This is аn appeal from an order overruling appellants’ plea of privilege and pertains to Vernon’s Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995, subdivision 7.
Appellees
Upon trial to the court, the court entered judgment overruling appellants’ plea of privilege. We will affirm that judgment.
By several points of error appellants claim thаt the court erred in (1) finding that the acts of appellants constituted fraud; (2) in admitting evidence of a suit pending in Brown County between appellants and the State of Texas; and (3) in admitting evidence relating to conversations, agreements and representations allegedly made to appellees by Pierson prior to the execution of the written contracts.
Appellees аre residents of Bell County and operate merchandising businesses there. Instant Credit is a credit service business and Pierson is its agent, emрloyed to solicit participants for its credit card program. In May and June, 1972, Pierson visited with appellees in Bell County at their rеspective places of business, and represented that certain beneficial consequences would accrue to appellees if they contracted for his company’s credit serv
Pierson also represented that credit vouchers submitted by member merchants would be paid without the mеmber being required to complete every detail of the voucher. Instant Credit would furnish credit cards, free of charge to custоmers, upon receipt of the first voucher from the merchant member, and the fees for credit card services would be less thаn that charged by major credit card companies. Pierson stated further that Instant Credit would return the $300 membership fee at a cеrtain percentage each month.
In May and June, 1972, each appellee paid Pierson, for the benefit of Instant Credit thе sum of $300 by check for the purpose of becoming a member merchant of the credit card program. Some of the chеcks were cashed by Pierson in Bell County.
Thereafter, each of the appellees extended credit to customers, and submitted the credit voucher forms of Instant Credit signed by the customers to Instant Credit in Dallas.
Appellees received notices from Instant Credit that a number of the voucher forms lacked sufficient information, such as customer’s height, or weight, or color of eyes, or color of hair, or home phone, or social security number, or driver’s license number, or Armed Forces ID card number, or that credit vouchers were late in not arriving at the principal office of Instant Credit within seven days.
Some of the appellees received no return from Instant Credit on credit vouchers submitted; while some received a small percentage of collections made on the printed vouchers submitted, but not within thirty days of date of submission. Instant Credit then terminated each of the membership contracts of appellees without returning any part of the $300 membership fee.
Appellees’ evidence was that many of the rеpresentations were not true.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995, subdivision 7, provides that in a suit wherein the basis for recovery is fraud, the suit may be brought in the county where the fraud occurred. Under subdivision 7 three venue facts must be established: (1) that the fraud occurred, (2) that the fraud was committed by the defendant or by one for whose acts he is legally responsible, and (3) that the fraud occurred in the county of suit. 1 McDonald, Tеxas Civil Practice § 4.13 (1965 Rev. vol.).
From an examination of the record we are of the opinion appellees adducеd some evidence showing the existence of the required venue facts.
By their second contention appellants claim that the court committed reversible error in admitting proof of a suit pending in Brown County between appellants and the State of Texas. That proof consisted of an instrument purporting to be a temporary injunction signed by the district judge of Brown County on Septеmber 14, 1972, which enjoined Robert E. Pierson and Hank Price, II individually “and d/b/a Instant Credit Service, Inc.” from committing certain acts.
Aside from the mattеr of relevancy, ap-pellees’ proof should not have been received since appellees wholly failed to comply with Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 3731a. However, from an examination of the
Appellants third contention will not be sustained since parol evidence was admissible to establish that the contracts were induced by fraud. Dallas Farm Machinery Company v. Reaves,
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Sterling and Jerrine McClanahan, doing business as the House of Sterling; Don Von, doing business as Von Music; Doris Lаngford, doing business as Tex’s True Value Hardware Center; T. M. Gollihiri, doing business as Tom’s Auto Supply; ant! Doyle Whitehead and Ron Ambrose, doing business as Ragsdale Service Company.
. Usually termed “Instant Credit” in this opinion.