99 F. 472 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Indiana | 1900
This is a suit by the Interstate StockYards Company against the Indianapolis Union Railway Company, the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railway Company, the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Indianapolis Railroad Company, the Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company, the Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company, the Indiana, Decatur & Western Railway Company, the Peoria & Eastern Railway Company, and Volney T. Malott, as receiver of the Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company, charging each with unlawful discrimination against the complainant in the transportation of interstate commerce by refusing to deliver at its switch live stock in car-load lots consigned to it from other states for delivery at its stock yards in the city of Indianapolis, and to receive for shipment live stock in car-load lots to be transported and delivered to consignees in other states than the state of Indiana. On the filing and presentation of the bill of complaint duly verified, a temporary restraining order was entered, enjoining such alleged discrimination until the further order of the court, and a day was fixed for hearing the complainant’s application to enter an order of injunction for the like purpose, to continue in force until the final determination of the suit. This application has been heard on the verified bill of complaint, the verified answers of certain of the defendants, and on numerous affidavits filed by the respective parties. The application, broadly stated, presents only two questions: First. Is the cause of action exhibited in the bill of complaint within the jurisdiction of this court? Second. Under the facts and law of the case, is it shown that the unlawful discrimination complained of exists or is threatened?
The defendants claim that the Indianapolis Union Railway 'Company, if not an absolutely indispensable party, is at least a necessary party, and, being within the jurisdiction of the court, must be made a party; and because it is a corporation created under the laws of the state of Indiana, and its railroad is located and operated exclusively within the county of Marion, in this state, that it is not engaged in interstate commerce, within the true construction of the interstate commerce act, and is, therefore, subject only to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state for the redress of the grievances complained of. All the parties defendant except the Union Railway Company are confessedly common carriers of interstate commerce, and no question is made but that this court has jurisdiction over them, unless such jurisdiction is ousted because the Union Railway Company is a necessary or indispensable party over which the court has no jurisdiction because it is not engaged in interstate business. If the Indianapolis Union Railway Company is a necessary party, without the presence of which a decree cannot be rendered against the other defendants without prejudice to their substantial rights, then it would be the duty of the court to dissolve the restraining order, to overrule the application for a temporary injunction, and to dismiss the bill. The Indianapolis Union Railway Company is a corporation organized under an act of the general assembly, of
“Sec. 4. The said Union Railroad Transfer & Stock-Yards Company [whose name was thereafter changed by decree of court to the Belt Railroad & StockYards Company] shall extend to all persons doing business on or along the line of said railroad full facilities to connect switches with the "said road, and shall carry and transport freight to and from such switches at rates per car not exceeding that charged by said company for transporting through freight of a like class and character over said road.”
“See. 11. Any such union railway company may by agreement in writing with any railroad company, not being one of said proprietary companies and owning or operating a railroad which extends to, into or through, or near the town or city in or near which such union railroad is or may be situated, admit said last mentioned railroad company to the use of the tracks, side tracks, switches, depots, depot grounds, yards, sheds and other structures or railroad facilities and appliances (including the use of its belt railroad and belt railroad facilities, if any) during such time, on such terms and conditions, and for such compensation or rent as may be agreed upon. The right of any associate company to continue in the use and enjoyment of the property and facilities of the union company may be made to depend upon the faithful performance of such terms and conditions by such associate company as may be inserted in said agreement. The companies which may be so admitted are herein designated as associate companies: provided, that no such associate company shall be admitted to the use of the property and facilities of such union railway company except upon the unanimous vote of the directors of such union company.”
The thirteenth and fourteenth sections of the act provide that, in case other railroad companies are admitted to the use of the railroad and other property of the Union Railway Company, a board of managers shall be appointed, composed of one representative selected by each railroad having, such use, to whom it shall be competent to delegate so much of the authority, power, and jurisdiction of the board of directors as may be agreed upon. The seventeenth section provides that any agreement- entered into before the taking effect of the act for the use of such property by other railroad companies shall have the same force and effect, and be as valid and binding, as if it had been made after the taking effect of the act. By the last preceding section the so-called “reorganization agreement” of October 17, 1882, was ratified and confirmed. The fifth and sixth clauses of this agreement provide for an appraisement of the value of all the property, including the lease of the Belt Railroad, owned by the Union Railway Company; also of all engines, cars, and other equipment, tools, or machinery used in operating and maintaining the Belt Railroad; and that such appraisement shall for all time to come constitute the basis on which the fixed rental shall be computed and paid as hereinbefore provided. The.seventh clause provides that interest at the rate of 7 per centum per annum shall be paid upon the appraised • value of all such property, and the amount thereof shall constitute the fixed rental to be paid to the Union Railway Company by the several other railroad companies making use of the same, and said fixed rental shall be from time to time divided into as many equal shares as there are railroad companies using said property, and each company so using the same shall pay one of said shares. The
The remaining question is whether, under the facts and the law, it is shown that the unlawful discrimination complained of is threatened or exists. It is clear, by force of the express terms of the interstate commerce act, that in respect of interstate commerce there can be no lawful discrimination to the advantage or disadvantage of any person, place, locality, or kind of traffic. A common carrier of interstate freight cannot lawfully deny switch connections and service to one person, place, locality, or kind of traffic which it affords to others similarly situated. The complainant is the owner of switch connections with the Belt Railroad, which have beén in existence for a long period of time. Such switch connections were made with the consent of the Belt Railroad, and under the authority of the fourth section of the ordinance and statute above mentioned. The contention of counsel for the defendants is that these switch connections were made simply for the purpose of delivering and receiving dead freight thereat and therefrom. The existence of switch connections rightfully existing implies the right of the owner thereof to service thereat by the carrier consenting to such connections. It would be a vain and foolish thing to incur the labor and expense of making such connections unless they were to be used in connection with the transportation of freight to and from the same. And, unless the right to service at such switch connections is limited, either expressly or impliedly, the owner thereof may lawfully insist that the carrier shall there deliver and receive all such freight as it customarily carries, if the switch connections are suitable and convenient for the delivery and receipt of such freight. There is no evidence of any limitation of the purposes for which the switch connections now owned and used by the complainant should be used, other than that which is to be implied from the fact that such connections were constructed for the delivery and receipt of dead freight. In the opinion of the court, the Belt Railroad could not lawfully limit the right to use such switch connections for any kind of interstate freight transported by it. Any such limitation would be prohibited by the true construction of the fourth section of the ordinance and statute. The ordinance and statute under which they were put in cannot he construed as limiting the right to use the switch connections of the complainant solely for the receipt and delivery of dead freight. There is nothing in the ordinance or statute justifying such a construction. The language of the fourth section of each is clear and unambiguous. Each requires switch connections to be granted to all persons, and service in respect of all freight to be afforded upon equal rights and impartial terms. It is to be assumed that the switch connections were put in upon the implied understanding
It is contended .by counsel for the defendants that the national and staté statutes requiring railroad companies to feed, water, and
The nature of the wrong complained of, the fact that it is of a continuing character, that it is not susceptible of accurate pecuniary estimation, and that resort to actions at law would involve a multiplicity of suits, none of which would end the litigation, all tend to make it manifest that the remedy in a court of law is not as adequate to afford relief as is the remedy in a court of equity. The jurisdiction in equity does not depend upon the fact that there is no remedy at law. It is afforded whenever the remedy at law is not as full, adequate, and complete as in a court of equity. The rule that equitable relief will not be granted until the complainant’s right or title in respect of the subject-matter has been established in an action at law, does not apply where the subject-matter of the litigation is to prevent discrimination in violation of the interstate commerce act.
A review of the evidence in this case would prove unprofitable, and would needlessly protract this opinion. It suffices to say that,