700 A.2d 530 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1997
In 1995, appellant Insulations, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, entered into a contract with appellee Journeymen Welding & Fab, a Michigan Company, for the sale of custom made commercial insulation. When appellee refused delivery of the custom-manufactured insulation and refused to pay appellant the agreed-upon contract price, appellant filed suit in Pennsylvania to recover contractual damages.
Upon being served in the instant suit, ap-pellee filed preliminary objections asserting, inter alia, a lack of in personam jurisdiction. By order dated January 17, 1997, the Honorable Daniel J. Ackerman sustained appellee’s jurisdictional preliminary objection and dismissed appellant’s complaint. This appeal followed.
Appellant’s sole claim is that the trial court erred in concluding that Pennsylvania does not have personal jurisdiction over ap-pellee. A Pennsylvania court can exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident if the following two criteria are satisfied: (1) jurisdiction is conferred by our state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute does not offend the constitutional standards of due process. See, e.g., Engle v. Engle, 412 Pa.Super. 425, 430-31, 603 A.2d 654, 657 (1992). Since Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute
An exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant would violate due process unless “the defendant [has] sufficient contacts with the forum [state] such that granting jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Snavely & Sons v. Springland Associates, 411 Pa.Super. 1, 4, 600 A.2d 972, 974 (1991) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Our inquiry into whether sufficient contacts exist, referred to as a minimum contacts analysis, requires a court to determine whether a defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state is such that he should reasonably anticipate being “haled” into court there. Engle, 412 Pa.Super. at 430-31, 603 A.2d at 657 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). An exercise of personal jurisdiction must rest upon some act whereby a defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. Id.
Applying this analysis in cases involving contractual obligations, this Court has held that the mere existence of a contract between an in-state party and an out-of-state party is not sufficient, by itself, to confer Pennsylvania courts with jurisdiction over the out-of-state party. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Oaks, Ltd. v. Josephson, 390 Pa.Super. 103, 106-08, 568 A.2d 215, 217 (1989). Instead, “negotiations prior to the contract, its contemplated future consequences, the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.’ ” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)).
Order affirmed.
. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(b).