[¶ 1] The State of North Dakota appeals a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee’s findings of fact and order dismissing the State’s petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
I
[¶ 2] On August 3, 2011, the State filed a petition alleging M.H.P. wаs a delinquent child who committed gross sexual imposition in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-03(l)(d), a class A felony if committed by an adult. The State alleged M.H.P., a fifteen-year-old male, engaged in sexual contact with E.B., born in 2002, by intentionally touching E.B.’s vaginal area through her clothing. The judicial referee found M.H.P. engaged in sexual contact with E.B., a child under the age of fifteen, and scheduled a dispositional hearing to determine whether M.H.P. needed treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child. A juvenile court order was entered on April 18, 2012, adopting the judicial referee’s findings and order.
[¶ 3] The judicial referee conducted the dispositional hearing on May 31, 2012 and found M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child. The judicial referee еxplained he previously found beyond a reasonable doubt that M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition and stated, “Although this fact alone would be sufficient to sustain a finding of a need for treatment and rehabilitation, there was а substantial amount of evidence to the contrary.” Based on these findings, the judicial referee dismissed the petition. The juvenile court adopted the judicial referee’s findings and order, dismissed the proceeding and concluded the issue of M.H.P. registering as a sexual offender did not need to be addressed.
II
[¶ 4] The State appealed to this Court under N.D.C.C. § 27-20-56(1), providing:
“An aggrieved party, including the state or a subdivision of the state, may appeal from a final order, judgment, or decree of the juvеnile court to the supreme court by filing written notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order, judgment, or decree, or within any further time the supreme court grants, after entry of the order, judgment, or decree. The appeal must be hеard by the supreme court upon the files, records, and minutes or transcript of the evidence of the juvenile court, giving appreciable weight to the findings of the juvenile court.”
[¶ 5] M.H.P. argues the State’s appeal is barred by the Double Jeoрardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and should be dismissed. “Double jeopardy principles apply to juvenile court proceedings involving adjudication of delinquent acts.”
Interest of B.F.,
[¶ 6] The State raises two separate arguments on appeal. Double jeopardy principles affect each issue differently, and we аnalyze them separately. First, the State argues the juvenile court erred by finding M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. Second, the State argues the juvenile court erred in dismissing the State’s petition and in not requiring M.H.P. to register as a sexual offender.
A
[¶ 7] The State argues this Court can review the juvenile court’s determination that M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation because the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexuаl imposition. The State argues this case is distinguishable from Interest of B.F. because the juvenile court here already found sufficient evidence existed to prove the delinquent act and, therefore, M.H.P. need not be retried.
[¶ 8] This case’s procedural posture differs from
Interest of B.F.
Whether we may review a juvenile dispositional finding appears to be a matter of first impression in North Dakota, and we find no guidance nationally. In
Interest of B.F.,
the issue was “whether double jeopardy principles bar the State from appealing after the juvenile court judge upоn request for review sets aside a judicial referee’s determination that a juvenile committed a delinquent act.”
[¶ 9] To determine whether double jeopardy is implicated, we first examine the underlying delinquency procedure. The State filed a juvenile petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child. The State alleged M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition by engaging in sexual contact with a victim less than fifteen years old. A delinquent child is defined as “a child who has committed a
[¶ 10] A delinquent act is defined as a crime. N.D.C.C. § 27-20-02(6). Thе judicial referee found M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition and reserved the issue of whether M.H.P. was in need of treatment or rehabilitation for the dispositional hearing. The statute controlling this procedure provides:
“If thе court finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason of which the child is alleged to be delinquent or unruly, it shall proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing to hear evidence аs to whether the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation and to make and file its findings thereon.”
N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29(2).
[¶ 11] Under the statute, a child is not delinquent for committing a delinquent act.
In re R.Y.,
[¶ 12] At the dispositional hearing, M.H.P. introduced evidence from Dr. Shannon Weisz, M.H.P.’s parents, M.H.P.’s basketball coach and M.H.P.’s cousin’s wife to establish M.H.P. did not require treatment or rehabilitation. The judicial referee noted that while the finding of the delinquent act alone wоuld be sufficient to sustain a finding M.H.P. was in need of treatment or rehabilitation, “there was a substantial amount of evidence to the contrary.” After noting the testimony from Dr. Weisz, who concluded M.H.P. did not need treatment and rehabilitation, and discussing M.H.P.’s strong relationshiр with his parents and siblings and M.H.P.’s strong academic performance, the judicial referee found M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child and dismissed the State’s petition.
[¶ 13] The State is appealing a factual finding and asking us tо conclude M.H.P. is a delinquent child. However, M.H.P. cannot again be placed in risk of the loss of liberty. “Jeopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution.”
Breed v. Jones,
B
[¶ 15] The State next asks us to review whether the judicial referee erred by dismissing the State’s petition instead of the proceeding and by not requiring M.H.P. to register as a sexuаl offender. The crux of both arguments is whether the determination that M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition required M.H.P. to register as a sexual offender.
[¶ 16] Registration as a sexual offender is a collateral consequencе of a conviction.
In re L.T.,
Ill
[¶ 17] The State argues the judicial referee erred by dismissing the State’s “petition” instead of the “proceeding.” The State’s argument rests on the language difference between subsections (1) and (2) of N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29. Subsection (1) states, “If the court finds that the child is not a deprived child or that the allegations of delinquency or unruly conduct have not been established, it shall dismiss the petition and order the child discharged from any detention or other restriction previously ordered in the proceeding.” N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (2) states, “If the court finds that the child is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceeding and discharge the child from any detention or other restriction previously ordered.” N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29(2) (emphasis added). The State argues that if the judicial referee dismissed the proceeding, which the State characterizes as only the dispositional hearing, the judicial referee still could have determined M.H.P. was required to register as a sexual offender.
[¶ 18] We disagree with the State’s distinction between petition and рroceeding. “In interpreting a statute, we look at the plain language of the statute and give each word its plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intention plainly appears.”
In re T.H.,
[If 19] Section 27-20-03(1), N.D.C.C, refers to “proceedings” in a broad sense:
“1. The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction of the following proceedings, which are governed by this chapter:
a. Proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent, unruly, or deprived;
b. Proceedings for the termination of parental rights except when a part of an adoption proceeding; and
c. Proceedings arising under sections 27-20-39 through 27-20^2.”
The term proceеdings is broader than the term petition. A proceeding refers not
[¶ 20] The judicial referee concluded M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. Based on that finding, the judicial referee properly dismissed the proceeding, which included the State’s petition. The issue of sexual registration was not and cannot be reached by the juvenile court because the proceeding was dismissed as required by N.D.C.C. § 27-20-29(2).
IV
[¶ 21] The State’s appeal of the juvenile court’s findings is dismissed because it violates the double jeopardy clause, and we affirm the juvenile referee’s order dismissing the State’s petition.