186 Iowa 86 | Iowa | 1919
I. The appellant asserts the court erred in permitting plaintiff to introduce in evidence, as the basis for allowance of damages, the prices at which it supplied dealers with goods such as are alleged to have been destroyed by the negligence of defendant; that it erred in-this respect because the prices put in evidence by the use of Exhibit F were arbitrarily fixed by plaintiff itself, and were not the cost at which the goods could be replaced by plaintiff from factories at which the destroyed goods had been purchased; that it erred in refusing to strike Exhibit F because same was made up from an arbitrary value put upon the destroyed property by the plaintiff himself, and, therefore, does not show a value determined from a market in which there is competition.
Grant the claim of appellee, and, of course, the cases control that hold a complaint may not first be made here. It becomes necessary, then, to investigate what objections were made.
II. This occurred in the examination of Johnsrud: -
Thereupon, defendant objected “that the cost of machinery is not the price to the dealerand despite it, the witness was per
“Q. Have you made a notation on Exhibit F as to the fair market value of all these lines of machinery here in Mason City on the 7th of October, 1910?” The witness answered, “Yes,” over objection “that' the cost of machinery is not the price to the dealers, and is not the proper measure of damages, and for the further reason that it does not appear as yet from the evidence whether plaintiff is a manufacturer or a jobber of this machinery.” “Q. Well, what is the fair market value of the classes of machinery that you enumerated that was destroyed down there at that time?” To this, defendant made objection, among others, on the ground “that the proper measure of damages is not the market price.” When, later, the witness was asked to say what the fair market value “of this line of stuff” was, in Mason City, on October' 7, 1910, defendant asked leave to interrogate the witness as to his competency, and, this being denied, made objection that it was not shown the witness was qualified to testify to such market price. At this point, the court stated it "understood that .the reference to “fair market value” was to “the wholesale price of the goods in this locality.” Counsel for plaintiff responded:
“We refer to the value in this sense when there is some man offering to. sell to somebody willing to buy. It is not the retail value we are asking about: it is the fair value of implements like the implements that were in the warehouse — not at retail.”
Further discussion ensued. In the course of it, Mr. Markley, one counsel for defendant, stated that the courts held “that the reasonableness of prices must depend upon the cost of production, the cost of material used, the risks of the business, the labor of producing, the demand for the goods, and all things which tend to show the reasonable worth of the article;” that, if it should develop, on cross-examination, that competition was throttled, as to goods
The witness was asked to state the fair market value in Mason City of one item in the stock of goods burned, on the day of the fire. Defendant objected that the question “does not call for the proper measure of damages or value.” Like objection was interposed when witness was asked to state the fair market value in the market at Mason City, on the day of the fire, of the binding twine burned.
“The value and sufficiency of the general and ad inclusive objection, ‘incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant/ depends largely upon the nature of the evidence against which it is urged. * * * Thus, if the grounds of objection are perfectly obvious, and the evidence is wholly inadmissible for any purpose, the general objection is sufficient.” 9 Encyc. of Evidence 71, 73.
And see Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51; First Nat. Bank v. Carson, 30 Neb. 104 (46 N. W. 276); Swan v. Thompson, 124 Cal. 193 (56 Pac. 878); Roche v. Llewellyn, 140 Cal. 563 (74 Pac. 147); Alcorm v. Chicago & A. R.
The objection that evidence is incompetent is sufficient where the evidence is incompetent for any purpose. 9 Encyc. of Evidence, 73; Iverson v. McDonnell, 36 Wash. 73 (78 Pac. 202); State v. Hendrick, 70 N. J. L. 41 (56 Atl. 247); Hynes v. Hickey, 109 Mich. 188 (66 N. W. 1090); Dedric v. Hopson, 62 Iowa 562; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gay, 88 Tex. 111 (30 S. W. 543). The objection that testimony is incompetent and immaterial is sufficient, where the grounds of objection are discernible. Guarantee Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 124 Fed. 170. If the evidence could not have been made competent, then the objection is sufficient. Tooley v. Bacon, 70 N. Y. 34. It has been held, when the opinion called for is wholly incompetent on its face for any purpose, and the ground of objection could not be obviated, a general objection is sufficient. 9 Encyc. of Evidence 92; Wallace v. Vacuum Oil Co., 128 N. Y. 579 (27 N. E. 956); Rodgers v. Fletcher, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 299. Where evidence is immaterial, an objection to it as immaterial is sufficiently specific. M. Groh’s Sons v. Groh, 177 N. Y. 8 (68 N. E. 992); Turner v. City of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301 (4 Am. St. 453); Ward v. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 413.
“An objection to evidence as ‘irrelevant’ is sufficient, where the irrelevancy appears from the evidence itself.” McDermott v. Judy’s Admr., 67 Mo. App. 647; Owen v. Frink, 24 Cal. 171.
So, if the particular objection appears on the face of the evidence itself (Wood v. American Life Ins. Co., 7 How. [Miss.] 609); or where the evidence is not admissible for any purpose (Western Coal & Min. Co. v. Berberich, 94 Fed. 326; Taylor v. Adams, 115 Ill. 570; State v. Hilsabeck, 132 Mo. 348 [34 S. W. 38]; Neely v. State, [Tex.] 56 S. W. 625). Whether or not it aids appellant that less definite objections than it made will base review is, however, not
“According to some authorities, the sweeping assertion that testimony is ‘incompetent and immaterial,’ or ‘irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial,’ does not apprise the court of the precise point upon which counsel relies, and error cannot be predicated upon the refusal of the court to entertain it. Jones on Evidence, 897.”
In Johnston v. Cedar Rapids & M. C. R. Co., 141 Iowa 114, at 116, witnesses testified, over the objection of incompetent and immaterial, that plaintiff complained, at) different times after her injury, of pain in her back. On appeal, it was insisted that:
“This general exception to the rule of evidence which excludes proof of a party’s declaration in his own favor should be restricted, at leq,st to the extent that such declarations made in contemplation of the institution of an action to recover damages, or after such action has been commenced, should not be admissible.”
We say that the objections in question do not raise spell a distinction. In Hanrahan v. O’Toole, 139 Iowa 229, at 236, letters were offered as tending to prove the mental soundness of the writer. Objections were made on part' of the contestant that these were “incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.” On appeal from overruling these, it was argued that the letters were personal communications between the witness and the deceased, and should have been excluded, under the statute. And we said:
“Counsel overlook the obvious fact that the objection made, on the trial was to the competency of the testimony, and not to the competency of the witness under the statute.”
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It is absolutely clear that sufficient objection was made to compensating one whose goods have been destroyed, by allowing him the price at which he had directed his agents and employees to sell these goods. One objection was, that “there can be no market value of the article when its current price is not affected by competition, where competition is disarmed by combines or monopoly.” Another'was:
“It seems to me we ought to have the right to examine this witness, to find out whether or not the price that he is now attempting to put on this machinery is the price that is fixed by a monopoly, or by this firm that has no competition, and that has possibly killed off any competition.
Again, it was moved to strike out testimony as to market value “for the reason that the testimony now shows that this witness testified to the price at which these goods were sold, and that the price list was made up in Chicago, and was not governed in any way by competition in the market, and that, therefore, the price at which it was sold is no evidence of market value, and is wholly incompetent for that purpose, and the only measure of damages is the actual loss or damage that was incurred by the plaintiff which would be determined not by this kind of testimony.”
At the end of re-cross-examination, Mr. Markley moved to strike out Exhibit F, for the reason that the testimony shows these prices were fixed in Chicago, and are not variable; that there is no competition about them, and it is no evidence of market value, but is simply an arbitrary price fixed, from which no variation could be made. And to the offer of Exhibit F, a list made by a witness, with prices noted against each article listed, the objection was:
“Defendant objects for the reason that the same is a mere compilation made by this witness from books kept, according to his testimony, by various bookkeepers, partly
III. Having settled that the objections were sufficiently specific, it remains to consider whether it was error to overrule them.
The property destroyed consisted of staple farm machinery and binding twine. If, at the time of the destruction of -these goods, there was no market value at Mason City for either farm machines or binding twine, then it would manifestly be error to allow plaintiff to put in evidence based on a nonexistent standard. Stated differently, such testimony should not have been received in that event, because, in the absence of a market value at Mason City (as will be shown presently), the measure of damages was the price at which the goods could be substituted for in kind at the nearest or best place in which such goods had a market value, perhaps plus transportation, and perhaps plus an allowance for damages caused by delay in having the sub
It may not be doubted that the basis of all damages rules is a fair' compensation to the loser Avith the least burden to the one Avho caused the loss. See McDonald v. Unaka Timber Co., 88 Tenn. 38 (12 S. W. 420); Burr's Ferry, B. & C. R. Co. v. Allen, (Tex.) 149 S. W. 358; 1 Sutherland on Damages (3d Ed.) Section 12; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Word, (Tex.) 158 S. W. 581; Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. v. Peninsular Land, etc., Co., 27 Fla. 1, 157 (9 So. 661, 679); Sears v. Lydon, 5 Ida. 358 (49 Pac. 122). If cosit of replacement is the true measure Avithin that rule, it does not matter that the stock could not have been replaced with goods obtainable on the Mason City market. In some of these cases, and in many other authorities, one application of the rule is that Avhile, ordinarily, fair compensation is afforded by paying market value at the time Avhen and place Avhere property is injured, yet, if there be no market value at that place, by reason of Avant of dealers, or some other reason, then actual value at such place is ascertainable by proof of market value in other places at which the goods can be bought; and fair compensation is made by paying Avhat is market value at the nearest market in which the lost goods may be substituted for in kind, and, perhaps, cost of transportation added. See McDonald v. Unaka Timber Co., 88 Tenn. 38 (12 S. W. 420); Grand Tower Co. v. Phillips, 23 Wall. 471 (23 L. Ed. 71, 74); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Word, (Tex.) 158 S. W. 561. When a stock of merchandise is involved, the measure of damages is the cost of such stock in like quantity at the place of the alleged trespass, if purchasable there in such quantity; otherwise, it is the wholesale price of such goods on the nearest market where they can be purchased in like quantity, with necessary cost of transportation added. Sears v. Lydon, 5 Ida. 358 (49 Pac. 122). To the same
It is no answer that appellee cannot make replacement in the market in Mason City. As we have seen, and shall presently see, it is controlling that it could replace where it had bought before, or in some other place, and that it would be compensated if defendant paid to it what the cost of replacement would be, wherever appellee was compelled to get substitution made. No rule of the law of damages permits the injured party to receive more than he has lost. Tt must be conceded, — at any rate we think it was proved, —that these goods were staple, and that plaintiff could readily have substituted them in kind. It appears, to put it mildly, that plaintiff was on close and friendly relations with the International Harvester Company, the manufacturer, and was a heavy buyer from it. Culbertson testifies that whether these things could be replaced by buying of the International Harvester Company depended, of course, on how much was wanted; and that, if more was required than the output of this manufacturer, replacement could not be made by purchase from it. But he adds that all of
IV. It may be assumed that Clements v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 74 Iowa 442, 443, holds that evidence of what such goods sold for on the Mason City market is some evidence of what market value of such goods • was. But we shall presently attempt to show that it was no evidence of what this plaintiff had lost. Be that as it may, the overruling of the objections made works more than a holding that the value ou the Mason City market was a circumstance bearing on what loss had been sustained. It was a holding that plaintiff's loss was the aggregate list price of the items of the stock at the time it was stored in Mason City, to be sold in 13 counties.
The exact, ultimate question is whether one who has a stock on hand, who must pay storage and insurance, and must make distribution and sale in a large territory, at the cost of money and time, which distribution and sale may entail waste and loss, may, if that stock be destroyed, recover as if he had already sold all the stock at list price, without deduction for sales, costs, delivery, depreciation, waste, etc., — may recover as if he had already received cash for the whole stock at the full list price, without any detraction, and then another had negligently destroyed the cash received. We must answer that he may not.
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In 2 Sutherland on Damages (3d Ed.) at the close of Section 445, page 1215, it is said:
“The value of a large tract of land cannot be proven .by evidence as to what it will bring when cut up into small farms. The sale in small quantities involves expense, and does not afford a sufficiently accurate basis for determining the value of the whole tract.”
And in the second paragraph of Section 447 (Yol. 2, page 1219), the author says:
“The value at which a stock of goods may be sold at retail, standing alone, does not afford a basis for fixing their market value, which is what they could have promptly sold for in bulk or in convenient lots; Between the prices at which goods may be obtained in a market, and at
To the same effect is Needham O. & P. Co. v. Hollingsworth, B. & Co., 91 Tex. 49 (40 S. W. 787), and Temple Groc. Co. v. Sullivan, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 281 (44 S. W. 401). Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N. Y. 448, was trespass for entering upon plaintiff’s premises and unlawfully taking and carrying away her goods under an attachment. It was held that the market value was the measure of compensation due, and that such market value was the price at which the goods could be replaced for money in the market, and not the price for which they are sold at retail. It is therein said:
“The sum at which the plaintiff could have replaced the goods in market would have indemnified her for the loss sustained. * ® * The retail value or the price at which goods are sold at retail includes the expected and contingent profits, the earning of which involves labor, loss of time, and expenses, and supposes no damage to or depreciation in the value of the goods, and is dependent upon the contingency of' finding purchasers for cash, and not upon credit, within a reasonable time, the sale of the entire stock without loss by unsalable remnants, and the closing out of a stock of goods as none ever was or ever will be closed out, by sales at retail at full prices.”
In criticising the position of the appellant, that the retail price of goods destroyed is not the measure of damages where a wholesale stock is destroyed en masse, appellee states that plaintiff is a wholesaler, and that it was its purpose to sell the stock in question at wholesale; that the cases cited by appellant merely and rightly hold that there can be no recovery for goods destroyed in bulk, and to be sold at wholesale, on the basis of retail value, on the reasoning that such stock could not be sold at those
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For breach of contract to deliver to plaintiff daily during a period of five years a specified quantity of logs, the measure of damages is the difference, if any, between the contract price and the price at which logs could, by reasonable diligence, have been procured elsewhere. Hassard-Short v. Hardison, 114 N. C. 482 (19 S. E. 728).
Where it was alleged as a basis for special damages that the party was unable to print a certain frontispiece, and for the loss of sales and of subscriptions, a recovery cannot be allowed, even though it appears that the party went to dealers and could not find similar paper, where there was no proof that such paper could not usually be
One may not recover special damage because breach of contract deprived it of a profit on a resale already made, “for such damage might have been avoided by replacing the undelivered lumber by other of like kinds.” Lawrence v. Porter, 68 Fed. 62, at 66.
Replacement is the standard. Mr. Sutherland in the first book of the third edition ofl his work on Damages, at page 140, states that, if the party claiming damages is a purchaser, he can recover no more than it would cost him with reasonable diligence to supply himself with the same property, by resort to the market or other source or means of supply; that it is not what he could have gotten for the property, but what he can replace the lost property for. In large measure, this doctrine has support in Grand Tower Co. v. Phillips, 23 Wall. 471 (23 L. Ed. 71, 74).
We find nothing that aids appellee, when a careful analysis is made of Read v. State Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 307.
One basis of the rule that replacement is the true compensation is that, where such replacement will lessen the damages and yet compensate the loser, replacement is the true measure, because it is the duty of the injured party to dp all he may in reason do to' reduce the damages. Poplar Company v. Chapman, 74 Fed. 444; Springfield S. W. R. Co. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650 (158 S. W. 1058).
In the circumstances, the true measure of compensation was the reasonable cost of replacement, and was not the market value at Mason City. Damages on the basis of that market overpay the plaintiff. Assessing the cost of replacement and anything that may have been lost by necessary delay to the defendant repays just what plaintiff has lost —places it where it is once more in position to get all it can by making an effort to sell its stock to dealers in the 13
Why should not the court have adopted the same rule here that it did with reference to salvage? It did not leave salvage to the Mason City market. As to it, the court charged that there it was a question (Instruction 10) of “the reasonable cost of restoring it to its original condition,” and that the recovery could not be beyond that cost.
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If we assume, on the authority of City Nat. Bank v. Jordan, 139 Iowa 499, 504, that the witness was competent, yet this is no answer. His competency cannot sustain the adoption of an erroneous measure of damages.
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It is true that damages for breach of contract are limited to what the parties intended, and to injuries that could, in reason, be anticipated, but that in tort there is liability for damages that were not and in reason could not be anticipated, so long as such damages could result from the tort, and were, in fact, caused by it. But that does not enlarge the rule that not more than compensation is due. It enlarges the possibility of being made to respond in damages, but it adds nothing to what is a proper measure of damages. See Farmers’ Sav. Bank v. Jameson, 175 Iowa 676.
V. Let it be conceded that for burning a house and its contents, replacement is not the correct measure of damages. Burke v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 54 Tenn. 451, at 465. Let it be conceded that, where a carrier undertakes to take stock to market, and the stock is destroyed, or its arrival unduly delayed, the measure of damages is the price that would have been realized on the market for the stock, had it reached the market with reasonable speed. Certainly, when the carrier breaches its contract for reasonably speedy transportation to market, the
VI. Buford v. McGetchie, 60 Town 298, Galliers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 116 Iowa 319, Clements v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 74 Iowa 442, Sanford, v. Peck, 63 Conn. 486 (27 Atl. 1057), and Budd v. Van Orden, 33 N. J. Eq. 143, do not go beyond holding that, in certain conditions,
Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 129 Iowa 465, at 479, et seq., Pope v. Filley, 9 Fed. 65, and Showman v. Lee, 86 Mich. 556 (49 N. W. 578), are of no help to either party, and do no more than to fix rules for the allowance of damages which, no matter how correct, have no application whatever to this case. For instance, the last-named case declares that, where property upon which one has a chattel mortgage is converted, he is not limited to what the property would have realized on a forced sale under the chattel mortgage. The case of Burr's Ferry, B. & C. R. Co. v. Allen, (Tex.) 149 S. W. 358, declares that the measure of damages contended for there was an impossible measure.
It was error to receive the testimony that has so far been dealt with.
He makes no pretense of having any knowledge of the value of the articles listed in Exhibit F. He admits that
“I can’t remember all the prices. I can’t remember what the value was on all the machines. Independent of the memoranda I have made, I have no other knowledge or recollection of what the market price was. Q. So that, when you were testifying and reading from this list, Exhibit F, you were depending upon the list to furnish the answer to the questions, wasn’t you ? A. Yes. Independent of this memorandum I have made, I have no knowledge or recollection as to what the market price was.”
Asked if it were not true that he was not answering upon his knowledge or recollection as to prices, he answered, “Yes.” He said he had no knowledge of the cost of manufacturing these goods or of the cost of selling them; that he made the exhibit wholly from the books, and depended upon them “wholly” for the prices to be set down in the exhibit. Finally, that Exhibit F tallies with the price list sent to him; that the prices attached to the items in Exhibit F are the prices that were fixed by the officers of the company in Chicago, and sent out here; “I had no right to vary;” that, with the exception of discounts and freight, “I regarded that -selling price which the company sent out from Chicago as the market value. I had no right to vary;” that he “testified yesterday that the items I set out in this exhibit and prices attached thereto were the prices that were fixed by the officers of the company in Chi
“Q. The plaintiff fixed the prices on all their goods, didn’t they ? A. They sent out a catalogue — yes, sir.”
A price list book, Exhibit I, was prepared. It was made up from the lists sent by the general office to the Mason City branch.
“Q. [to Johnsrud]. I call your attention to this book I hand you, — did you compile it from these different letters and schedules a price list? A. Yes, sir, the book you have just handed to me is one of those books that have been compiled from these different letters and schedules. The purpose of the book is, it gives the various prices on all the different things, and we use that book in the office. The blockmen use it, and other agents do. These blockmen and other men, traveling men, traveling around trying to assist in the sale of these goods, use a book similar to the one I have in my hand, and I made out a number of these books. This book is the one for 1910, and was compiled from different sources. Q. The prices contained in this book referred to were fixed in Chicago several years ago, and sent out by this company to their local agents, — the prices on these various things you have testified to here, binders and things of that kind ? A. Well, yes, it was sent out to the different dealers. It was also sent to us. Q. ■State what records of the office you used in extending and
It cannot be said the jury did not follow this line of testimony, to wit, prices set out in Exhibit F. All indications are that it did follow said line.
On the whole, it is absolutely clear that what the court allowed the jury to act on was testimony that each item in the stock stored at Mason City was worth a sum stated in an exhibit, which sum was the price put on each item by the seller as the price which the agent of the seller should demand from the dealer who desired to buy. If payment is made on this basis, it is manifest the owner would get the price he himself had placed on his own goods in his direction to his agents at what price to sell. As well say that, where two stacks of hay are destroyed, one must be paid for at market price, unless a stack like it is furnished, but that the other ha,s its market value fixed at the sum the owner told an employee he might sell that one stack for. See Lovejoy v. Michels, 88 Mich. 15 (49 N. W. 901), having considerable bearing on this question.
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We cannot see how the fact, if it be one, that there was competition in selling the machines, destroys the objection that the prices in the exhibit were arbitrarily fixed by the plaintiff. When it is attempted to obtain compensation for the burning of such machines, does the fact that there would have been competition if the machines had remained in condition to be sold compel one who has negligently destroyed them to pay as compensation whatsoever price the owner has directed his agents to sell at? The objection to Exhibit F that is now' relied on is not to the form of the exhibit; hence, the answer that the exhibit was clearly
This evidence was competent, because showing that the engines did throw sparks was competent on the question of the efficiency of the spark arresters, — on whether the appliances were of the character asserted by defendant. Especially is this so in view of the fact that an expert, introduced by appellee, testified that the engines of the defendant were not equipped with the best spark arresters in general use in October, 1910. It was held, in Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Thomas, 110 Va. 622 (66 S. E. 817), that, in such an action, the burden is on defendant to prove that it has availed itself of all the best mechanical contrivances and inventions in known practical use to prevent the communication of fire, and that, where the particular locomotive which caused the fire is not identified, in a suit for damages by fire charged to have been set by the locomotive of defendant, plaintiff may show defects in the spark-arresting apparatus of any one of defendant’s locomotives which may have caused the fire, and defendant may show that all of its locomotives passing on the day of the fire were properly equipped. We are not holding that evidence would be competent which tended to show that engines
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that fire. Of course, it is the general rule that such testimony should not be received. See Babcock v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 62 Iowa 593; Bell v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 61 Iowa 321; 3 Elliott on Railroads 562; Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 114 Fed. 133; Gibbons v. Wisconsin Val. R. Co., 58 Wis. 335 (17 N. W. 132). And we are not persuaded that it avoids this rule to contend, as the appellee does, that it introduced no evidence of other fires’ having been set, but merely proved that Keidle “discovered the hay near the icehouse on fire some months before that icehouse was burned.” We think it fairly appears that Keidle was permitted to testify what was, in effect, as injurious as a statement that fires were found in
tXTI. The sixth assignment is that it was error to receive testimony to show what the market value of scrap iron was, as a means of determining the credit that should be given defendant on account of salvage consisting of undamaged and usable parts of machinery which plaintiff had shipped to the factory. The brief point is that it was error to permit plaintiff .to show what the salvage or usable parts of the machinery were worth as scrap iron. We have examined the record with great care, and are of opinion that no objections sufficient to raise this point were made in the trial court.
XIII. The court confined the plaintiff’s right to recover to fires that may have been set out by switch engine No. 1055. It was urged by motion for new trial that the evidence does not support a verdict finding that the fire which destroyed the property of the plaintiff was caused by said switch engine; that, at best, the testimony was in equipoise, and that, therefore, plaintiff has not established its case by a preponderance. For reasons pointed out in State v. Asbury, 172 Iowa 606, we will not determine this point on this appeal. And see Seibert Bros. & Co. v. Germania F. Ins. Co., 132 Iowa 58, at 61, and Clark & Co. v. Monson, 183 Iowa 980.
On much the same reasoning, we refrain from deciding whether the court should have given the jury additional instructions when it came into court and asked to be cleared up on certain points suggested by the foreman.
For the errors specified herein, there must be a reversal. — Reversed and'remanded.