delivered the opinion of the court.
Thе argument of the insurance company is that the killing of the deceased was an injury to or violation of a legal tight or interest of thе. company; that, as a consequence thereof, it sustained a loss, which is the proximate effect of the injury.
The answer of thе defendant is founded upon the theory that the loss is, the remote and indirect result merely of the act' charged, that at the_ commоn law no civil action lies for an injury which results in the death of the party injured, and that the statutes of Louisiana upon that subject do not include the present case.
The authorities aré so numerous and so uniform to the proposition, that by the common law no civil aсtion lies for an injury which results in death, that it is impossible to speak of it as a proposition open to question. It has been decided in many cases in the English courts and in many of the State
*757
courts, and no. deliberate, well-considered decision to tbe contrary. is to bе found. In "Hilliard on Torts, p. 87,- sect. 10, the rule is thus laid down: “ Upon a similar ground it has been held that at common law the death of a human being, though clearly involving pecuniary loss, is not the ground of an action for damages.” The most of the cases upon the subject are there rеferred to.
Baker
v.
Bolton et al.,
1 Camp.
493; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v.
New York & New Haven Railroad Co.,
In
Hubgh
v.
New Orleans
&
Carrollton Railroad Co.,
*758 In Hermann v. Carrollton Railroad Co., 11 id. 5, this principle was again affirmed in an opinion by Chief Justice Mеrrick.
It is only necessary to refer to one other case, involving the same principle as those already cited, but in its facts more closely resémbling the case under consideration.
In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co., supra, the declaration alleged that on the twentieth day of Marсh, 1850, the plaintiffs, had outstanding and in force a policy of insurance for $2,000 upon the life of Samuel Beach; that Beach was on that day a passenger on the defendants’ road';., that the defendants so carelessly, negligently, and unskilfully conducted themselves that the train- on -which Beach was riding was thrown down a bank into the river; that Beach was greatly wounded'.and bruised, by means whereof he then and there'died, by reason of which the plaintiffs were compelled to pay to his administrators the sum of |2,000 upon the said policy.
The allegatiоn of the • present • plaintiffs is that Brame tortiously and illegally took the life of McLemore by shooting him. This is open to the inference that the act of Brame was felonious. The case in Connecticut is based upon the allegation of negligence and carеlessness, and is the more favorable to a recovery, in that it avoids the suggestion existing in the present case, that the civil, injury is merged in the felony. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the action could not be sustained.
We have cited-and given referencеs to the important cases on this question; they are substantially uniform against the right of recovery.
Upon principle, we. think, no other сonclusion could be reached than that stated. The relation between the insurance company and McLemore, the dеceased, was created by a contract between them, to which Brame was not a party. The injury inflicted by him was upon McLemore, against his personal rights; that it- happened to injure the plaintiff was an incidental circumstance, a remote and indirect result, not necessarily or legitimately resulting' from the act of killing. As in
Rockingham Insurance Co.
v. Mosher,
By the .common law, actions for injuries to the person abate by death, and cannot be revived or maintained by the executor or thе heir. By the act of Parliament of Aug. 21, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., an action in certain cases is given to the representatives of the deceased. This principle, in various. forms and with various limitations, has been incorporated into the statutes of many of our States, and among othеrs- into that of Louisiana. It is there given in favor of the minor children and widow of the deceased, and, in default of these relatives, in favоr of the surviving father and mother. Acts of La., 185 5, pr. 223, p. 270. The case of á creditor, much less a remote claimant like the plaintiff, is not within the statute.
In each of the briefs it is stated that the defendant was tried for the homicide, and acquitted. In the view we take of the case, the fact of a trial, or its result is a circumstance quite immaterial to the -present question, however important it may have been to the defendant. Judgment- affirmed.