INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITIONS, INC., d/b/A Grеater Miami International Auto Show, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Florida, and the Greater Miami Automobile Dealers Association, D/B/a Greater Miami International Auto Show, Appellees.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
*30 Salley, Barns, Pajon & Immer and James F. Dougherty, II, Miami, for appellant.
Joseph A. Wanick, City Atty., and Lionei Barnet, Asst. City Atty., Quinton, Leib & Aurell and Paul C. Huck, Miami, for appellees.
Before BARKDULL, C.J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
BARKDULL, Chief Judge.
The appellant hеld an automobile show at the Miami Beach Convention Hall in February of 1968, 1969 and 1970. The use of the Convention Hall on each of these occasions was pursuant to an independent contract with the appellee. On August 5, 1970, the appellant entered into a new contract with the appellee, City of Miami Beach, for the use of the Hall to hold its show. Said contract was for a five-year period, reserving the Convention Hall for the appellant's use early in the month of February for the years 1971 through 1975. The contract did not give the appellant the exclusive right to hold an automobile show in the Convention Hall.
The appellant held its show in February of 1971 without incident. On or about June 18, 1971 the appellee, Greater Miami Automobile Dealers Association, being desirous of putting on its own automobile show in November of 1971, contacted the City of Miami Beach regarding leasing of the Convention Hall. All parties recognized that the Greater Miami Automobile Dealers Association show would be in competition with the appellant's show in February, 1972, and would probably be detrimental to that show. However, inasmuch as the appellant was not granted an exclusive right to stage an automobile show at the Conventiоn Hall, the City of Miami Beach entered into a contract with the Greater Miami Automobile Dealers Association permitting it to hold its show in November, 1971 at the Convention Hall. Subsequent to this show, the appellant contacted the City of Miami Beaсh informing the City that the appellant considered the City's action in leasing the Convention Hall to the Greater Miami Automobile Dealers Association for its show to be a breach of the City's contract with the appellant, and that the appellant would not perform under the contract.
Thereupon, the appellant brought the instant suit, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the City for breach of contract and against the Greater Miami Automobile Dealеrs Association for the malicious, intentional, and wanton destruction of the contractual relationship between thе City of Miami Beach and the appellant. The City of Miami Beach counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract on the part of the appellant. The City of Miami Beach and the Greater Miami Automobile Dealеrs Association both moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of аction and that the appellant was estopped to raise issues herein which were determined adverse to thе appellant in an almost identical case previously filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Aftеr hearing on the motions, the trial court entered an order dismissing the appellant's complaint with prejudice followеd by a final judgment. This appeal ensued.
Appellant, in negotiating for its five-year lease with the City of Miami Beach, had an оpportunity to obtain an exclusive right to present automobile shows at the Hall. The law is quite clear that courts may nоt rewrite, alter, or add to the terms of a written agreement between the parties and may not substitute their judgment for that of thе parties in order to relieve one from an alleged hardship of an *31 improvident bargain. Home Development Co. v. Bursam, Fla. 1965,
In the case of The Parkleigh House, Inc. v. Wahl, supra, a lessee sought a declaratory decree and аn injunction in equity to prevent the lessor from leasing its remaining premises to another business which would compete with lesseе's food business. There was no written clause in the parties' contract giving the lessee an exclusive right to sell food stuffs in the lеased premises. However, the lessee claimed that it had such an exclusive right based upon certain oral promises made prior to the execution of the lease. This court rejected plaintiff's claim, holding that such a restrictive covenant preventing the lessor from leasing the remaining premises to plaintiff's competitor could not be written intо the lease by the courts. A similar holding is found in Furchgott's Inc. v. Jacobs, Fla.App. 1967,
The contract with the City of Miami Beach cleаrly reveals an absence of circumstances upon which the appellant could support a claim for relief. Therefore, the court quite properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. David's Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Wometco Vending of South Florida, Inc., Fla.App. 1969,
The Convention Hall is operated by the City and its costs are to be partially offset through revenues derived from the facility аnd, therefore, it is incumbent upon the City to keep it in use as much as possible. The City being free to contract as it pleased without breaching its agreement with the appellant, we do not find that the action of the Automobile Dealers constituted a tortious interference with any contractual right of the appellant. Clearly there was no interference with any contractual right because no exclusive existed. The appellant and the Automobile Dealers are сompetitors and the law recognizes competition between competitors, and if there is an interferencе with a non-exclusive right this is a privileged interference. See: Zoby v. American Fidelity Company, 4th Cir.1957,
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"* * * Where the alleged interferer is a financially interested party and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. See Kurtz v. Oremland,33 N.J. Super. 443 ,111 A.2d 100 ; Restatement of Law of Torts, Sec. 769."
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See also: Martin v. Texaco, Inc., Dist.Ct., Miss., S.D. 1969,
Therefore, we affirm the action of the trial judge here under review.
Affirmed.