Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented here is whether the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., pre-empts state jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing protesting substandard wages paid by foreign-flag vessels to Ameriсan longshoremen working in American ports. The Florida courts held that there was no pre-emption, citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
In 1966 the respondents, a Liberian corporation and a Panamanian corporation, operated cruisе ships to the Caribbean from Port Everglades and Miami, Florida. Respondent Ariadne Shipping Company operated the S. S. Ariadne, of Liberian registry, with a crew subject to Liberian ship's articles. Respondent Evangeline Steamship Compаny operated S. S. Bahama Star, of Panamanian registry, with a crew subject to Panamanian ship’s articles. The uncontradicted evidence showed that “[ljoading of the ship, stowage and loading of automobiles, loading cargo and shiр stowage” occurred whenever either vessel berthed at Port Everglades or Miami, “[pjart of it [performed] by employees of the ship and some of it by outside labor.” The petitioner is a labor organization representing longshoremen in the Miami area. Although none of those doing the long-shore work for the ships belonged to the union, whenever either vessel docked at Port Everglades or Miami in May 1966, petitioner stationed a picket nеar the vessel to patrol with a placard protesting that the longshore
McCulloch and lucres construed the National Labor Relations Act to preclude Board jurisdiction over labor disputes concerning certain maritime operations of foreign-flag vessels. Specifically, Incres,
In Benz a foreign-flag vessel temporarily in an American port was picketed by an American seamen’s union, supporting the demands of a foreign crew for more favorable conditions than those in the ship’s articles which they signed under foreign law, upon joining the vessel in a foreign port. In McCulloch an American seamen’s union petitioned for a representation election among the foreign crew members of a Honduran-flag vessel who were already represented by a Honduran union, certified under Honduran labor law. Again, in lucres the picketing was by an American union formed “for the primary purpose of organizing foreign seamen on foreign-flag ships.”
The considerations that informed the Court’s construction of the statute in the cases аbove are clearly inapplicable to the situation presented here. The participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wаges to be paid American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to serve as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work. There is no evidence that these occasional wоrkers were involved in any internal affairs of either ship which would be governed by foreign law.
We hold that their activities were not within these excluded operations. The American lоngshoremen’s short-term, irregular and casual connection with the respective vessels plainly belied any involvement on their part with the ships’ “internal discipline and order.” Application of United States law to resolve а dispute over the wages paid the men for their longshore work, accordingly, would have threatened no interference in the internal affairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or international law. We therefore find that these longshore operations were in “commerce” within the meaning of § 2 (6), and thus might have been subject to the regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board.
The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is exclusive and pre-emptive as to activities that are “arguably subject” to regulation under § 7 or § 8 of the Act. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
■ Reversed.
Notes
A picket was also stationed in front of the terminal through which passengers embarked and disembarked. This picket carried a sign alleging that the ships were unsafe, and passed out handbills to the same effect.
The injunctive order was in four paragraphs. Paragraphs 1 and 2 prohibited picketing with signs, or distributing handbills stating, alleging, or infеrring that the vessels were unsafe. The petitioner abandoned its appeal from these provisions and they are not before us. Paragraph 4 was set aside on appeal. See n. 3, infra. Paragraph 3 therefore is the only provision under review in this Court. It prohibits petitioner from:
“Picketing or patrolling with signs or placards indicating or inferring that a labor dispute exists between [respondents] and [petitioner], by any statement, legend or language alleging [that respondents] pay their employees substandard wages.”
Initially petitioner directed the picketing not at respondents’ ships but at Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc., a Florida corporation that acted as respondents’ general agent. Eastern obtained a temporary injunction,
The Court of Appeal set aside paragraph 4 of the injunction which prohibited “[b]y any manner or by any means, including picketing or the distribution of handbills, inducing or attempting to induce customers and potential customers of [respondents] to cease doing business with [respondents].”
We put to one side situations in which the lоngshore work, although involving activities on an American dock, is carried out entirely by a ship’s foreign crew, pursuant to foreign ship’s articles.
The Board has reached the same conclusion in similar situations. See, e. g., International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 13, 161 N. L. R. B. 451 (1966); Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 156 N. L. R. B. 753 (1966); New York Shipping Assn., Inc., 116 N. L. R. B. 1183 (1956). Cf. Uravic v. Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234 (1931).
Our conсlusion makes it unnecessary to consider petitioner’s further contention that in the absence of any evidence of an illegal objective, prohibition of peaceful picketing to publicize substandard wages dеprived petitioner of freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Florida courts were in error in concluding that the National Labor Relations Act does not govern relations between the operators of foreign-flag vessels and the American longshoremen who work on such vessels while they are in American ports. However, I would not rest reversal on the conclusion that the union’s сonduct in this case was “ ‘arguably subject’ to regulation under § 7 or § 8 of the Act.” The union’s picketing was clearly not proscribed by any part of § 8 of the Act. The only possible dispute could be over whether the picketing was aсtivity protected by § 7 of the Act or whether the picketing was neither protected nor prohibited by the Act and therefore was subject to state regulation or prohibition. If the National Labor Relations Act provided an effective mechanism whereby an employer could obtain a determination from the National Labor Relations Board as to whether picketing is protected or unprotected, I would agree that the faсt that picketing is “arguably” protected should require state courts to refrain from interfering in deference to the expertise and national uniformity of treatment offered by the NLRB. But an employer faced with “arguably protеcted” picketing is given by the present federal law no adequate means of obtaining an evaluation of the picketing by the NLRB. The employer may not himself seek a determination from the Board and is
So long as employers are effectively denied determinations by the NLRB as to whether “arguably protected” picketing is actually protected except when an employer is willing to threaten or use force to deal with picketing, I would hold that only labor activity determined to be actually, rather than arguably, protected under federal law should be immune from state judicial control. To this extent San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,