International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, its Territories and Canada, Local Union No. 151, Petitioner v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent; National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, its Territories and Canada, Local Union No. 151, Respondent, Katie M. Martens
No. 16-3686; No. 16-3940
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
Submitted: October 18, 2017; Filed: March 26, 2018
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges. SMITH, Chief Judge.
I. Background
IATSE furnishes labor for entertainment-venue employers, supplying stagehands, riggers, and lighting technicians to employers whо require such services for entertainment events. Two such employers are The Freeman Companies, d/b/a Freeman Decorating Services, Inc. (“Freeman“) and SMG, specifically SMG‘s place of business called the Pershing Center in Lincoln, Nebraska (“SMG Pershing“). The Board issued a complaint alleging IATSE had operated an exclusive hiring hall with respect to Freeman and SMG Pershing and had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the NLRA. The Board alleged that IATSE: (1) discriminated against nonunion employees by granting priority to its own members for job referrals; (2) refused to refer two emplоyees to a particular job in February 2013; (3) suspended seven members from its referral list; (4) had maintained a rule in its constitution and bylaws prohibiting legal proceedings against it by its members without providing for the four-month limitation required by section 101(a)(4) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act; (5) followed a job-referral rule that allowed IATSE to refuse to refer an employee in order to collect a fine; (6) failed to remit certain bonuses to employees who are not IATSE members; and (7) failed to remit such bonuses to certain individuals for improper reаsons. IATSE denied all allegations.
IATSE petitions for our review of the Board‘s decision, and the Board cross-applies for enforcement. First, IATSE argues the Board lacked jurisdiction over employer SMG Pershing. Second, it contends that it did not operate exclusive hiring halls with respect to either SMG Pershing or Freeman. Third, IATSE argues that it did not violate the NLRA by removing individuals from its referral list, failing to refer the two employees to a February 2013 job, or prioritizing members over nonmembers. Finally, IATSE contends that the Board‘s charge of discriminatory referrals was time-barred.1
II. Discussion
A. Standard of review
We review the Board decision for substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Midwest Precision Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 408 F.3d 450, 457-58 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Credibility determinations are also considered under the substantial evidence test. Id. at 457. We will not displace the Board‘s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even if we would have madе a different choice had the matter been before us de novo. Id. at 458 (citation omitted). Instead, we afford great deference to the Board‘s credibility determinations, “and will not overturn them unless they shock the conscience.” N.L.R.B. v. RELCO Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d 764, 787 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Finally, we defer to the Board‘s conclusions of law in construing the NLRA, so long as “they are based upon a reasonably defensible construction of the Act.” JCR Hotel, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 342 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
B. Jurisdiction over SMG Pershing
We first consider whether the Board has jurisdiction over employer SMG Pershing. By statute, “[t]he Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”
In assessing whether the $50,000 threshold has been met by a multi-state employer, the Board considers all the emplоyer‘s locations, not just the particular
IATSE says it is improper for the Board to consider SMG as a whole in the jurisdictional analysis because the alleged violations are only relevant to SMG‘s Pershing location. The general manager for SMG‘s two Lincoln, Nebraska locations testified as to SMG‘s business operations. He stated that SMG “manages over 200 different facilities across the country and across the world.” J.A. vol. I, 50. And he was asked, “[i]n your position as general manager for SMG, are you familiar with whether or not the company has purchased greater than $50,000 worth оf services from entities outside the State of Nebraska within the last 12 months?” Id. The manager answered in the affirmative. Id.
On this record, we hold that the Board has jurisdiction over SMG Pershing. We acknowledge the seeming discrepancy in the Board‘s consideration of all of SMG‘s locations for jurisdictional purposes, but only SMG Pershing for the purposes of the charge. But IATSE has provided no legal authority that the Board‘s use of SMG‘s activities outside of Pershing was error. And the Board followed its own discretionary jurisdictional guidelines. The ALJ, in her decision, referenced the local SMG general manager‘s testimony that SMG has purchased services in excess of $50,000 from outside of Nebraska within thе previous year. The Board adopted the ALJ‘s use of this testimony. The Board‘s opinion stated, “[i]t is irrelevant whether [the $50,000] amount applies to SMG globally or only SMG/Pershing,” and it cited the established law dictating that the Board consider the impact on commerce of all the employer‘s plants or locations. Int‘l All. of Theatrical Stage Emps., Moving Picture Techns., Artists & Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories & Canada Local No. 151 (Smg & the Freeman Cos. d/b/a Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc.) & Katie M. Martens (IATSE Local No. 151), 2016 WL 4548855, at *9, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (Aug. 26, 2016) (citing Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. at 84). We hold that the Board‘s conclusion that it had jurisdiction over SMG Pershing is supported by substantial evidence.2
C. Exclusivity of Hiring Halls
We first address whether IATSE operated an exclusive hiring hall with respect to Freeman and SMG Pershing. As thе Board has previously explained:
A union‘s duty of fair representation derives from its status as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees in a specified unit. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enf. denied 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Where a union has a nonexclusive referral arrangement with an employer, the union has no exclusive status relating to potential employees. Individuals can obtain employment either through the union‘s hiring hall or through direct application to the employer. Without the exclusive bargaining representative status, the statutory justification for the imposition of a duty of fair representation does not exist. Accordingly, no duty of fair representation attaches to a union‘s operation of a nonexclusive hiring hall. See Laborers Local 889 (Anthony Ferrante & Sons), 251 NLRB 1579 (1980).
The word “exclusive” when used with respect to job referral systems is a term of art denoting the degree to which hiring is reserved to the union hiring hall. Hiring is deemed to be “exclusive,” for example, if the union retains sole authority to supply workers to the employer up to a designated percentage of the work force or for some specified period of time, such as 24 or 48 hours, before the employer can hire on his own.
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int‘l Ass‘n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 71 n.1 (1989) (citation omitted). Thus, all hiring authority need not be reserved to the union for a hiring hall to be considered “exclusive.” An exclusive hiring hall can exist where the employer has the right to hire a certain number or certain percentage of the employees on a job. Carpenters Local 608 (Various Emp‘rs), 279 N.L.R.B. 747, 754 (1986). A hiring hall may be exclusive even if the employer obtains personnel on its own “on a minimum number of occasiоns when the Union [] exhaust[s] its referral list.” Theatrical Wardrobe Union Local 769, IATSE (Broadway in Chi.), 349 N.L.R.B. 71, 73 (2007). Likewise, a hiring hall may be exclusive even where the employer can reject any applicant referred. Ironworkers Local 843, Int‘l Ass‘n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL-CIO, 327 N.L.R.B. 29, 30 (1998).
Even if a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) does not require employers to hire only those employees recommended by the union, the parties’ past practice can nevertheless demonstrate exclusivity. N.L.R.B. v. Moving Picture & Projection Mach. Operators Union, Local No. 143, 649 F.2d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1981). For example, an employer‘s practice of hiring only job-seekers recommended by the union, and not hiring job-seekers not referred by the union, evidences an exclusive hiring hall. N.L.R.B. v. Teamsters “Gen.” Local Union No. 200, 723 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2013). The Board can infer a de facto exclusive hiring hall from an implicit understanding between a union and an employer. Id. (citation omitted). An employer‘s credited testimony “that a de facto exclusive hiring hall arrangement existed” supports the finding of an exclusive hiring hall. Laborers Local 135 (Bechtel Corp.), 271 N.L.R.B. 777, 779 n.8 (1984).
i. Exclusive Hiring Hall With Respect to Freeman
The Board found that IATSE operated an exclusive hiring hall with respect to Freeman. IATSE and Freeman entered into CBAs containing the following language: “The Employer agrees that the work described above shall be performed only by qualified workеrs assigned by the Union through its job referral procedure.” IATSE Local No. 151, 2016 WL 4548855, at *9. Freeman‘s sales manager, Scott Young, testified that his practice tracks this language. He always requests IATSE to provide workers. IATSE, in response, identifies conflicting testimony; however, the Board credited Young‘s testimony on this point. Some evidence showed that Freeman occasionally uses its own foremen to oversee the labor, may reject a referred worker, and can hire other employees if IATSE cannot fill Freeman‘s needs. These exceptions do not make an otherwise exclusive referral arrangement nonexclusive. Carpenters Local 608, 279 N.L.R.B. at 754; Theatrical Wardrobe Union Local 769, 349 N.L.R.B. at 73; Ironworkers Local 843, 327 N.L.R.B. at 30.
Before the Board, IATSE contended that the CBAs were not valid. IATSE noted that its constitution and bylaws require that CBAs be ratified by the members and that there was evidence that they had not been so ratified. But the Board concluded there was “no credible evidence to show that it was a requirement or standard practice for the membership to ratify all contracts (or any contracts) that the executive board entered into on behalf of the Respondent.” IATSE Local No. 151, 2016 WL 4548855, at *9. We agree. The Board credited a former IATSE business agеnt‘s testimony that contracts were never put up for a ratification vote by the membership. It also relied on corroborating testimony that it was not IATSE‘s normal
Even discounting the validity of the written agreements, the parties actually operated in accordance with the agreements’ terms. The Board concluded “the job referral practice was cаrried out by Freeman according to the terms of the agreement and, except in rare circumstances, workers were not hired outside of the referral system.” IATSE Local No. 151, 2016 WL 4548855, at *9. An exclusive hiring hall can be inferred from the implicit understanding between IATSE and Freeman. See Teamsters “Gen.” Local Union No. 200, 723 F.3d at 785. Moreover, Young‘s testimony regarding exclusivity supports the finding of an exclusive hiring hall. Laborers Local 135 (Bechtel Corp.), 271 N.L.R.B. at 779 n.8. Based on the parties’ practice, and Young‘s credited testimony that Freeman abides by the CBA‘s exclusivity provision, an exclusive hiring hall can be inferred. The Board‘s finding that the IATSE operated an exclusive hiring hall with respect to Freеman is therefore supported by substantial evidence.3
ii. Hiring Hall with Respect to SMG Pershing
The Board found that IATSE operated an exclusive hiring hall with respect to SMG Pershing. There was no CBA between IATSE and SMG Pershing. To reach its decision, the Board instead relied on testimony showing the “practice of SMG/Pershing utilizing labor referred through [IATSE] before obtaining labor elsewhere.” IATSE Local No. 151, 2016 WL 4548855, at *9.
The law is clear that the parties’ practice alone can provide the required evidence to demonstrate exclusivity. Moving Picture & Projection Mach. Operators Union, Local No. 143, 649 F.2d at 612. IATSE presented testimony that SMG Pershing did not exclusively use workers referred by IATSE, but the ALJ largely discredited this testimony. IATSE mеmber Brian Wait testified that he had previously worked jobs for SMG Pershing without being referred by IATSE. But the ALJ explained that it did
not find [Wait‘s] testimony on these points persuasive because it lack[ed] specificity about when he worked the events, if SMG was the management company, how many laborers he worked with on those jobs, the percentages that were union workers, the members that were hired directly by SMG, the Respondent, or another source. Equally important, Wait failed to establish that he had direct knowledge regarding how each person was hired to work the aforementioned events.
IATSE Local No. 151, 2016 WL 4548855, at *9. In addition to Wait, IATSE member Sheila Brunkhorst admitted she worked for SMG Pershing after she was suspended from IATSE‘s referral list, but as the Board argues and the ALJ observed, this particular job initially was scheduled at an outdoor venue, then it was moved to the Pershing Center as a last minute emergency substitution. This isolated instance does not negate the exclusivity typically evident in their dealings.
The record evidence supports the Board‘s conclusion that SMG Pershing hires its labor through IATSE. Lorenz, the SMG Pershing general manager, testified that SMG Pershing obtains all its labor through IATSE and has never hired elsewhеre. This testimony alone could establish exclusivity. Laborers Local 135 (Bechtel Corp.), 271 N.L.R.B. at 779 n.8. Lorenz‘s testimony was corroborated by SMG‘s Lincoln, Nebraska production manager. On appeal, IATSE points to testimony by IATSE business agent Perry Gillaspie, who testified that SMG Pershing does not have to call IATSE first before hiring elsewhere and could hire whomever it wanted. But, again, the ALJ did not credit Gillaspie‘s testimony on this point, but Lorenz‘s. She was
The Board noted that there was a “Letter of Understanding” in effect bеtween IATSE and SMG Pershing. This Letter of Understanding expired in 2012, but Lorenz testified that even after it expired, IATSE and SMG Pershing continued to operate under the same terms. This letter stated in part, “NON-EXCLUSIVE SERVICE PROVIDER: On those occasions when Local 151 cannot meet the staffing demands of an event, Pershing / SMG will supplement Local‘s call with its own personnel or with another service provider.” J.A. vol. III, 236.4 This letter—even though purporting to describe a “non-exclusive” provider—supports the finding of exclusivity. It shows that the parties agreed SMG Pershing would use IATSE to staff events, but it could supplement with other personnel if IATSE could not sufficiently supply employees. Even if SMG Pershing supplemented with other workers when IATSE could not meet the staffing demands of an event, such atypical supplementation does not preclude an exclusivity finding. Theatrical Wardrobe Union Local 769, IATSE (Broadway in Chi.), 349 N.L.R.B. at 73.
The Board‘s finding of exclusivity rested largely on credibility determinations, which do not shock the conscience and will not be disturbed on appeal. See RELCO Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d at 787. Its finding of an exclusive hiring hall between IATSE and SMG Pershing is supported by substantial evidence.
D. Alleged NLRA Violations
Under the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to “restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”
These provisions impose upon labor organizations “a statutory duty of fair representation.” Breininger, 493 U.S. at 73. Exclusive hiring halls must operate consistent with that duty. Id. at 78. Exclusive hiring halls “are not illegal per se under federal labor law, but rather are illegal only if they in fact result in discrimination prohibited by the NLRA.” Id. According to the Supreme Court:
The Board has held that “any departure from established exclusive hiring hall procedures which results in a denial of employment to an applicant falls within that class of discrimination which inherently encouragеs union membership, breaches the duty of fair representation owed to all hiring hall users, and violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), unless the union demonstrates that its interference with employment was pursuant to a valid union-security clause or was necessary to the effective performance of its representative function.”
Id. at 75 n.3 (citations omitted). “[A] union cannot operate a hiring hall to discriminate based on an employee‘s lack of union membership.” Stagehands Referral Serv., LLC, 347 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1170 (2006) (citations omitted); see also
We now turn to IATSE‘s challenge to the three alleged NLRA violations.
i. Suspensions from the Referral List
IATSE suspended seven members from receiving referrals for a year beginning in February 2013. Their removal from the list prevented them from being hired. IATSE thus bore the burden to show that the suspensions were necessary to enablе effective performance in representing its constituency. Stagehands Referral Serv., 347 N.L.R.B. at 1170. The Board found that the reasons IATSE gave for these suspensions were not credible or were contradicted by record evidence. Thus, as the Board concluded, IATSE failed to show the suspensions were necessary for effective constituent representation.
IATSE argues, and presented testimony at trial, that there were many reasons the seven members were suspended. It emphasizes the decision was applied uniformly to “all members engaging in the conduct that would damage IATSE‘s rеlations with the employers.” Pet‘r‘s Br. 36. IATSE says that, broadly speaking, the seven individuals were suspended “for (1) violating work rules, (2) misconduct, and (3) egregious conduct that affected the entire bargaining unit.”
Moreover, as the Board pointed out, most of the reasons given in the letters were also protected activity under the NLRA. See Automatic Screw Prods. Co., 306 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1072 (1992), enfd. mem. 977 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that employees’ discussions about wages are inherently concerted). In short, because IATSE removed the seven members from the referral list, thus interfering with their employment status, the burden wаs on IATSE to show that suspending these members was necessary for effective performance of representing its constituency. See Stagehands Referral Serv., 347 N.L.R.B. at 1170. Substantial evidence supports the Board‘s finding that IATSE failed to make this showing. Such evidence also supports the Board‘s finding that IATSE violated section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the NLRA by suspending these individuals from the referral list.
ii. Refusal to Refer Two Members to the Cornhusker Hotel Job
It is undisputed that IATSE refused to refer Sheila Brunkhorst and Tony Polanka (“Polanka Jr.“) to a February 2013 job with Freeman at Cornhusker Hotel. This, of course, prevented Brunkhorst and Polanka Jr. from getting hirеd. The burden then shifted to IATSE to show that doing so was necessary for effective performance of representing its constituency. See Stagehands Referral Serv., 347 N.L.R.B. at 1170.
IATSE business agent Gillaspie admitted that Brunkhorst and Polanka Jr. were qualified to work the job, but they were not referred because they had visited Complete Payroll—the company responsible for IATSE‘s payroll—to discuss payroll issues. The ALJ resolved disputed testimony on IATSE‘s justification for not referring Brunkhorst and Polanka. She explicitly rejected Gillaspie‘s testimony on
IATSE failed to meet its burden that refusing to refer Brunkhorst and Polanka Jr. was necessary to the effective performance of its representative function. See Stagehands Referral Serv., 347 N.L.R.B. at 1170. Substantial evidence supports the Board‘s decision that thе refusal to refer Brunkhorst and Polanka Jr. to the February 2013 Freeman job at the Cornhusker Hotel violated section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the NLRA.
iii. Prioritizing Members over Non-Members for Job Referrals
The Board found that IATSE discriminated against nonmembers in maintaining its referral list. Normally, IATSE job referrals are based on qualifications, years of experience, and availability. When Gillaspie became business agent for IATSE, he was not provided a referral list. He was, however, given a list of then-current members who used IATSE‘s referral hall. Interestingly, when Gillaspie created the new referral list, the first 30 names оn the new list were IATSE members. Gillaspie testified that when making referrals, he begins at the top and goes down the list in order. After compiling the initial list, Gillaspie did subsequently add members and nonmembers in the order in which they were chronologically added, but the record is clear that in practice members were prioritized for job referrals. IATSE argues Gillaspie “did the best that he could and acted in the most fair way that he was able with the information he was given,” but it cites no law to support that this explanation qualifies as a defense. Pet‘r‘s Br. 53.
E. Timeliness of NLRB Charge
IATSE‘s final argument on appeal is that the charge with respect to the referral lists was untimely.
The ALJ, whose opinion the Board adopted on this issue, detailed her reasons for rejecting this argument. Specifically, the ALJ found that IATSE did not stop exercising control over the referral process in early 2013.
- Hire, direct, and supervise the Complete Payroll employees that IATSE Local No. 151 provides to the contractors through IATSE Local No. 151‘s organization . . . ; and
- Collect the funds from the contractors that have contracted with IATSE Local No. 151 and who have used Complete Payroll‘s employees through IATSE Local No. 151‘s organization.
J.A. vol. III, 301. We agree with the Board‘s conclusion that Gillaspie‘s contract simply reinforced his authority to represent IATSE in his dealings with employers.
Finally, the ALJ highlighted Gillaspie‘s “shifting testimony.” IATSE Local No. 151, 2016 WL 4548855, at *9. Gillaspie testified, “At some point last year in early spring, I turned [the referral list] over tо the referral committee and then they turned it back over to me to be used. So at that point, they took possession of the referral list.” J.A. vol. I, 35. The ALJ took this to mean IATSE “maintains control of the referral process but allows Gillaspie, as its agent and Complete‘s labor director, to
IATSE relies solely оn Gillaspie‘s testimony that IATSE no longer maintains a referral list to establish that IATSE ended its referral involvement in February or March 2013. If not credible, this testimony does not invalidate the ALJ‘s ruling. The ALJ‘s findings of fact, credibility determinations, and ultimate conclusion, which were all adopted by the Board on this point, are supported by substantial evidence. The Board‘s conclusion that IATSE‘s 10(b) defense is without merit is affirmed.
III. Conclusion
We therefore enforce the Board‘s order and deny IATSE‘s petition for review.
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