IN RE: SEASPAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND HANK’S DOCKS, INC., d/b/a/ MALLARD COVE MARINA, DEBTOR; INTERIM CAPITAL, LLC, APPELLANT v. HANK’S DOCK, INC., AND SEASPAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, APPELLEE
NO. 2:05-CV-315
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE
(Bankruptcy Court Cases No. 04-21339 and 04-21340) Judge Greer
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In April 2004, Hank’s Dock, Inc., [Hank’s Dock] and Seaspan Development Corporation [Seaspan] filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. [Record on Appeal No. 1; No. 2] [hereinafter “RA ___”]. In November 2004, the debtors filed their first amended joint plan of reorganization. [RA 9] [hereinafter “Plan”]. In December 2004, Interim Capital, LLC, [Interim], one of the debtors’ three secured creditors, filed its objections to the Plan, claiming the Plan violated various subparts of
On appeal, findings of fact by the bankruptcy court will not be set aside by this court unless clearly erroneous.
Interim first complains that the bankruptcy court set the Plan interest rate on its claim at 4% per year to be paid over 24 years. As stated in the confirmed Plan:
The Interim Capital Restructured Debt will: (a) bear interest at a rate of four percent (4%) per annum, and (b) be payable in (i) payments of $2,700 each commencing on the 15th day of the month following the Effective Date2 and on the 15th day of each month thereafter through
August 15, 2007, and (ii) 287 equal installments of principal and interest in the amount computed on the then outstanding principal balance commencing on September 15, 2007 through July 15, 2030, and (iii) a 288th installment of all remaining principal and interest due on August 15, 2031. [RA 24, p. 42].
According to the bankruptcy court, the “most appropriate [interest] rate” to be applied by bankruptcy courts “is the current market rate for similar loans at the time the new loan is made,” language similar to the holding of Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 1982). [RA 22, pp. 243-44]. The court then noted that it had no evidence before it of “what the current rate of interest is for similar . . . disaster relief loans.” [Id., p. 244]. Instead, only evidence before the court was of the current contract loan interest rate of 4%. [Id.]. The court also ruled, in the alternative, that In re Colgrove (Cardinal Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985), dictated a result that “the market rate for an oversecured loan is limited to a cap of the contract rate, which in this case is four percent. To hold otherwise would give the secured creditor a windfall, to the detriment of the debtor.” [Id.].
Pursuant to
[t]o the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which . . . is greater than the amount of such claim, there
shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.
Neither the statute itself nor the United States Supreme Court has directly addressed how the rate of interest should be determined in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. In re American Homepatient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005), and Till v. SCS Credit Corporation, 541 U.S. 465 (2004), are instructive, however, American Homepatient dictates that a bankruptcy court deciding upon a interest rate in a Chapter 11 case should apply “the market rate” of interest “where there exists an efficient market.” 420 F.3d at 568. And, when “no efficient market exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till plurality.” Id. In Till, the United States Supreme Court held that the formula approach–which requires the adjustment of the prime national interest rate for the risk of nonpayment–was the appropriate method for determining the adequate interest rate on a Chapter 13 cram down loan. 541 U.S. at 479-80.
Although American Homepatient was decided almost three months after the bankruptcy court’s decision in this case, the bankruptcy court’s rationale closely mirrors the framework set out by the Sixth Circuit. The bankruptcy court first stated that the interest rate should be “the current market rate for similar loans at
Interim’s second contention is that the bankruptcy judge erred in finding that the debtors’ Plan did not unfairly discriminate against Interim. Interim argues that it was unfairly discriminated against because the Plan provides higher rates of interest and more favorable repayment terms to the debtors’ two other secured creditors, Frank and Beth Petersilie [hereinafter “the Petersilies”] and Citizens Bank [hereinafter “Citizens”]. [RA 24, pp. 41-45].
Pursuant to
“[r]egardless of the particular test to which one ascribes, one thing is clear: at a minimum, there must be a rational or legitimate basis for the discrimination and the discrimination must be necessary for the reorganization . . . . Without either, it is impossible for the disparate treatment to be considered fair.” In re Crosscreek Apartments, LTD., 213 B.R. 521, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997).
This court finds the bankruptcy court was correct in ruling that the debtors’ Plan did not unfairly discriminate against Interim. To begin, as noted by the bankruptcy court, there was “a reasonable basis for the discrimination” for the different interest rates. [RA 22, p. 242]. First, the court noted that the contract rate between Interim and the debtors was for 4%. [Id.]. Second, the court stated that the original rate of the Petersilies was 8% and reduced to 5% with the Plan. [Id.]. Finally, the court noted that Citizens originally had an 11% interest rate, and the rate is decreased to 5% with the Plan. [Id.]. The most rational reason for the 4% rate of interest assigned to Interim on the SBA note by the Plan was that 4% was the actual interest rate on the contract between Interim and the debtors. [RA 7, p.
Second, this discrimination was necessary for the successful reorganization of the debtors. According to the bankruptcy court, “the projections indicate that the debtors [sic] numbers are very close. The debtor is going to need almost every penny that it generates to pay the principal on these debts. It would severely hamper the reorganization efforts of this debtor if it had to pay a greater interest rate than the four percent.” [RA 22, pp. 242-43]. As noted above, this court cannot set aside the findings of fact made by the bankruptcy court unless they are clearly erroneous.
After careful consideration of the entire record of proceedings related to this case and for the reasons stated above, Interim’s appeal is denied, and this action will be dismissed.
An appropriate order will follow.
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
