Iowa City v. Nolan

CITY, Appellee, IOWA NOLAN, Appellant.

John

No. 57504. of Iowa. Supreme Court Feb. Nolan, pro

John se. Bowlin, Robert City Atty., H. Asst. City, appellee.

MOORE, Justice. Chief charged

Defendant John Nolan was Magistrate the' Division of the District Court with over a dozen vehicle separate violations under three Iowa City conviction, Upon appealed ordinances. he prima charges (one under each ordi- facie responsible three of for said viola- Court, nance) District where (Our to the Johnson tion.” emphasis). ordi- guilty under all three

he was found together, Read these provide ordinances for a total of No- nances. He was fined $20. statutory prohibitions enforcement of the challenge defense consisted of a to the lan’s against both passive active and traffic vio- these ordinances. On constitutionality of 6.16.2, lators. Sections 6.16.9 and 6.30.7 parties unnecessarily limited the appeal, define the actual violations and are made this court scope presented of the issues to operable through pro- section 6.54.9 which directing an order we therefore issued punishment vides for operator of the if he supplemental file parties to briefs or she can be found or of the vehicle’s reargument. for We find set the matter registered operator owner if the is not appellant’s challenge constitutionali- provisions available. These impose a form to be without merit ty of these ordinances of strict or vicarious liability upon regis- his convictions under all three and affirm tered owner of an illegally parked vehicle. sections. upon It is the constitutional validity of this presented I. The ease was to the trial vicarious liability that our decision in this upon stipulation court the vehicle appeal must rest. ordi- illegally parked under various nances and that defendant was the vehicle’s II. recently We have set out the evidence offered registered owner. No burden to be met a party challenging the regarding identity operator of the validity constitutional of a statute or ordi vehicle. Iowa, nance in Keasling Thompson, N.W.2d (cid:127) 689. That discussion need not set The relevant Iowa ordinances are repeated be here. It will suffice to say that (in pertinent portions): as follows out challenger strong must overcome a pre operator 6.16.2 “No of a vehicle shall § sumption of constitutionality negate park any vehicle in stop, any stand or every upon * * reasonable basis which the en following places of the might upheld. Henderson, actment be In re person any shall ve- 6.16.9 “No leave § Iowa, 199 N.W.2d 121. If more than street, upon any alley public hicle or possible, one construction is one of which any period longer for a ground at time will render the ordinance constitutional and * * than twelve hours another unconstitutional or of doubtful con “It 6.30.7 shall be unlawful and a vio- stitutionality, the construction which it provisions chapter lation of the of this will upheld will be followed and adopted. cause, allow, any person permit for Rasmussen, Iowa, State v. 213 N.W.2d any registered or suffer vehicle 666. operated by person name of or such overtime *. matter, III. In this criminal proof upon prosecution burden of is well “It shall be unlawful and a violation of established under the due clause of any provisions -chapter of this the Fourteenth Amendment to the United permit any vehicle to remain person States Constitution. The United States Su space beyond legal any parking [the preme Court stated in In re Winship, 397 parking time].” 358, 364, 90 1068, 1073, any “If vehicle found 368, 375: stopped, standing any or provisions protects Due Process Clause manner violative “[T]he identity operator against accused conviction except upon Title 6 and the determined, proof beyond or every cannot be reasonable doubt of person corporation necessary in whose name fact to constitute the crime registered charged.” said vehicle is shall be held with which he is applies delineating felonies public This standard both elements of wel- City of Des Moines v. Ro- frequently misdemeanors. fare offense dispenses 262, 273, senberg, 243 Iowa 51 N.W.2d “In wrongdoing. awareness of the interest larger good puts the burden of acting at upon person hazard otherwise In a of United series States standing responsible innocent but rela- cases, important most of which is tion to public danger.” a United v. States States, 246, 72 Morissette v. United 342 U.S. Dotterweich, 281, 277, 134, 320 U.S. 64 S.Ct. 240, 288, high 96 L.Ed. court has S.Ct. 136, 48, 88 51. L.Ed. See also United States exception the general carved out an to Park, 658, v. 1903, 421 U.S. 95 S.Ct. 44 criminal due considerations 498, 499; 489, L.Ed.2d City of Des Moines v. public welfare offenses. These are area Davis, 202; Iowa, 199, 214 N.W.2d v. State post-in- public regulations that arose in Dahnke, 599, 603, 553, 244 Iowa 57 N.W.2d cope era with dustrial revolution to 556. then-emerging complexities of the industri- regulations These have no alized world. only may public Not welfare legisla common law and have been ancestors dispense with a mens rea or scienter being: characterized as requirement, does, it may, frequently “ * * * neglect in the nature of where impose a vicarious liability “criminal” for care, requires or inaction where it law recognized the acts another. We such duty. Many violations of such imposes a 1329, Barry, v. 255 State Iowa or regulations result in no direct immedi- 833, 125 affirming N.W.2d the conviction of person property ate or but injury to partner a in a car sales agency whose em danger merely probability create ployee, knowledge, without defendant’s per the law seeks to minimize. it which mitted a customer to pasteboard plates use * * accused, *. if he does not will application without for registration and cer violation, usually position is in tificate of title. We there said: prevent no society it with more care than “ * * 321.26, Code, *. It [section no might reasonably expect and more ex- 1958 imposes as a duty upon amended] might reasonably ertion than exact the dealer to see requirement that this responsibil- assumed from one who his not neglected. It falls within the class of ities. *.” Morissette v. United police offenses where is prohibited the act 255-256, 72 342 S.Ct. at U.S. for the welfare of the state. It is in the 246, at 296-297. 96 L.Ed. prohibition nature of a such as is usually regulations square- fall of traffic Violations found in statutes that person forbid a public classification of ly proper within a permit ice accumulate his before front Public Sayre, welfare offenses. See Wel- city door pointed on a street. As is out in 55, 73, Offenses, Col.L.Rev. fare 33 Law, Edition, Wharton’s Criminal 12th 29, 1, 45, page Vol. in such instances it is wide in lawmak There latitude consequence of no whether the offend- an offense ers to declare exclude er cognizant of the violation of the knowledge diligence elements of from legislature law. The may adopt such a California, Lambert its definition. 355 method as the best way preventing 242, 225, 228, 240, 2 U.S. 78 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d * public. deleterious results to the *.” 228, 231; 858, Dobry, State 217 1332, 255 Iowa 125 N.W.2d 834. 704, 861-862, 702, appeal 250 dis N.W.2d missed, 519, 87, See, 55 79 L.Ed. e. g., U.S. Commonwealth v. Minicost Car Rental, Inc., general 746, 632. No constitutional doctrine of Mass. N.E.2d 411 (where mens rea has ever been articulated. Powell car illegally parked, lessee rental 514, Texas, agency’s 88 S.Ct. upheld conviction under a regula- 6.30.7, legisla- 1269. Thus tion almost identical with section

IQ 5 Corpo sibility means “at Kansas v. Hertz first view” or “on City of its supra); more”, or “without Mo., (where Richards, driver face” State v. ration, 499 S.W.2d 497, 502, 439, 441, 126 Iowa liability imposed 102 N.W.2d vicarious present, was not ownership proof of is sufficient to create city very similar under ordinance on owner on jury question defendant’s 6.54.1); responsibility v. Koc Commonwealth to section violation. Commonwealth de zwara, Pa. A.2d cert. Mass., Pauley, N.E.2d 905. This nied, 1624, L.Ed.2d proof would also be sufficient to convict (conviction upheld where defendant’s defendant unless the evidence indicated de- minors; jail sen beer employees sold was not in responsible fendant fact for the intact). invalid but fine left tence held permits This violation. defendant to come before appeal this ordinances forward evidence that someone permissible within area clearly us are operating the vehicle without his consent or lives regulation people’s in the interest of facts with other which would rebut the (cid:127) have tragic statistics property. prima registered facie inference that the within as to be promulgated been so well a vehicle responsible owner of is for its knowledge. general ordinary person’s In the operation. public area of welfare 50,000 annually through are lost lives About offenses, shifting such burden is not consti- vastly greater A number traffic accidents. Park, tutionally supra, infirm. See U. v.S. injured crippled. Cer persons 672, 1912, at at U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d on a down illegally parked an vehicle tainly at 501. seriously during rush can hour town street A similar City Kansas ordinance con- travel. endanger pedestrian and vehicular the Missouri Supreme City fronted Court authori rationale the above Under the City Corporation, supra, of Kansas Hertz ties, vicariously registered may owner be a “ upon vehicle a ‘If is found street illegally parked vehicle and his liable for any provision in violation of of this chap- subject pursuant public to a punishment ter, the owner or in whose name person may he be regulation. Whether welfare registered such vehicle is in the records of us subjected not imprisonment is before county any city, or state shall be held statute Compare language now. responsible prima violation, facie for such Park, supra, involved in United States ” present.’ if the driver thereof is not at 666, 1908, at U.S. lan at with Justice Cardozo’s The Missouri court held: n. People v. Sheffield Farms-Slaw guage 34.344, supra, directly imposes “Ord. § Co., 25, 32-33, 121 N.Y. N.E. son-Decker parking for the violation on the holding 477 and the in Commonwealth owner, providing of the car the driver is Koczwara, 586, 155 A.2d supra, 397 Pa. at present. require It not does not that the 830-831. owner be driver. *. doctrine, facie’, public ‘prima “The words

Under this welfare as used in ordinance, impose prima it is 6.54.1 this do that the may clear section not mean own- upon presumed responsibility facie strict criminal er is to be driver. The ve registered here, of an as used that a illegally parked phrase, owner means rebut- an proving presumption existence of table exists that the car By hicle. was vehicle, (2) registered being operated in the illegally parked by not the driver without defendant, (3) inability to the consent of and that name of the operator, city registration actual can is correct. the car Unless determine rebutted, imposing presumption facie prima make out a case ordi- ve upon imposes liability for the nance for the responsibility violation this prior authority upon violation the owner.” 499 at hicle’s owner. Under S.W.2d others, “prima respon- this facie” 451-452. court (3) the City ordinances conviction must carry damag- IV. hold not We ing permis- stigma. here well within the may considered fall Government not make legislation. public welfare conduct criminal is wholly passive. sible bounds which California, inference created section 6.54.1 does Lambert deny by plac- due to defendant not L.Ed.2d 228 him, proof upon but ing the burden of rath- Lambert, quoted going shifts to him the merely er burden approval following with statement from that the vehicle forward with evidence “ Holmes, Law, p. The Common ‘A law operated by one who the not has punished which conduct which would right presume operating the automo- blameworthy average member of the its owner’s consent. The convic- bile community would too severe for that must therefore be affirmed. tions ” community to bear.’ Affirmed. S.Ct. at 2 L.Ed.2d at 232. I believe the given construction ordinance majority in MASON, RAWLINGS, puts this case LeGRAND, in this catego- ry- REES, REYNOLDSON, UHLENHOPP and

JJ., concur. Under the majority construction of the ordinance automobile owner is guilty HARRIS, JJ.,

McCORMICK and dissent. crime when his car City Iowa he proves unless the car was McCORMICK, (dissenting). Justice being operated without his consent on the large case This is small which involves occasion Although involved. the record agree I am unable to principles. with the does not show what maximum penalty is majority’s principles. view of those possible for such crimes in City, the in I. Dictum Morissette v. United conduct may is misdemeanor and include 246, 72 96 L.Ed. penalties, misdemeanor a maximum of fine (1952), majority opinion, 288 relied on the jail sentence of 30 days. $100 321.- §§ purport does not to authorize state and 236(1), 321.482, addition, The Code. In government liability” to local create “strict alleged subject violator is to misdemeanor Immediately crimes without limitation. prosecution and penalties maximum for language quoted approval by after the 321.487, failure appear. to Code. majority, Court added: penalties These stigma and this do not “Also, commonly relatively penalties are exist under the Missouri ordinance involved small, conviction does grave and no dam- City City of Kansas v. Corporation, Hertz age reputation. to an offender’s Under (Mo.1973), 499 S.W.2d 449 from which the considerations, such courts have turned to majority takes its construction of ordi- construing regulations statutes which prosecu- nance in this case. In Missouri a dispensing make of no mention intent as for regarded ordinance violation is aas holding guilty with it and that act City Howe, civil action. Kansas 416 not, alone out the crime. This has makes (Mo.App.1967). 688 S.W.2d maxi- however, of expressions been without penalty mum under the ordinance in Hertz misgiving.” at 342 at a relatively small fine and included no L.Ed. 96 at 297. potential incarceration. 499 S.W.2d at 453. Although the Many Morissette decision does not states do treat ordinance viola- exactly government may delineate McQuillin, how far tions as misdemeanors. 9 Munic- area, go in this it does ipal Corporations, (“The indicate three factors at 27.38 700 vio- (1) present: must be the conduct must lation of an ordinance usually not viewed very negli- least be akin to common-law a as misdemeanor unless its violation slight, See, gence, penalty such.”). g., must be expressly declared e. same This is the conclusion reached in Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. People analogous situations in a number of other (1955). N.E.2d jurisdictions. Top Red Driv-Ur-Self v. passivity Iowa, regard to without Potts, (1957); 227 Ark. S.W.2d conduct, subject he is the owner’s Forbath, People Cal.App.2d Supp. penalty and criminal conviction criminal Stone, (1935); City P.2d Seattle jail, days as 60 great as may be which 67 Wash.2d 410 P.2d 583 parking of- upon conviction days illegal parking If is as serious as the ordinance, and fense, by the authorized if contends, it majority opinion should be a required. as appear if he fails days crime, government but the must then ac- proving personal cept burden is not a parking violation illegal If an However, one guilt. individual viola- majority crime”, maintained in as “true alleged here was under an Iowa tions nor a crime not be called it should opinion, equate meter ordinance. It is difficult If it is a penalties. carry criminal it should system lofty meter with the liability is un crime,” strict vicarious “true traffic fatalities. We goal preventing proc substantive due denies reasonable majority not told how failure to the offense is “Where of law. ess charge temporary pay City’s rental is, crime, where it that a true nature of storage public parking a vehicle in a punishable delinquency or is moral involves public safety. place endangers penalty, or a serious imprisonment Moreover, majority opinion fails to respondeat that the doctrine clear seems recognize the difference between strict lia- as a foundation repudiated superior must be The traffic bility liability. and vicarious very it is of the liability. For for criminal which ordinances under defendant of crimi deep-rooted notions essence of our liability. strict charged purport impose personal and indi guilt nal illegal parking an offense with- They make Respon Sayre, *.” Criminal vidual regard out to the state of mind of the Another, 43 Harv.L. sibility for the Acts liability is strict as operator. vehicle That 689, (1930). People v. Shef 717 See Rev. Here, however, un- discussed in Morissette. Co., 225 N.Y. field Farms-Slawson-Decker 6.54.1, majority’s construction of § der v. 25, (1918); Commonwealth 121 N.E. 474 only liability is not strict but vica- the issue 575, (1959), Koczwara, Pa. 155 A.2d 825 397 majority sustains an liability. rious 848, 1624, denied, 4 363 U.S. 80 S.Ct. cert. makes the vehicle owner ordinance which L.Ed.2d culpable for conduct for which the vehicle regulations like those Municipal The owner’s vi- operator strictly is liable. machinery of crim- utilize the involved here wholly on ve- liability predicated carious is tool as an enforcement administration inal ownership presumed and authorization hicle in nature. purely civil regulations social relationship by operator. its use No Koczwara, 397 Pa. at v. Commonwealth See negligence is involved. akin to common-law process does not 580, at 827. Due 155 A.2d may vehicle be or was No notice that ways. The City to have it both permit the required. is United States a criminal for con- not to be labeled right 277, 134, Dotterweich, 64 v. 320 U.S. S.Ct. to a true not to amount acknowledged duct (1943), by majority relied on 88 L.Ed. 48 constitutionally pro- cherished and crime is vehi- authorizing imposition guilt on a as City, as 6.54.1 of Iowa Ordinance owner, tected. explained in United States cle deprives those majority, 658, 1903, by Park, construed 95 44 v. 421 U.S. S.Ct. right. It (1975). it of that basic Park vicarious under L.Ed.2d 489 Under convicted process per- clause of when the properly imposed the due is thereby violates authority to exercise and charged of the United son fails Amendment the Fourteenth in relation to the supervisory responsibility Constitution. States 108 authority No such fact beyond another. inferred reasonable

violation doubt. in States, Barnes responsibility exists v. United supervisory 837, and See a motor vehi- relationship 843, 2357, 2361-2362, between ordinary 93 S.Ct. bailee. 380, cle owner and Turner United (1973); 386 and 398, 642, U.S. S.Ct. event, 6.54.1, con- because as any § (1970). L.Ed.2d makes crim- majority conduct strued opinion majority says not inal which In Turner Barnes the Supreme criminal, I hold it is on truly would invalid applied reasonable doubt standard with- grounds. process due saying requirement out it is a proc- of due I accept II. do assertion Nor Application ess. reasonable doubt accept- is somehow majority opinion that it standard in Turner caused some commenta- proof a de- able to shift burden actually tors to conclude the Court adopted a mere welfare offense”. “public fendant in that Evidence, case. McCormick on protects any process The due clause accused (Second 344 at Ed.1972); 815-817 Christie any “except conviction crime against Pye, Presumptions Assumptions beyond a reasonable doubt of upon proof View, the Criminal Law: Another 88 Duke constitute crime every necessary fact 919, (1970); Note, L.J. 921-923 The Uncon- Winship, In re charged.” with he is which stitutionality of Statutory Criminal Pre- U.S. sumptions, 22 Stan.L.Rev. 352-353 L.Ed.2d (1970). The later decision in Barnes sup- ports this conclusion. prosecutorial Mere law enforcement or justify does on trampling inconvenience not I do see how than less standard constitutionally rights which assured. standard, reasonable doubt applied as non-per- the risk shifting This includes Barnes, Turner could squared prove guilt suasion on elements essential the rule of In Winship, re If, supra. as Wilbur, Mullaney of crime. Winship says, the due pro- clause State (1975); 44 L.Ed.2d 508 against tects accused except conviction Monroe, (Iowa 1975). 236 N.W.2d proof upon beyond a reasonable doubt of actually I believe means III. pf every crime, essential element then proof illegally upon that vehicle any lesser deny process. standard would due City, it was in Iowa an inference arises that the presumption When of innocence collides illegally parked by either inference, with a lesser the lesser inference the illegal parking. the owner authorized Priebe, give way. State must 198 Iowa by an represents The inference effort 609, 610, 199 N.W. City culpability by of the owner to establish If is construed as purporting to illegal permitting responsibility his proof ownership make of prima facie evi- parking to be inferred unless he overcomes that dence the owner illegally parked the it This is by evidence in defense. closer vehicle or illegal parking, authorized the an oc- theory under which convictions case, essential element the City’s City of majori- present curred case than the get can to the of trier fact on that element theory. ty’s by proving ownership alone. In such a question presented then is whether situation, proof ownership unless of alone I process. this inference accords with due permit juror would rational to find this does, any do not believe more than element, deny the inference would an ac- vicarious construction. due process cused law. of process, In order accord with due law, proof As matter of by deemed the ordi- vehicle own- evidence sufficient ership permit be alone nance to invoke the inference must itself would a rational juror juror for a say beyond sufficient rational find reasonable doubt that operator illegally operator, who determine the actual was the *.” he authorized the (Italics the car or that supplied). parked highly mobile socie- In this illegal parking. City’s inability to determine the ac- teaches that experience common ty, operator part tual was not stipula- of the he did not. “The great too that chances parties tion of the nor does the record show sufficiently real that a convic- possibility any that evidence on issue. I do not under- * * * resting on the [inference] majority stand how the can affirm defend- based on a conviction cannot be deemed they ant’s convictions when occurred under Turner United sufficient evidence.” a presumably mistaken view of the law at supra, 396 U.S. the trial court which did not require the juror A rational L.Ed.2d at 627. City to show one of the elements that the ownership proof find from could not majority says proved must be for 6.54.1to of the vehicle illegal that alone applicable. With a record any devoid of entirely on his own person acting another element, hardly evidence on that it can possibility. not a reasonable said it was established as a matter law. Hence, even under this construction consistently We have held that a convic- ordinance, infringe proc- due it would tion cannot when proof stand essen- ess. Brown, lacking. tial element is State v. construction majority’s if the IV. Even (Iowa 1970), N.W.2d and citations. correct, 6.54.1 were of Iowa ordinance We have also reversed and remanded for constitutional, the fact remains defend- new applied trial when trial courts have an convicted in district court ant was tried and incorrect rule of law in the proceedings construction of the ordi- a different under leading except to conviction those rare city attorney, At that time the de- nance. instances when error has been found to defendant, attorney, and trial court fense prejudice be harmless or without to the 6.54.1 was to all believed effect of § defendant. registered create an inference that the own- Even majority holding, under the illegal parked vehicle was the er case should be reversed only who it. The and remanded for driver constitutionality new trial. dispute related to the parties stipulated the inference. The illegally parked and that

the vehicle was HARRIS, J., joins in this dissent. owner. A registered was the defendant al- which defendant

motion to dismiss in denied him due leged the ordinance obligation City of its by relieving the of law his doubt beyond a reasonable prove illegally operator identity as by the trial court. overruled car was KELLY, Appellant, Warner S. was convicted defendant Thereupon fined. BREWER, Appellee. a differ- Lou V. puts majority opinion Now than did the ordinance on ent construction No. 2-57803. the ma- court. Under parties trial of Iowa. construction, imposes the ordinance jority’s responsibility” criminal facie strict “prima Feb. elements are established three when 12, 1976. Rehearing April Denied ille- “(1) existence of an City’s proof: vehicle, (2) registered in the gally defendant, inability

name

Case Details

Case Name: Iowa City v. Nolan

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Feb 18, 1976

Citation: 239 N.W.2d 102

Docket Number: 57504

Court Abbreviation: Iowa