, Lobbying excludes course, the major heads of subunits are members of boards and commissions from barred from a scope lobby- narrower 68B.2, §§ that ban. See Iowa Code .5A. ing lobbying before agency their or an — 68B.5A(1) prohibits lobbying by Section agency they regularly contact—in section official, any “statewide elected the execu- 68B.5A(2). 68B.5A(2). Yet, § See id. tive or administrative agency head of an first two subsections do not mention mem- state government, deputy executive or bers of boards or commissions. See id. agency administrative head of an of state (2). 68B.5A(1), “[sjtate § Furthermore, a government, or member of general employee” is not an “official.” Id. 68B.5A(1). assembly.” Id. Section 68B.2(25). Thus, the narrowest ban on 68B.5A(2) prohibits major head of a “[t]he 68B.5A(3) lobbying contained section subunit department or independent apply does not to members of boards or agency position state whose involves sub- commissions. construing section stantial exercise of administrative discre- Bureau, 68B.2A as identified Farm we tion or the expenditure public funds” as cannot ignore specific the more statute on well employees as certain position “whose point that does prohibit lobbying by involves substantial exercise of administra- members of boards or commissions. tive expenditure discretion or the course, many Of “lobbying general princi- funds” from before the ples which person employed applicable. identified in remain or before Wilson out, ... As Farm person points whom the has Bureau recog- substantial or Wilson regular part many contact as nized person’s conflict-of-interest statutes 68B.5A(2). duties.” Id. merely declaratory Section “are of the common 68B.5A(3) prohibits Indeed, other employees from law.” 165 we did *11 the conflict- to utilize to resolve language literal standard to the “limit ourselves

not presented. Id. issue alone” Wilson. of-interest 403.16] of [section 68B.2A(3) Here, expressly disa- section of by examining the nature begin We law. See Iowa displacing common vows of dis- rulemaking. The standard agency 68B.2A(S) (“Unless spe- § otherwise Code of interest based on a conflict qualification of cifically provided requirements this every necessarily not be the same would to, be in and shall not shall addition section Generally, agency agency action. type or any rights other remedies supersede, of rule- encompasses product action law.”). Additionally, we think provided cases, agency and other making, contested 17A.19(10) incorpo- IAPA section Med. action. Smith Iowa Bd. of law conflict-of-inter- general rates common (Iowa 2007). Exam’rs, 729 N.W.2d Notably, section principles. est case is A contested 17A.19(10)(e) prohibits action that only restricted proceeding including a but not improper purpose,” “motivated an licensing ratemaking, price fixing, action when the administra- and but also taken “subject disqualification.” Id. legal rights, privi- tor was duties or which 17A.19(10)(e). legisla- § that the It seems leges party required Consti- general to incorporate ture intended con- by an statute determined tution or to be judi- enable flict-of-interest standards and an evi- agency opportunity after for standards. development cial of these hearing. dentiary rules, “whether com- Conflict-of-interest 17A.2(5). contrast, § In rule- on statutory, mon law or are based moral making adopting, is “process Wilson, principles public policy.” Id. amending, repealing or a rule.” “They complete at 822. demand 17A.2(12). § A rule is “statement loyalty public to the and seek to avoid in- general applicability implements, difficult, subjecting public to the servant terprets, prescribes policy.” law or Id. insoluble, deciding be- and often task of 17A.2(11). however, not, A “[a] rule is duty advantage.” private tween determination, decision, in a con- or order necessary advantage “It is not Id. that this 17A.2(ll)(d). Id. Section tested case.” financial one,” employer- abe and “[t]he 17A.2 thus creates dichoto- an irreducible always been rec- employee relationship has my and contested rulemaking between one ognized possible source of conflict importance of this dichoto- cases. Id. of interest.” at 823. To be more relationship by the fully mous revealed accurate, specific we have con- viewed case. facts of this employer-employee flict in an relationship action ne agency The diverse forms of rather context “as conflict of duties than different review de cessitate standards of a conflict interest.” Id. at 823. this agency on the action and the con pending regard, inquiry our basic considers how challenge. text of the See Iowa Code impacts loyalty duty the conflict 17A.19(10). the dis We have also said work. See id. perform commission To tinction between action is sure, forms proceeding an urban renewal action, important determining the amount only type one official Wilson process parties.” “due afforded to Green treated its See id. unique. itself facts as Health, Dep’t Manor v. Pub. Therefore, wood 821-23. 68B.2A is rele- section 2002). (Iowa For the vant, particular but we must the^ examine follow, claim of conflict within the role of reasons that we think the distinc asserted identify similarly to the standard rulemaking. proceed We thus tion is relevant

415 disqualifying an administrator. employed One As here the term “bias” adverse, employed sug in Wilson and means preconceived mental at- standard — by gested Farm Bureau —focuses on the titude or disposition, toward a party to a for a conflict potential appearance or controversy, weight of such and nature (“It bias. See 165 N.W.2d at 822 as to materially impair destroy or Potential for conflict of interest which the impartiality essential to a fair hearing. avoid.”). law desires to take note that We It does not relate to views entertained closely this standard is similar to a stan regarding matter in- dard utilized federal courts in some volved .... contexts, which in disqualifying defines Rapids Cedar Transp., Steel Inc. v. Iowa any part terest as interest on the of an Camm’n, 825, State Commerce 160 N.W.2d “ administrator that could cause ‘a disin (Iowa 1968) added). 837 (emphasis After (the terested observer conclude that [to] all, a claim of bias in the context of con- in agency) has some measure adjudged the cases justiciable tested “becomes a issue well particular facts as as the law of a case only as it bears on the fairness of the ” in advance of hearing it.’ See Cinderella hearing.” Anstey, 292 N.W.2d at 390. In Sch., FTC, Finishing Career & Inc. v. 425 the context process of due in adjudicative (D.C.Cir.1970) F.2d 591 (quoting Gilli proceedings boards, before school the pre- SEC,

gan, Will & v.Co. 267 F.2d sumption objectivity impartiality (2d Cir.1959)). Under Cinderella stan contested cases “will typically be determi- dard, adjudicatory hearings before the native of the bias issue” only and can be “ attended, agency ‘must be only not with “direct, overcome compelling evidence every element of very fairness but with the to the contrary.” Bd. Dirs. v. Just- ” appearance of complete fairness.’ Id. mann, (Iowa 1991). Texaco, (quoting FTC, Inc. v. 336 F.2d (D.C.Cir.1964)). Anstey recognized itself that comments generally suggestive particular policy The Cinderella standard is generally position require do not disqualification in compatible, only to the standard em- the adjudicatory context. See 292 N.W.2d Wilson, ployed in but the standard we at 391. In the context of an administrator applied have in the context of contested who had made statements in a contested cases as well. See Anstey v. Iowa State case surrounding extension of electrical Comm’n, Commerce 292 lines, transmission we said: (Iowa 1980) (“We believe that per- charged sonnel making with decisions of Van Nostrand’s statements at the Ener- great import ... guided by should be gy Policy objections Council that few rationale of [Canon of the good, Code of Judi- objectors that most are motivated cial Conduct as it existed which financial considerations and that most provided that judge ‘[a] should avoid im- objectors merely want the lines to cross propriety and appearance of impro- other peoples’ property, they while activities.’]”).3 priety Yet, in all of his might interpreted be leaning toward Anstey’s contemporary cases reveal bias general view that electrical trans- not an concept. unlimited extended, We stated mission franchises should be another case: are not shown to be directly referable to A component current judge’s of the Code of Judicial impartiality might reasonably ques- requires judge Conduct “disqualify him- 51:2.11(A). tioned.” Iowa Ct. R. any proceeding self herself in in which the added) Box (quoting Home (emphasis objections or to the line particular

this Of- (D.C.Cir. FCC, fice, Inc. v. F.2d it. 1977) curiam)). (per *13 Thus, at 890. Id. a public, on position, even

taking a Thus, of a neutral Cinderella view “[t]he dispute to the does issue related policy in- simply an adjudicator is detached maker. In or- a decision disqualify not model for an administrator apposite role him, must it be shown disqualify der statutory com- broad who must translate of a capable judging “that he Id. at policies.” into concrete social mands controversy fairly on the basis particular rulemaking in a process Due 1168-69. of its own circumstances.” ad- judicial upon roles “impose does not they Dist. perform Joint Sch. when functions (quoting Id. Hortonville ministrators Ass’n, judges.” Educ. 426 U.S. from See very 1 v. Hortonville those of No. different 2314, 1, 2808, 482, 493, 49 Consequently, 96 L.Ed.2d the Associa- id. at 1168. S.Ct. (1976)); Morgan, v. States will 9 accord United tion National Advertisers standard of 409, 999, 1004, 421, 85 S.Ct. “only 313 U.S. 61 when disqualify a commissioner 1429, 1435(1941). L.Ed. and convincing there has been clear member has an showing that the rulemaking is differ- Notwithstanding, mind matters critical unalterably closed on case and follows ent from contested of Id. disposition proceeding.” disqualification. different standard at 1170. Advertisers, FTC, v. Inc. Ass’n Nat’l of 1151, (D.C.Cir.1979); ac- F.2d 1165-70 627 uniformly applied has The D.C. Circuit EPA, v. F.2d Lead Ass’n 647 cord Indus. this to informal challenges standard (D.C.Cir.1980). 1130, 1179 This different ad- asserting an rulemaking proceedings on the broad distinctions standard based have recused himself or ministrator should and a case rulemaking between contested Am., herself. See Air Ass’n Transp. of as the due proceeding, as well different Bd., 476, Inc. Mediation 663 F.3d v. Nat’l process concerns. (D.C.Cir.2011); 487 PLMRS Narrowband (D.C.Cir. FCC, 995, agencies Corp. In a v. 182 F.3d 1002 rulemaking, expected Fox, 1999); efficiently, to “allocate more act & W Fish Co. v. 931 F.2d resources C 1556, (D.C.Cir.1991); specific Un- greater speed, give with notice 1564 Consumers FTC, 417, US., scope” to industries of ion Inc. v. F.2d 427 proposed 801 of Advertisers, (D.C.Cir.1986); F.2d rule. Ass’n Nat’l 627 United Steelworkers of Am., Marshall, 1166; see Nat’l 647 also Petroleum AFL-CIO-CLC Refiners (D.C.Cir.1980). FTC, 672, 1189, Ass’n v. 482 F.2d 690-91 F.2d 1209 Other (D.C.Cir.1973) (recognizing efficiency adopted courts have this rubric well. v. Bal- rulemaking proceedings). Factory that accrues Trawler Ass’n Alaska (9th 1456, Cir.1987); legitimate policymaker, dridge, “The of a F.2d functions adjudicator, interchange a Better v. Illinois Pol- unlike demand Citizens Env’t 105, Bd., 152 important Ill.App.3d and discussion about issues.” lution Control Advertisers, (1987); 627 F.2d at Ill.Dec. 504 N.E.2d Ass’n Nat’l Indeed, Rest., Inc., Md. Fogle officials en- v. H & effective “must G (1995); Nw. Bell Tel. Co. gage policy in debate and discussion about 654 A.2d “ ‘infor- v. 133-34 Agency],” Stojferahn, matters before [the (S.D.1990); Tel. Ass’n agencies mal contacts between and the Tenn. Cable Comm’n, are the the Tenn. Pub. Serv. 844 S.W.2d “bread and butter” of ” administration.’ also Mun. (Tenn.Ct.App.1992); at 1169 165 see process Id. N.D. Corp. Dep’t imposes Servs. v. State ex rel. of the United States few re- Labs., Health & upon Consol. strictions the states.... But where (N.D.1992) (citing favorably cases state, 563-64 legislature instead of fix- the Association National Ad- applying itself, ing the tax commits to some sub- rule, applying vertisers but the stricter body duty ordinate of determining facts). to adjudicative standard Cinderella whether, amount, in what upon subsequent panel A of the D.C. Circuit did levied, whom making it shall be and of question seem to call into the Association apportionment, its assessment and due rule, National but did so Advertisers that, process law requires at some *14 suggesting process apply due should not at stage of the proceedings, before the tax all in Natural rulemakings. See Res. fixed, Def. becomes irrevocably taxpayer Council, EPA, 156, Inc. v. 859 F.2d 194 opportunity heard, shall have an to be of (D.C.Cir.1988). appear any It does not notice, which he must have either per- rejected court has the Association Na- of sonal, by publication, byor fixing law tional rule in favor of the Advertisers Cin- place the time and of the hearing. derella standard. 385-86, 714, Id. at 28 at 52 S.Ct. L.Ed. at standard is D.C. Circuit’s based 1112. part upon pair century-old of United contrast, By in Bi-Metallic Investment Supreme States Court cases that distin- Co., the Colorado Tax Commission and guished proceed- between administrative State of Equalization Board adopted sub- ings legislative that resemble action and stantial uniform tax increase. 239 U.S. at proceedings adjudicatory that resemble ac- 443, 142, Advertisers, 36 S.Ct. at 60 L.Ed. at tion. See Ass’n Nat’l 627 374. The of rejected generally challenge F.2d at 1165. See Court any Bi-Metallic without Inv. v. Equalization, significant pause, Co. State Bd. reasoning: 239 of 441, 141, (1915); U.S. 36 60 372 S.Ct. L.Ed. applies Where rule of conduct Denver, Londoner v. City Cnty. 210 of people, more than a few it impractica- 373, 708, U.S. 28 S.Ct. 52 L.Ed. 1103 everyone ble that should have a direct (1908); Bonfield, Arthur Earl The Defini- adoption. voice in its The Constitution tion Agency Adjudication Formal Un- of does not require public all acts be der the Iowa Administrative Procedure done in meeting town an assembly or Act, 285, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 323-24 the whole. General statutes within the (discussing [hereinafter Bonfield] the influ- power state are passed that affect the ence of Londoner and Bi-Metallic Invest- person individuals, property some- ment on the development Co. of adminis- ruin, point times to the giving without law). Londoner, trative In City them a chance to be heard. Their rights Denver established administrative protected are only way they scheme permitting local boards “to make can in a complex society, by their improvements local and to assess the cost power, remote, immediate or over those upon property specially benefited.” 210 who make the rule. 375, 709, at U.S. 28 S.Ct. at 52 at L.Ed. Determining 445, 1108. 142, affected landown- Id. at 36 S.Ct. at 60 at L.Ed. ers were to a hearing, so, entitled the Court In doing distinguished the Court Lon- reasoned: doner as a case in which relatively “[a] assessment, concerned, small apportionment, persons number of affected,

and collection of taxes upon property exceptionally who were in each jurisdiction, within their 446, the Constitution upon ground.” case individual Id. at 418 Advertisers, F.2d at Nat’l 627 Ass’n L.Ed. at 375. The See 60

36 S.Ct. EPA, 39; Hercules, Inc. v. well- n. see also to this to adhere continues Court (hold (D.C.Cir.1978) generally F.2d 124-25 framework. established infor during an Ry., ing intra-agency contacts v. E. Coast States Florida United rulemaking do violate the Federal L.Ed.2d 223 mal S.Ct. U.S. Act); Home Box Allegheny-Lud- Procedure (1973); Administrative States United (“[W]e recognize 567 F.2d at 57 Office, 92 S.Ct. Corp., 406 U.S. Steel lum L,Ed.2d (1972). agencies informal contacts between are the ‘bread butter’ interpreting federal courts Decisions are com process administration Procedure Act Administrative the Federal they do not long as appropriate so pletely interpretation our persuasive or raise serious judicial frustrate review Energy Iowa IAPA. See Citizen/Labor fairness.”).4 questions of Coal, State Commerce Inc. 1983). (Iowa Comm’n, 17A a dis- Chapter similarly provides Nevertheless, already *15 we our cases think for administrators qualification standard crafting a distinc- a foundation for provide not informal acting in contested cases but by Ass’n similar to one made tion 17A.11(2). of § rulemakings. See Iowa Code Geringer v. National Advertisers. See for statutory The absence standard Sews., Dep’t 521 N.W.2d Human of rulemaking in context disqualification (noting Anstey n rule (Iowa 1994) Advertis- instructive. See Ass’n Nat’l is of tempered so as to harmonize “must be ers, (discussing at 627 F.2d 1169 n. 39 pro- with the dictates of administrative rulemak- processes between differences legislature”); cess as established cf. 17A.2(5)in- adjudication). ing and Section Advertisers, Nat’l 627 F.2d at Ass’n of any a contested case is administra- dicates (“[W]e must a apply disqualification legal rights, “in tive action which the is with the struc- standard that consistent privileges required are party duties or Act].”). purposes ture and FTC [the or to be deter- by Constitution statute all, agency opportunity a num mined after an presupposes After the IAPA evidentiary hearing.” between rule- for an Iowa Code significant ber of differences 17A.2(5) added). (emphasis The com- For exam makings and contested cases. tying together thread cases ple, specifically prohibits the IAPA ex mon contested process fair tribu- in contested cases. in the due context—a parte communications 17A.17(1)(a). Yet, only truly necessary the rule because of is nal—is facts. parte determining adjudicative ex in informal function of silent on contacts rulemakings. suggests This Hollinrake Iowa Law id. Enforcement (Iowa 1990); Acad., with ex legislature not as concerned Bonfield, Adju- rulemakings. 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 323-24. parte contacts informal ap par- with the facts immediate This conclusion consistent dicative “concern[] ties,” Davis, Approach when de Kenneth An proach Culp taken federal courts termining whether con to Problems Evidence in the Adminis- parte ex Process, L.Rev. during rulemakings tacts informal violate trative Harv. Davis], facts Procedure and “the [hereinafter the Federal Administrative Act. (D.C.Cir.1977); expresses 4. While Home limits on 477-78 also Ass'n Nat'l see Box Office Advertisers, (discussing n. 40 principle, subsequent panel 627 F.2d at 1169 this backed relationship away proposed between Home Box from its limits. See Action Office FCC, Television). 564 F.2d Children’s Action Children's Television case,” onfield, B particular agencies 63 Iowa in conducting rulemaking proce- contrast, dures”). at agen- L.Rev. when an cy implements statutory policy and acts case, In this the Commission acts under facts,” legislatively, “legislative it considers a delegation of authority legisla- from the which not concern the par- do immediate ture, 455A.6(6), see Iowa Code which whole, Davis, society ties but as a 55 Harv. from a theoretical standpoint the Commis- 402-04, L.Rev. and for which an eviden- sion shares with governor, see Iowa tiary hearing generally unnecessary, see Const, IV, § art. 1 (vesting “supreme exec- Bonfield, Adjudi- 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 325. authority” utive in the governor); id. art. play cative facts no role an informal IV, § 9 (providing governor that the “shall rulemaking, making hearing unneces- take care that the faithfully laws are exe- Advertisers, sary. See Ass’n Nat’l cuted”). consequence, As a section 455A.6 F.2d at 1161-62. Neither the United represents a broad authority mandate of any States Iowa Constitutions nor stat- Commission, which oversees over- requires ute the Commission hold a formal whelming complex and technical evidentiary hearing on the record before This, course, matter. is consonant with adopting a rule. obvious, one general purpose of adminis- regard, In this chapter suggests 17A trative agencies within regula- the modern virtual absence of process due in the con- tory subjects state: regulation text of rulemakings. See Greenwood justifiably numerous complex, and the Manor, (“The 641 N.W.2d at 834 impor- *16 importance an of legal, administrator’s tance of the distinction between the cate- technical, and scientific expertise cannot gories agency [of lies in the due action] be understated. The commissioners are process parties afforded to involved con- not mere legislative functionaries of the tested proceedings.”); case Polk County v. will; rather, they are executive officers Bd., 267, Iowa State Appeal 330 N.W.2d who exercise sound discretion within the (Iowa 1983) (same); 276 Lunde v. Iowa policy-making guidelines legislature the (Iowa 357, Regents, Bd. 359 of provided has them. Accordingly, it is un- (“ Ct.App.1992) agency ‘Other action’ enti- (and derstandable Governor the Iowa person tles the affected to no more than an Senate, unanimously which confirmed hearing, informal procedural without the Heathcote outstanding based on her cre- process due safeguards inherent in an ad- dentials) expertise would have viewed the versarial proceeding.”). Federal law in Heathcote bring could to the antidegrada- Advertisers, accord. See Ass’n Nat’l of policy tion rulemaking indispensable. (“When 627 F.2d at 1165-66 proceeding Advertisers, See Ass’n Nat’l 627 F.2d at of is classified as a rulemaking, process due 1168 (“Rulemaking involves the kind of ordinarily does not procedures demand issues ‘where a experience month of will be rigorous more provided than those by Con- ” year worth a hearings.’ of (quoting Am. gress.”); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Airlines, Bd., Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics 359 Corp. Council,

Power v. Natural Res. Def. 624, (D.C.Cir.1966))). F.2d 633 Inc., 519, 524, 1197, 1202, 435 U.S. 98 S.Ct. (1978) 460, Similarly, 55 L.Ed.2d (stating forget 467 we cannot that the leg islature, Federal Congress, Administrative like Procedure Act’s “is not confined to rulemaking procedures informal of executing policy contained method its which in 5 553 possible U.S.C. establish “the maximum involves the least delegation of procedural requirements Congress which discretion to administrative officers.” Fa was willing States, 414, to have the impose upon 425-26, courts tes v. United 321 U.S.

420 (1944). upon showing no less than a 660, 668, ground of bias L.Ed. 849 88 S.Ct.

64 that the convincing evidence be clear and the discretion can contrary, On agency -has administrator undertaken “intelligible as an long significant so quite mind,” “unalterably an closed action with See its exercise. guide exists to principle” “motivated Inc., thereby making their action Ass’ns, Trucking v. Am. Whitman Ass’n Nat’l improper purpose.” 457, 474, 121 S.Ct. 531 U.S. Advertisers, F.2d (2001) 627 at 1, 17, (holding L.Ed.2d pollutants air un regulate could the EPA on showing “This focus should on solely Act the basis the Clean Air der if prejudgment, any, member’s agency health). human Fi risk to pollutant’s failure weigh rather than a issues also contains nally, the Iowa Constitution Co., F.2d fairly.” W Fish C & nul legislature permitting provision showing essentially 1564. The should “by passage rule lify an administrative pre so the administrator was demonstrate majority all of of a resolution they disposed position to one were general house members each to the “unwilling arguments to consider Ill, 40; art. see assembly.” Iowa Const. Narrowband, PLMRS contrary.” Christopher L. & Jerry Anderson also Therefore, “[ajgencies F.3d at 1002. are Poynor, Empirical A Constitutional faith, required and to good to consider in Rules Analysis Iowa’s Administrative evaluate, objectively presented arguments Procedure, Drake Review Committee however, them; officials, need (describing legisla L.Rev. subjectively impartial.” Carolina authority nullify rules under arti ture’s States, Grp. v. Study Env’tl United III, 40). cle section (D.C.Cir.1975); F.2d accord Unit Steelworkers, 647 at 1209. ed F.2d After however, as D.C. recognize, We all, appoint “[ajgency decisionmakers did, conception limited Circuit that some implement statutory pro precisely ed accompany process due informal should *17 grams, have some inevitably policy and so rulemaking. understand that mean We Ass’n, Lead Indus. preconceptions.” requires nar ingful judicial review some Thus, F.2d a favoring spe at 1179. even challenge row an opportunity adminis cific over another not a basis rule is note, course, of trator for bias. We a disqualification absent evidence that in a acting rulemaking commissioner “is view “could not administrator’s be presumed objective ‘capable to be rulemaking proceedings changed particular controversy a on judging fairly ” Union, that were to follow.” Consumers the basis of its own circumstances.’ Unit 801 F.2d at 427. Steelworkers, (quoting ed 647 F.2d at 1208 Indeed, Morgan, 313 at 61 S.Ct. statutes them- U.S. at environmental 1435). Yet, presume 85 L.Ed. at certain amount appropriate selves often inquiry merely does Fund not center on whether institutional bias. Env’tl Def. (8th Corps Eng’rs, could conclude an 470 F.2d disinterested observer Cir.1972) (“[W]e acting rulemaking agree administrator in a had do not with the appel- in of view in the prejudged implicit some measure merits contentions proposed action. lants that quasi-legislative [the National Environmental Placing Policy requires officials Commission its commis Act] rulemaking subjectively impartial.”). being in Far from sioners—and the this case— context, dispassionate regarding pres- think proper in the we a district neutral and environment, may ervation of our a commission- rulemaking court vacate on case, position to have a in favor of See F.2d at expected er is 1174-80. an in expanding protections environmental all EPA previously administrator had worked forms: attorney as an with the Natural Resources

“A should not be seeking Trade Commissioner Defense Council a suit to com- antimonopoly policies, on and a pel neutral the EPA to list lead as hazardous air Exchange Securities and Commissioner pollutant under the Air Clean Act. Id. at apathetic should not be about need 1172. See generally Natural Res. Def. governmental restrictions. Council, Train, (2d Inc. v. 545 F.2d 320 theoretically Cir.1976). ideal administrator After the EPA was required to one view in point whose broad pollutant, list lead as an air the administra- general agreement policies with the he joined tor participated EPA’s staff and administers.” subsequent rulemaking that listed Ass’n, pollutant lead as a prescribed (quot- Lead Indus. F.2d at 1179 Davis, ing Culp acceptable Kenneth maximum amounts of pol- Administrative lead (3d ed.1972)). 12.01, Law Text at 247 lution in the atmosphere. Lead Indus. singlemindedness Ass’n, While extreme in favor 647 F.2d at 1172. The court reject- position an makes administrator Industry ed the Lead Association’s chal- “totally incapable giving fair consider- lenge to the rules based on the administra- ation to the issues that are presented for participation. tor’s likely unacceptable, decision” is participat- The court observed that no other court ing rulemaking in a with a preexisting had ever—under any disquali- standard — policy position is well within the ambit of fied administrator from participating in conduct, permissible absent clear and con- an informal rulemaking on proceeding vincing contrary. evidence to the See id. policy basis of bias. Id. at 1179. The 1179, 1180; Narrowband, at PLMRS court concluded that “under prejudg- (distinguishing F.3d at 1002 an administra- ment test for rulemaking [Association tor’s “unalterable prejudgment” “legit- National Advertisers ... there can be ] policy imate preconceptions”). question no but that [the administrator’s] case, Turning to the facts of this Farm disqualification from the lead standards Bureau emphasizes preexist- Heathcote’s rulemaking is unwarranted.” Id. ing support advocacy for and of a robust Indeed, antidegradation policy. at all Here, supports evidence a conclusion *18 during times the rulemaking proceedings, that Commissioner Heathcote pre- had a argues, Farm Bureau actively Heathcote position conceived about the value of a advocated for the antidegradation policy’s antidegradation muscular policy. As adoption. It argument bolsters this by out, Farm points Bureau she was involved pointing out a number of similarities be- in drafting policy for the Iowa Environ- tween the Iowa Environmental Council’s mental Council and was instrumental in rule, proposed which Heathcote helped drafting the 2007 rulemaking petition. We draft, and the final adopted by rule agree also that the final rule adopted by Commission. Farm Bureau also maintains the Commission was similar in key some salary Heathcote’s was a asserting factor — aspects to the proposed rule the Iowa job Heathcote’s duties “paid included advo- Nevertheless, Environmental Council. cacy” likening lobbyist. her to a similarities or differences are not evidence

We observe that a challenge Union, similar was of bias. Consumers 801 F.2d rejected in Likewise, Lead Industries Association. at 427. Farm Bureau has failed experi- quist: years Heathcote’s convincing evidence of Susan clear and proffer

to as employment mind. ence and continued Water unalterably closed an for the Environmen- Policy Director distinctions exist factual recognize We indispensable tal are the source of Council and Lead Industries this case between disqualify- qualifications, not source First, partic Heathcote’s Association. Tatum, 409 U.S. ing bias. See Laird crafting policy before ipation both 7, 13-14, L.Ed.2d 93 S.Ct. to the Commission and being nominated (1972). rulemaking proceedings was during the the administrator’s than likely greater Accordingly, we hold Commissioner Association. See 647 Industries Lead employment Heathcote’s with the Iowa the D.C. Circuit com at 1174. While F.2d job including her Environmental Council— lack of evidence demon mented on the advocacy policy research and duties —do ad any influence strating outside antidegrada require not us to vacate the ministrator, emphasize it proceeded process rulemaking The policy. tion implement poli expected an official give not rise to the standard simply does executive, expected he was not cy for the urged by Farm Bureau. disqualification not ideally should be—neutral to be—and policy standpoint. See id. at 1177- from a Disqualification V. of Commissioner course, scope 79. Of it does not seem the La Seur. challenged influence the administrator La Seur was The Commission concedes dispositive. over a rule has ever been had not elector on December eligible challenged in & The administrator C W adopt when the Commission voted impact had Fish Co. a considerable on Nonetheless, antidegradation policy.5 rulemaking proceedings, but D.C. Cir argues long-stand- the Commission Iowa’s his participation improp cuit held not ing officer doctrine validates the de facto 1559, 1564-65. er. See F.2d action the failure of despite Commission’s Second, perhaps importantly, more qualify La for office after she Seur employment Heathcote continued her with Bureau responds moved. Farm de Yet, the Iowa Environmental Council. we facto doctrine officer is not without limit this persuaded are not would be apply case. In the does this dispositive distinction. Commission alternative, Farm asserts the de Bureau built-in conflicts interest. policy contains superseded facto officer doctrine was provides five of the The statute nine com- Specifically, 1998 IAPA amendments. actively in or engaged missioners must be is in- Farm Bureau contends the doctrine thereby presumably employed in—and compatible with the amended form of sec- represent might industries that —certain 17A.19(10)(e). tion conceivably regulation by 455A.6(1). Facto Doctrine. A. De Officer Commission. See *19 The validates offi- It would be de facto officer doctrine anomalous conclude that authority by legal four commissioners would not simi- cial action taken without other authority to an who lacks larly expected bring giving be with them both official de jure authority to take See policy experience preconceived policy official action. (Iowa State, 583, Allen 528 N.W.2d 588 positions. paraphrase To Justice Rehn- v. adopt Commission voted to 5. Because the Commission concedes La time the qualifications, lack we Seur's need not de- antidegradation policy. actually cide whether at she was "elector”

423 1995). words, acts of a de In other “the City ly as 1997. Heights Windsor v. Spanos, (Iowa 591, are officer valid as to the 572 N.W.2d 593-94 facto 1997). v. City Waite Santa persons.” third Cruz, 802, 822, 327, 334, 22 184 U.S. S.Ct. core, At its ability doctrine limits the (1902). 552, 46 L.Ed. 566 The de facto of a plaintiff “to challenge governmental officer doctrine has a key been stitch in action on the ground that the officers tak- the fabric of our common law since our ing that action are improperly in office.” of statehood. See State ex days earliest Lauer, Andrade v. 729 F.2d 1493-94 (7 Clarke) Cnty. Judge, rel Rice v. 1 (D.C.Cir.1984). It operates in a way that (1858). 186, 195 It has “ancient origin,” distinguishes between “collateral” at- Held, Herbst 679, 684, 194 Iowa 190 tacks, plaintiffs which gov- attack (1922), N.W. 155 dating at least to an ernment action on the ground that early English common law case called officials who took the action im- were Fountaine, Abbé 6, 32, Y.B. pi. 9 Hen. f. office, properly in attacks, and “direct” Carroll, (1431), see State v. 3 38 Conn. plaintiffs which attack qualifica- (tracing history of the doc officer, tions of the rather than the ac- law). through trine English common Over tions taken by the officer. time, the doctrine has achieved “practically acceptance universal courts.” Id. doctrine, Under the 1496.6 the le Herbst, 194 Iowa at 190 N.W. at 155. gality of the qualifications officer’s to hold applied We this ancient doctrine as recent office cannot be collaterally attacked as a contrast, 6. The distinction the de facto officer doctrine the direct-collateral distinction draws is in the itself distinct from the more context of the de com- facto officer doctrine object refers to the monly meanings attack —the officer’s used of "direct” and "collat- qualifications eral,” used, to hold instance, office or the official in the context of action that the result of the officer's actions. whether a new applies constitutional rule ret- words, In other instead of the "when” or See, roactively. e.g., Ragland, State v. challenge, "where” of a the direct-collateral (Iowa 2013); State, Perez distinction focuses in the de facto officer con- (Iowa 2012). As used text on the petitioner's "what” of the chal- retroactivity inquiry, in the the terms distin- lenge. Heights, In Windsor example, we guish appeals between direct from an initial applied the de facto officer doctrine to a chal- proposed application conviction or of a new lenge authority to the city attorney postconviction constitutional rule in a relief prosecute a traffic case on direct review from action, which definition occurs when the the defendant’s conviction. 572 N.W.2d at Perez, underlying conviction is "final." below, challenges 593-94. As we discuss words, N.W.2d at 358. In other the direct- qualifications permitted through official ordinarily collateral distinction refers to when procedural narrow closely framework that proceeding challenge and in what may types persons may circumscribes who brought. basically The same is true in the bring an action. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1302. context of a collateral attack on a court's regard, In this the direct-collateral distinction personal jurisdiction exercise of over a civil contemplates also challenge the "who” of a defendant, although the distinction contem- addition to the Consequently, "what.” Ireland, plates Corp. different fora. See Ins. permits fact that the IAPA direct review of Guiñee, Compagnie Ltd. v. des Bauxites de action, administrative see 694, 706, 2099, 2106, U.S. 102 S.Ct. 17A.19, point is immaterial. The of our (1982) ("A L.Ed.2d defendant is al- holding today is that Farm Bureau did not fit ways ignore judicial free proceedings, challenge parameters its within the narrow judgment, risk a default challenge and then permit a court to set aside action *20 judgment jurisdictional grounds that on in a ground on the lawfully that the officer did not proceeding.”). collateral perfect hold title to office. 424 every proceeding in before their actions. would result if invalidating official of

means 464, (1863); Leas, Iowa 469 title could be called in 14 officers their Keeney v. such Pub Greeting County, Card v. 118 question.” Shelby Nat’l Ass’n Norton see also 570, Serv., F.2d 425, 1125, 569 442, 1121, v. Postal 30 lishers U.S. 6 S.Ct. L.Ed. U.S. (“In (D.C.Cir.1976) short, remedy (1886). the 178, 186 579 invalida composition is not improper Moreover, weight no gives “the doctrine through action tion Commission’s enforcing legal the interest removal of but rather challenge, indirect appoint- concerning eligibility norms Commissioner allegedly disqualified interests in ment office and individuals’ attack.”), other vacated on way of direct having against act them government 253, 884, 54 98 S.Ct. grounds 434 U.S. lawfully agents.” only through appointed (1977). The 169 doctrine is based L.Ed.2d Andrade, F.2d at 1497. It “assumes 729 pub necessity protect seeks on cog- judicially that an individual suffers no orderly functions of by sustaining lic he injury nizable when is some despite defect government legiti- governmental action that is adverse of an officer. Windsor qualifications respects mate in all save that the official 593; at Heights, 572 accord State N.W.2d lacks lawful title to of- taking action (Iowa Driscoll, 916, N.W.2d 917 v. 455 Note, Clokey, The De Kathryn fice.” A. 1990); & 129 Hawley Hoops, Buck v. Iowa Facto Doctrine: The Case Con- Officer 688, (1906). 406, 409, 105 N.W. 689 Clear 85 Application, tinued Colum. L.Rev. a ly, adopts practical approach the doctrine 1121, Clokey]; 1122 see [hereinafter problem. to an have also infrequent We Otto) (9 Smith, 20, v. 99 Hussey also U.S. the de facto observed that officer doctrine (1878) (“The 24, 314, acts 25 315 L.Ed. “is consistent with the broader rule that officers are held to be valid [de facto] validity of presumes agency official it. public good requires because the The Allen, 588; actions.” 528 N.W.2d at see one.”). Ryder no But principle wrongs see v. also Co. Iowa State Com Teleconnect 182-83, States, v. United 515 U.S. 115 (Iowa Comm’n, 158, 162 merce 2031, 2035, 132 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 143 1987) (“An rule is agency presumed valid (1995) makes (holding an individual who a party and the is on the challenging burden timely judicial to a officer challenge based it to demonstrate that ‘rational Appointments on the is entitled Clause not could conclude the rule was within the claim). of his determination merits agency’s delegated authority.”). The Unit “applies qualified doctrine where Supreme explained ed States Court has official, by infirmity, does technical not the public parties that and third “are hot validly position.” hold the official Windsor required to investigate” the officer’s title Heights, 572 at 593-94. “may safely upon assumption” act of one support order to the acts on Waite, legally that the officer office. officer, ground he is a de facto U.S. S.Ct. at 46 L.Ed. they done must be under color all, right at 566. After citizens have “to office, of which must the duties have accept the law it is and are written” not discharged been assumed and “required validity.” its Lang to determine fill person claiming the office. City Bayonne, N.J.L. A. (1874). Fisher, (1907). Iowa Bailey Just as citizens do not make law, responsi jure There be a de office in order for they should bear the must bility determining validity. its the court to find the officer to be one de See id. Bullís, “It manifest endless confusion facto. Town Decorah v.

425 (1868); Norton, 12, 18 accord 118 U.S. at the doctrine to ex officiojudges of election 1125, 441, 6 S.Ct. at 30 L.Ed. at 186 results who had failed to take the statuto- (“[T]here officer, jure oath). can be no either de rily required fill.”)- facto, if there no office or de be cases, In each of these the application of performed The duties the de facto offi- Yet, the doctrine was obvious. we have powers must also within the cer downplayed importance never Bailey, Early office. See 38 Iowa at 231. requisite qualification for officials to act. appointment assumed color cases example, For ignored we have not necessary election was also a element of importance taking of officials the oath of application. the doctrine’s See Herkimer Dish, office. See Grimes Indep. Sch. 257 Keeler, 683, 680, 178, v. 109 Iowa 81 N.W. 113, 806; Iowa at 131 N.W.2d at State ex Conn, (1899); Carroll, 179 38 at 471-72. Hartnett, 386, rel. 101 Iowa at 70 N.W. at Yet, later an appointment we held or elec- contrary, 593. To the we have stressed establishing tion color of title is not indis- necessity justice of the doctrine’s Buck, 409, pensable. 129 Iowa at application on behalf of the public and at 689. N.W. third parties. See Grimes Indep. Sch. past, In the we applied have the doctrine Dist., 113, 257 Iowa at 131 N.W.2d at 806. variety to a of defects in official title. have also applied We the doctrine to Some instances in which we have applied more serious errors election or appoint surely the doctrine have been minor tech- Co., ment. See State v. Cent. States Elec. nical infirmities of those who otherwise 801, 818, 457, 238 Iowa 28 N.W.2d clearly had color of title to their office. (1947) (applying the doctrine to a mayor Sheets, 35, See State v. 291 N.W.2d city councilman accepted positions who (Iowa 1980) (applying the doctrine to a as trustees incompatible contended to be who, county attorney following election to offices); municipal with their Cowles v. office, failed to submit a written oath Dist., 689, 698-99, Indep. Sch. 204 Iowa bond); with his Cnty. Bd. Dirs. v. Bd. 83, (1927) 216 N.W. 87-88 (applying the Educ., 106, 112, 802, 257 Iowa doctrine to two school board members ap (1964) Indep. [hereinafter Grimes Sch. pointed to fill the vacancies of two current (applying the doctrine to Dish] members school board members who already had of the board of directors of a school dis- resigned, thereby technically depriving the trict who performed years three of board quorum); board of a Metro. Nat’l Bank v. being functions before sworn as re- Bank, 682, Commercial State 104 Iowa statute); quired by State ex rel. Hartnett 26, (1898) 74 N.W. Powell, (applying the 382, 385-86, 101 Iowa 70 N.W. (1897) doctrine to a clerk of court who accepted a (applying the doctrine to position as receiver for a bank in insolven school board required directors who took a cy proceedings before the court at which person oath from a not legally authorized worked, he oath); allegedly disqualifying to administer the him & Wheeler Wilson clerk). Sterrett, from Mfg. continuing to serve as Co. 94 Iowa Some suggest specter N.W. 675-76 these cases (applying the doc- lurking trine to a conflict of deputy county clerk who interest between incom had clerk, See, appointed by patible been positions. e.g., but the board Cent. States Co., supervisors had not Elec. 238 Iowa at approved ap- 28 N.W.2d at 466; Bank, pointment, and the deputy given had not Metro. Nat’l 104 Iowa at statute); required bond State ex rel. 74 N.W. at 28. applied We also the doc (7 Rice, Clarke) 7 Iowa (applying trine a peace officer who had failed to *22 426 693, 142-43, 612, 1, S.Ct. 46 statutorily psychologi U.S. 96 required

undergo (1976), Driscoll, superseded by 455 N.W.2d at L.Ed.2d 758 evaluation. cal grounds recognized on other as in statute 918. FEC, v. 124 540 U.S. S.Ct. McConnell Furthermore, opined we have that the (2003). Perhaps 491 157 L.Ed.2d quasi- acts of a could validate the doctrine dramatically, States the Su- most United public on the offi- when the relied official applied the doctrine to the preme Court authority. of consistent assertions cial’s government actions insurrectionist Buck, 408-09, 105 N.W. at 129 Iowa at See See of Texas. Texas v. Civil-War-Era Additionally, applied have even we 689. (7 Wall.) 700, White, 732-33, 19 U.S. in which doctrine to factual situations the (1868). These dramatic L.Ed. lack of title to office officer’s lawful of officer doctrine applications the de facto concerns, implicated such arguably larger courts are possible part because Heights, process. as due Windsor consequences of what de- cognizant the doctrine (applying at 598-94 to N.W.2d government power without claring a actor attorney actually city who did not have (7 Borden, 48 entails. U.S. Luther Cf. authority a traffic prosecute to contractual How.) 1, 38-39, 12 L.Ed. 597-98 occurring neighboring city violation in a (1849) (applying political question doc- 32B, allows chapter political under which by the to the martial law used char- trine each other for subdivisions contract with during ter Rhode Island government of performance governmental services part the Dorr Rebellion in because Allen, advantage); for mutual N.W.2d consequences effectively with associated appeals (applying at 588 the doctrine to declaring proffered government one ille- members appointed committee who were reasoned: gal). Luther Court department per- the director of the question certainly presented [T]he requiring sonnel violation of a statute For, if very serious one: this court is appointment by the commis- personnel this upon inquiry authorized enter as sion); City Rapids, Koss v. Cedar and it proposed plaintiff, should (Iowa 1978) (applying government charter be decided to a term judge doctrine district whose period legal during had no existence judge, assistant chief and thus whose au- mentioned, time above it had been judge —if thority appoint district associate annulled adoption opposing in a condemnation had ex- proceeding, government, passed by the laws pired). —then legislature during its that time were nul- Similarly, applied federal courts have collected; lities; wrongfully its taxes its pure challenges the doctrine to to the con- compensation salaries and to its officers propriety appointment stitutional of an accounts illegally paid; its im- attempts what has been to “en- called settled; judgments properly legal concerning eligibility norms forc[e] in civil and sentences of its courts crimi- Andrade, appointment office.” void, nal cases null and officers For example, F.2d at 1497. the United opera- into who carried their decisions pre- all Supreme States Court validated if trespassers, tion answerable as by Election Com- 1976 actions Federal cases as criminals. some mission, though even its members were 38-39,12 Id. at L.Ed. at 597. unconstitutionally in violation of appointed II, application of the Appointments of Article Historical doctrine— Clause Valeo, inside and of this state— Buckley Section Clause 424 both outside it uniquely reveals is not reserved for for the crime operating a motor vehicle oversights. Judge mere minor As prior while intoxicated they the time *23 commented, Learned Hand “It is not whol- completed had all the required law en- ly clear upon how far the conditions a[n] Palmer, forcement training. In State v. qualifications may be [official’s] absent and peace we held a officer who had not com- his acts still be immune from collateral pleted the required statutory course of attack.” v. Ry., Johnson Manhattan 61 relating instruction processing the (2d 934, Cir.1932). F.2d 938 suspected drivers of operating a motor

However, the doctrine has its limits. vehicle while intoxicated was not a de facto example, For we have recognized it does purposes officer for of invoking the im- apply person to a third who charge- “is plied-consent 859, statute. 554 N.W.2d able with the knowledge of the defect in (Iowa 1996); 864-65 see also Iowa Code the title of a claimed officer to his office.” 321J.1(7) (1995) (defining “peace officer” 5, Heyland Wayne Indep. Sch. Dist. No. “[a]ny to include other law enforcement 1310, 1314, 278, 231 Iowa 4 N.W.2d 280 officer who satisfactorily completed has an (1942); Herkimer, 684, accord 109 Iowa at approved course relating to motor vehicle 179; 81 N.W. at Mayor Jersey State v. operators under the influence of alcoholic (1899). 634, City, 709, 63 N.J.L. 44 A. 712 beverages at the Iowa law enforcement “appearance of right is the essence of academy or a law training enforcement authority, de facto officer’s [and] ‘[i]f program approved by department official’s claim to office is known to be public safety”). The de facto officer doc- unlawful, notoriety of his title defect apply trine did not to validate the invoca- ” prevents a finding of color of authority.’ implied-consent tion of the procedures be- Sierra Club v. & Castle Cooke Homes Ha- cause the lack qualifications went “to waii, Inc., 184, 849, 132 Hawaii 320 P.3d 321J.l(7)(e).” Palmer, the heart of section (2013) (quoting Clokey, 865 85 Colum. words, 554 N.W.2d at 865. In other 1123). L.Rev. at If the defect in the au- “ peace officer was not ‘otherwise trained thority public officialwas known to the ” to administer the test.’ certified public, then the doctrine apply. does not Driscoll, 918). (quoting Id. 455 N.W.2d at Nevertheless, case, See id. at 868. in this allegation there was no that La Seur’s lack contrast, Driscoll, In peace officer of elector during status was notorious completed required had implied-con- time the Commission ap- considered and training, sent yet but had not completed a proved antidegradation policy.7 psychological required evaluation all peace very important prior

A officers applica- employment. factor in the 455 tion of the de facto officer N.W.2d at doctrine can be 917-18. We held the de facto drawn from two cases we decided officer involving applied doctrine to validate the ad- peace officers who persons had arrested ministration of the blood-alcohol test course, might 7. Of La Seur agencies herself have been ernment which act in reliance on put on notice actions, that she lost her elector status validity of an officer's the fact by registering to vote in Montana. See Mill- that the officer himself knew or should have Romer, 30, (Iowa wright v. 33 authority known that he lacked official 1982) ("Every citizen is assumed to know the dispositive would not be of the issue. More charged knowledge law and is with directly pertinent appearance is the to oth- However, statutes.”). provisions of ers at the time. Sears, Co., 14, primary purpose [s]ince the EEOC v. doc- Roebuck & 650 F.2d (2d 1981). protect public trine gov- is to 18 Cir. 659, (Ct.App. Cal.Rptr.2d disqualification because

the officer Comm’n, 2003); ability Daniels Indus. not undermine did issue N.E.2d the test and Ill.2d Ill.Dec. administer properly officer id., being 266 Ill. subjected opinion); from (plurality protect (McMorrow, testing. and indiscriminate Dec. 775 N.E.2d at 946 inaccurate J., Fichner, re specially concurring); id. at 918. (1996). 677 A.2d 206-07 N.J. very it clear that two cases make These *24 applied facto officer doctrine the de rule also the of approach This resembles at is- particular disqualification the when Supreme decision the United States Court integrity confi- undermines the and sue Zdanok, which indicated in Glidden Co. in actions taken or deci- demanded dence apply the officer rule did not when de facto by Clokey, government. made See sions qualification for an embodied “a the officer the (“Although at 1135 85 Colum. L.Rev. concerning the strong public policy” prop- denies generally facto officer doctrine de er of or was government administration in title enforcing an interest individuals constitutional upon “based nonfrivolous ap- should not requirements, the doctrine 530, 535-36, 82 grounds.” 370 U.S. S.Ct. specific qualification a office ply when (1962) 1459, 671, 1465, 8 L.Ed.2d 678-79 protect individuals to aims to the A reason can (plurality opinion). similar Palmer, authority.”). official’s the be in American Co. v. found Construction qualifications lack of threatened the basic Jacksonville, Tampa Key& Rail- West objective proce- implied-consent 372, 387-88, 758, way, 13 S.Ct. 148 U.S. dures, qualifications but the lack of (1893), 764-65, although 37 L.Ed. 492 the disqualifica- Driscoll did not. When specifically facto doctrine was not de integrity tion does not and undermine case, prohibit- In that identified. a statute action taken or the deci- confidence before judge ed whose order was by made it be government, sion would appeals sitting panel court from on the contrary good to allow the the order. at 13 reviewing Id. S.Ct. collaterally action to be Dris- attacked. 492; at at Court 37 L.Ed. see Circuit coll, This 455 at 918. distinction is 517, § of Appeals Act of ch. 26 critical to the resolution in this ultimate (1891) (“[N]o justice Stat. or case. judge, question may before who cause or have or been tried heard in district court approach

This with the is also consistent ... hearing shall sit on the trial or such approach taken other courts and com- cause circuit court question or mentators. One commentator has said: appeals.”); see also 28 U.S.C. considers a When court collateral (“No judge shall hear or determine an challenge, poli- title it should discern the appeal the decision a case or issue from particular requisite cies in the embodied him.”). mentioning tried Without they to office determine whether doctrine, the Court reasoned: designed protect the interests of indi- viduals before such or appearing officers incompetent If made him the statute protect govern- the administration of hearing, sit in which he at the decree ment. unlawful, part perhaps took ab- void, Clokey, certainly L.Rev. be solutely See at 1138. should set Colum. quashed by any having Other courts this model. Fair or court follow aside error, authority by appeal, to review Political Practices it Comm’n Californi Against Cal.App.4th Corruption, ans certiorari. Co., ception.

Am. at subsequently Constr. U.S. S.Ct. While La Seur lost 764, L.Ed. at 492. her status as an elector when she moved state, from the the move totally did not Similarly, Supreme Court has held: objectives undermine the require- timely challenge who makes a [0]ne ment that initially were met. The move validity of appoint- the constitutional did not eviscerate her background and adjudicates ment of officer who his Moreover, qualifications. challenged case is entitled to a decision on the vote cast La only Seur occurred five question merits of the whatever re- Iowa, months after she left and the vote may appropriate lief if a violation took place at a time she still when owned a indeed occurred. very see, home in Iowa. It is difficult to 182-83, Ryder, 515 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. at reality, how La Seur was less fit to consid- 2035, 132 L.Ed.2d at 143. The ex Court er adopted by the rule the Commission plained, “Any other rule would create a five months after she left the state when Appointments disincentive to raise *25 Clause she participate continued to in every Com- challenges with respect questionable ju to hearing person mission in or by telephone. dicial appointments.” Id. at 115 S.Ct. The facts of this case fall well short of 2035, 132 at L.Ed.2d at 143. Palmer, in those in which the officer was case, In this it is difficult to discern never properly perform trained to the task with precision objective the underlying at issue in the first place and the purpose policy the legislature had in mind in impos of the statutory qualifications were under- ing requirement the for commissioners to mined the qualify. Instead, failure to be legislature electors. The could have the facts fit more with Driscoll. wanted Commission members to be in help electors order to determine with important It is also keep to in mind that greater accuracy required political bal qualifications to be an elector do not Commission, ance for the help to ensure exist for the benefit of an individual or to citizens, engaged members were in protect an individual from the authority of order to help ensure members were con public Additionally, officer. the case Iowa, by residency nected to or other rea implicate any does not constitutional chal- Overall, sons. the reasonableness of the lenge. Iowans, The Commission serves all requirement likely is per derived from the sought and the action to be declared inval- spective the state would not want id Farm Bureau would affect all Iow- Commission members with little or no con very purpose ans. of the de facto The tact to the making state rules governing officer doctrine is to ensure the orderly Thus, Iowans. it is reasonable to view the government function of despite defects in purpose requirement as consistent qualifications anof officer when the Nevertheless, with perspective. this there defects are minor or technical. Ryder, 515 is nothing suggest require the elector 180-81, at U.S. 115 S.Ct. at designed ment was protect individuals L.Ed.2d at 142. think public poli- We may subjected who to the authority of a cy requires of this state vote cast protect official or to orderly years La Seur five ago approve government. administration of today, rules be considered valid and we Importantly, La Seur was elector decline to undo all that has been done appointed when to the Commission. This she because was not an elector at the time important policy circumstances, because the of the re- of the vote. Under all the quirement clearly in stronger satisfied the in- there is a public policy to main- government not undermine the administra- orderly functioning of issue did

tain the government tion or an individual’s process undo the policy than case, rights. In this defect did neither. a defect. based on government truth, Finally, previously applied we have public policy behind the de residency re- throughout found de facto officer doctrine to officer doctrine is facto Mfg. kind. quirements in See Rich Co. example, For the area government. 840, 842, not 241 Iowa Petty, we do reverse a prosecution, criminal 80, 81, (applying the doctrine appeal in a criminal case on conviction county error occurred at when member of a board of merely legal because a one Peterson, supervisors was not a freeholder and other trial. See State (Iowa 2003). representa- not adequately If we did take members were not Farm operation townships). to the tive of certain Bureau practical approach this emphasizes “geographical the need ... uncertainty and could government, chaos human, To err in to the de facto officer doc- errors boundaries” prevail. regard, Bureau process government imag- are non- trine. In this Farm ines an elaborate scenario in which La prejudicial technical nature should predicated foreign country action Seur move to a require government could citizenship, renounce her American on that error be undone. yet assert the Commission would still situation this case is presented course, applies. nothing doctrine Of *26 to comparable that of elected official beyond require- 455A.6 the elector section to take the properly who fails oath residency qualifi- actual is a suggests ment have years, rejected For 150 we office. Compare cation office. Code every government claim that action must (“An 455A.6, with id. 39.27 elected an official to be invalidated when failed official shall continue to be a resident of take the oath office. See properly state, district, county, township, city, Sheets, (dealing 291 N.W.2d at 37 with a person or ward or for which the attorney county who failed to submit elected, in which the duties office oath); Dish, Indep. written Sch. Grimes are to be exercised for the duration of the (con- 112, N.W.2d at 257 Iowa 131 806 office.”). term of cerning school members not board who did oath); Hartnett, Manufacturing take the State ex rel. 101 Our result Rich is in 386, many 70 (dealing considering Iowa at N.W. at 593 with accord with other courts path school board members who took of whether the de facto officer ap doctrine plies residency require from an to elector office individual authorized (7 it); Rice, See, State, e.g., administer rel. 7 Iowa v. 808 State ex ments. Gwin So.2d Clarke) 65, (Ala.2001); (dealing at 195 with ex officio v. City 67 Gates Tenakee (Alaska 1035, judges of election results who 954 P.2d 1038 Springs, failed oath). Darrow, 296, 119 1998); the statutorily required take The v. 58 Ariz. Juliani (1941); 565, Anderson, of office P.2d v. require- oath fundamental 568 Brown ment, 970, 188, (1946); but it otherwise 210 Ark. 198 191 does not undermine S.W.2d Hecht, People who 105 action taken an official failed to ex rel. v. Cal. Hoffman 621, 941, (1895); take ex properly the oath if the official other- 38 P. 944 State rel. 129, Deakyne, wise understood the duties the office James v. 58 A.2d 131 Hamrick, requirements perform (Del.Super.Ct.1948); Hagood and the those v. 600, 429, (1967); 223 157 430-31 duties. de facto officer doctrine seeks Ga. S.E.2d Duncan, 318, 54 when State v. 153 Ind. N.E. practicality applied the defect

431 1066, (1899); Miller, 1066-67 Patterson v. We understand a different scenario or 493, White, (1859); Ky. 59 496 State v. 156 fact proposed situation can be that would 770, 136, (1924); 140 La. 101 So. Baker v. the application render of the de facto offi- State, 567, 1070, 377 833 Md. A.2d 1086 inappropriate. cer doctrine propo- Such a (2003); Greyhound Corp. v. Mich. Pub. sition, however, does not serve to under- Comm’n, 578, Serv. 360 Mich. appropriate mine the application of the (1960); 395, State, v. 401-02 Bird 154 doctrine under the facts of this case. 493, 539, (1929); 122 So. 540 Miss. In re Thus, we analysis confine our to the facts St., 494, 105, Oak 308 Mo. 273 S.W. 109 case, do, of this required as we are (1925); 56, Hayes, Prescott v. 42 N.H. 58- apply the law consistently with its applica- (1860); Jacobs, 59 State ex rel. Newman v. tion in past. The de facto officer 143, (1848); 17 Ohio 152-53 v. Franks doctrine has served a valid role main- 134, 912, 170 City, Ponca Okla. 38 P.2d 913 taining government process since the (1934); 69, v. Graham Sch. Dist. No. 33 years statehood, earliest of our and it con- 263, 185, (1898); Or. 54 P. 187 Dove v. today. tinues to do so Kirkland, 313, 503, 92 S.C. 75 S.E. (1912); Jones, 484, Roche v. 87 Va. 12 S.E.

965, (1891); B. Amendment to IAPA. We Green Mountain Sch. Durkee, Dist. No. v. next turn argument by 56 Wash.2d to the Farm Bu- (1960); 351 P.2d State ex rel. reau that the 1998 amendments to the Darby, Schneider v. 179 Wis. abrogated IAPA the de facto officer doc- (1922); N.W. City Crawford trine. The IAPA establishes the exclusive Sheridan, (Wyo.1964). 392 P.2d person means for a or party adversely Potter, But see 125 W.Va. Omdorff by agency affected action judicial to seek 25 S.E.2d (recognizing a review. 17A.19. Prior nonresident who receives the most votes 1998, the Act permitted a court to reverse *27 office, for elected office does not hold the grant or other relief from action but not discussing the de facto officer doc- when, reasons, among other it was “[a]f- trine). by fected other error of law.” See Iowa In analysis, the final practical the nature 17A.19(8)(e) (1997). Code the the de facto officer doctrine supports statute was to require amended a court to our uphold validity conclusion to the of the reverse, modify, grant or other relief when Commission action taken in this case. The product making “[t]he of the decision un- only support contrary real for a conclusion by persons dertaken who improperly were is found in the failure of La Seur to main- constituted as a decision-making body, tain her required status as an elector. were by improper motivated an purpose, Yet, the de facto officer doctrine exists to or disqualification” were to if the validate official action when an underlying court infirmity determines the agen- the requirement Thus, is not satisfied. the cy action “prejudiced” the “substantial mere failure to qualify enough. is not rights” person seeking judicial re- Moreover, disqualification the in this case (codi- 1202, § lief. 1998 Iowa ch. Acts not did undermine the integrity and confi- 19(10)(e) (2011)). fied at Iowa Code 17A. dence in process by followed the Com- gist argument Farm Bureau’s is mission or in the Commission decision. that the de facto officer doctrine is now When La Seur lost her status elector, 17A.19(10)(e), incompatible the loss not with section unqual- did render her ified to do job. her by and has been implication. abolished it.” Food directly negate not Cookies legislature amends a does

When Distrib., Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse statute, “any material said that we have 1988). (Iowa Inc., 430 N.W.2d statute language of a in the change Thus, Ahi- our focus is on intent law.” State to alter presumed 1996). (Iowa legislature. tow, 544 N.W.2d Moreover, may be re common law “[t]he case, no indica- simply In this there by a statute implication pealed legislature to abolish tion the intended legislature’s intent to expresses the plainly amended facto officer doctrine when it de Vilsack, 725 N.W.2d so.” Atwood do (10) (e). 17A.19 section 17A.19 Section 2006). (Iowa 641, 644-45 (10) (e) facto not mention the de does doctrine, leg- we recognize officer Yet, or statu “[c]onstitutional the venera- certainly understands islature repeal the common tory provisions do facto officer doctrine ble role the de intention unless the implication law our law. throughout has been embedded plain.” Iowa Civil Liberties Un do so is over example, disputes in the area of For (Iowa Critelli, 244 N.W.2d ion v. land, the doc- specifically applied it title 1976). by providing: trine will contrary, legislature “To involv- In all and controversies actions long- intend presumed not to to overturn question parcel of title held ing law, and principles of established deed, county all acts under treasurer’s construed, unless an statute be so will treasurers, auditors, assessors, super- plainly appears intention do so visors, shall other de officers facto necessary or express declaration un- validity as be of the acts of officers same language implication, and the mistakable jure. de employed of no other reasonable admits added). § 448.14 (emphasis construction.” Considering presence the historical 870, 879, Dagel, Ritter v. 261 Iowa law, facto in our it is de officer doctrine (quoting 50 Am. have very unlikely legislature would 333), at superseded by Jur. Statutes it sim- uproot abrogate intended Steinberg, In re rule as stated in Estate of judicial re- ply identifying grounds (Iowa 1989); 443 N.W.2d accord greater specificity. view Wilson, 822; State v. cf. *28 (Iowa Osborn, 1985) significant N.W.2d also it is that the 69-70 We think (“We changes premise leading authority proce- start with the on administrative made a will not law claim or any revision of statute be dure did not mention altering theory following construed the law unless treatise on Act as his change legislature’s accomplish intent to the 1998 amendments to indicate unmistakable.”). abrogate in its clear and meaning is amendments were intended all, fact, merely After statutes de- the de facto In Pro- some “are officer doctrine. Wilson, claratory B amended of the common law.” fessor onfield’s comment on the 822; 17A.19(10)(e) City see Hia- section was limited to sin- N.W.2d also (d) (e) Comm’n, “Paragraphs are Reg’l Planning gle watha sentence: (Iowa 1978) (“The beneficial, of cur- clarifying statute elaborations rule.”). 17A.19(8) (d)- § IAPA merely paragraphs the common-law rent codifies (e).” onfield, New Proposed are ... to in- Arthur E. B Additionally, obliged “[w]e (SF terpret conformity with the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act statutes 2WI) statutory language Reporter-Drafts- common law wherever with Comments (1996); man 192 accord Arthur E. Bon- old common law deeply doctrine that is field, Amendments to Iowa Administra- embedded into our law. (1998), Chapter Procedure Act tive 17A contrast, in Estate Woodroffe, we (House Adopted) File 667 as Code of reasoned that the drafters of the 1984 Report on Selected Provisions to Iowa Corporation Model Business (upon Act State Bar Association and Iowa State Act) legislature which our based the Iowa (d) (“Paragraphs Government expressly “they stated away intended to do (e) beneficial, clarifying elabora- with the de facto corporation concept 17A.19(8)(d)- tions IAPA original section through provisions mirroring” Iowa Code (e).”).8 time, At the same Professor Bon- sections 490.203 and 490.204. 742 N.W.2d provided field valuable and detailed com- (Iowa 2007) 94, 103 (citing 5 Matthew G. ment on other amendments to section Doré, Series, Iowa Practice Business Cor- 17A.19. We think the nation’s leading au- (2007)). porations § 16:9 Unlike the stat- law, thority on administrative who has utes in Woodroffe, Estate the IAPA years been instrumental over the in assist- were merely amendments intended to clar- ing legislature Act, the Iowa in drafting its ify scope previous statute.9

would have devoted considerable commen- (10) (e) Finally, our tary analysis rule that presumes section 17A.19 if purpose legislature of the 1998 amendments intended to change legal abrogate was to an important, rights centuries- and construction of statutory terms previous permit- 8. The present version of the statute regarding antidegrada- at the vote ted reversal of an decision when it policy. Clearly, quorum tion existed. Simi- "(d) upon procedure” was unlawful larly, [m]ade seemingly section 455A.6 itself would "(e) by other [a]ffected error of law.” Iowa only require five votes in favor of the antide- 19(8) (1997). § Code 17A. 455A.6(1). gradation policy. See id. Be- cause we have determined Heathcote’s vote in recognize many presented by 9. We issues are improper, any inqui- favor of the rule was not IAPA, the amendments to the but these issues ry participation into whether La Seur’s impact do not the de facto officer doctrine. acceptable conceivably way, moot. In this precise meaning We need not determine the Farm rights Bureau’s "substantial ... have "improperly constituted." Iowa Code prejudiced.” [not] been all, 17A.19(10)(e). inquiry today After our 19(10); City 17A. see also Des Moines only legislative whether a clear intent to Bd., Emp't Pub. Relations century-and-a-half overrule a of caselaw (Iowa 1979) (indicating the "substantial Ritter, plainly appears. See 261 Iowa at rights” language in "analogous the IAPAis 156 N.W.2d at 323. It does not. In all rule”). course, the harmless error Of as we likelihood, course, improperly constitut- above, mentioned our decision in Wilson re- probably ed board is one that does not have jected par- the view that a conflicted official’s quorum Setting to act. aside action taken ticipation scrutiny is not insulated from mere- quorum application without a is a reasonable ly by being deciding vote. See 165 19(10)(e). of section 17A. Nor would the de Arguably, applies N.W.2d at 819-20. Wilson case, apply facto officer doctrine in such a however, Surely, plain here as well. read- *29 problem, the board as a whole is the not the ing reasoning of Wilson reveals its limited is credentials of an isolated board member. nothing to conflicts of interest and has to do good-faith participation by with 455A.6(5) an official in Interestingly, pro- section itself spite inability of a technical to hold office. majority vides that of the ‘‘[a] members of the ("[A] at See id. 819 vote cast quorum, in violation majority commission is a and statute, quorum may any interest even if act in immaterial matter within the conflict of to the outcome, commission, jurisdiction proceeding.” the of the vitiates unless a more added.)). (Emphasis adopted by Notwithstanding, restrictive rule is the commis- no 455A.6(5) case, party § sion.” Iowa argument, Code In this has made such an and we do all nine members of the Commission were not consider it further here. 434 deed, involved three of the four officers statutory text does not amending the in have said the to the Administrative case. We were not this

impact “ presumed Heights, is to legislature ‘The Act. See 572 Procedure Windsor past, law, including Palmer, case 593-94; of the the state 554 N.W.2d at know at N.W.2d a statute.’” law, Glawe, time it enacts 865-66; at the Only at 842. 547 N.W.2d Transp., 801 Dep’t v. Iowa IAPA, Welch we did involved the but not Allen 2011) (Iowa (quoting State 600 17A.19(8)(e) N.W.2d in that case. interpret section 1980)). (Iowa Jones, 298 298 N.W.2d v. Postell, 528 N.W.2d at 587-88. Unlike See Similarly, statutory about text the nothing the to know legislature presumed

“The in suggests the an timing of amendments in construction of terms the prior the officer to abolish our de facto doc tention act, substi- and an amendment original 17A.19(8)(e). by amending trine section phrase a new term or one tuting case, merely legislature In this the iden- construed indicates the previously agency to action specific challenges tified or executive the judicial construction 17A.19(8)(e), in the amendments to section not corre- phrase term or did former overlap challenges con- may some of which intent and a legislative with the spond under de facto officer doctrine sidered given interpretation should be different to overturn- enough as not serious warrant Thus, in inter- phrase. new term or ing challenged. the official action that is amendatory an act there is a preting only grant The statute the court directs legal rights. change in presumption by person an relief from decision peculiar is a rule to amendments This disqualified who was when substantial change other acts purporting rights petitioner prejudiced of the were existing statutory law.” standard, infirmity. of the This because Supervisors, Palmer State ex rel. v. Bd. of identified, entirely we have consistent (Iowa 1985) (quoting 1A 865 N.W.2d governing with the the de facto standard Sutherland, Statutory Construction Compare officer doctrine. Code (4th ed.1973)). 22.30, Thus, at 178 an 17A.19(10) Des City Moines statutory following text our amendment Bd., Emp’t Pub. Relations N.W.2d presump of the text raises a construction (Iowa 1979), with Windsor legislature that the intended to alter tion Heights, 572 N.W.2d at 593-94. Under rights explained by our cases. See 17A.19(10)(e),as under the de facto section Co., Family v. Am. Mut. Ins. Postell doctrine, minor or technical infirmi- officer (Iowa 2012). present In the N.W.2d that did not prejudice ties substantial case, we decided three de facto officer rights of those affected the decision do in years immediately doctrine cases relief. permit grant courts to amendments, and preceding the 1998 17A.19(10)(e). Thus, appeals court of decided one. See Wind with statute works hand hand 593-94; Heights, N.W.2d at Palm sor Allen, amended statute. It is not inconsistent er, 865-66; 554 N.W.2d at continuing purpose with the doc- 587-88; Oklendorf, Glawe trine, (Iowa it does appli- not undermine Ct.App.1996). Instead, However, cation of doctrine. doc- purport none these cases important play trine continues role predecessor interpret of section 17A. 19(10)(e). operation government this 572 the Heights, See Windsor *30 593-94; Palmer, recognizes grounds and that the for 554 N.W.2d at state 865-66; Allen, always 587-88. In relief from official action do N.W.2d at grounds enough mean those to over- sition with an organization environmental disqualify turn the action taken. We conclude the did not her voting from on the antidegradation rules legislature promulgated by did not intend to abolish the de Environmental Protection by implication. facto officer doctrine Be- Commission. The creating statute pro- cause the doctrine survived the 1998 Commission Ad- majority vides that a ministrative Act commissioners Procedure amendments actively will be case, engaged in activities direct- applies and to the facts of this we ly affected environmental regulations. correctly granted hold district court 455A.6(l)(a)-(c) (2009).10 See Iowa Code summary judgment to the Commission re- Accordingly, viewpoint bias is garding contemplat- Commissioner La Seur. permitted,

ed and and Farm Bureau failed grounds to establish disqualify Heath- VI. Conclusion. cote.11 by grant- district court did not err however, I disagree, majority’s with the ing summary judgment to the Commission conclusion as to Commissioner La Seur. regarding both Heathcote’s and La Seur’s The law requires every commissioner to be participation. The district court also did “elector[ ] state.” Id. by granting summary not err judgment 455A.6(1). It is undisputed La Seur lost affording without Farm oppor- Bureau an that status when she moved to Montana tunity to obtain the internal emails from registered Yet, to vote in Montana. the Iowa Environmental regarding Council Commission, she continued to serve on the scope job of Heathcote’s function. Ac- traveling back to Iowa to vote in favor of cordingly, we affirm the decision of the antidegradation rules. district court. This is not some mere technicality. As AFFIRMED. the majority emphasizes in the Heathcote justices All concur except WATER- portion of opinion, its the Commission has MAN, MANSFIELD, ZAGER, JJ„ a “broad mandate of authority” and en- part

who concur in in part. dissent gages “policy rulemaking” for Iowa. Thus, it is fair and reasonable for the WATERMAN, Justice (concurring in legislature require that its members be part dissenting part). below, Iowans. As I discuss the same respectfully I part concur in requirement and dissent applies to all elected state I part. agree with the majority’s Iowa, con- and local officials in judicial and all clusion that officers, Commissioner po- Heathcote’s as well as certain other boards Iowa Code section pending 455A.6 creates a nine- rules were before the Commission. requires member commission and that three Bureau, however, Farm has not advanced this "actively engaged members shall be in live- her, ground disqualifying as a focusing grain farming,” stock and one member shall allegations instead on of bias and conflict of "actively engaged be in the business of fi- agree majority interest. I with the that Com- commerce," nance or and one member shall missioner employment Heathcote’s outside "actively engaged management in the with Iowa Environmental Council and her manufacturing company.” policy positions disqualify do not her from 455A.6(l)(a)-(c). voting antidegradation on the rules. I leave suggests 11. The day record that Commissioner for another whether a commissioner can may colleagues Heathcote have counseled her rulemaking proceeding vote on a when the organization in the environmental at the Iowa personally commissioner also was involved in lobby Environmental Council on how to lobbying proceeding. outside on that same antidegradation proposed rules while the *31 disqualified. Specifical- con- should have been The Commission

and commissions. challenge can the Com- ly, of Farm Bureau not an elector this was La Seur cedes under section antidegrada- mission’s action Iowa Code for the voted when she state 17A.19(10)(e) of product “[t]he rules. tion by persons undertaken making decision acknowledges that La majority The as a deci- improperly who were constituted once qualified be to serve ceased to Seur body ... or were to sion-making Montana, but nonetheless moved to she disregards The disqualification.” majority the based on de her upholds participation the IAPA. I would hold that amendment to to According the officer doctrine. facto disqualified La Seur that because was doc- the de facto officer view of majority’s Commission was im- voting from and the trine, unqualified way stop the to an only participat- with her properly constituted voting acting or official from are ing, antidegradation the rules void. get quo proceeding bring a warranto Meanwhile, of facto majority’s while The use the de officer him removed. her or La way through uphold a vote after Seur proceeding a works its doctrine—to such courts, moved her to Montana —under- can continue vote residence the official act, variety residency requirements reme- a have no mines of or and affected citizens Jus- in the Iowa Code Constitution.12 dy. court, example, of must tices this be wrong. legislature I think this 46.14(1); § Iowa Iowa residents. Code narrowed unfairness and corrected this Const, V, (requir- § art. see also Iowa adopted when it de facto officer doctrine justices ing to be members Iowa 1998 amendments to the Iowa Admin- bar). the de facto officer doctrine Does (IAPA), Act Iowa istrative Procedure Code allow me to move to Florida and continue 17A. Iowa Acts ch. ch. See 1998 court, voting despite on decisions our (codified 17A.19(10) § § 24 at Iowa Code parties, I objections from the until am (2001)). While the de facto officer doctrine thrown out office? may preclude still collateral attack on a action, out, majority points As the past agency party may since 1998 Commis- exercising quasi-legislative seek direct action on the sion review engaged ground rulemaking. that one or more decision-makers function when Const, See, Ill, e.g., (stating county city § art. dent of a served Iowa or this state representative state "shall have been in- airport”); (requiring § 347.9 id. trustees year preceding habitant of one next this state hospital county public residents to be election, at the his his time of election ("A county); represen- § id. 368.14 local sixty have had an actual residence of shall City Development [to tative Board] must days county, may in the or district he have registered territory city be a voter of the or Ill, § represent”); art. been chosen to id. ....”); representative represents which (requiring satisfy state senators same ("[Civil 400.17(3) e]mployees § id. service representa- requirement residence as state required shall not to be a resident of the be tives); IV, (requiring § id. art. the Governor city they employed, they in which but and Lieutenant Governor to be dents); resi- Iowa shall become a resident of the state within V, (requiring § id. members of art. years appointment two or the date of such judicial nominating commissions be employment begins shall remain resi- electors); 217.2(l)(c) during remainder dent of the state (2013) (requiring members of the Council on 421.1(1) ("The employment.”); id. state electors); to be Iowa Human Services id. ... consist of three board tax review shall airport (requiring 330.20 members of local registered members voters city who shall commission to be residents "of state_"). county establishing the or a commission resi-

437 requires legislature ging,” Our EPC commission- and without such qualifications, to live in Iowa to ensure environmental ers “anyone in Arizona or elsewhere would be regulations promulgated by are Iowans free to run for the office of Mayor of who understand conditions in our state and Nogales long so as he or she established who will live under the they rules issue. residence after the election in time to be a 455A.6(1)(“The See Iowa Code members qualified elector before the term of office ”). shall be electors of state.... began”); Ch, Wall v. Mun. Cal.App.3d 223 qualifications “Wherever are fixed there is 247, 702, (1990) (not- 272 Cal.Rptr. 703-04 classes; a division into that is say, there ing that possibility “the that citizen confi- serve, is a class which may and another adjudication dence in the of traffic cases may not.” ex State rel. Jones v. increases when they by are handled local 298, 307, Sargent, 339, 145 Iowa 124 N.W. residents” was an important legislative (1910) added). 343 (emphasis The legisla- goal that was sufficient justify the re- exceptions ture did not allow carpet- for quirement traffic commissioners be baggers. Common sense tells us that a residents of the county in which they are greater official will have a interest appointed); Boulware, Snyder v. 109 on, in the rules he voting or she is will 427, (1939) (indicat- 913, Mont. 96 P.2d 915 possess greater understanding of the ing purpose of a residency requirement question, issues in and will lend more cred- county commissioners disquali- “was to ibility and confidence to the if proceeding fy those who were not familiar -with the specifically he or she is a resident —or particular needs of the section of the coun- this case an jurisdiction elector—of the ty”); Gangemi 166, v. Rosengard, 44 N.J. by affected the actions of that public offi- (1965) 665, 207 A.2d (noting previ- its cial. supports ous caselaw residency require- important purposes The served resi- ment city theory commissioners on the dency requirements have been noted in that “residence assures a rudimentary un- many See, e.g., court decisions. Woodward derstanding conditions”); of local Horwitz Beach, City 1081, 538 F.2d of Deerfield Reichenstein, 6, 881, 15 N.J. 103 A.2d (5th Cir.1976) (noting durational resi- (1954) (stating the “lack of residence dency requirements ensure “candidate his ward ward councilman imperil[s] knowledge problems the issues and representation of the ward in the sense area”); Massion, Triano v. 109 Ariz. statute”); intended Farnsworth v. (1973) 513 P.2d (finding a Jones, N.C.App. 441 S.E.2d residency requirement that candidates had (indicating one rationale of a qualified to be electors for six months was residency requirement is to “ensure that supported by the conclusion that candi- sincerely elected officials represent living dates in the they represent districts district”). residents of particular likely are to familiarize themselves with majority opinion thwarts the legislature’s the people problems and the of the dis- goal of ensuring the regula- Commission trict); Macias, State v. 162 Ariz. tions promulgated exclusively by Iow- P.2d 258 (Ariz.Ct.App.1989) (noting a ans who will live regulations. under those state provision constitutional requiring But, “qualified elected officers to be problem the fundamental elector[s]” with the of the state at majority’s the time the election opinion is that it conflicts with prevent intended to “political carpetbag- Prior to only IAPA.13 the IAPA is, purpose part, 13. The simplify process of the IAPA in judicial "to review of disquali- ... body or were modify agency ing reverse courts allowed *33 fication. action 1202, § 24. Iowa ch. La 1998 Acts rights petitioner if substantial disqualification once Seur was to agen- the because prejudiced been ha[d] And, to Montana.14 the Com- she moved cy [was]: action constituted when improperly mission or In violation of constitutional a. Seur, member, La who voting it included statutory provisions; an required her status as Iowa had lost statutory authori- In excess of the b. provision precludes This use the elector. agency; ty of the here. de facto officer doctrine rule; agency In violation of an c. the IAPA ren- The 1998 amendment to lengthy majority’s irrelevant the dis- ders upon procedure; Made unlawful d. development the history cussion of and law; by error of e. Affected other common law de facto officer doctrine in the case, unsupported In a contested f. the The Iowa and federal courts. 1998 the record by substantial evidence expressly to amendment the IAPA allows that rec- the when agency made before empowers challenge to courts parties whole; viewed as a or ord is agency previously review action that Unreasonable, arbitrary capri- or g. have been under the upheld would com- an by cious or characterized abuse law de officer doctrine. The mon facto clearly or a unwarranted ex- discretion that, historically, we majority notes have of discretion. ercise “applied the facto doctrine to [de officer] appointment.” ... errors in election or 17A.19(8) (1997). Signifi- However, by cited none of the cases however, amendment, cantly, address majority improperly constitut- following language was added: decision-making body ed or member sub- reverse, modify, grant The court shall disqualification after ject ac- appropriate agency other relief from Those amendments the IAPA. cases tion, equitable or legal including majority predated cited relief, declaratory if it determines that longer apposite. no amendment rights person seeking substantial See, Co., e.g., State Elec. v. Cent. States judicial relief be- prejudiced have been 801, 818, 288 Iowa 28 N.W.2d agency any cause action is Dist., (1947); Indep. Cowles v. Sch. following: 689, 698-99, N.W. Iowa 87-88

(1927); Metro. Nat’l Bank Commercial Bank, 682, 687, product making e. The of decision State 104 Iowa 74 N.W. (1898). there persons Similarly, who were im- 28 because is no undertaken analogous federal to Iowa properly provision constituted as a decision-mak- Code agency rulemaking, action as well increase its ease and trict court whether the action case, ”). 1(3). agency availability.” contested or 'other action.' Iowa 17A. The Code rulemaking apply IAPA"is meant to to all proceedings contested case and all suits for graduate 14. La Seur is Yale Law judicial agency attorney. review of action.” Id. She School and licensed should Utils., 17A.1(2); moving accord IES Inc. known to Montana and have that' Fin., Dep't registering Revenue & end her to vote there would status (Iowa 1996) ("The disqualify generally allows ... her [I] as an Iowa elector and would APA judicial continued on the Commission. review from an action dis- from service 17A.19(10)(e) (2009), section legislature federal mon law. Our has overruled that rule of majority discussed construction: inap- caselaw posite. law, The rule of the common statutes in derogation thereof are to be majority’s interpretation renders construed, strictly application has no 17A.19(10)(e) effect, part of section without provisions this Code. Its proceed- and all contrary to our canons of construction. ings under it shall liberally construed *34 Bearinger v. Dep’t Transp., See Iowa promote with a view to objects its (Iowa 2014) (“We 844 N.W.2d parties assist obtaining justice. interpret [legislation] in a manner to Iowa 4.2. Code avoid ... rendering any part of the enact- Farm Bureau’s challenge is the exact (internal ment superfluous.” quotation contemplated situation by the statute. omitted)); Keutla, marks State v. 798 There question Seur, is no that La at the (Iowa 2011) (‘We 731, 734 N.W.2d seek an time of the action in question, was interpretation does not render por- disqualification under Iowa Code sec- tions of [a statute] redundant or irrele- 455A.6(1). tion parties The agree she was vant.”). By concluding agency action longer no an Iowa elector at the time of upheld must be under the de facto officer question. Therefore, the vote in I would doctrine, majority effectively cuts off conclude the decision-making body was any opportunity to seek review under the improperly constituted with her voting “subject to disqualification” language of 455A.6(1) participation. See Iowa Code 17A.19(10)(e) section and leaves it mean- (requiring all Commission members to be ingless. Iowa). What does that term mean if it electors of the State of can trumped by be the de facto officer Next, Farm Bureau has shown its “sub- doctrine? The majority offers no answer. rights” stantial prejudiced were by La Seur’s act of voting disqualified. while Rather, majority concludes the de 17A.19(10)(“The court shall facto officer doctrine survives the 1998 reverse, modify, grant other appropri- amendment because that term is not men- action, ate relief from equitable or 17A.19(10)(e). Yet, tioned section as the legal relief, including declaratory if it majority acknowledges, presume we determines that substantial rights of the amendments to statutes alter the law. See person judicial seeking relief have been Co., Postell v. Family Am. Mut. Ins. 823 prejudiced-”). We have described the (Iowa 2012) (“Finally, when rights” “substantial language as follows: legislature statute, amends a it raises a We have found this rights” “substantial presumption that legislature intended language analogous to a harmless error law.”). change And, in the as majori- recognize rule. We the commissioner’s ty further acknowledges, common “[t]he action “should not be tampered with un- may law repealed by implication in a less the complaining party has in fact plainly expresses statute that the legisla- been analysis harmed.” This form of Vilsack, ture’s intent to do so.” Atwood v. appropriate because it would be ineffi- (Iowa 2006). 725 N.W.2d 644^5 That provide cient for us to relief from invalid is what we have majority’s here. The agency action particular when the inval- interpretation supported by is not its reli- idity prejudiced has not the substantial ance on the rule of construction that stat- rights petitioner. Therefore, [the are presumed repeal utes not to complainant] com- bears the burden of dem- majori- upon by the The Iowa cases relied invalidity both

onstrating predat- officer doctrine ty for de facto resulting prejudice. agency’s action the IAPA. ed both Wilson and Inc., 705 N.W.2d Fleetguard, Hill omitted). 2005) (citations (Iowa Farm Bu- majority, by denying review, raised on direct challenge reau’s easily here. We established Prejudice is meaningless requirement renders vote invalid when that a long have held Iowa residents. I Commissioners be voting body should have one member of to main- conclude La Seur’s failure would when disqualified voting, from even been an Iowa enables tain her status as elector vote decisive. member’s is not the tainted agency’s the district court to review the See, City, v. Iowa e.g., Wilson section action under Code (Iowa 1969). Wilson, the five 17A.19(10)(e), summary judgment City city council of Iowa members on to the EPC improperly granted adopted related on and resolutions voted *35 issue. Id. at Howev- urban renewal. 816-17. to votes, er, least if our the of the at one Even this case was decided under at time law, was a find vote prohibited member of the council common I would La Seur’s is voting on related to doc- statute from issues not validated the de facto officer existing renewal because an con- the foregoing urban trine. Because of rationales Id. at residency requirements, flict of interest. 820-21. elector I determining whether vote should be disagree majority’s with the contention vacated, disqual- when the her sta- even vote of that La Seur’s failure to maintain changed not comparable ified member would have as an elector “is to tus outcome, prop- we held “the better rule holds a that of an official who fails to elected a inter- Taking vote cast in violation of conflict of erly take the oath of office.” statute, if the out- est even immaterial to to procedure oath of office is a technical be come, proceeding.” vitiates the Id. 819. qualified an otherwise performed before contrast, noted such supported By We two rationales office. candidate takes (1) disquali- rule: participation requirement “the of the that each member of the com- may fied member in the discussion have be state is mission an elector this influenced mem- opinion the other funda- holding condition of office that bers,” may mental, residency “such cast re- participation not technical. This suspicion impartiality through on the of the deci- quirement cannot be remedied (internal sion.” Id. quotation taking retaking at 820 marks such as procedural step omitted). stated, “It being impossible We an oath.

to determine whether the virus of self- La Seur’s failure maintain her status result, ... interest affected the it must as an Iowa elector is similar to the failure body’s de- assumed that it dominated the of the officer in State v. to take the Palmer liberations, and that the judgment its prior adminis- required training course (internal product.” Id. quotation marks tering breath test. omitted). The same is true here. (Iowa 1996). case, In that we not- 864-65 allowing participation disqualified

La Seur’s while ed an officer be considered a may peace approved have influenced the facto officer to adminis- opinion de members, least, very proper training other it ter the test without suspicion “ignore As decision legislature’s casts on decision. in would Wilson, narrowly ‘peace it to know define officer’ more impossible for us law,” and impact participation. purposes implied exact of La Seur’s consent completely ignore [the statute]’s “would tion and rendered the Commission im- requirement specialized training.” properly OWI constituted decision-making body. 17A.19(10)(e). at 865. further noted the Id. We absence See Iowa Code That stat- training was more than a “technical trumps ute the de facto officer doctrine. infirmity” But, the training provided because majority’s even under the common safeguards protect the citizens of Iowa analysis, law participation La Seur’s from improperly administered tests with should not be excused the de facto consequential criminal and administrative officer doctrine. Her participation in vot- penalties including driving privi- loss of therefore, ing, invalidates the Commis- leges. See id. at 865-66. As the majority antidegradation Wilson, sion’s rules. See out, points “the de facto officer doctrine is 165 N.W.2d at Accordingly, I would applied particular disqualifi- when the reverse the district court’s entry of sum- integrity cation at issue undermines the mary judgment against Farm Bureau. and confidence demanded in actions taken JJ., Mansfield and Zager, join this con- by government.” or decisions made part currence in part. and dissent in Here, allowing La Seur to vote on rules affecting the citizens of Iowa when she did qualification

not meet the basic she “ignore[s]

be an Iowa legisla- elector *36 require

ture’s decision” to commissioners 865;

to be electors of the state. See id. at Sargent, 145 Iowa at 124 N.W. at cf. (“The fixing qualifications for office a legislative judicial and not a func-

tion.”). Further, above, as noted

elector requirement protects citi- Iowa’s by ensuring zens those individuals ENTERPRISES, Eagle SZ LLC d/b/a responsible making rules will af- Solar, Appellee, Point fect the citizens the state will be inter- ested and invested in the outcome of the rulemaking procedures, they as them-

selves will live under the rules that are BOARD, IOWA UTILITIES a Division Therefore, enacted. the failure to main- Department Commerce, tain status as an elector of the state is Iowa, Appellant, State of more than a technical infirmity. As one of only qualifications required two every Light Company, Interstate Power and member, commission “goes it to the heart” Coopera- Iowa Association of Electric qualifications set forth under section tives, Energy and MidAmerican Com-

455A.6(1), therefore, La Seur’s vote pany, Intervenors-Appellants, should not be rescued by the de facto Palmer, officer doctrine. See Advocate, Office of Consumer Environ-

at 865. Policy Center, mental Law & Iowa reasons, For Council, these I La conclude Seur’s Environmental Iowa So- failure to maintain Energy her status as an Iowa Wind Trade Asso- lar/Small elector, ciation, required by Energy Code section Iowa Renewable As- 455A.6(1), sociation, left her disqualifica- Energy Solar Industries

Case Details

Case Name: Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, and Iowa Water Environment Association
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Jul 11, 2014
Citation: 850 N.W.2d 403
Docket Number: 12–0827
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
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