100 Tex. 208 | Tex. | 1906
John V. Trump sued the International & Great Northern Railroad Company in the District Court of Williamson County to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him while in the employ of the said railroad company at Taylor,
The defendant answered by general demurrer, exceptions, general denial, plea of contributory negligence and assumed risk. Trump recovered judgment for the sum of $9,000.
The Court of Civil Appeals found the facts before stated and also that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and the risk was not assumed. In the preceding part of its charge, the court defined negligence, contributory negligence, assumed risk and ordinary care, of which no complaint is made. In the third paragraph of the charge the judge instructed the jury as to the duty of the railroad company to use ordinary and reasonable care to prevent injury to Trump and stated the liability of the railroad company to him in case it negligently failed to perform that duty; and, in connection thereAvith, informed the jury that if the injury arose from a risk assumed by the plaintiff, or if he was guilty of contributory negligence, the railroad company would not be liable, and continuing that charge, said: “In this connection you are further instructed that the defendant Avas bound to use reasonable care and prudence for the safety of the plaintiff while in its service, by providing him with machinery and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for the use for which they were intended to be employed; and that defendant will be liable to plaintiff, if plaintiff’s injuries were directly and proximately caused by a failure of defendant in either of the particulars hereinafter submitted for your consideration, to comply with said duty, or if they were caused directly and proximately by a failure of defendant in either of said particulars to use reasonable care and prudence to subsequently maintain said machinery and appliances in a condition reasonably safe and suitable for doing the work which they were intended to do.’’
In paragraph 4 of the court’s charge the issue as to negligence of defendant in failing to maintain the engine in a reasonably safe condition Avas submitted to the jury in terms that guarded the rights of the defendant.
In paragraph 5 of the charge, the court, in the folloAving language, submitted the question to the jury as to the condition of the turbine engine when it was furnished: “If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the turbine above mentioned was connected with a certain steam boiler in the roundhouse of defendant at Taylor, Texas, by a pipe for the purpose of conducting steam into said turbine in or
At the request of the railroad company the court gave the following charge: “You are instructed that the defendant rested under no duty to exercise any care whatever to make its turbine engine reasonably safe when used in an improper and negligent manner, and if you believe from the evidence that said turbine engine was in a reasonably safe condition, or that defendant exercised ordinary care to keep it in such condition provided that the same was started properly, in accordance with instructions and with due care, but that said machine was not in condition to withstand sudden, improper and negligent starting, and that plaintiff started said machine suddenly, improperly and negligently, and thereby contributed to causing the bursting of said machine, you will return a verdict for defendant.”
"Upon appeal the railroad company presented by its seventh assignment of error an objection to this portion of the third paragraph of the charge: “In this connection you are further instructed that the defendant was bound to use reasonable care and prudence for the safety of the plaintiff while in its service, by providing him with machinery and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for the use for which they were intended to be employed.”
A majority of the Court of Civil Appeals found that the-assignment was well taken and that the charge was error, for which the judgment
“Question. Did the trial court err in giving to-the jury that part of the third paragraph of its charge complained of in appellant’s seventh assignment of error ?”
We answer that there was no reversible error in the charge mentioned in the preceding question. Plaintiff sought to recover upon the following grounds: (1) The railroad company was negligent in not furnishing a drainage cock to the pipe which led from the boiler to the turbine engine; and (2) that the company was negligent in not keeping the turbine engine in repair, whereby some of the parts inside of it became defective and caused the injury. The part of the charge of which complaint is made submitted to the jury the general rule with regard to the duty of the railroad company in furnishing machinery in this language: “In this connection you are further instructed that the defendant was bound to use reasonable care and prudence for the safety of the plaintiff while in its service, by providing him with machinery and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for the use for which they were intended to be employed.” Granting that this language is ambiguous, and, if it stood alone, might have led the jury to believe that the railroad company was bound absolutely to furnish appliances reasonably safe, it was however explained by the explicit directions contained in the fifth charge which submitted this ground of recovery in the following terms: “And if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence in so failing to provide said steam pipe with a drainage cock, you will return a verdict for plaintiff.” It will be seen that the issue with regard to the drain cock was expressly submitted to the jury as a ground of liability upon condition only that the evidence should show that the railroad company was negligent in failing to provide a drain cock for the pipe. Under this charge the jury -could not possibly have understood that they could find for the plaintiff for injuries inflicted upon him by reason of the absence of the drain cock unless the proof showed the negligence of the defendant in the selection and construction of the machinery.
We concur with Chief Justice Fisher that there was no reversible error in the charge; in support of which conclusion the learned chief justice presented an able and exhaustive argument, making it unnecessary for us to go more extensively into a discussion of the matter.