INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 824, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee, v. VERIZON FLORIDA, LLC, Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
No. 15-10536.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Oct. 7, 2015.
1241
IV.
In sum, we conclude: (1) Carpenter‘s sentence of incarceration is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable; (2) Carpenter invited any error the district court may have made in sentencing him to a life term of supervised release; and (3) Carpenter failed to object to the conditions of his supervised release during sentencing, and he can show no plain error in the conditions the district court imposed. Thus, we affirm the district court‘s judgment in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.
Gregory A. Hearing, Benjamin Bard, Sacha Dyson, Ernesto Mayor, Jr., Thompson Sizemore Gonzalez & Hearing, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and VINSON,* District Judge.
VINSON, District Judge:
The primary question in this labor arbitration appeal is an unusual one: did the arbitrator exceed his power by issuing a substituted award after he determined that he had exceeded his power in the original award? After close review and oral argument, we agree with the district court that he did, and we affirm.
* Honorable C. Roger Vinson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
I.
The plaintiff, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 824 (union), is the bargaining agent for communications technicians employed by the defendant, Verizon Florida, LLC (company). At all times pertinent, the parties operated under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that addressed “bumping rights” in the event of a layoff. Specifically, Article XI, Section 2, stated that any regular full-time employee with more than twelve months seniority had the right to bump an employee with less seniority, with the following caveat (emphasis added):
2.3 An employee must have the ability to perform any job which he/she seeks to obtain through bumping. If it is a job which the employee has previously held, the employee will be allowed a reasonable period of time for re-familiarization and, if the job is one which he/she has not previously held, the employee must be able to perform the job with minimum additional training.
In September 2012, the company announced a surplus that would eliminate positions held by thirteen communications technicians. To facilitate the bumping process, the company asked the affected employees to fill out a Florida Workforce Reduction Checklist and rank their preferred alternative placements. The company allowed four of the thirteen to bump into the alternative positions they listed, but the other nine were not allowed to bump. In particular, the company denied Chris Schwartz, Tom Alexander, Peter Alicea, and Derrick Raborn from bumping into a Customer Zone Technician I (CZT 1) position.
Article(s) Violated: Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1.4, Article XI, Section 2 and any other Articles, Sections or Past Practices that may apply.
Grievance Description: On Tuesday, February 5, 2013, the Union was notified by the Company that employees currently in the “bumping” process would be denied from “bumping” into another position as the language provides for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Settlement Desired: That the Company abide by the language in Article XI, Section 2 and allow employees to “bump” into other positions as negotiated between the parties.
As provided by the CBA, the parties proceeded to a hearing before an arbitrator with the American Arbitration Association (AAA), where they agreed that “[t]he decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon both parties.” They refused to stipulate to the issues to be arbitrated, but it is clear that the issue in the grievance was whether the employees had the ability to perform the jobs that they wanted to bump into. Less clear, however, is whether their ability to perform the jobs at issue would be gauged under the “minimum additional training” clause or the job “previously held” clause of Section 2.3.
The company contends that the dispute was presented to the arbitrator under the former and not the latter, while the union argues that both clauses were at issue. Specifically, the union argues that an employee‘s “ability” to perform the job could be established if he could do the job with “minimum additional training” or if he “previously held” that job. Thus, according to the union, arguing to the arbitrator that the employee was able to do the job necessarily encompassed both provisions of Section 2.3. While there was some suggestion that both clauses may have been at issue, the record is clear that the arbitration dealt primarily with the “minimum additional training” prong. Indeed, it is undisputed that the union‘s representative told the arbitrator during his initial statement—and he made substantially similar statements in his arbitration brief—that “[h]aving the ability [to perform the job] and the three little words ‘minimum additional training’ within Section 2.3 are the crux of this entire proceeding.”1
The arbitrator entered his original award on August 26, 2013. He found that the phrase “minimum additional training” meant training of less than four weeks in duration, and he appears to have agreed with the company that all of the employees under review would require more than that amount of training.2 To that extent, the arbitrator determined that “the Company properly declined to allow them to bump into those positions.” However, he further found that Schwartz and Alexander had in the past been “on loan” by management to the jobs at issue, so they “previously held” those positions. Thus, he sustained the grievance with respect to Schwartz‘s and Alexander‘s bumping rights.
The arbitrator agreed with the company and issued his substituted award on Monday, September 9, 2013, finding that “[u]pon review and deliberation, [I am] persuaded that [my] earlier award did, in fact, partially rely on a contract provision not submitted for consideration.”4 The arbitrator wrote that the original award was “subject to change” pursuant to Section 682.13(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes, which states: “Upon motion of a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an arbitration award if ... [the] arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator‘s powers.” The substituted award deleted by strike-through the entire “previously held” analysis (but was otherwise the same as the original award), and it proceeded to deny the union‘s grievance as to all of the affected employees as they would each require more than four weeks training.
The union brought this action in federal district court to confirm the original award and vacate the substituted award. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of the union. The district court held that the original award fell within the arbitrator‘s power based on the union‘s “broadly worded” grievance. The court further held that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his power by issuing the substituted award in violation of functus officio. This common law rule (meaning “task performed“) provides that, while an arbitrator may correct clerical, typographical, or computational errors in a final award, he has no power to revisit the merits of the award after it has issued. See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 186 F.3d 1261, 1270-71 & n. 4 (10th Cir.1999) (Functus officio provides that, “once an arbitrator has issued a final award and thus discharged his or her office, that arbi-
II.
We will review a district court‘s decision to confirm or vacate an arbitration award de novo. Davis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014). In light of the very strong federal policy in favor of finality for arbitration awards, the arbitrator‘s decision is entitled to “considerable deference.” Osram Sylvania, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union 528, 87 F.3d 1261, 1263 (11th Cir.1996). As this court has recognized:
“[c]ourts ... do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.... The arbitrator‘s award settling a dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator‘s own notions of industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”
Id. (quoting United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 371, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987)); Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass‘n, Int‘l, 861 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir.1988) (“An arbitrator‘s result may be wrong; it may appear unsupported; it may appear poorly reasoned; it may appear foolish. Yet, it may not be subject to court interference.“). Stated simply, our review is limited to whether the arbitration award is irrational; whether it fails to draw its essence from the parties’ contractual CBA; or, as in this case, whether it exceeds the scope of the arbitrator‘s power and authority. IMC-Agrico Co. v. Int‘l Chem. Workers Council of the United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 171 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir.1999).
III.
Preliminarily, the company argues that the district court erred in concluding that the original award fell within the scope of the arbitrator‘s power.
The arbitrator‘s authority is established in the CBA, which provides that the arbitrator shall be limited “to a review and determination of the specific grievance submitted for arbitration.” The company concedes (as it must) that the arbitrator‘s authority derives from the grievance. And it further concedes (at least impliedly) that the grievance was indeed “broadly worded,” as the district court recognized. However, the company contends that the original award exceeded the arbitrator‘s authority because the case itself was not “broadly arbitrated,” and “[t]he record is amazingly clear that [the ‘previously held’ language] was not at issue in this case.” While the company‘s description of the arbitration proceeding has support in the record, reversal is not warranted on this ground.
It is true that an arbitrator is “not free to reinterpret the parties’ dispute and frame it in his own terms.” Piggly Wiggly Operators’ Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Operators’ Warehouse Indep. Truck Drivers Union, Local No. 1, 611 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir.1980).5 And it is likewise true that a majority of the arbi-
However, this case is unique inasmuch as the arbitrator was subsequently persuaded that he had exceeded the scope of his authority in the original award, so he issued the substituted award. The question then becomes: could he do that? Or rather, as stated at the outset of this opinion, did he exceed his authority by finding that he had exceeded his authority? The company maintains that he did not exceed his authority for three reasons.
First, the company contends that the arbitrator was free to revisit and revise his original award because it was not final in that it did not adjudicate the “limited issue” that had been raised in the grievance, specifically, the “minimum additional training” issue. The record clearly shows otherwise. As the district court found, and as detailed above, the arbitrator‘s original award resolved the grievance on the merits—including the “minimum additional training” issue for all of the affected employees—and it concluded by specifying a remedy. The arbitrator applied the contractual language of the CBA. There is no evidence suggesting that he did not deal completely with the grievance as it was submitted to him, or that the original award was intended to be anything other than final.6
The company next contends that the district court should not have applied functus officio as it is of “questionable” viability in the labor arbitration context.7 We recognize that some courts have been critical of the doctrine and have opined that an arbitrator should have the inherent power to reconsider his award within a reason-
Rule 40 provides (emphasis added):
Within 20 days after the transmittal of an award, any party, upon notice to the other parties, may request the arbitrator, through the AAA, to correct any clerical, typographical, technical, or computational errors in the award. The arbitrator is not empowered to redetermine the merits of any claim already decided. The other parties shall be given 10 days to respond to the request. The arbitrator shall dispose of the request within 20 days after transmittal by the AAA to the arbitrator of the request and any response thereto. If applicable law requires a different procedural time frame, that procedure shall be followed.
“This rule essentially codifies the common law doctrine of functus officio.” See Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.2009) (concluding same about AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 46, which is identical to Rule 40 in all relevant aspects). Therefore, regardless of the viability (or advisability) of functus officio as a matter of common law, Rule 40 operated in precisely the same manner and precluded the arbitrator here from revisiting the merits of the original award after it was issued. Cf. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass‘n, Inc., 227 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir.2000) (noting that arbitrators “assuredly are bound by the... rules that give them power to act,” and declining to confirm a second arbitration award that was entered by a separate arbitrator in violation of AAA Commercial Rule 48, which is, in pertinent part, identical to Rule 40).10
As a general matter, we agree that, since arbitration is a matter of contract, the contracting parties can ask an arbitrator to clarify or reconsider his decision if they mutually agree. It is a practical and common sense way to correct an award, and it appears to be frequently utilized. See, e.g., Hyle v. Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc., 198 F.3d 368, 370 (2d Cir.1999) (arbitrator can reconsider final award if there is “agreement by the parties“); Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d at 848 (Functus officio “is merely a default rule, operative if the parties fail to provide otherwise“; but, if the parties do provide otherwise, “[t]here is no legal bar to authorizing arbitrators to reconsider their decisions“); accord Legion Ins. Co. v. VCW, Inc., 198 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir.1999) (arbitrator can make “changes” to final award “when the parties consent“); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 327, 333 n. 5 (3d Cir.1991) (noting that arbitrator can clarify a final award “upon the mutual assent of the parties“). The question here is: did the parties mutually consent? We think not.
The union‘s request—which was essentially comprised of a single question—was narrowly framed. Notably, it did not challenge the arbitrator‘s reasoning or his substantive analysis in any way; it merely inquired about his application of that reasoning and analysis to the factual record. Specifically, the union asked whether, under the logic of the ruling as the union understood it, Alicea and Raborn should have been offered a CZT 1 position like Schwartz and Alexander had been. While one could argue that this was a request for “reconsideration” in that the arbitrator previously found (at least by implication) that Alicea and Raborn should not have been awarded the job, the union‘s request bore no resemblance to the company‘s request. The company‘s request was a full-frontal attack on the merits. Over the course of several single-spaced pages, it disputed and challenged the arbitrator‘s
The cases that the company has cited are not to the contrary. For example, in Brown v. Witco Corp., 340 F.3d 209 (5th Cir.2003), the arbitrator ordered that an employee, Glenn Brown, be reinstated with full back pay. When the company and union could not agree on how to calculate the amount of back pay, the parties “voluntarily requested that the arbitrator clarify” his ruling, which he did. Id. at 211-13, 217 (emphasis in original). Brown was not pleased with the clarification, and he filed suit. Id. at 213. In rejecting Brown‘s argument that the clarification violated functus officio, the Fifth Circuit held that the arbitrator had “jurisdiction to clarify what he originally intended to award Brown in the light of the specific issues and ambiguities raised by both parties post-arbitration.” See id. at 217-19 & n. 10. The Court of Appeals further stated that the requests for clarification gave the arbitrator power and authority to “interpret or construe” the original award. See id. There is a considerable difference between the requests to clarify in Brown (which clearly were mutual), and the requests at issue in this case (which clearly were not). Furthermore, the arbitrator here did not simply “interpret or construe” his original award; he deleted the entire “previously held” discussion which favored the union, while leaving only the “minimum additional training” portion which favored the company. Thus, he substantively changed and revised his decision‘s analysis and ruling entirely.
T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir.2010) is also undercut by its factual differences. The parties to the arbitration in that case not only both petitioned the arbitrator to “amend” his initial ruling, but they did so pursuant to an AAA arbitration rule (International Centre of Dispute Resolution (ICDR) Article 30(1)) that authorized such action. See id. at 333-36. Since the arbitrator was “empowered” by the rule to revise his award in the manner that he did—and the parties had “displayed clear and unmistakable intent” to have him do so—the Second Circuit held that functus officio did not bar the arbitrator from changing the original award. Id. at 342-46; see also id. at 347 (“Because we conclude that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers by revising the Original Award in a way consistent with his interpretation of his reconsideration authority under ICDR Article 30(1), we reverse the district court‘s decision to vacate the Amended Award on [functus officio] grounds.“). The parties here did not “clearly and unmistakably” ask the arbitrator to reconsider his original award; and, perhaps more significantly, there was no rule that “empowered” him to do what he did. If anything, Rule 40 said he could not. See Brown, 340 F.3d at 219 (explaining that an arbitrator can revisit a final award if he is asked “mutually and without any party‘s objection within a reasonable period of time,” but that is “in the absence of any... formal arbitration rule expressly to the contrary” (emphasis added)); cf. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1004 (observing that arbitrators are bound by the rules “that give them power to act,” and refusing to confirm a second award that was entered by another arbitrator because he “did not misinterpret Rule 48 [which is virtually identical to Rule 40]; he decided to ignore it utterly“).12
In summary, “it was for the arbitrator to decide just what the issue was that was submitted to it and argued by the parties.” Waverly, 633 F.2d at 685. And the arbitrator here decided—at least initially—that the issue submitted included both the “minimal additional training” and the “previously held” language in the CBA. While the arbitrator was later persuaded that this was error, Rule 40 precluded him from making that determination and issuing the substituted award. Accordingly, the decision below is
AFFIRMED.