21 N.W.2d 711 | Wis. | 1946
Action commenced October 4, 1944, by the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 180, C.I.O., plaintiff, against the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, defendant, to review and set aside an order of the Industrial Commission dated September 19, 1944, making an assessment against the plaintiff representing delinquent unemployment compensation contributions. From a judgment entered October 16, 1945, *366 confirming the decision of the commission, plaintiff appeals. The facts will be stated in the opinion. The question presented for determination is whether the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 180, C.I.O., a nonprofit labor organization, is an employer and its officers and members employees so as to make the union subject to the payment of contributions under ch. 108, Stats., commonly known as the "Unemployment Compensation Act."
Appellant is a local chapter of a labor union, and has a membership of about forty-three hundred individuals, all of whom are employees of the J. I. Case Company. It has a collective-bargaining contract with the company and is the sole bargaining agent for all of the workers. It is organized primarily to improve working conditions and to establish a wage in accordance with the needs and desires of its membership. Its operations include the necessary organization administrative activities typical of labor unions, the handling of matters for the employees of the company, and it also conducts certain educational, social, and charitable activities which utilize a minor portion of its efforts and funds. Its major efforts and funds are expended in matters arising out of its contract with the company, improving working conditions, maintaining and increasing wages, and in general guarding and promoting the rights of labor.
The officers of the union are: President, vice-president, recording secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, three trustees, guide, and sergeant at arms. Committees and stewards are also provided for in the organization. Some committeemen and all stewards are elected by the employees of the departments. *367 There are between one hundred sixty-five and one hundred seventy such Committeemen and stewards. The stewards' function is to see that the provisions of the labor contract with the union are carried out and take care of members' grievances arising in the department. Each officer receives a fixed sum monthly from the union, the lowest amount' being $5 per month and the highest $35 per month. The officers are reimbursed for certain expenses, and the balance has to be absorbed from their income from the union. Stewards, bargaining-committee members, and officers frequently are required to perform services for the union during working hours, and the union compensates members performing such services by paying them approximately the amount they would have earned as employees of the company for the time devoted to union work. Such lost-time payments are made pursuant to a definite plan adopted by the union. The average weekly amount paid to two hundred five members of the union for the year 1941 varies from one cent per week to $10 per week, four persons collecting a weekly average of over $10 per week. The largest number of this group of members, one hundred sixty-eight, received from one cent to $1 average weekly pay. It was agreed that two individuals performing clerical work in plaintiff's office were employees and worked at least eighteen weeks in 1941.
The union is a nonprofit voluntary association, not organized under any statutory provision, and it concedes, and the record clearly establishes, that it is not a partnership under the statutes. Its income consists of dues of $1 per month paid by each member.
The circuit court confirmed the decision of the Industrial Commission that the appellant is an employer within the meaning of sec.
Appellant contends the Industrial Commission exceeded its statutory authority in ordering payment of contributions on its defined pay roll, (a) because the local union is a voluntary association and not such an entity separate and!distinct from its own members so as to stand in the relation of employer and employee between itself and its membership; (b) the union is an organization that fails within the provisions of sec.
The Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Act was first enacted in January, 1932 (ch. 20, Laws of Sp. Sess. 1931), and was designed to meet an emergency threatening public order and stability. As a necessary part of the exercise of police power the contributions here involved are required.Industrial Comm. v. Woodlawn Cemetery Asso. (1939)
Sec.
The controlling statutory provisions are as follows:
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
To sustain its position that it does not come under the act appellant contends that this being a nonprofit, voluntary association for the benefit of its members, it is not in a legal sense a business and that it therefore cannot employ its own members so as to be an employer as defined in the act. It is contended that the committeemen and stewards are merely reimbursed for lost time, which is taken from the treasury of the union, and that this money belongs to all of the individuals, including those who receive the lost-time reimbursement. It is argued that the union is not a separate entity apart from its members and that therefore there can be no employer for whom services are rendered as the member rendering services has an equal interest in the result with all other members of the union. It is conceded that the association may be liable for its acts to third parties and that it may be an employer of third parties whom it hires, but it is contended that the union cannot be an employer and an employee at the same time, as a person cannot be divided into two entities.
Reliance is had on the case of Hromek v. Freie Gemeinde
(1941),
Whether the employee may be eligible for unemployment compensation so as to benefit from any of the assessments made against the union is not a determining factor. Maloneyv. Industrial Comm. (1943)
Further contention is made that appellant is an organization that falls within the provisions of sec.
"Employment of any person by a corporation, community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."
It is true that appellant is a nonprofit, voluntary association and no part of its income inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. The primary purpose of appellant, as stated in its by-laws, is to improve working conditions and to establish a wage in accordance with the need and desires of its membership. It is also true that some of its income is used for charitable and educational purposes, according to its records, but during the period from February 1, 1941, to January 31, 1944, out of a net income of $91,653.65 available to the local unit only some $6,039.52 was spent for purposes which could be classified as charitable or educational. This would only be six and six-tenths per cent of appellant's expenditures used for charitable and educational purposes. The balance of its funds was used largely to carry on its collective-bargaining contract with the J. I. Case Company and to improve working conditions and establish reasonable wages for its membership. This cannot well be said to be for educational or charitable purposes, and does not come within the definition of the word "exclusively" as determined by this court.Gymnastic Association v. Milwaukee (1906),
It is considered that the findings and decision of the Industrial Commission as confirmed by the trial court are in accordance with the facts and law of the case.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. *373