INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN‘S ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1416, AFL-CIO v. ARIADNE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL.
No. 231
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 13, 1970—Decided March 9, 1970
397 U.S. 195
Richard M. Leslie argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Thomas H. Anderson.
Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dоminick L. Manoli, and Norton J. Come filed a memorandum for the National Labor Relations Board as amicus curiae.
The question presented here is whether the National Labor Relations Act,
In 1966 the respondents, a Liberian corporation and a Panamanian corporation, operated cruise ships to the Caribbean from Port Everglades and Miami, Florida. Respondent Ariadne Shipping Company oрerated the S. S. Ariadne, of Liberian registry, with a crew subject to Liberian ship‘s articles. Respondent Evangeline Steamship Company operated S. S. Bahama Star, of Panamanian registry, with a crew subject to Panamanian ship‘s articles. The uncontradicted evidence showed that “[l]oading of the ship, stowage and loading of automobiles, loading cargo and ship stowage” occurred whenever either vessel berthed at Port Everglades or Miami, “[p]art of it [performed] by employеes of the ship and some of it by outside labor.” The petitioner is a labor organization representing longshoremen in the Miami area. Although none of those doing the longshore work for the ships belonged to the union, whenever either vеssel docked at Port Everglades or Miami in May 1966, petitioner stationed a picket near the vessel to patrol with a placard protesting that the longshore
McCulloch and Incres construed the National Labor Relations Act to preclude Board jurisdiction over labor disputes concerning certain maritime operations of foreign-flag vessels. Specifically, Incres, 372 U. S., at 27, held that “maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not in ‘commerce’ within the meaning of § 2 (6) [of the Act].” See also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957). This construction of the statute, however, was addressed to situations in which Bоard regulation of the labor relations in question would necessitate inquiry into the “internal discipline and order” of a foreign vessel, an intervention thought likely to “raise considerable disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well.” McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 19.
In Benz a foreign-flag vessel temporarily in an American port was picketed by an American seamen‘s union, supporting the demands of a foreign crew for more favorable conditions than those in the ship‘s articles which they signed under foreign law, upon joining the vessel in a foreign port. In McCulloch an American seamen‘s union petitioned for a representation election among the foreign crew members of a Honduran-flag vessel who were already represented by a Honduran union, certified under Honduran labor law. Again, in Incres the picketing was by an American union formed “for the primary purpose of organizing foreign seamen on foreign-flag ships.” 372 U. S., at 25-26. In these cases, we concluded that, since the Act primarily concerns strife between
The considerations that informed the Court‘s construction of the statute in the cases above are clearly inapplicable to the situation presented hеre. The participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wages to be paid American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not tо serve as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work. There is no evidence that these occasional workers were involved in any internal affairs of either ship which would be governed by foreign law.4 They were American residents, hired to work exclusively on American docks as long-
We hold that their activities were not within these excluded operations. The American longshoremen‘s short-term, irregular and casual connection with the respective vessels plainly belied any involvement on thеir part with the ships’ “internal discipline and order.” Application of United States law to resolve a dispute over the wages paid the men for their longshore work, accordingly, would have threatened no interference in the internal affairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or international law. We therefore find that these longshore operations were in “commerce” within the meaning of
The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is exclusive and pre-emptive as to activities that are “arguably subject” to regulation under
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Florida courts were in error in concluding that the National Labor Relations Act does not govern relations between the operators of foreign-flag vessels and the American longshoremen who work on such vessels while they are in Ameriсan ports. However, I would not rest reversal on the conclusion that the union‘s conduct in this case was “arguably subject” to regulation under
So long as employers are effectively denied determinations by thе NLRB as to whether “arguably protected” picketing is actually protected except when an employer is willing to threaten or use force to deal with picketing, I would hold that only labor activity determined to be actually, rаther than arguably, protected under federal law should be immune from state judicial control. To this extent San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), should be reconsidered. I concur in the Court‘s judgment in this case because in my view the record clearly indicates that the peaceful, nonobstructive picketing on the public docks near the ships was union activity protected under the National Labor Relations Act. See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 499-500 (1953).