IOWA ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, IOWA BANKERS BENEFIT PLAN, IOWA LABORERS DISTRICT COUNCIL HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND, DES MOINES ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS PC, and IOWA SPRING MANUFACTURING & SALES COMPANY v. DOUG OMMEN, in his official capacity as Insurance Commissioner of Iowa
No. 4:25-cv-00211-RGE-WPK
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CENTRAL DIVISION
June 30, 2025
REBECCA GOODGAME EBINGER
Document 17 Filed 06/30/25
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs sue Defendant Iowa Insurance Commissioner Doug Ommen in his official capacity seeking to enjoin enforcement of amendments to Title XII, subtitle 1, Chapter 510B of the Iowa Code contained in Senate File 383 (“SF 383“) and entitled, “An Act Relating to Pharmacy Benefits Managers, Pharmacies, Prescription Drugs, and Pharmacy Services Administrative Organizations, and Including Applicability Provisions.” Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds signed SF 383 into law on June 11, 2025, and it is scheduled to become enforceable at midnight on July 1, 2025. Plaintiffs argue the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA“) expressly preempts several provisions of SF 383. Plaintiffs also argue several provisions of SF 383 violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by impermissibly restricting or compelling commercial speech. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a permanent injunction against enforcement of the entirety of SF 383.
After considering Plaintiffs’ pleadings and supporting materials, and applying the factors from Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc), under the standard applicable to the restraint of duly promulgated state laws as set forth in Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 731–32 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc), the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for a fourteen-day ex parte temporary restraining order for the reasons set forth below. The Court also schedules briefing deadlines and a preliminary injunction hearing.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Statutory Background
The Court draws the following facts from Plaintiffs’ complaint, motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, supporting declarations, and supporting brief. Compl., ECF No. 1; Pls.’ Mot. TRO, ECF No. 6; Pls.’ Ex. 1 Supp. Mot. TRO, Bartle Decl., ECF No. 6-1; Pls.’ Ex. 2 Supp. Mot. TRO, Veenstra Decl., ECF No. 6-2; Pls.’ Ex. 3 Supp. Mot. TRO, Karow Decl., ECF No. 6-3; Pls.’ Br. Supp. TRO and Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 16. As a general rule, “the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a [temporary restraining order] are not binding at [later stages such as a preliminary injunction proceedings or a] trial on the merits.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
1. Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Iowa Association of Business and Industry is an advocacy group representing more than 600 members who collectively employ more than 300,000 people. ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. “The
Plaintiff Iowa Bankers Benefit Plan is a “tax-exempt Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association under
“Plaintiff Iowa Laborers District Council Health and Welfare Fund . . . is a self-funded Taft Hartley welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. The “Laborers Fund” “covers more than 2,200 active participants and 505 retirees and, with dependents, a total of 5,700 lives, the majority of whom live in Iowa.” Id.
Plaintiff Des Moines Orthopaedic Surgeons PC is a privately owned medical practice with several Iowa locations. Id. ¶ 11. It provides health benefits for “approximately 150 employees and, with dependents, approximately 400 total lives.” Id.
Plaintiff Iowa Spring Manufacturing & Sales Company is an Iowa Corporation that manufactures agricultural and garage-door springs. Id. ¶ 12. “[Iowa Spring] provides health benefits to its employees through a fully insured plan underwritten and administered by Wellmark, which includes PBM services through Wellmark‘s contract with CVS Caremark.” Id. “Iowa Spring‘s health benefit plan covers approximately 175 employees and, with dependents,
2. ERISA preemption
Except for churches and the government, employers sponsoring health benefit plans are governed by ERISA, which contains a broad express preemption provision. See
Sponsors amend their plans and contracts with providers often (usually for annual plan periods), and sponsors frequently contract with PBMs to administer pharmacy benefits and obtain advantageous pricing. See, e.g., ECF No. 6-2 ¶¶ 25–33. Through PBMs, sponsors and their insureds gain access to negotiated networks of pharmacies. Id. ¶ 31. And through these networks, built and contracted by the PBMs, sponsors gain access not only to special pricing, but potentially other features, like waivers of copayments for their insureds. ECF No. 6-3 ¶¶ 10–13.
Senate File 383 reflects an attempt by the State of Iowa to preserve rural community healthcare systems by protecting local rural retail pharmacies from exclusion by PBMs and to incentivize the use of local pharmacies to level the playing field with large chain or mail-order pharmacies operating within PBMs’ networks. See Governor Reynold‘s Transmittal Letter, ECF No. 1-1; see also, ECF No. 1 ¶ 3.2 The provisions of SF 383 attempt to accomplish these goals by imposing requirements, restrictions, or transaction fees on several categories of persons and entities expressly defined within the Iowa Code, including “pharmacy benefit managers,”
As examples of requirements, restrictions, or transaction fees,
4. Plaintiffs’ contentions
Plaintiffs argue these and several other requirements, restrictions, or transaction fee provisions of SF 383 directed at plans themselves or at one or more of these classes of entities are unenforceable due to ERISA preemption or First Amendment violations. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 53–63 (ERISA preemption); id. ¶¶ 64–79; ECF No. 16 at 17–20; see also, e.g.,
Finally, Plaintiffs present declarations describing the consequences to various firms, employees, and insureds if injunctive relief is denied. Bradley W. Bartle, Chief Actuary and Vice President for Wellmark, Inc., doing business in Iowa as Wellmark Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa, explains his company‘s role in Iowa‘s healthcare system and presents a series of actuarial analyses conducted to assess the impact of SF 383. ECF No. 6-1. Bartle used 2024 drug-claim data from his company, which insures approximately 800,000 Iowans, to estimate the cost of several individual sections of SF 383 to plans and insureds. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Taken together, he concludes the SF 383 sections he analyzed
will increase total costs for benefit plans per year for Wellmark insured and/or administered self-funded plans by as much as $96.8 million (and for each plan, an average Enrollee per year increase in cost of as much as $120.5), and separately, an increase of as much as $38.7 million per year of additional costs to be paid by Enrollees covered by Wellmark insured and/or administered plans (and an average per Enrollee per year increase in cost of as much as $48.18).
Id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiffs also submit the declaration of Kirk Veenstra, the Senior Benefits Manager at Pella Corporation, an Iowa manufacturer of doors and windows and member of The Association. ECF No. 6-2 ¶¶ 2, 5, 8. Pella Corporation provides health benefits for employees and their dependents through a self-funded plan that provides coverage for prescription drugs. Id. ¶¶ 8–13. Pella Corporation is responsible for plan design, contracting with CaremarkPCS Health LLC for PBM services to administer and manage prescription drug benefits. Id. ¶¶ 12, 23. Pella Corporation‘s plan operates on a calendar-year basis with plan benefit offerings and service-
Finally, Plaintiffs submit a declaration from Paul Karow, Vice President and Chief Pharmacy Officer at Wellmark, Inc., doing business in Iowa as Wellmark Blue Cross Blue Shield of Iowa. ECF No. 6-3 ¶ 2. Karow describes a specialty drug program Wellmark operates through its PBM vendor, CVS Caremark. Id. ¶¶ 10–13. Through the program, regular co-pays for insureds are waived; enactment of SF 383 will prohibit continuation of the program. Id. Karow provides examples with five specialty drugs showing an immediate price increase for insureds ranging from $100 to $4,380 per prescription if SF 383 goes into effect. Id.
The Court presents additional facts as necessary below.
B. Procedural Background
Governor Reynolds signed SF 383 on June 11, 2025, nineteen days before it was to become enforceable. Plaintiffs filed the present action twelve days later on June 23, and filed their motion for a temporary restraining order on June 26. ECF Nos. 1, 6. The Commissioner has waived service. ECF No. 3. Plaintiffs’ attorney has consulted with the Commissioner and represents the Commissioner does not agree to voluntarily stay enforcement of SF 383 and opposes a temporary
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Temporary Restraining Orders
Courts in this circuit apply the well-established Dataphase factors when considering motions for preliminary injunctions and motions for temporary restraining orders. Sports Design & Dev., Inc. v. Schoneboom, 871 F. Supp. 1158, 1162–63 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing S.B. McLaughlin & Co. v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project, 877 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1989)). A movant is entitled to such relief when “the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113.
Dataphase articulates four factors the Court considers when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order: 1) the probability the movant will succeed on the merits; 2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; 3) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; and 4) the public interest. Id. When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a duly enacted statute reflecting legislative will, the required showing as to a probability of success is a “likelihood of success.” Planned Parenthood, 530 F.3d at 731–32. When a plaintiff seeks to restrain governmental action, the public
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) allows for ex parte temporary restraining orders where the moving party presents “specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and the moving party‘s attorney certifies in writing “efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”
B. ERISA Preemption
“ERISA pre-empts ‘any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan’ covered by ERISA.” Rutledge, 592 U.S. at 479 (quoting
A state law impermissibly “references” ERISA if the applicability of the statute distinguishes between ERISA-secured plans and other plans. See Rutledge, 592 U.S. at 481 (a state law did not impermissibly reference ERISA “because it imposed surcharges ‘regardless of whether the commercial coverage [was] ultimately secured by an ERISA plan, private purchase, or otherwise.‘” (quoting N.Y. St. Conf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995))).
Ultimately, ERISA‘s preemption provision is broad. Challenged provisions do not escape preemption based merely on the fact that they may regulate PBMs rather than plans directly, and no otherwise generally applicable presumption against preemption applies. Wehbi, 18 F.4th at
C. First Amendment Limits on the Restriction of Commercial Speech
Through the
Pursuant to Central Hudson, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies to “content- or speaker-based” “commercial speech restrictions.” Id. at 1055. Central Hudson‘s four-part test asks:
(1) whether the commercial speech at issue concerns unlawful activity or is misleading; (2) whether the governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the challenged regulation directly advances the government‘s asserted interest; and (4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to further the government‘s interest.
Id. (quoting Centr. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). And, “[j]ust as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain views or from compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.” United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
“Success on the merits has been referred to as the most important of the four [Dataphase] factors.” Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011). “When
In light of Iowa‘s enactment of SF 383, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of success pursuant to the heightened standard of Planned Parenthood to meet their burden. “The plaintiff need only establish a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of any one of [its] claims.” Richard/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 826 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Based on the allegations contained in the submitted declarations and the Court‘s preliminary analysis of SF 383 for purposes of considering an ex parte temporary restraining order, the Court holds Plaintiffs have made the necessary showing that provisions of SF 383 are unenforceable as preempted by ERISA and violative of the First Amendment, as set forth below.
1. ERISA preemption
The Court focuses on the challenged provisions of SF 383 codified at
Section 510B.1.4.‘s anti-discrimination provision as applied to health plans requires plans to treat all licensed and law-abiding pharmacies identically as to “participation, referral, reimbursement of a covered service, or indemnification.”
In Rutledge, the Supreme Court addressed several provisions of an Arkansas statute directed towards pharmacy benefit managers. Rutledge, 592 U.S. 80, 84–85 (2020). Taken together, the challenged provisions, “[i]n effect . . . require[d] PBMs to reimburse Arkansas pharmacies at a price equal to or higher than that which the pharmacy paid to buy the drug from a wholesaler.” Id. at 84. The Court focused on the “connection with” prong of the test for ERISA preemption and concluded, based on a characterization of the challenged cost provisions as “nothing more than cost regulation,” that no impermissible connection existed. Id. at 89.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected arguments that the Arkansas statute‘s
Prior to Rutledge, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits had held state statutes restricting plan structure intruded impermissibly upon a central matter of plan administration and fell within ERISA‘s preemption provision. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana ex rel. Ieyoub, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996) (Louisiana any-willing-provider law preempted and not saved by ERISA saving clause); Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2000) (Kentucky any-willing-provider law preempted but saved). After Rutledge, the Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion, finding several provisions similar to those contained in SF 383 preempted by ERISA. See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass‘n v. Mulready, 78 F.4th 1183, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2023) (holding state-law geographic access standards, discount prohibitions, and any-willing-provider provisions preempted by ERISA because they “require providers to structure benefit plans in particular ways,” and “govern[] a central matter of plan administration” (quoting Rutledge, 592 U.S. at 86–87)).
The dividing line between state laws with permissible and impermissible connections to ERISA, however, remains murky. Several cases hold state laws dictating coverage or non-discrimination in the relationship between the plan and covered individuals are preempted. For example, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97, 108–09 (1983), the Supreme Court stated, “We have no difficulty in concluding that the Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law ‘relate to’ employee benefit plans,” and “[w]e hold that New York‘s Human Rights Law is
In Mulready, the Tenth Circuit determined a plan‘s choice of provider relationships, such as pharmacy selection, are similarly integral to plan structure and administration. See Mulready, 78 F.4th at 1198. The court explained:
Functionally, the network restrictions mandate benefit structures; they at least “eliminate[] the choice of one method of structuring benefits.” The Access Standards dictate which pharmacies must be included in a PBM‘s network, and the [any-willing-provider] Provision requires that those pharmacies be invited to join the PBM‘s preferred network. The Discount Prohibition requires that cost-sharing and copayments be the same for all network pharmacies—whether retail or mail-order; standard or preferred. Each provision either directs or forbids an element of plan structure or benefit design.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Importantly, the court in Mulready found Rutledge did not disturb Cigna or Nichols. Id. at 1199 (”Rutledge does not change our conclusion). In Mulready, the Tenth Circuit noted the Supreme Court in Rutledge had concluded the Arkansas law at issue ultimately amounted to a price control law, rather than a regulation of plan structure. Id. (“The unanimous Court held that [the Arkansas] law was a mere cost regulation that did not have an impermissible connection with ERISA plans.“). In contrast, the law at issue in Mulready carried an impermissible connection to ERISA in that it essentially dictated plan structure. id. at 1198 (“However sliced, the network restrictions ‘require providers to structure benefit plans in particular ways, Rutledge, 592 U.S. at 86–87, and ‘prohibit[ ] employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a [certain] manner,’ Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.“). Unlike the permissible state law in Rutledge, the Court concludes SF 383 reaches beyond price control and requires sponsors to structure their plans in particular ways. Senate File 383 directly and indirectly controls health plans’ relationships with pharmacies,
Finally, the Court finds nothing in the Eighth Circuit‘s application of Rutledge in Wehbi to call this conclusion into doubt. The North Dakota statute in Wehbi “merely authorize[d] pharmacies to do certain things” such as “provide relevant information to a patient,” “disclose certain information to the plan sponsor,” “mail drugs . . . as an ancillary service,” or “charg[e] a shipping . . . fee.” 18 F.4th at 968. The Eighth Circuit expressly held the challenged provisions, “constitute[], at most, a noncentral ‘matter of plan administration’ with de minimis economic effects and impact on the uniformity of plan administration across states.” Id. (emphasis added). The de minimis nature of the requirements imposed by North Dakota differed from the mere price controls in Rutledge, but they did not, directly or indirectly, impinge upon central matters of plan structure. Here, in contrast, it is evident from the text of SF 383 and the declaration of Veenstra that SF 383 imposes structural constraints on plan design that are not de minimis and that reach central matters of plan design and administration. Rutledge, 592 U.S. at 86–87.
In reaching this preliminary conclusion specifically with reference to
2. First Amendment
Senate File 383 contains several provisions that restrict speech. For purposes of considering the temporary restraining order, the Court focuses on SF 383‘s provision prohibiting pharmacy benefit managers from “impos[ing] a monetary advantage or penalty that would affect a covered
Central Hudson applies because this restriction on commercial speech is speaker- and content-directed. 1-800-411 Pain Referral, 744 F.3d at 1055. The regulated content does not “concern[] unlawful activity [n]or is [it] misleading.” Id. Rather, SF 383 directly prohibits the disclosure of truthful comparative reimbursement rate information to covered persons.4 Such information has clear commercial value to consumers. The second and third factors ask “whether the governmental interest is substantial” and “whether the challenged regulation directly advances the government‘s asserted interest.” Id. Iowa may well have a substantial interest in promoting and protecting retail pharmacies when coupled with an interest in ensuring pharmacy access to rural areas. Cf. Birchansky v. Clabaugh, 421 F. Supp. 3d 658, 678 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (“[P]rotecting or favoring a particular intrastate industry is not an illegitimate interest when protection of the industry can be linked to advancement of the public interest or general welfare.“). Looking specifically at the methods of protection chosen, however, the Court sees no substantial interest in the suppression of factually accurate reimbursement rate information from covered persons. Instead, the Court sees, at most, a potential indirect rather than direct advancement of Iowa‘s
3. Severability
Plaintiffs seek to have all of SF 383 enjoined notwithstanding SF 383‘s severability provision. See
The Court does not address all of the challenged provisions and makes no finding, at this preliminary ex parte phase, whether the entirety of SF 383 ultimately rises or falls on the strength and core character of the limited sections addressed herein. The Court has found two provisions unenforceable as a preliminary matter. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs, however, that a severability analysis in the present context involves, essentially, “intricate legislative work,” id., that is complex and challenging. Cf. Sisney, 15 F.4th at 1194 (“Sometimes a limited solution is not possible because it would entail quintessentially legislative work (in the case of a statute) or executive work (in the case of a regulation) that the Constitution does not empower federal courts to undertake.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs have set forth sufficient argument
B. Threat of Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs’ affidavits describe primarily economic hardship, which, in most instances, is not irreparable harm. See ECF Nos. 6-1, 6-2; see also Wildhawk Investments, LLC v. Brava I.P., LLC, 27 F.4th 587, 597 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Economic loss, on its own, is not an irreparable injury so long as the losses can be recovered.” (citation omitted)). The Eighth Circuit has held, however, that when the threatened economic harm may not in the future be recovered, economic harm may be considered irreparable harm. See, e.g., Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C., 109 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The threat of unrecoverable economic loss, however, does qualify as irreparable harm.“). And here, if the statute is ultimately deemed unenforceable, there is no possibility of recovery.
Moreover, for the very same reasons the Court finds a preliminary likelihood of success regarding ERISA preemption, the Court finds a threat of irreparable harm beyond unrecoverable economic harm. Interference with plan structure and design interferes with the ability to conduct the ongoing process of review, amendment, and negotiation necessary to maintain plans from year to year. Plaintiffs, their covered employees, pharmacies, and PBMs generally operate within a web of contracts and relationships built over time with annual adjustments to those contracts.
Finally, Karow describes immediate price increases to covered persons with particular focus on specialty drugs. ECF No. 6-3 ¶ 10–13. To the extent such dramatic price increases ($4,380 per prescription in one instance) threaten covered persons’ ability to access prescribed drugs in a timely fashion, the Court finds a threat of irreparable harm.
C. Balance of Hardship and Public Interest
The Court concludes the final two Dataphase factors favor issuance of a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs face irreparable harm outweighing risk of injury to Defendant. The loss of fourteen days’ enforcement ability seemingly deprives Defendant of the least valuable window of time for enforcement. If much or all of SF 383 ultimately is found constitutional and not preempted, vigorous and meaningful enforcement will occur when new contracts, networks, and plan structures arise, and when the Commissioner has issued robust guidance, pharmacies are aware of their rights, and plans can understand what is required. Plaintiffs presently labor under existing contracts, billing structures, and pharmacy networks. The public will not be aided by uncertain disruption to drug distribution pathways. In other words, “the temporary nature of the requested relief poses minimal harm to defendants.” Saxena v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-05035-KES, 2025 WL 1149498, at *3 (D.S.D. April 18, 2025) (citing Nebraska v. Biden, 52 F.4th 1044, 1047 (8th Cir. 2022) (concluding that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the
D. Granting Order Without Notice
Rule 65(b)(1) provides a
court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant‘s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and reasons why it should not be required.
Here, Plaintiffs’ attorney represents he gave notice of the present motion to Defendant, and, in fact, Defendant‘s filing as to a preferred briefing schedule demonstrates notice, although they have not had the opportunity to respond fully.
Given the descriptions of harm present in Plaintiffs’ declarations, the Court finds the requirements of Rule 65 satisfied. Cf. Creativision, Inc. v. Martinelli, No. 4:16-cv-00428-SMR-HCA, 2016 WL 9345208, at *1 (S.D. Iowa July 26, 2016) (discussing requirements of
E. Security
Rule 65(c) states the Court “may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”
The Commissioner, in his motion seeking a briefing schedule, urges the Court to impose a bond of $80,000 if the Court issues a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 8 at 4–5. The Commissioner suggests this amount relates to statutory penalties found at
The Court does not find the Commissioner‘s suggested basis for bond amount compelling in light of the minimal hardship cause by the limited present relief. The Court concludes no bond is required in this matter for the limited, temporary relief being granted through this order. The Court‘s conclusion in this regard, like all of the Court‘s conclusions herein, does not foreclose assertion of similar arguments at the preliminary injunction hearing regarding security for 1) any possible preliminary injunction or 2) any possible continuation or extension of the temporary
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the allegations contained in the record and after considering the Dataphase factors, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order.
The Court notes Plaintiff The Association asks the Court to make any final order applicable to all of its members. ECF No. 1 ¶ 60.a. n.6. The Association, however, does not name its members, making any immediate temporary relief essentially universal in contravention of the Supreme Court‘s recent narrowing of district courts’ ability to impose injunctive relief beyond that which is necessary to afford relief to named parties. See Trump v. Casa Inc., Nos. 24A884, 24A885, 24A886, 2025 WL 1773631, at *15 (June 27, 2025) (holding injunctions may not be “broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue“); see also id. at *4 n.2 (recognizing the question of granting relief to unidentified members of a litigant organization but expressly declining to address the question). Accordingly, the Court will require Plaintiffs to provide to the Court and Defendant a list identifying its members not later than twenty-four hours from issuance of this order.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Doug Ommen, in his official capacity as Insurance Commissioner of Iowa, may not enforce SF 383 against the named plaintiffs, including the subsequently identified members of The Association, while this temporary restraining order is in effect.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Iowa Association of Business and Industry must file a list of its members not later than twenty-four hours after the time this order is filed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order does not prevent Defendant Doug
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is set for Monday, July 14, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 410 in the United States Courthouse in Des Moines, Iowa. Defendant shall file a response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction by no later than July 7, 2025. If necessary, Plaintiff shall file a reply by no later than July 9, 2025. By no later than 12:00 p.m. on July 10, 2025, the parties shall file exhibit and witness lists and exhibits. The parties shall also each provide the Court with a tabbed, three-ring binder containing copies of all of that party‘s exhibits by no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 10, 2025. The binder shall be delivered to the trial judge‘s chambers in Des Moines, Iowa.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of June, 2025.
REBECCA GOODGAME EBINGER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE