201 Mass. 41 | Mass. | 1909
The plaintiff seeks to recover in an action of contract damages for the refusal of the defendants’ testator to purchase real estate according to the terms of his written agreement. The plaintiff traces its title, by various mesne conveyances, from a deed of James Stevenson to William A. Hayes, duly entered for record at fifty-five minutes past four in the afternoon of December 1, 1897. Simultaneously with this deed was recorded a declaration of trust by Hayes, which recited that the several parcels of real estate included in the transfer to him were incumbered, and that Stevenson was desirous of liquidating the debts to which they were subject, and to the end that this purpose might be more expeditiously accomplished, Hayes was clothed with ample power to make repairs and generally to manage the property and to make conveyances of it. As a part of the same transaction and of the consideration for the deed from Stevenson to Hayes, the latter, simultaneously with the record of the other two instruments, executed and delivered to the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank a mortgage upon a part of the real estate for $160,000, and gave his note as trustee to that bank for the additional sum of $15,000. Hayes conveyed the estate in question to one Storer, all the owners from Storer to and including the plaintiff being bona fide purchasers for value. The defendants’ testator refused to accept conveyance according to his contract with the plaintiff, because of liens alleged to have been created by six general attachments against the property of James Stevenson, followed by sales upon execution thereunder. These attachments were made at twenty-four minutes past four o’clock in the afternoon of December 1, 1897, and copies of the writs, with so much of the return as was required by law, were deposited in the registry of deeds two minutes later than the
The defense most relied upon is that of res judicata, grounded
In reason this rule can be applied only to the issues which might have been raised as matter of right by the parties thereto. It cannot in justice extend to cases where the question whether the disputed issue can be tried at all rests in the discretion of the trial tribunal. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine whether, when, upon a suit in equity, purely equitable relief is denied on the ground that the defendant has come to a position where he cannot comply with an equitable mandate or that the plaintiff’s right, although perhaps sounding in equity and well founded in law, turns out not to be of such character as to be entitled to equitable relief or that in the exercise of sound discretion it ought not to be granted or for any other reason, the
It has been held, under the early as well as later chancery practice in this Commonwealth, that where peculiar equitable relief is refused, jurisdiction may be retained by the equity court lor assessment of damages. Peabody v. Tarbell, 2 Cush. 226. Andrews v. Brown, 3 Cush. 130. Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Gray, 288, 305. Attorney General v. Deerfield River Bridge, 105 Mass. 1. Milkman v. Ordway, 106 Mass. 232, 257. Wonson v. Fenno, 129 Mass. 405. Woodbury v. Marblehead Water Co. 145 Mass. 509. Brande v. Grace, 154 Mass. 210. Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 589. Lexington Print Works v. Canton, 171 Mass. 414. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Holt, 185 Mass. 97. See also New York v. Pine, 185 U. S. 93,104. It was formerly held in England that in such case the Court of Chancery had no power to award damages, but this defect was cured by Lord Cairns’s Act, 21 & 22 Viet. c. 27, § 2. Krehl v. Burrell, 7 Ch. D. 551. Sayers v. Collyer, 28 Ch. D. 103. Even in view of this statute it has been decided to be discretionary with the court whether to retain jurisdiction for this purpose or to dismiss the bill and leave the plaintiff to his remedy at law. Durrell v. Pritchard, L. R. 1 Ch. 244, 252. Cooke v. Forbes, L. R. 5 Eq. 166, 174. Avery v. Griffin, L. R. 6 Eq. 606. It has been stated frequently in respect of petitions for the removal of erections wrongfully placed on the land of a plaintiff that, if the act has been done innocently and the injury occasioned by removal would be greatly disproportionate to any gain to the plaintiff, the removal would not be ordered but the plaintiff be left to his remedy at law. Low v. Innes, 4 DeG., J. & S. 286. Aynsley v. Glover, L. R. 18 Eq. 544. Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N. H. 572. Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings, 159 Mass. 306. The cause is sometimes retained in equity for assessment of damages on the ground that there is no remedy then open at law. Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 502. It has been the general practice of this court to retain jurisdiction of the cause in equity for the purpose of assessing damages, as appears from the cases above
The inference from these cases is plain that a plaintiff praying for specific performance cannot compel the chancery court to retain jurisdiction of his cause solely for the purpose of assessing damages, when for any reason other than the infirmity of his claim both at law and in equity the peculiar equitable relief sought ia denied. The plaintiff’s situation at the time of filing its bill in equity was this: it had a valid contract with the defendants’ testator for the purchase of land ; its title appeared to be unimpeachable ; on its face this entitled it to relief in equity; it brought its bill accordingly; it had no reason to anticipate an adverse decision by the court upon the documents in its hands. There is no occasion for the application of the rule that it should have stated its cause of action in different forms, because the statement of its claim for relief in damages in a form good at law did not carry with it the right to have the legal aspects of its case passed upon by a court of equity.
The defendants rely upon Connihan v. Thompson, 111 Mass. 270, where, with reference to the contention that by commenc
Without pausing to examine the correctness of this position as it is not now before us, it is enough to say that under these circumstances it cannot be assumed as matter of law that the decree of dismissal was entered upon the merits and thus deny the plaintiff a remedy to which in some form it seems to be clearly entitled. Therefore, as the equity suit might have been determined upon one ground which would, or upon another which would not, be a bar to the maintenance of this action, it is open to the plaintiff to show the precise ground upon which it went. Corbett v. Craven, 193 Mass. 30. Waterhouse v. Levine, 182 Mass. 407. McDowell v. Langdon, 3 Gray, 513. Harlow v. Bartlett, 170 Mass. 584, 591. The plaintiff should be permitted to try out its action at law, and to prove from whatever evidence may be available, including reasonable inferences, whether the decree in its equity suit was entered on the merits of the bill, or only because purely equitable relief was refused. The fact that the decree contains no reservation of right to sue at law is inconclusive. Although this is sometimes done, and may be necessary in certain cases, it is not essential in a case like the present. Scott v. Rayment, L. R. 7 Eq. 112. It follows that the plaintiff’s requests for rulings, to the effect that the title was good and that the defendants had not sustained their plea of res judicata, should have been granted.
Exceptions sustained.