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Insolia, Vincent v. Philip Morris Inc.
216 F.3d 596
7th Cir.
2000
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Inc., Group, Hill Liggett Company, of the assignment not obtain did AGCO For Knowlton, Inc., The Council And signing of until after Obligations Retail Inc., Research-U.S.A., Tobacco Anglins Guaranties, we doubt Institute, Inc., Defen- The Tobacco dispute with their contemplated ever dants-Appellees. the arbi- way to find its would Agricredit table. tration 99-2654, 99-2693. Nos. Appeals, Court States United

III. Circuit. Seventh not have con- could Anglins Because 19, 2000 Argued Jan. clause arbitration templated that 16, 2000 June Decided dispute encompass would with AGCO we conclude party, nonsignatory Rehearing En Banc with Rehearing and their author- exceeded that the arbitrators Aug. Denied Retail Obli- Anglins’ arbitrating the ity by REVERSEthe We Agricredit.

gations arbitra- confirmation court’s

district case to award, Remand

tion con- proceedings further court

district order. with this

sistent Billy Mays, INSOLIA, Maureen

Vincent Phyllis Mays, Insolia,

Lovejoy, Karen Plaintiffs-Appel Lovejoy,

and Lee

lants,

v. INCORPORATED,

PHILIP MORRIS Company, Reynolds Tobacco

R.J. Corpo Tobacco

Brown & Williamson P.L.C., Loril

ration, Industries B.A.T. Liggett Company, Tobacco

lard Inc., Knowlton, Inc.,

Group, Hill Research- For Tobacco

The Council Inc., Insti

U.S.A., and The Tobacco

tute, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. Corporation,

Physicians Plus Insurance

Plaintiff-Appellant, Reyn- Incorporated,

Philip R.J. Morris Company, & Wil- Brown

olds Tobacco Corporation, B.A.T. Tobacco

liamson P.L.C., Tobacco Lorillard

Industries *2 filed from a lawsuit stems appeal

This mak- major cigarette country’s against by three groups industry trade ers can- lung developed who former All three smoking. they blame cer that *3 long smoking before began smokers (ar- ciga- on Schooler, appeared A. warnings Olsen James first J. Steven WI, Madison, all three Cates, in and packages & rette Lawton gued), day for' Farring- every McClain, packs Humphrey, two to three B. smoked Kenneth MO, began Insolia Rich- McClain, Vincent Independence, decades. several ton & 12, Boardman, Suhr, 1935, and smoked Curry age & at Schmidt, in smoking ard L. smoking in began Madison, WI, plaintiff-appellant Billy Mays Field, for until 1974. 13, until 1994. continued 1951, age at and Brady, Zaleski, & Quarels L. Michael 1953, Lovejoy began Maureen (argued), WI, Speyer F. Madison, James three 15, in 1996. The and quit age CA, Porter, James Angeles, Los Arnold & in the lung cancer diagnosed with were Lardner, Timothy J. Clark, Foley & R. 1990’s. Ralph Murray, Pike, Peterson, & Johnson spouses, and their Deuren, Boerner, former Reinhart, The Van Weber, A. citizens, in state filed suit Milwaukee, WI, all Rieselbach, Wisconsin Norris & the case removed Schultz, the defendants Niess, court but Schultz, Coyne, Bruce A. jurisdic- diversity under court Madison, WI, B. to federal Bauer, Robert Becker & Judge § District tion, 1332. Vennum, 28 U.S.C. Minne- Raschke, Lindquist & all but one extinguished B. Crabb Gebhárt, H. Barbara MN, F. John apolis, James summary judg- on claims Koeppl, Schmid, Brynelson, John Axley (W.D.Wis.1999), ment, Madison, WI, F.Supp.2d Stevens, for Dewitt, Ross & was subsequently claim remaining and the defendant-appellee. argue appeal, On dropped. CUDAHY, BAUER, Before mis- liability, negligence, their strict EVANS, Judges. Circuit exposure to intentional representation, and have claims should substance a hazardous EVANS, Judge. Circuit they ask judgment, summary survived as moral the Wis- thing questions certify were such several If us to there appeal would of this Court. Supreme the outcome estoppel, consin companies plain. For decades judg- summary grant review We noth- that there is public have assured novo, construing evidence de ment they now yet cigarettes, from ing fear nonmoving light most favorable by profess- this one slough lawsuits like off Transp. Int’l Navistar Bragg v. party. along all everybody knew ing that Cir.1998). (7th 373, 376 164 F.3d Corp., risky. was under appropriate judgment Summary 56(c) if Procedure Rule of Civil stance, ciga- Federal litigation taking material issues of genuine no there are from suffering either rette makers Catrett, 477 U.S. Corp. Celotex acknowledging fact. or are amnesia (1986). 91 L.Ed.2d 106 S.Ct. years has been propaganda over inef- judg- summary moving however, party ap- Once estoppel, fectual. Judicial opponent’s in the hole uncovers a adopted ment positions plies only to inconsistent bears the case, party that nonmoving hypocrisy is punishing litigation, must show at trial burden realm. ultimate of another left to a court something issue genuine creating is evidence case there is whether this for us issue only 323-25, 106 S.Ct. Id. at fact. summary of material out properly snuffed which facts are those Material 2548. judgment. might affect the outcome of the suit. smoking, particular the addictive nature Inc., Liberty Lobby, Anderson v. 477 U.S. of smoking. We must first define this 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d 202 imaginary “average pin consumer” and (1986). An genuine issue is if a reasonable down the' time in question. trier of fact could find favor of the propose that in this context “average nonmoving party. Id. The judge must ask consumer” smoker, should be a beginning whether a jury could return fair-minded a maybe even a beginning teenage smoker. plaintiff verdict for the on the evidence The Restatement incorporates the com- presented. The existence aof mere scin- mon-sense notion that if a consumer knows tilla of evidence supporting ahead of time that a product might be position insufficient; there must be evi- dangerous but goes ahead and uses it any- jury dence on which a could reasonably way, the consumer takes the risk upon *4 252, find for plaintiff. at Id. 106 S.Ct. himself and the will manufacturer not be 2505. strictly held liable. Nicotine’s addictive begin We with the claim. grip makes it quit difficult to smoking. law, Wisconsin governs case, which Consequently, the state of knowledge of (Second) relies on the Restatement the average consumer must be measured Torts this area. Vincer v. Esther average person, before the is hooked and is Williams Swimming All-Aluminum Pool no longer capable making a rational Co., 826, 794, 69 Wis.2d 230 N.W.2d 797 choice. agree that, We with (1975); Sciano, Dippel 443, 37 Wis.2d when it product comes to an addictive like (Wis.1967). 155 N.W.2d Section cigarettes, the “average consumer” is the 402A of the says Restatement that one beginning smoker.

who sells an unreasonably prod- dangerous

uct is liable physical for harm by caused The also the average believe con product. However, the section’s “com- sumer should be a teenager because ment i” explains that “applies this rule when many people begin smoking and be only where the defective condition of the come addicted. The argue defendants product makes it unreasonably dangerous Bic, Todd v. S.A., Societe 21 F.3d to the consumer.... The article sold (7th Cir.1994) (en banc), holds that dangerous must be beyond to an extent children may never be the standard to that which would contemplated by the measure consumer expectations. in Todd ordinary it, purchases consumer who with terpreted law, which, Illinois like Wiscon ordinary knowledge common to the sin, adopted the Second Restatement of community as to its characteristics.” Wis- Torts, Todd, Section 402A. Id. at 1405. In consin courts have restated Restate- a 22-month-old child killed a was fire by ment as “If average follows: consumer by 4-year-old started a using ciga child reasonably would anticipate the dangerous lighter rette belonged to one of the condition of the product fully appreci- adults in the household. Id. at 1404. The ate the attendant injury, risk of it would estate of the deceased child sued the man unreasonably not be dangerous and defec- ufacturer of the cigarette lighter, arguing objective tive. an This is test and is not though the ordinary adult consumer dependent upon the knowledge par- of the appreciated would have lighter’s dan injured ticular consumer.” Sumnicht v. ger, children-—who foreseeable were Toyota Sales, Motor 121 Wis.2d 360 users-—would not have understood the (1984), Vincer, N.W.2d quoting 230 product’s hazards. Id. at 1407-08. The N.W.2d at 798. expand court refused the Restatement’s contemplation contend that consumer the av test from ordi erage in question nary consumer the time did consumers to foreseeable users. Id. fully appreciate the health risks of at 1408. percentage of what interpreta- question defendants’

Contrary to the teenagers. smoking as began univer- there is a tion, mean Todd does record, in this ordinary by con- the evidence Confined sally fixed definition ordinary consumer of relationship no must view we sumer that bears primary adult smoker. beginning Because as product question. cigarettes users, ciga- consumers, purchasers the con adults, per- component The second gauging lighters

rette from the must consid lighters contemplation we cigarette test ceived risks of sumer oddly, makes sense. viewpoint plaintiffs, frame. The adult’s time er is the prod- even holds true for logic as benchmark. using The same suggest primarily is used diapers measuring uct—like is a convenient They say this —that purchased and that is major children but it the first is when stick because But by adults. supervised of which is use came report on Surgeon General product say, bubble suppose there smoking’s out, public awareness — only the children were not which gum^ any greater not have been would hazards —of users, pur- primary also the primary landmark re of that prior to the release con- chasers, any parental independent of defendants, oddly, advo equally port. bub- defy reason to excuse It would trol. that consumer argument at oral cated bubble-gum- manufacturers gum ble *5 the at the time be measured awareness grounds on the injuries to children related discovered, in other words injury was rarely product use the that adults who learned plaintiffs here when the the 1990’s haz- gum’s appreciated have bubble would the cancer. The idea behind they lung had Likewise, if the facts demonstrate ards. is that con contemplation test consumer ais ordinary beginning smoker they eyes open when had their sumers who contempla- consumer then the teenager, prod dangerous potentially chose to use measured from be tion test should manufacturer blame the uct later cannot perspec- teenager’s pre-smoking average However, injuries. foreseeable tive. at a using product began who consumers smoking in their begin do Most to thought be product was time when teens, this. record does not reflect but the holding from precluded safe are to evidence plaintiffs failed introduce The find when responsible manufacturer ever percent of those who have that 82 prod surprise!—the years out later that — age before daily began smoking smoked — n companies Cigarette uct toxic. 18. CenteRS and For Disease Control DDT, asbestos, of with the makers along Mortality Morbidity Prevention, and out to be products turned and other 45, 8, 1996, Weekly Volume Report, Nov. that mea love rule bad news—would Department 45, citing No. Health of U.S. only after consumer awareness sures Preventing Services, TobaCCO and Human danger and has been done damage Among People: Report Young A Of Use discovered, a rule would be but such thus (1994). Instead, the Surgeon The General Instead, preposterous. than a little more Gen- plaintiffs pointed Surgeon to the 1988 contemplated ordinary consumer what the Nicotine Addiction Report on eral’s dangers smoking should be about always “almost be- tobacco said addiction began plaintiffs at the time the evaluated adoles- during early or gins childhood 1935; Insolia, for Lo smoking. For that’s indicating statistics cence” and to early 1950’s. vejoy Mays, that’s all stu- percent high school about 23 up, To sum high percent to 35 percent and 30 dents claim, judgment stage, summary at the smoked. in 1958 1966 school seniors produced hinges on whether impre- General’s remark Surgeon a reasonable that would allow evidence cise, percentage about what and statistics adults American jury find pertinent to are not teenagers smoke

601 early general and in the 1950’s did not about 1935 health hazards and knowing understand the hazards of before about danger of addiction a question they began smoke. of fact that by jury. should decided See State Texas v. American Tobacco a halfhearted effort made Co., 956, (E.D.Tex.1997) 14 F.Supp.2d 966 court to that the ordi- the district show (when facts are viewed in light most favor- consumer, nary they began at the time plaintiff, able to “while the health risks of smoke, appreciate general did not consumption known, are generally smoking. Judge health risks of Crabb re- the addictive consump- nature of tobacco idea, jected and the have tion is not generally known due to the dropped appeal. it on Other courts also misrepresentation concealment De- have held that there was common knowl- fendants”); Castano v. American Tobacco edge smoking, although of the evils of Co., 953, 1, F.Supp. 961 n. 958 959 plaintiffs in many began of those cases (E.D.La.1997); Burton v. Reynolds R.J. plain- at a later date than did the Co., 1515, Tobacco F.Supp. 884 1526 Allgood Reyn- tiffs this case. See v. R.J. (D.Kan.1995); Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d (5th Co., 168, olds Tobacco 172 80 F.3d 429-31(“we simply cannot assume that Cir.1996); Roysdon v. Reynolds R.J. To- common knowledge general 236(6th Co., Cir.1988); bacco 849 F.2d risks tobacco use naturally includes Tobacco Co., Reynolds Guilbeault v. R.J. common knowledge of tobacco’s addictive (D.R.I.2000); F.Supp.2d 84 263 Hollar v. quality”); Rogers Reynolds v. R.J. Inc., Tobac Philip F.Supp.2d 794, Morris 807 (Ct. Co., (N.D.Ohio co App. 557 N.E.2d 1998); Jones American To . Ind.1990). Co., Supp.2d bacco 1 F n (N.D.Ohio 1998); Tompkin v. American . get past To summary judgment Brands, Inc., F.Supp.2d 905 plaintiffs produce needed evidence that *6 (N.D.Ohio 1998); Todd Brown & Wil gen- tobacco’s addictive nature —unlike its Corp., F.Supp. liamson Tobacco 924 62 eral health generally risks —was unknown (W.D.La.1996); Paugh v. Reynolds R.J. in 1935 and the 1950’s. In a world where Co., F.Supp. Tobacco 834 231 the amount of information always ex- (N.D.Ohio 1993); The American Tobacco panding, going back in time to determine Co., Grinnell, Inc. v. 951 S.W.2d 429 public the state of knowledge 50 and 65 (Tex.1997). But see Hill v. Reynolds R.J. years ago easy is no task. But we can Co., F.Supp.2d Tobacco types think of might three of material that (court (W.D.Ky.1999) denied motion to dis- help show ordinary person what the knew unwilling judi- miss because it was to take about smoking early 1935 and the cial something notice “of as intangible as opinion polls 1950’s: during Public taken public knowledge over three decades in the eras; contemporaneous those other assess- past”). attitudes; public ments of and information widely public through available to the exclusive argument television, newspapers, magazines, or oth- appeal although typical is that con sources, er from which one can infer what bad, smoking sumer was aware that ordinary person might have known. he or she didn’t know back then that smoking evidence, was addictive. The idea is that In category the first of cancer, cigarettes the first only polling by don’t cause but evidence was introduced they you cigarettes do make crave more pub- the defendants and it addresses the risks, and those additional cigarettes perception general are the lic’s of health that public ones cause cancer down the road. smoking’s It’s what the knew about ad- (Defense really the expert addiction that kills—not smok danger. dictive Theodore ing. Several courts have said that A. a Gallup wheth Wilson said 1954 nationwide poll percent er there is a distinction knowing between showed that 89.9 had heard or Industry Re- Tobacco in 1954 the example, be- connection presumed about read (which later became search Committee cancer. Wilson lung and tween Research) Tobacco Council defendant by Scholas- youths poll of a also cited signed advertisement thought full-page took out a percent 45.4 in which Magazine tic manufac- cigarette by four defendant lung risk of greater a ran smokers all Amer- in the 448 published that was nonsmokers, percent turers 19.6 than cancer popula- cities with serving newspapers ican ran a heavy greater thought only 25,000 Headed people. than cancer, of more percent tions and 32.2 lung risk Cigarette “A Frank Statement be some connection might there thought Smokers,” “[w]e said the advertisement link between no conclusive as a people’s an interest cancer.) accept and lung every paramount responsibility, basic con- the record category second We in our business. consideration other that outside assessments several tains inju- make are not products we believe addictive of nicotine’s unaware public was Tobacco The defendant rious health.” Company Tobacco Reynolds R.J. nature. that release in 1988 issued news Institute wrote Teague E. Claude scientist research people the number about said statistics that “the memorandum planning in a 1972 “con- quit smoking managed to who have keep confirmed smoker things which ‘addic- smoking is an claim any tradict that ‘satisfied’, and i.e. nicotine habituated are that smokers The claims tion.’ ... grati- manipulative secondary physical contradict sense and defy common ‘addicts’ largely fications, unknown and/or n every quit smoking people fact that A Brown the non-smoker.” unexplained testimony congressional In 1994 day.” mar- Corporation Tobacco & Williamson attention, widespread received in a 1978 memo wrote keting employee each of the de- executive officers chief are aware few “[v]ery consumers oath testified under manufacturers fendant nicotine, i.e., its addictive effect was ad- nicotine not believe did poison.” nicotine is nature and sure, ordinary consum- To be dictive. report said Surgeon General’s piece informa- every not soak up er does experi- who many adolescents children advertisement, or, in an appears tion of, or unaware “are cigarettes ment with matter, printed every word that for that ad- underestimate, strength of tobacco govern- uttered newspaper in a or Dr. plaintiffs’ experts, One diction.” *7 informa- knowing what agency. But ment my “In Griest, in affidavit: his John stated public general tion was available per- dealing with nicotine addicted practice what rough fact finder a idea gives the sons, most were unaware I found that have might know. ordinary consumer cigarette nature of highly addictive of the Gri- are addicted.” after smoke until heavily on re- rely most plaintiffs The value, it is since is little est’s statement by Surgeon General ports issued pa- number of the limited that doubtful Surgeon The medical authorities. other representative of seen is tients has he smoking, report on seminal General’s early in and the public large habituating, instance, smoking was said for are mindful of Though we 1950’s. compared report The but not addictive. that coming up in with evidence difficulty -It was until to coffee. tobacco infor- public the state of accurately gauges smok- declared Surgeon General that the stray lines ago, two decades mation several to co- addictive, tobacco comparing ing in a one sentence industry memos and in report also offered plaintiffs The caine. paltry. us as report strikes. government Adminis- Drug Food by U.S. former that said A. Kessler David tration head plaintiffs intro- category the third orga- major public no health prior to 1980 disseminat- duced information evidence that determined nicotine had For nization industry tobacco itself. ed drug. an addictive The defendants belittle knew it would quit be hard to American irrelevant, arguing this evidence as that smoking. The fact Surgeon that the Gen- government what or medical authorities eral and other authorities smoking called experts say does not what the Aver- reflect .only in “habituating” 1964 and not “addict- age plain- Joe on the street knows. The ing” until 1988 is a semantical distinction however, point, public tiffs’ is that if the beyond grasp of our Average Joe. community did not conclude until There is a considerable difference between addictive, 1980 or 1988 that smoking knowing that smoking is bad and knowing surely Average Joe could have addictive, that smoking is but there is not 1935, 1951, known or 1953 that smoking much of a difference knowing between that inference, was addictive. This is a valid and smoking habituating and knowing it is summary judgment on all inferences are plaintiffs addictive. Once the conceded party. drawn favor of the nonmoving the ordinary consumer knew that smoking was habit-forming, they created The evidence this record that an enormous burden for themselves ordinary plain- consumer at the time the they have not surmounted. began smoking tiffs was unaware of smok- ing’s danger addictive is surprisingly thin. particular Based on this evidentiary rec- Insolia has the strongest case because he ord, no reasonable trier of fact could find began smoking long before the first Sur- plaintiffs for the that the ordinary consum- geon report General’s on and 30 er in 1935 and in early 1950’s did not years warnings appeared before the first appreciate the health risks smoking. cigarette packs. on Whether the evidence This decision does not possi- foreclose the amounts to a mere scintilla or whether it is bility that other might prevail on enough to summary judgment overcome liability against claim the tobacco call, would be a anything close absent else. industry. Another record another case us, easy have' made it might be different. plaintiff Another however, by conceding ordinary might marshal better evidence that consumer at in question the time knew haze of companies’ the.tobacco propaganda was habit-forming. One of obscured whatever health hazards were proposed the defendants’ findings of fact known to the average consumer. We ex- the district court was that “[t]he reject plicitly industry’s invita- American long has had the common knowl- tion to declare that cigarettes are not un- edge potential health hazards associ- reasonably dangerous. But we do agree with cigarette smoking ated and the habit- Judge with Crabb that the in this forming cigarettes.” plain- nature of case did not meet evidentiary them burden “[ajdmit response tiffs’ was to the strict claim. average American has been led to believe cigarettes merely ‘habit-forming’ question The next plain- is whether the *8 ‘addictive,’ opposed as and not un- has negligence prey tiffs’ claim also falls cigarettes highly derstood as addictive contemplation consumer test. Wisconsin drug delivery devices.” law exactly clarity is not a model of in be, might

There well delineating as the the difference between strict argue, se, a liability, difference between a habit that negligence per ordinary and easily can be and a physiological broken The negligence. explanation, best howev- er, stop. addiction that is difficult to But as comes from Justice Heffernan’s concur- noted, LaDow, Judge Greiten v. average opinion Crabb the consumer ring 235 677, (Wis.1975), would not be preoccupied with the esoteric N.W.2d 683-86 which was difference between a “habit” and an subsequently adopted major- “ad- as the court’s Co., If in Howes v. Deere & average diction.” the ity opinion American knew 71 (Wis.1976). 268, 76, habit-forming, was the Wis.2d 238 N.W.2d 80 though it is product even Sciano, of a design Dippel Interpreting in the 402A (1967), unreasonably dangerous Justice 155 N.W.2d Wis.2d the year recently as last Id. As of strict sense.” finding said Heffernan under, this affirmed Supreme Court of Section Wisconsin the standards liability Corp., Wis.2d Sharp v. Case per position. negligence equivalent 402A is (Wis.1999). 387-88 Negli 595 N.W.2d Greiten, at 684. N.W.2d se. recover plaintiff a allows per se gence is whether for us issue unduly burden The or impossible where it is go to a claim should negligence plaintiffs’ acted defendant that' the prove some contem the consumer jury, though even plaintiff need Id. The negligently. their 402A doomed test of Section plation Instead, negligence under prove fault. plaintiffs, The natu liability claim. strict only prove need plaintiff theory, the per se negli say yes, arguing rally, product defective dangerously the defen around claim revolves gence The focus in harm. Id. 685. caused foreseeably creating conduct in dants’ the condition per se is on negligence say product. The defendants hazardous i.e., of the defen the results product, no, negligence characterizing plaintiffs’ 2,n. 686. Id. at 685 actions. dant’s of their version claim as a warmed-over ordinary negligence, The focus in catego liability Judge Crabb claim. strict hand, on how the defendant other is on the claim a plaintiffs’ negligence as rized the i.e., on the defen product, created the components “hybrid” that combined final result. attaining conduct dant’s unreasonably liability (cigarettes prove fault. Id. at plaintiff Id. The must and are addictive because dangerous prove that plaintiff must 686. cancer) negli components of with cause ordinary care failed to exercise defendant (the making knew when defendants gence harm. Id. failure that this caused and product cigarettes that selling at 684-85. placed the dangerous). This combination short, per se about negligence per se negligence claim in the plaintiffs’ effect, negligence is about conduct while court, to the district category, according Negligence effect. leading to that Howes, 238 N.W.2d citing —unlike 71 Wis.2d proving fore requires per negligence governed Negligence per se— se 76. per Conversely, negligence seeability. 402A, defendants which shields Section proving negligence requires se—unlike un ordinary if consumer liability — from unreasonably danger product was that the risks, thus the product’s derstood the ous. se) claim fell (per plaintiffs’ negligence their strict as liabili down the same chute for a defendant be possible It is ty claim. per “If negligent se. negligent both in a defec ordinary care results the lack of portion of the this disagree We with prod true that the design, tive it is indeed thoughtful analysis this court’s district unreasonably dangerous may be uct well First, though closely related case. difficult Dippel v. Sciano.... even in the sense claim, to the strict proves .negligence plaintiff Where. —in own. The claim stands on its negligence case, ordinary care the lack of claim revolves around plaintiffs’ negligence nois doubt that design product of a —there produc- conduct companies’ evept in the may recovery there plaintiffs contend that ing cigarettes. *9 unreasonably in an design defective results market- manufacturing, designing, while at 685. dangerous product.” Id. the defendants selling cigarettes, and ing, cigarettes were addic- foresee that could possible for defendant It also is ar- plaintiffs and cause cancer. per se. tive negligent negligent, to prod- with the forward gue going recovery negligent for the may be “[T]here despite standable, uct knowledge, the tobacco cousins, since the two are close duty twins, companies ordinary breached their if identical under Wisconsin law. and negligence. care thus are liable for But nowhere does Howes transform the negligence Their theory that the defen- plaintiffs’ negligence claim negli- into a dants were at fault during process the is gence per se claim. Throughout opin- the claim independent liability of their strict plaintiffs’ ion the negligence claim is con- regarding the final result. sistently called a “negligence” claim. The Second, if former smokers’ plaintiffs’ even claim of negligence negligent design and manufacture in ingredients claim contains of strict this case is liability, analogous to plaintiffs’ claim, we Howes’ any negligence fail see mandate Howes that not to their strict liability a claim such must be claim. As we negligence treated as it, read nothing in per requires Howes catego- se. The alleged in Howes rizing the former smokers’ negligence negligence liability: and strict negligence claim as a negligence per se claim. product designed, how was manufac- tured, marketed; be- Perhaps the district court’s conclusion product cause allegedly unreason- that Howes refashioned neg- ably dangerous. 238 N.W.2d 78. ligence claim into negligence per se was crafting special verdict and instruc- upon based the following passage: trial, at the close of tions the court forced LaDow, Greiten supra, emphasizes the plaintiffs to choose between their neg- that when the upon claim based negli- ligence and' strict liability theories. Id. at gence, it is necessary prove what the 78-79. with strict went lia- seller or do; manufacturer did or did not and lost. Id. at bility 79. The Wisconsin that there was a of the duty breach reversed, Supreme Court saying that the ordinary care and that the element of trial court should not automatically have foreseeability was encompassed as an required to elect between the element proof. It pointed was also two theories because sometimes the sub- if proof out such demonstrated a defec- of both jury mission theories to the tive unreasonably condition dangerous appropriate. Id. consumer,, to the user or product n might well fall negligence per within the opinion, Over the course of the what se doctrine of supra. Dippel, initially Howes terms “strict liability” claim Howes, becomes referred to as “negligence 238 N.W.2d at 80. In saying that per se.” “We here that when negligence declare two a might case fall within the grounds negligence alleged are it does negligence per se Dippel doctrine of if the not categorically plaintiff follow proof negligence also demonstrated an always must elect one grounds condition, two unreasonably dangerous Howes of negligence for jury merely submission reiterated teaching Greiten’s that a .... especially This is when the negli- so defendant negligent could be both gence per se, se doctrine as in negligent per. formulated discussed as earlier. comparative negligence Wisconsin goes law Howes on to expla- endorse Greiten’s 402A, sec. from in Dippel, Restatement nation of the negli- distinction between supra, and common negligence law gence negligence per se—and Greiten (footnote pleaded.” both properly Id. made negligence per clear se omitted). Later, the court concludes that imposed upon framework had not been the trial court erroneously thought negligence “Dippel actions. did not intend “the negligence precluded issues of apply were dangerously stan- defective by the submission-of case to the jury dard to an ordinary negligence case. It negligence per se doctrine.” Id. at was not modify intended to or to limit a Treating 80. negligence per recover, plaintiffs right inter- but to extend ..se changeably with strict liability is right to those circumstances where it under-

606 plain- to the our attention now shift of We particulars the allege impossible to was companies the tobacco claims that tiffs’ Dip- that intended It not was negligence. and mis- fraudulently conceal to conspired actions.” negligence to transplanted pel be In smoking. of the health risks represent Consequently, Greiten, at 684. 235 N.W.2d that liability claim strict to their contrast court’s as- district the part ways with we ge- only what the determining necessitated former the places that Howes sessment knew, the smoker average beginning neric with- “squarely claims negligence smokers’ proof that require fraud plaintiffs’ claims category.” se per negligence in the upon alleged the relied they specifically that a puzzling defendant may seem It they specifically misrepresentation or-that designing a for negligent be found could con- fraudulent alleged of victims the were unrea- not found end is that the product plaintiffs the none of Because cealment. that point out Critics sonably dangerous. from the single a statement recall could the jury a to find requires “negligence of smok- the effects industry about risk of an unreasonable creates product origi- their stamped out Judge Crabb ing, consumer; jury if finds the harm reli- proof lack of claims for of nal fraud an un- present not product does that the ance and causation. in the strict or defect danger reasonable mo- summary judgnent briefing sense, jury can- then the liability products to tion, however, attempted the smokers negligent be- find the manufacturer not di- they were their claim transform find an logically jury cannot cause pub- that the into claim rectly defrauded a to the consumer of harm unreasonable risk community was defrauded and lic health conduct.” by the manufacturer’s created as a particular suffered result. Supporters at 388. Sharp, 595 N.W.2d con- makers theory is that cigarette defect finding that a jury’s that “a argue the addictive information about cealed danger reach- quantum a did not create nicotine, pub- consequently qualities a deciding level ing the ‘unreasonable’ recognize not un- community lic did a preclude liability claim does not strict addictive, con- smoking is recently til that could that a defect existed finding to create sequently no one tried to and that failure have been discovered recently, conse- products until cessation constituted a breach the defect discover unable to quit were quently care, ordinary there- duty of a defendant’s sooner, consequently their injuries.” Id. Puz- causing cancer were di- avoiding lung chances not, law in this is the Wisconsin zling or minished. law. uphold to and we are bound spec tenuous and Aside from the Co., F.2d Hansen v. Cessna Aircraft al link the defendants’ between ulative (7th Cir.1978). 679, 682-84 beginning leged concealment contempla- Perhaps the consumer injuries what these chain and actual liability chain, plaintiffs’ plain strict tion test did at the end of the claim, contributory negli- concept of prob into another theory new tiffs’ runs negligence plaintiff “A gence namely, will do to that it is new. lem— however, That, through us to ar complaint for his may claim. not amend generally opposition Apportioning negligence in his brief decide. guments See, e.g., Stew- Shana jury. summary judgment.” question for motion F.3d Chicago, 271 N.W.2d Wulf, City v. han art Wis.2d Cir.1996). (7th (1978). law, insist plain- The smokers matter of As theory community was public health are distinct from their negligence claims tiffs’ judgment, claims, up summary cooked on and the district their answers lurking in already the former stubbing erred out court pletho- interrogatories. Given certain judgment. summary

607 paper this, ra of produced by a case like tentional exposure” claim plaintiffs es- of information in interrogatory bits an pouse. plaintiffs The compare their claim hardly provides the particularity required battery physical cases which force is 9(b). of a fraud claim. See Fed. R. P. Civ. requirement, not a citing 19th century cases from jurisdictions. other Common Finally, the plaintiffs ask us to Stratton, wealth v. 303, 114 Mass. 305-06 recognize a tort claim of expo “intentional (1873); Monroe, State v. 547, 28 S.E. 548 or, sure to a hazardous substance” alterna (N.C.1897). But Wisconsin battery law re- tively, certify issue to Wisconsin quires unlawful physical touching and the Supreme Court. Federal courts are loathe use of force or violence. Vandervelden v. to fiddle around with state Though law. Victoria, 243, 177 Wis.2d 276, 502 N.W.2d may try district courts to determine how (Wis. 1993). 278 Ct.App. The plaintiffs the state courts would rule on an unclear compare their cases, claim to nuisance cit- law, area state district courts are en ing Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., couraged to dismiss actions based on novel 416, (1996) 201 Wis.2d 829, 548 N.W.2d 834 state law claims. Railway Agen Express (nuisance stray claim for voltage injury to cy, Models, Ltd., Inc. v. Super Scale 934 cattle), v. Jost Dairyland Power (7th 135, Cir.1991). F.2d 138 con When Coop., 647, (1969) (nui- 172 N.W.2d 652 fronted with a state law question that sance claim for intentional emission of haz- go way, could either the federal courts ardous chemicals into air fell on usually choose the interpretation narrower crops). But requires nuisance damage to Birchler v. Gehl liability. restricts property. Vogel, 548 at 834. N.W.2d The Co., (7th 518, Cir.1996). 88 F.3d 521 Inno cite plaintiffs smattering other cases vative state law claims brought should be they say recognize similar claims. Export court. Corp. v. Me state Afram Co., Bennett v. Larsen 681, 118 Wis.2d 348 S.A., tallurgiki Halyps, 1358, 772 F.2d (1984) N.W.2d 548 (7th (applying pesti- Cir.1985). 1370 cides violation of criminal statute is The say they litigate tried to se); negligence per Brabazon v. Joannes court, in state but the tobacco compa- Co., Bros. (1939) 231 Wis. 286 N.W. 21 nies —as generally do in cases like (intentionally spraying substance toxic to this —removed the case to court. federal claim). plaintiff may grounds for a tort are a predicament because But we do not find these cases analogous state law in this area is stunted and we decline invent what would be a ability of companies tobacco to remove truly novel tort claim in Wisconsin. diversity jurisdiction. cases under Some We also certify decline to litigation, however, Wiscon- place has taken See, Supreme sin question Court the e.g., state courts. of wheth- Philip v. Ramos Cos., Inc., er Wisconsin Morris (Fla.Dist. courts would recognize an 743 So.2d 24 1999); intentional Small v. Ct.App. exposure to a hazardous sub- Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., claim. stance Certification may 679 be appro- N.Y.S.2d 593 (N.Y.App.Div. 1998); Grinnell, 420; priate where Horton 951 S.W.2d there ques- unresolved Co., v. see, American law, e.g., Tobacco tions state Hanlon existing 667 So.2d 1289 Milton, (Miss.1996); Town (7th Gilboy v. v. American Tobacco 186 F.3d Co., Cir.1999); Lines, Inc., In Badger re (La.1991); 582 So.2d Forster v. Reynolds Co., (7th R.J. Tobacco Cir.1998); F.3d Shirkey v. 437 N.W.2d 698-99 (Minn.1989). Co., Lilly Eli (7th & And even if 852 F.2d 227 Cir. bind, 1988), are in something of a simply that does not we cannot certify every justify the federal courts imposing a but unlikely new creative state cause of action claim on tort Wisconsin. litigants devise from blank slate. said, That addition, there is little indication that certify we decline to wheth- Wisconsin courts recognize would the “in- er consumer for consumer for the return a verdict jury could able should be purposes test contemplation Liberty Anderson nonmoving party,” plain- smoker. beginning adolescent *12 248, 242, 106 S.Ct. Inc., 477 U.S. Lobby, to raise it by failing this issue

tiffs waived (1986), a number 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d plain- the Regardless, court. in the district majority ac- the conclusions their strict of the supporting scant evidence tiffs’ degree reach a fail to simply test satisfy the as clear cepts not would claim liability juror that no reasonable of such definition of certitude most favorable the under even fact, In Thus, contrary. issue is the conclude could consumer. the various of appreciation for certifi- public of and is unsuitable the state controlling not fifty Hanlon, cigarette 835. Our at risks from 186 F.3d health cation. as re- the is so indeterminate years ago moot or more renders decision subject negligence judgment the on the summary on certification make to quest extraordinarily difficult. issue. decision, the we our Recapping Affirm claim, strict on their To succeed judg- summary of grant district court’s that “the to would have show fraud, and in- liability, on strict ment fully appreci- [did not] average consumer sub- to a hazardous exposure tentional injury” associated risk the attendant ate Judge claims. We also stance AffiRM Toyota Motor v. smoking. Sumnicht with certify any issues not to decision Crabb’s 2, 338, N.W.2d Sales, 121 Wis.2d Howev- Supreme Court. to the Wisconsin standard, (1984). the central this Under summary er, grant we Reverse terms, howis general in its most question, and Re- claim negligence

judgment on did the long-term to health detrimental to the district of the case portion MAND years ago fifty smoker average beginning appel- proceedings. further court for Cigarettes were smoking? cigarette view ap- costs their recover lants shall as I can as far back “coffin nails” called peal. does remember, certainly but linked to can- they firmly were mean CUDAHY, concurring in Judge, Circuit were ago. Cigarettes fifty years cer dissenting part. part and respirato- to various to thought contribute to be ailments, they were believed ry presents an in- majority Although training,1 with serious athletic inconsistent evi- commentary much sightful heart disease cancer or lung a tie to addressing dence, me in it to seems fact, In mind. yet public sight of the demands have lost liability to their best companies did the tobacco know, all As we summary judgment. In spotlight. out of the keep these links that, requires after judgment summary together companies got the tobacco light evidence in the most viewing the “Frank State- notorious publish party, there nonmoving favorable to “there is stated ment” which fact. See issues of material genuine are no smoking is one cigarette 317, 322, proof no Catrett, 477 U.S. Corp. Celotex We be- lung (1986). [of cancer].... causes L.Ed.2d 265 106 S.Ct. injuri- are not make products we lieve Further, inappropri- summary judgment is Ex. T. 14145.2 ous to health.” that a reason- is such “if evidence ate from three to the record come certainly 2. Citations advertising tried to cigarette 1. But (1) "A. appendix, cited as appellants' sources: App. opposite. example, in convey For (2) supplemental appellee's [page];” at Company ran the fol- Tobacco the American [page];” or appendix, (3) “Supp.App. as cited lowing Gifford in Ac- "Frank advertisement: ex- plaintiffs' trial been what would have halfback was young N.Y. Giant ... The tion hibits, trial All [number].” as "T. Ex. cited Lucky top Strike already a star —and in the record found can be exhibits cited (Summary Supp.App. at 61 See smoker." R.277, unless part of Exhibit A attached as Pollay). Testimony W. Expected of Richard specified. otherwise Tobacco patted Institute itself on the back Possibly things are that simple, but it is for this disinformation in a campaign mem- entirely also possible that the ordinary orandum, calling “brilliantly it conceived beginning smoker associated “habit form- “creating executed” and doubt about ing” with yen for bon-bons, pistachio charge actually without denying cups nuts or of coffee but thought her- Thus, it.” T. Ex. it 20987. seems that the oin and cocaine when “addiction” was men- defendants tried keep the full risks of tioned. The unbreakable bondage to hard cancer public. from the At earlier stages drugs was probably most minds of quite *13 in this litigation, plaintiffs argued that be- a different order than everyday habits— ginning did not smokers fully appreciate at least a reasonable jury could so con- general the knowing that clude. plaintiffs provide did some evi- risks — n dence likely would make a person short that beginning smokers were un- of breath or cough-prone is far short of aware that cigarettes addictive,3 see, were fully appreciating that smoking could e.g., (Affidavit like- Supp.App. at 58 of Dr. John ly be fatal. Greist) But the majority (“I asserts that H. have found that most the issues of appreciation health-risk have [smokers] were unaware of the highly ad- been narrowed to knowledge of addictive- dictive nature cigarette of smoke until af- ness. Based arguments on the before this ter addicted.”); are T. Ex. 13677 panel, focus, (Brown I can this accept but I do not & Williamson marketing memo- believe limiting inquiry the to 1978) aware- randum from (“Very few customers ness of gets addictiveness us closer to are aware of the nicotine, effects of i.e., its granting summary judgment. addictive nature and that nicotine is a poi- son.”); 12408(R.J. T. Ex. Reynolds plan- In majority’s view, the key the part of memorandum, ning entitled “The Nature the analysis involves the of Tobacco Business and the Crucial question beginning whether Nicotine,” 1972) (“[Nic- Role of written in (whether “teenagers” or “adults” —I’ll dis- and secondary otine physical and manipu- moment) cuss this in a regarded cigarette gratifications lative are unknown and/or smoking as either habit forming or addic- largely unexplained to the [beginning tive—and whether these two attributes smoker]. He does not start smoking to synonyms in the mind of average obtain undefined physiological gratifica- .beginning smoker. The majority answers reliefs, tions or and certainly he does not question this by first noting start smoking to satisfy a non-existent concession that American saw craving nicotine.”), for and it seems to me cigarettes as “habit forming” quality —a the state of mind of the beginning by seen quite as distinguish- subject smoker on this from able from “addictive.” The majority then is not something lends easily itself makes this concession lever for sum- summary judgment if the evidence mary judgment by —even describing the differ- offered the plaintiffs is not overwhelm- ence between a “habit” and an “addiction” ingly persuasive. as “esoteric.” majority regards also the difference between forming” “habit The majority points to no evidence that and as “a “addictive” semantical distinc- suggests that this distinc- habit/addiction tion beyond the grasp of Average our “beyond tion was the grasp of Average our Joe.” Joe.” making assumption in favor 3. The provided also some evidence the pharmacological upon effect of smoke cigarette manufacturers were well-aware smoker.”); body (internal of the T. Ex. 259 of quality cigarettes addictive but failed by general memorandum counsel for Brown See, to share it public. e.g., with the T. Ex. Williamson, 1963) ("[NJicotine & is addictive. (report Philip Morris Board of Di- are, then, We selling the business of ... an 1969) (''[T]he rectors explanation ultimate drug.”). addictive perpetuated cigarette for the habit resided in judgment based summary grant allows defendants, majority has a smoker is thesis that such of the on the sagacity part demeaned unfairly only the dan- ignored about has also older better-informed Joe proverbial summary judgment addictiveness gers mandate inferences “all reasonable Thus, sum- path court draw towards cigarettes. Anderson, nonmoving party.” of the favor by adopt- can smoothed judgment mary Far from 106 S.Ct. 2505. 477 U.S. at more assumptions somehow factual ing “esoteric,” profession- medical thinking it This is knowledge. common credible than understood the als have habit/addiction than there is more very implausible, and, fairly re- until years, distinction hypothesis support enough evidence were mere- cigarettes they thought cently, addicted smokers became beginning Compare A.App. at forming.” “habit ly any without children they were still when (“In 56(1964 Report) Surgeon General’s to which addiction powerful warning terminology [the scientific medical and all, subject. First of becoming they were habitu- be labeled smoking process] should to- that the evidence produced *14 clearly from addic- it distinguish to ation teen- targeted themselves companies bacco tobacco, of tion, effects biological since were, at the smokers or as agers beginning caffeine-containing other like coffee least, begin that smokers aware very and the chewing beverages, betel-morsel See, 10299(presen- T. e.g., Ex. their teens. produced those like, comparable are not of Directors Morris Philip Board tation barbiturates, alcohol, by morphine, 1969) (“The 20-year begins old 16 to (emphasis addicting drugs”) potent other reasons.”); Supp. smoking psychosocial for (1988 at 58 Sur- A.App. original) with Expert of (Summary Expected App. at 68 ... (“Cigarettes Report) General’s geon (“[T]he Pollay) Testimony of Richard W. pharmacological addicting.... are displayed a stra- industry long has that determine processes and behavioral market.”). And youth in the tegic interest those that similar tobacco addiction that acknowledges majority although the as her- drugs such addiction determine per- “30 evidence shows that the plaintiffs’ cocaine.”). Average Whether oin and high school seniors percent to 35 cent cigarettes Joe, smoker beginning regarded smoked,” this dismisses and 1966 it or forming or addictive saw being as habit per- and “not “imprecise” evidence as both concepts these two between no distinction percentage question of tinent to the what comparative fifty years ago is the kind teenagers.” smoking as jury. began to a be left of smokers question should that majority is correct that beginning smoker the standard Whether many how exactly direct evidence “teenager,” as taken to be should be but teenagers, as began smokers “adult,” the ma- or an as plaintiffs argue, also that the one when considers determines, to be also needs ad- jority only percent evidence introduced requirements of again dressed.4 Here Ex. year, T. quit each see smokers light- taken summary seem to be judgment ah, A (Jorenby Ex. B et to R.277: attached majority makes majority. The ly by the Bu- Sustained-Release Trial Controlled “[mjost statement curious Patch, or Both Nicotine propion, a teens, begin smokers do Eng. Cessation, J. Smoking Med. New this.” In does reflect but record 4,1999)), jury could (May at 685-91 340:9 knowledge words, other it is common the conclusion reasonably left with teenag- is a beginning typical smoker high-school majority of vast these er, of this case the record somehow Pollay) W. Testimony Expert of Richard produced 4. because the This matters advertising teens more ("Cigarette affects age of smoker has some evidence See, articles). e.g., adults,” perceptions. bearing citing smokers’ than (Summary Expected Supp. App. at 69-70 kept smoking through their adult Therefore, lives. I believe that majori-

ty hasty, and wrong, to determine aas

matter of law the “beginning smoker”

must mean the “adult beginning smoker.” reasons,

For these I respectfully dissent

from the majority’s analysis and conclu-

sions respecting strict liability.

UNITED America, STATES of

Plaintiff-Appellee, WILLIAMS,

Kevin also known as

Twin, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-4265.

United States Court Appeals,

Seventh Circuit.

Argued May

Decided June

Case Details

Case Name: Insolia, Vincent v. Philip Morris Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Jun 16, 2000
Citation: 216 F.3d 596
Docket Number: 99-2654, 99-2693
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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