2021 IL App (3d) 190758
Ill. App. Ct.
2021

*1 Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Intеrnational Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria , 2021 IL App (3d) 190758

Appellate Court INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL Caption 50, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE CITY OF PEORIA, a Municipal

Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. District & No. Third District

No. 3-19-0758 Filed February 1, 2021

Decision Under Appeаl from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 18-MR-439; the Hon. Mark E. Gilles, Judge, presiding. Review Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Esther J. Seitz, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Springfield, for appellant. Appeal

Jerry J. Marzullo and Joseph E. Weishampel, of Puchalski Goodloe Marzullo, LLP, of ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍ Northbrook, and Thomas W. Duda and Scott Moran, both of Palatine, for appellеe.

Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION The defendant, the City of Peoria (City), appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 50 (Union), in a declaratory judgment action challenging the definitions in a City ordinance. FACTS The Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/1 et seq. (West 2018))

provides that a city must pay “the entire premium of [its] health insurance plan” for a full-time firefighter, the firefighter’s spouse, and the firefighter’s dependents if the firefighter suffers a catastroрhic injury or is killed in the line of duty. 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2018). The Act does not define the terms “injury” or “catastrophic injury.” The City passed an ordinance on June 12, 2018, amending sectiоn 2-350 of the Peoria City

Code. Peoria Ordinance No. 17584 (approved June 12, 2018). The ordinance amended the application procedures for those seeking the Act benefits in the City, and it also defined terms used but not defined in section 10 of the Act, specifically defining “injury,” “gainful work,” ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍ and “catastroрhic injury.” Peoria City Code § 2-350(b) (amended June 12, 2018). “Catastrophic injury” is defined as “[a]n injury, the direct and proximate consequences of which permanently рrevent an individual from performing any gainful work.” Id. “Gainful work” is defined as “[f]ull- or part-time activity that actually is compensated or commonly is compensated.” “Injury” is defined as:

“A traumatic physical wound *** directly and proximately caused by external force ***, chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious disease, radiation, virus, or bacteria, but does not include:

(1) Any occupational disease; or (2) Any condition of the body cаused or occasioned by stress or strain.” After the City passed the ordinance, the Union filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that thе definitions were not consistent with the Act. The City responded that the definitions did not violate or contradict the Act, and the City had the power to definе those terms pursuant to its home rule authority. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court held that the Union had associational standing and granted summary judgment in favor of the Union. The circuit court held that the terms “catastrophic injury” and “injury” as used in Act were “not ambiguous when considering the full text of [section 10] along with the [j]udicial opinions construing and defining those terms.” Thus, the circuit court ruled that the City’s definitions of “catastrophic injury” and “injury” were invаlid, null and void, and struck the definition of “gainful work” as superfluous. The City appealed. *3 ¶ 6 ANALYSIS The City argues that establishing the definitions constituted a permissible exercise of the

City’s home rule authority and that the definitions did not contradict the statutory text of the Act. The Union contends that the term “catastrophic injury” аs ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍used in section 10 of the Act was judicially defined in 2003 as synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability pension. See Krohe v. City of Bloomington , 204 Ill. 2d 392 (2003). The Union argues that the City’s attempt to redefine “сatastrophic injury” and “injury” and to add a “gainful work” requirement was inconsistent with the Act. The Union contends that the City’s home rule authority did not give it the power tо redefine those terms. We review de novo orders granting summary judgment. Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n , 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 28. Section 10 of the Act, titled “Required health coverage benefits,” states:

“(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date of this Act suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injurеd employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee ***. *** * * *

(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible fоr insurance coverage under this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response to fresh pursuit, the officer оr firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigatiоn of a criminal act.” 820 ILCS 320/10(a)-(b) (West 2018). In Krohe , the Illinois Supreme Court found that the ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍phrase “catastrophic injury” as used in

section 10(a) of the Act was ambiguous. Krohe , 204 Ill. 2d at 397. In Krohe , a firefighter who had been awarded a line-of-duty disability pension brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the city pay his and his family’s health insurance premiums pursuant to sectiоn 10(a) of the Act. at 394. The city declined to pay, arguing that the firefighter did not have a “catastrophic injury” as required by section 10(a) of the Act. at 396. Thе court found that, while the statute was facially ambiguous, the legislative history was unambiguous, and the court ruled that the legislative intent was for the phrase “catastrophic injury” in section 10(a) of the Act to be synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2018)). Krohe , 204 Ill. 2d at 400. The City seeks to distinguish on the basis that the City is a home rule municipality,

and it passed its ordinance under its home rule authority. The City contends that its definition should trump the judicial interpretation in . The City had the authority as a home rule unit to adopt procedures for determining claims

under the Act. Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates , 2014 IL App (1st) 123402. However, as specifically providеd in section 20 of the Act, “[a]n employer, including a home rule unit, that employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctiоnal probation officer, or firefighter may not provide benefits to persons covered under this Act in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this Aсt.” 820 ILCS 320/20 (West 2018). The court in *4 distinguished the procedural requirements that the home rule unit could exercise ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍concurrent control over the substantive requiremеnts of the Act. , 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶ 37; see also Englum v. City of Charleston , 2017 IL App (4th) 160747, ¶ 55; Esser v. City of Peoria , 2019 IL App (3d) 180702, ¶ 13 (city’s designation as high deductible plan as its “basic” plan under the Act was not inconsistent with procedures of the Act). The City, pursuant to its home rule authority and in accordance with section 20 of the Act, could define an administrative procedure for determining benefits under the Act, but it cоuld not redefine the Act’s substantive terms to the extent that the City would provide benefits inconsistent with the Act. After the Illinois Supreme Court has construed a state statute, “ ‘that construction becomes,

in effect, a part of the statute and any change in interpretation can be effected by the Gеneral Assembly if it desires so to do.’ ” Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan , 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 19 (quoting Mitchell v. Mahin , 51 Ill. 2d 452, 456 (1972)). Pursuant to , “a pension board’s award of a line-of-duty disability pension establishes [as a matter of law] that the public safety employee suffered a catastrophic injury as required by section 10(a) of [the Act].” ¶ 25. The Act was never amended in response to . Thus, if a firefighter is injured and awarded line-of-duty disability, he has a catastrophic injury pursuant to section 10(a) of the Act. We conclude that the City’s definitions of “cаtastrophic injury,” “injury,” and “gainful work” were inconsistent with the substantive requirements of the Act, and the ordinance was not a valid exercise of home rule authority. CONCLUSION The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed. Affirmed.

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