INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ET AL. v. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.
No. 82-1643
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 10, 1984—Decided June 5, 1984
467 U.S. 354
Patrick McEligot argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Bryce Rea, Jr., Nelson J. Cooney, William Kenworthy, F. H. Lynch, Jr., William W. Pugh, J. Alan Royal, Robert A. Wilson, and Curtis Wood.*
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a challenge to an effort by the Interstate Commerce Commission to create a new remedy to enforce motor-carrier rate-bureau agreements. The remedy at issue is the Commission‘s authority to reject effective tariffs that have been submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements. As we have recognized in the past, the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission or ICC) has discretion to fashion remedies in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 654 (1978). Although rejection of effective tariffs is a form of remedial power not expressly delegated to the Commission, thе remedy as proposed by the Commission in this case is closely and directly related to the Commission‘s express statutory powers and is designed to achieve objec
I
Motor-carrier rate bureaus are groups of motor carriers formed to negotiate collective rates. Since the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, motor carriers within the jurisdiction of the Commission have enjoyed immunity from the antitrust laws to enter into rate bureaus and to submit collective rates to the Commission. Ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472. To receive this immunity, rate bureaus must apply for Commission approval of bureau agreements, which describe the manner in which a bureau will negotiate collective tariffs. The original Reed-Bulwinkle Act gave the ICC broad discretion to determine which rate-bureau agreements were consistent with nаtional transportation policy.
This case arises out of an ICC interpretative ruling issued in 1980 explaining how the Commission planned to implement the new statutory guidelines for rate-bureau immunity. Motor Carrier Rate Bureaus—Implementation of P. L. 96-296, 364 I. C. C. 464 (1980). For the most part, this interpretаtive ruling presented the Commission‘s views on the substance of the new legislation, and established procedures whereby rate bureaus could submit existing agreements to the Commission for approval under the new standards. Before concluding, however, the ruling also addressed a problem the Commission had faced in regulating rate-bureau agreements even before Congress in 1980 amended the Reed-Bulwinkle Act: “the lack of definite remedies for proven rate bureau violations.” Id., at 499. The Commission announced its intention to fashion the following new remedy:
“In addition to the possible remedy of withdrawal of immunity for serious and continuing violations, we proposed to adopt a standard providing that proof of significant violations of an approved agreement will result in tariff rejection. Allegations of lesser violations would subject the tariff item to suspension or investigation.” Ibid.
The Commission subsequently explained how its new remedy would be implemented.2 The Commission intends to use the remedy to discipline motor carriers for substantial bureau agreement violations, such as unauthorized collusion or illegal bureau pressure on independent carriers. Brief for
Rejection of an effective tariff applies retroactively, and can have serious consequences for affectеd motor carriers. Rejection renders the tariff void ab initio. Brief for Petitioners 7. As a result, whatever tariff was in effect prior to the adoption of the rejected rate becomes the applicable tariff for the period during which motor carriers charged the rejected tariff. Under
Alarmed by the prospect of overcharge liability, respondents, a group of motor-carrier rate bureaus, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to review the Commission‘s new remedy. The Eleventh Circuit accepted respondents’ argument that the Commission lacks the power to reject effective tariffs. American Trucking Assn., Inc. v. United States, 688 F. 2d 1337 (1982). Because the Fifth Circuit previously had found the Commission to possess authority to rеject effective tariffs in a different context, Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. United States, 682 F. 2d 1092 (1982), cert. pending, No. 82-707, we granted certiorari in this case to examine the Commission‘s powers to reject effective tariffs. 462 U. S 1130 (1983). We now reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit.
II
The issue before us is narrow. Most aspects of the Commission‘s authority to supervise motor-carrier rate-bureau agreements are not seriously challenged. For example, the Commission undisputedly has the power to terminate a rate-bureau agreement if the agreement itself fails to meet MCA guidelines or if bureau members persist in filing tariffs in violation of the terms of the agreement.
Our sole concern in this case is whether, in addition to the remedial powers listed above, the Commission has the authority to reject retroactively a tariff submitted in substantial violation of a rate-bureau agreement once that tariff has gone into effect.4 As a practical matter, the question is whether motor carriers that provide services based on effec
A
Since the Commission styled its new remedy as a rejection power, the most obvious source of the authority claimed by the Commission is
“The Commission may reject a tariff submitted to it by a common carrier under this section if that tariff violates this section or regulation of the Commission carrying out this section.”
At least superficially,
To begin with, the term “reject” connotes a refusal to receive at the threshold. To interpret the power to reject as a license to revoke a tariff that the Commission has already accepted would be contrаry to the plain language of the subsection.6 For this reason, the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that rejection provisions analogous to
A further reason to believe that
Similarly, reading
The language of
B
Although we conclude that
The doctrine of ICC discretion arose out of a recognition that, since drafters of complex ratemaking statutes like the ICA neither can nor do “include specific consideration of every evil sought to be corrected,” the absence of express remedial authority should not force the Commission “to sit idly by and wink at practices that lead to violations of [ICA] provisions.” American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 309-310, 311 (1953). The doctrine originated in cases in which we accorded the Commission latitude to interpret its statutory powers in a reasonable manner. See, e. g., American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, supra; cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 774-777 (1968) (comparable construction of the authority of the FPC under the Natural Gas Act). More recently, however, we have applied the doctrine to sustain the Commission‘s efforts to place reasonable conditions on its acceptance of proposed tariffs. For instance, in United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., supra, we upheld a decision by the Commission to approve tariff increases only on the condition that carriers spend a specific portion of the increase on capital improvements and deferred maintenance. Although
In Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, supra, this Court again addressed the Commission‘s discretionary authority to condition tariff approval in a manner reasonably tied to statutory objectives. In that case, the Commission had extracted from pipeline owners, in exchange for approval of a tentative tariff schedule, the owners’ promise to refund whatever portion of the tentative rates the Commission subsequently found to be unreasonable. Claiming this action was unauthorized under the ICA, the pipeline owners argued that the Commission was required to choose between either suspending the proposed tariffs for an investigation into their reasonableness or approving the tariffs subject to prospective modification at some future date. Even though we agreed that the Commission lacks explicit authority to order refunds on tariffs that have gone into effect, we declined to interpret the ICA as placing the Commission in the dilemma posited by the pipeline owners. Suspension would have delayed the opening of the Alaska pipeline, whereas unconditional approval of the proposed rates might have unjustly enriched the pipeline owners. Since both alternatives were inconsistent with the policies underlying the ICA, we concluded that the Commission was justified in transcending its explicit remedial authorities and conditioning the approval of the Alaska-pipeline tariffs on a commitment to refund unreasonably high rates.
The remedial authority at issue in this case consists of another effort by the Commission to place a condition on the approval of a proposed tariff. In effect, the Commission has informed all motor carriers submitting proposed tariff
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 presents a statutory basis for the Commission to approve motor-carrier tariffs on the condition that the Commission may later nullify increases found to have been submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements. The legislative history of the Act is clear that, beyond the bounds of immunity granted in
There can be little doubt that Congress intended for the Commission to play a key rolе in holding carriers to the
But the very potency of overcharge is what makes the nullification of motor-carrier tariffs a troubling exercise of Com-
Nevertheless, we agree with the Commission that its new remedy is a justifiable adjunct to its express statutory mandate. The nullification of effective tariffs submitted in violation of rate-bureau agreements is directly aimed at ensuring that motor carriers comply with the guidelines established by Congress in the MCA. Consistent with congressional intent, the remedy stimulates competitive pricing beyond the bounds of the motor-carrier immunity granted in
Our concern over the harshness of this new remedial authority is lessened by the significant steps the Commission has taken to ensure that the penalty will not be imposed unfairly. Under the Commission‘s proposed scheme, effective tariffs will be nullified only upon findings of substantial violations of rate-bureau agreements. The guidelines for antitrust immunity set out in
III
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Commission does not exceed its authority by nullifying effective motor-carrier tariffs submitted in substantial violation of rate-bureau agreements. Accordingly, the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE O‘CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
This case presents the question whether the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) may nullify a motor carrier tariff at any time after it has become effective. Such nullification renders the carrier liable to shippers for the amount by which the rejected rate exceeds the last rate the carrier has lаwfully filed. The Court quite correctly reasons
I
The Court starts with the proposition that the enumeration of certain Commission powers in the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended,
The Court did not, as today‘s opinion asserts, approve the concept of “discretionary power” of the Commission in United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., supra. In that case, the Commission proposed to allow an immediate rate in-
Nor did the Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, supra, approve any principle of inherent Commission authority. In these cases, the Commission proposed to allow the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System to implement immediately rates on condition that the carriers refund any amounts collected during the period the rates wоuld otherwise have been suspended and later determined to be unlawful. The Court sustained the Commission‘s efforts, finding that the condition was a power “‘ancillary’ to [the] suspension power” and that immediate implementation would further Congress’ policy of early development and delivery of oil from Alaska‘s North Slope. 436 U. S., at 654-655. Again, the Court deferred to the Commission‘s efforts, but only because the Commission had implemented an alternative that was carefully tied to the statutory suspension power and narrowly tailored to the particular circumstances presented. Id., at 655.
Thus, Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. and Trans Alaska Pipeline Cases support neither the remedy the Commission has proposed to implement here nor the power on which the Court suggests that it can be based. In contrast to the conditions imposed in those cases, the Commission‘s proposed
II
Perhaps recognizing the open-ended character of the regulatory principle it announces, the Court suggests that two limiting criteria will cabin the Commission‘s discretionary authority. First, the Court proposes that the authority must be exercised to further a specific statutory mandate. Ante, at 367. Second, the Court proposes that the exercise of the authority must be directly and closely tied to that mandаte. Ibid. Whatever the merits of these criteria, they definitely are not satisfied in the circumstances of this case.
A
The Court points to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
Prior to the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act, the Commission had been attempting to curtail drastically the motor carriers’ opportunities to engage in collective ratemaking. In one rulemaking proceeding, for example, the Commission had proposed exactly what Congress itself had earlier re-
Well aware that the “Commission ha[d] recently embarked upоn a series of reviews of rate bureau agreements to determine whether they should be continued and, if so, under what conditions,” H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, p. 27 (1980), Congress made clear that it wanted to reduce the Commission‘s regulatory authority over motor carrier rate bureau practices.
“[I]n order to reduce the uncertainty felt by the Nation‘s transportation industry, the . . . Commission [is] given explicit direction for regulation of the motor carrier industry and well-defined parameters within which it may act pursuant to congressional policy; . . . the . . . Commission should not attempt to go beyond the powers vested in it by the Interstate Commerce Act . . . and other legislation enacted by Congress.” 94 Stat. 793.
Senator Cannon, one of the sponsors of the 1980 Act, explained:
“[L]egislation is desperately needed to clarify the existing regulatory uncertainty that plagues the industry and those who care about it. . . . This bill gives specific direc-
tion to the Interstate Commеrce Commission and we expect those directions to be followed. Where the Commission is to be given more discretion, it is clear from the statute, but in most cases, the discretion is eliminated.” 126 Cong. Rec. 7777 (1980).
Representative Harsha gave a similar explanation to his colleagues in the House:
“For too long Congress has basically been on the sidelines, while the Interstate Commerce Commission exercised unduly wide discretion in regulating the Nation‘s motor carrier industry. . . . [I]n the past several years, it has made changes in the regulatory system on its own initiative[,] in the absence of congressional guidance, if not consultation.
“It is not the intent of the committee, and I am certain that it is not the will of Congress, that while we reduce the amount of needless regulation in the trucking industry, we increase the regulatory powers of ICC bureaucrats.
“Therefore, [the bill] give[s] clear guidelines to the ICC on how to administer the law. In so doing, the cоmmittee expects the Commission to stay within the explicit powers invested by the new statute. . . .” Id., at 15585.
These sentiments were echoed in the Committee Reports of each congressional chamber. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, supra, at 29; S. Rep. No. 96–641, p. 31 (1980).
To be sure, Congress wanted the Commission to “retain and enforce existing regulations as to the processing of loss, damage, and overcharge claims . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, supra, at 40. But Congress expressed a strong disapproval of all of the Commission‘s pre-1980 regulatory innovations, and the retroactive rejection remedy had been prominent among them. See 44 Fed. Reg. 60122, 60123-
B
The Court contends, nevertheless, that the rejection power is directly and closely tied to
Even if Congress had left the Commission discretion to fashion some new remedies to enforce
Indeed, it is easy to see why Congress would not have included a retroactive rejection power among the arsenal of powers available to the Commission. Part of the Motor Carrier Act‘s purpose was, as the Commission asserts, to limit the rate bureaus’ freedom to engage in collusive behavior. Conversely, however, the 1980 Act was equally intended to promote certainty in industry pricing and to protect carriers’ reliance on filed tariffs. In the motor carrier industry, goods are shipped, revenues collected, and business plans formulated in reliance on these tariffs. In 1980, Congress apparently continued to believe that effective national transportation policy requires that carriers be able to rely on their filed rates and know that liability for charging those rates will result only if shippers show aсtual damage. Congress has deliberately encouraged carriers, within limits, to set prices collectively, and has insulated them from the proscriptions of the antitrust laws when they do so. The rejection power, by contrast, confronts carriers with a large and uncertain liability and discourages the collective price setting clearly contemplated by the Act. The rejection power “create[s] a legalized, but endless, chain of departures from [filed] tariff[s]; . . . destroy[s] the equality and certainty of rates, and, contrary to the statute, . . . make[s] the carrier liable for
III
What the Commission really seeks is a remedy that is not statutorily authorized but that is alleged to be administratively needed. The need, of course, is far from clear, given the impressive array of prescriptive powers, overcharge assessments, damages remedies, and civil and criminal fines at the Commission‘s disposal. See
Notes
Respondents contest this point. In an argument repudiated by the Eleventh Circuit, American Trucking Assn., Inc. v. United States, 688 F. 2d 1337, 1353 (1982), respondents contend that under
Respondents also argue that, even if
Indeed, until the recent past, the Commission generally shared the view that, though a tariff might have been submitted in a technically deficient manner, the tariff was not a nullity and a shipper‘s recovery was limited to actual damages. See Boren-Stewart Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., supra; see also Acme Peat Products, Ltd. v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 277 I. C. C. 641, 644 (1950) (“Where tariffs are tendered to and accepted by the Commission, the rates therein become applicable, even though technically they should have been rejected upon tender“). The few instances in which the Commission has nullified effective tariffs have involved cases of tariffs mistakenly filed with the Commission by carriers outside the Commission‘s jurisdiction. See Acme Fast Freight, Inc., et al., Common Carrier Application, 17 M. C. C. 549 (1939), sustained, 30 F. Supp. 968 (SDNY), aff‘d, 309 U. S. 638 (1940) (per curiam); Mercer Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 69 I. C. C. 233 (1922). Only in 1978 did the Commission propose to nullify an effective tariff of a carrier within the Commission‘s jurisdiction. National Assn. of Specialized Carriers, Inc., Agent—Show Cause and Strike Order, I. C. C. Order No. 36870 (Apr. 11, 1978). While an agency is free to change its mind about the meaning of an enabling Act, that the Commission has so long adhered to a narrow view of its rejection authority has some probative value for our decision today.
