OPINION AND ORDER No. 1
This is а eivil action for declaratory and monetary relief brought by a group of individuals on behalf of a proposed class of Wisconsin residents, all of whom began smoking before 1964, consumed at least one package of cigarettes a day for twenty years and have been diagnosed with lung cancer. The defendants are the leading manufacturers of tobacco products in this country as well as two industry trade groups, the Council for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco Institute. One of these defendants, the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, is the indirect subsidiary of defendant B.A.T. Industries P.L.C., an English corporation. This court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims of negligence, strict liability, intentional exposure to a hazardous substance and civil conspiracy under the diversity оf citizenship statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The case is before the court on the motion of defendant B.A.T. to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. B.A.T. maintains that it is not amenable to jurisdiction in Wisconsin because it has never transacted business in the state. Although B.A.T.’s indirect subsidiary, defendant Brown & Williamson, has sold cigarettes to Wisconsin residents, B.A.T. asserts that it does not manufacture or sell any products or services; it is only a holding company. For this reason, B.A.T. argues, it does not fall within the sweep of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute and does not have the necessary minimum contacts with this state to satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs contend that documents created by defendant B.A.T. reveal that it is in fact a manufacturer of tobacco products, not a mere holding company. In the alternative, plaintiffs argue that jurisdiction is appropriate because defendant Brown & Williamson is either the “alter ego” or the agent of B.A.T. Finally, plaintiffs assert that the court may exercise jurisdiction over defendant B.A.T. even though it has no direct contacts with Wisconsin because defendant participated in an alleged conspiracy to create a phony scientific controversy about the link between smoking and disease.
I conclude that defendant B.A.T. is not amenable to jurisdiction under Wisconsin’s long-arm statute or under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. References to tobacco products produced by “BAT” and “the Group” in documents created by defendant B.A.T. are not concessions that B.A.T. manufactures cigarettes. These references are either to another one of B.A.T.’s subsidiaries, non-party British American Tobacco Corporation, or are a collective term used to describe all of the companies owned by B.A.T. Though defendant B.A.T. sets the general policies followed by Brown & Williamson, there is .no indication *664 that this control extends to the subsidiary’s daily operations. In the absence of other indicia that would support piercing B.A.T.’s veil of limited liability, the degree of control demonstrated by plaintiffs is insufficient to permit the conclusion that Brown & Williamson is the alter ego of B.A.T. Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that Brown & Williamson is the actual or apparent agent of defendant B.A.T. Even if Wisconsin courts would hold that the long-arm statute supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on basis of the nonresident’s participation in a conspiracy, defendаnt B.A.T. has no contacts with Wisconsin, much less the minimum amount necessary to satisfy due process. Because the conspiratorial acts allegedly engaged in by B.A.T. have not been directed at Wisconsin, it is not possible to conclude that B.A.T. could have anticipated being haled into court in this state.
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden of proof rests on the party asserting jurisdiction.
See Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc.,
FACTS
A. The Group
The genealogy of all the corporate entities relevant to the disposition of this motion is rather complex. That virtually all of these entities are referred to colloquially as some combination of the letters B, A, and T does not help matters.
Defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation manufactures and distributes tobacco products in Wisconsin; it is incorporated under the laws of Delaware. It is an indirectly owned subsidiary of defendant B.A.T. Industries, a public limited company incorporated under the laws of England and Wales in 1928. Before July 23, 1976, defendant B.A.T. was an investment company named Tobacco Securities Trust Company Limited. No entity known as B.A.T. Industries existed before this date. Neither B.A.T. nor its predecessor has ever manufactured, marketed, packaged, sold, distributed or advertised tobacco products or any other gоods in the Wisconsin or anywhere else. Also on July 23, 1976, defendant B.A.T. became the sole ordinary shareholder in the British American Tobacco Company Limited, an English company that owns a number of subsidiaries engaged in the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, including defendant Brown & Williamson. These subsidiaries also conduct research related to tobacco products. The British American Tobacco Company, or “BATCo,” has been in continuous existence since its incorporation in 1902. It acquired the stock of defendant Brown & Williamson in 1927. Before July 23, 1976, BATCo was a publicly owned and traded company in which no shareholder held a controlling interest. Following the July 1976 transaction, BATCo continued its operations and retained its separate corporate existence and identity. Aside from changing its name from the Tobacco Securities Trust Company, defendant B.A.T. also retained its separate corporate existence and identity.
In 1978, BATUS, Inc. was incorporated under Delaware law as an indirect subsidiary and inter-mediate holding company of defendant B.A.T. BATUS became the direct holding company for defendant BA.T.’s American subsidiaries. In 1950, Gimbel Brothers, Inc. formed a company under Wisconsin law named Esco Beverage Corporation. In 1980, BATUS acquired Esco and renamed it BA-TUS-Wisconsin, Inc. In 1990, as part of a corporate restructuring plan, BATUS, Inc. changed its named to BATUS Holdings, Inc. At the same time, BATUS-Wisconsin took the name BATUS, Inc. Despite this swap, BATUS Holdings is not the successor to BATUS-Wisconsin. As a result of this restructuring, BATUS Holdings and its parent, defendant B.A.T., divested themselves of all holdings in the United States retail and paper business, including Marshаll Fields and *665 Appleton Papers, Inc., two businesses with operations in Wisconsin. 1
Defendant B.A.T. has never employed more than 185 people, all of whom have been engaged in managing the company’s investment interests. Presently, defendant B.A.T. has more than 500 subsidiaries. Collectively, defendant B.A.T. and its subsidiaries are known as the B.A.T. Group or simply the Group. “BAT” is a descriptive phrase used to refer either to defendant B.A.T. or to its subsidiary, BATCo. Since the 1976 transaction, defendant B.A.T. and defendant Brown & Williamson have maintained separate offices, employees, directors, officers, accounts, records and minutes. Defendant B.A.T. is neither licensed nor qualified to do business in Wisconsin. It pays no taxes, maintains no office and does not own, lease or control any real or personal property in Wisconsin.
B. Tobacco Industry Trade Groups
Defendant Cоuncil for Tobacco Research, a non-profit corporation, is the successor in interest to the Tobacco Industry Research Committee. It is organized under the laws of New York. Defendant Council for Tobacco Research has represented knowingly and falsely that whether smoking causes adverse health effects is a matter of scientific controversy. It has done so on behalf of the tobacco industry to promote the sale cigarettes.
Defendant Tobacco Institute, a corporation organized under the laws of New York, is funded by the tobacco industry for the ultimate purpose of promoting the sale of cigarettes. It too has represented knowingly and falsely that a consensus does not exist among scientists whether smoking causes adverse health effects. To achieve these objectives, defendant Tobacco Institute has engaged in substantial activities in Wisconsin, including lobbying, advertising and bulk mailing.
C. Documents Circulated by Defendant B.A.T. to Its Subsidiaries
In a company report filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 1995, defendant B.A.T. stated in part: “B.A.T. industries is one of the U.K.’s leading business enterprises with interests principally in tobacco and financial services. In tobacco the Group is the world’s most international cigarette manufacturer, selling products in almost every country____ The Group operates in more than 90 countries, employing some 173,000.” The report boasts that “Group companies are leading providers of personal financial and insurance services in the UK and North America. Principal operating companies [include] Farmers Group, [ ] thе fourth largest group of property and casualty insurance companies in the USA.”
A company-produced “Factfile” contains similar information, including many statements about defendant B.A.T.’s tobacco holdings. In many of the statements regarding cigarette production, brands and market share, attribution is to “BAT.” For example, on page three, the publication states that “BAT sells about 250 brands, including some of the world’s best known cigarettes.”
A December 1995 newsletter published by defendant B.A.T. includes a cartoon originally published in The Times of London. The cartoon depicts a be-suited man puffing contentedly on a cigarette beneath a plaque that reads: “Smoking is good for your wealth.” The man, presumably a BAT executive or shareholder, is reading a paper that proclaims defendant B.A.T. has reaped 1.8 billion pounds in pre-tax profits for the first nine months of 1995.
In July 1992 and 1993, defendant B.A.T. issued a policy directive entitled “Guidelines for Brown & Williamson.” The guidelines are divided into three sections: general, financial and specific. The specific guidelines range from domestic and international sales targets to management and product quality objectives. For example, in the 1992 document, point nine states: “US Domestic Market: There should be an objective to increase market share, subject to the development of increased margins in VFM and maintaining market share in full revenue. The plan should set out the trade-offs between market *666 decline, market share, mix, promotion and pricing.” Point two, under the “general” heading, directs defendant Brown & Williamson to “work on projects as required by the Tobacco Strategy Group and [ ] assist the New Business Devеlopment Team of B.A.T. Industries in that body’s evaluation of proposals to invest in new markets and to make acquisitions or disposals.”
Other documents circulated by defendant B.A.T. to its subsidiaries, including defendant Brown & Williamson, contain directives related specifically to tobacco products liability lawsuits. A March 1984 memorandum entitled “Legal Considerations on Smoking Health Policy” emphasizes that “statements about cigarette smoking or the smoking and health issue generally must be factually and scientifically correct,” and then goes on to provide the correct factual and scientific conclusions. Specifically, the memorandum states:
No conclusive scientific evidence has been advanced and the statistical association does not amount to proof of cause and effect. Thus а genuine scientific controversy exists. The Group’s position is that causation has not been proved.... Consequently the Group cannot participate in any campaigns stressing the benefits of a moderate level of cigarette consumption, of cigarettes with low tar and/or nicotine deliveries or any other positive aspects of smoking ...
Sometime in 1995, defendant B.A.T. circulated a more comprehensive set of documents under the heading “Legal Considerations in Smoking & Health Issues.” In a cover memorandum, a member of defendant B.A.T.’s board of directors, P.J. Ricketts, laid out the objective of the circular: “Recent changes in the law in some states in the U.S.A. have resulted in a fresh spate of litigation against the tobacco industry there. For this reason it is most important that other members of the Grouр are constantly aware of B.A.T. Industries’ stance on Smoking & Health.” Attached is an eleven page memorandum dated November 2, 1995, prepared by Anne Johnson. At the time, Johnson worked for BATCo. After discussing possible responses to the charge that smoking causes disease, Johnson concluded by saying that “it is essential to emphasize both sides of the causation argument and not to give overdue weight to the evidence which contradicts the view that smoking causes disease.”
D. Legal Memoranda and Research Documents
On August 20, 1970, David Hardy, a lawyer in Kansas City, addressed a memorandum to the general counsel of defendant Brown & Williamson. Hardy speculated that if “a plaintiff should allege that BAT manufactures and sells cigarettes by and through its ‘agent’ and wholly-owned subsidiary, B & W, then BAT would probably be served through its ‘agent’ and might well remain a defendant” in a lawsuit. By “BAT,” Hardy meant BATCo, not defendant B.A.T., whiсh did not exist at the time.
In 1979, J. Kendrick Wells III and Ernest Pepples both worked for defendant Brown & Williamson. In two memoranda addressed to Pepples dated November 9 and June 15, 1979, Wells discussed “various alternatives for handling BAT scientific reports which come to B & W in a way that would afford some degree of protection against discovery.” After rejecting one possibility as inconsistent with the notion that BATCo was acquiring the sensitive documents in anticipation of litigation, Wells proposed an alternative: “that all BAT scientific reports be shipped directly to Dr. Esterle under a formal arrangement that Dr. Esterle was assigned to be your agent for the acquisition of scientific materials in anticipation of litigation. Dr. Esterle would separate the reports which were relevant to smoking and health, or otherwise sensitive, for special handling as described below and place the routine reports into regular R & D circulation.” In the June memorandum, Wells noted that “Jim Rosene has kept his eyes out for potentially sensitive material and has simply held them in his office.” Later, Wells advised that “[cjontin-ued Law Department control is essential for the best argument for privilege.” Dr. Eserle and Jim Rosene also worked for defendant Brown & Williamson. Defendant B.A.T. has never received the type of documents referred to in Wells’s memoranda. References *667 to “BAT” in these memoranda are to BATCo, not defendant B.A.T.
From February 10-14, 1979, there was a research and development policy conference. None of the participants worked for defendant B.A.T., but there are references in conference notes to the “B.A.T. Group.” A similar conference took place five years earlier, from January 12-18, 1974. Again, none of the participants were employed by defendant B.A.T. Most likely, references in conference notes to “B.A.T.” are to BATCo. Defendant B.A.T. did not exist at the time.
On June 12, 1984, Wells wrote a file note documenting a two-day meeting involving himself, “Trial Counsel,” “BAT Legal” and someone named David Sehechter. The general topic of discussion was products, liability litigation in the United States. In particular, attendees discussed the potential disclosure of scientific documents. References to BAT are to BATCo, not defendant B.A.T.
In a January 17, 1985, file note, Wells documented a meeting with Earl Kohnhorst in which the two discussed removing “deadwood” from research and development archives. Wells made the following recommendation: “I said we would consider shiрping the documents to BAT when we had completed segregating them. I suggested that Earl tell his people that this was part of an effort to remove deadwood from the files and that neither he nor anyone else in the department should make any notes, memos or lists.”
On July 8, 1985, Sidney Rosdeitcher, a lawyer in Washington, D.C., addressed a addressed a memorandum to David Sehechter. Rosdeitchter opened the memorandum by stating: “You have asked us to consider hypothetically whether documents in the possession of B.A.T. Industries or its U.K. subsidiary, BATCo, could be discovered by a plaintiff in a U.S. lawsuit against Brown & Williamson.”
On February 17, 1986, Wells sent yet another memorandum to Pepples covering the issue of document management. The subject heading is listed as “BAT Science.” Wells discussed the plan for receiving “reports from certain projects to be donе at the laboratories of affiliated companies.” Wells outlined a proposal and related strategic considerations:
B & W will receive concise reports, estimated to be about one-half page in length, twice each year for each project it wishes to follow. While the brevity of the reports will reduce the potential for receipt by B & W of information useful to a plaintiff, disadvantageous information could be included and the reports could serve as road maps for a plaintiffs lawyer.
A January 17, 1990, meeting agenda focused on the “[ejoncern about [the] volume of research documentation spread around the group.” Among other concerns, the agenda discusses the need for “[r]egular lawyer reviews and audits of scientific documents produced in each company,” and questions whether “the lawyers [are] sufficiently educated about the problems that can arise in relation to research documentation[.]” At the bottom of this document are the typewritten initials MBC/CEC.
OPINION
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Although not a moving party on this motion, defendant Brown & Williamson has interceded to object to the use of certain exhibits submitted by plaintiff. Defendant Brown & Williamson maintains that these documents are protected by attorney-client privilege but has insisted that this gesture should not be construed as a formal invitation for the court to issue a definitive ruling on the subject and has made no evidentiary showing to support its assertion. Instead, defendant Brown & Williamson has explained that it wishes simply to preserve its objections for the record. These objections are noted. The contested exhibits have received the court’s full consideration and have beеn incorporated into the factual allegations recounted above.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Introduction
In a case based on diversity of citizenship, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a non-consenting, nonresident de
*668
fendant to the extent authorized by the law of the state in which that court sits.
See Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc.,
The nature, quality and quantity of contacts necessary to establish jurisdiction depend on the type of jurisdiction asserted: general or specific. When general jurisdiction exists, a nonresident defendant may be sued in the state regardless of the subject matter of the lawsuit. To establish general jurisdiction, the nonresident defendant must have “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A v. Hall,
A brief description of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute and applicable due process requirements is appropriate. Wisconsin’s long-arm statute should be liberally construed in favor of the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
See Federated Rural Electric Ins. v. Inland Power & Light,
Implicit in the minimum contacts requirement imposed by the due process clause is the notion that a court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant “under circumstances that would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
B. General Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs concede that defendant B.A.T. has no direct contacts with Wisconsin but maintain that the exercise of general jurisdiction is appropriate because of the contacts of its subsidiary, defendant Brown & *669 Williamson. According to plaintiffs, the court has general jurisdiction over defendant B.A.T. because defendant Brown & Williamson is an “alter ego” of B.A.T. This theory of jurisdiction encompasses plaintiffs’ assertion that no meaningful distinction should be drawn between B.A.T. and Brown & Williamson for the purpose of jurisdictional analysis because B.A.T. has held itself out as a cigarette manufacturer. Though plaintiffs present this argument as a separate basis for jurisdiction, the notion that these companies are abusing the corporate form to escape liability is not a free-standing theory of jurisdiction. Instead, it is one of many factors used to determine whether B.A.T. is the alter ego of Brown & Williamson. This principle will be addressed at greater length below.
By itself, the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent whose subsidiary has insufficient contacts with the forum state.
See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has emphasized that “[parents of wholly owned subsidiaries necessarily control, direct and supervise the subsidiaries to some extent” but anything less than the degree of control necessary to pierce the parent corporation’s veil of liability is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the parent.
See IDS,
The degree of control exercised by defendant B.A.T. over defendant Brown & Williamson is insufficient to justify a conclusion that B.A.T. is the alter ego of its subsidiary. *670 Plaintiffs have managed to show that defendant B.A.T. has set broad policy directives for Brown & Williamson on an annual basis. Without exception, these objectives are confined to relatively commonplace concerns such as anticipated prоfits and sales, brand strength and product quality. Other exhibits support plaintiffs’ allegation that B.A.T. has played a role in an alleged conspiracy to spread misinformation about the adverse health effects of smoking and to shield sensitive documents with false claims of attorney-client privilege. For example, one of the exhibits produced by plaintiffs is a memorandum written by P.J. Ricketts, a member of the board of directors of B.A.T. In this memorandum, Ricketts discussed the need for all of subsidiaries to understand B.A.T.’s “stance” on smoking and health. As outlined in another memorandum accompanying Rick-ett’s missive, this stance amounted to emphasizing lingering scientific doubts regarding the causal link between smoking and disease, such as playing up other factors that may contribute to the onset of tobacco-related illness, but not placing toо much weight on this evidence. Some allegations related to the alleged conspiracy are disputed. For example, plaintiffs allege that defendant Brown & Williamson shipped sensitive scientific documents to defendant B.A.T. and have produced exhibits supporting this assertion, including the January 1985 memorandum regarding the shipment of “deadwood” to “BAT.” Also, the July 1985 memorandum written by a Washington, D.C. lawyer supports the notion that B.A.T. was concerned about the potential discovery of sensitive documents in its possession. In response, an officer of defendant B.A.T. has averred that the company has not received shipments of documents from defendant Brown & Williamson. See Aff. of Peter L. Clarke, dkt. # 144, at ¶ 25. As already indicated, on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, such disputes are resolved in favor of the party asserting jurisdiсtion. Referring to paragraph 25 of this same affidavit, defendant B.A.T. maintains that the January 1990 meeting agenda addressing lawyer control of scientific research documents was not written by one of its employees. However, neither the affidavit nor the agenda itself supports this assertion.
Despite this evidence regarding the degree of control exercised by B.A.T over Brown & Williamson, there is no suggestion that B.A.T. has any responsibility for the daily operations of Brown & Williamson, much less the type of dominating control contemplated by the alter ego doctrine. Indeed, it is virtually inconceivable that a company of fewer than 200 employees could oversee the tens of thousands of workers employed by defendant Brown & Williamson while, at the same time, exert some control over 499 other subsidiaries.
Apart frоm the issue of control, there are no indicia that defendants B.A.T. and Brown & Williamson have disregarded corporate formalities. Plaintiffs point to various publications and filings circulated by defendant B.A.T. that contain boasts about the prowess of “BAT” and the “the Group” as a cigarette manufacturer. Presumably, plaintiffs believe that these references are evidence that the intricate corporate structure of defendant B.A.T and its various subsidiaries is a sophisticated ruse constructed to hide the reality that there is no legally meaningful distinction between parent and subsidiary. In plaintiffs’ words, “Defendant BAT is playing a corporate shell game for the very purpose of insulating itself from liability while protecting its huge profits generated from cigarettes.” Pl.’s Br. in Opp., dkt. # 117, at 2. Although this may be true, for better or worse, defendаnt B.A.T. is entitled to play such a game. Without question, one of the dominant benefits of incorporation is limited liability. To overcome this jurisdictional obstacle, plaintiffs must do more than demonstrate that there is a confusing similarity among the acronyms used to refer to defendant B .A.T. and its subsidiaries. Plaintiffs have cited no authority to support the propositions that these practices are improper. To the contrary, there are rather obvious, benign explanations behind the use of these generic terms. Defendant B.A.T. has shown that its intermediate holding company, the British American Tobacco Corporation, is commonly referred to as BAT. Similarly, inferences in these same documents to the accomplish *671 ments of “the Group” are not confessions that defendant B.A.T. actually manufactures and markets the tоbacco products sold by its subsidiaries. B.A.T. and the Group are not the same entity. The Group is a collection of many corporations; the financial state of affairs of these corporations cannot be represented accurately to shareholders and regulators without some discussion of the type of business engaged in by individual members of the conglomerate. In this sense, the Group does manufacture and market cigarettes because several of its constituent members do. In another, more important sense, the corporation that owns all of the entities that make up the Group, defendant B.A.T., enjoys a separate legal identity.
Plaintiffs ask the court to follow a more lenient standard for determining whether a subsidiary’s contacts with a forum state should be imputed to its nonresident pаrent company. Under this standard, a degree of control sufficient for exercising personal jurisdiction is established when a parent owns 100% of a subsidiary’s stock, shares common officers with its subsidiary and issues consolidated financial statements. This standard is based on a series of cases from the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
See Hayeland,
C. Specific Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs argue that the court may exercise specific jurisdiction over defendant B.A.T. through the actions of its agent, defendant Brown & Williamson. In the alternative, plaintiffs contend that jurisdiction under Wisсonsin’s long-arm statute is appropriate because B.A.T. is part of conspiracy to defraud the public about the health effects of smoking. As an initial matter, I note that plaintiffs have framed their agency theory as an argument for general jurisdiction. This is incorrect. Both the Wisconsin and federal court of appeals have discussed this issue in the context of subsection four of the long-arm statute, a provision that confers
specific
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
See Pavlic v. Woodrum,
1. Agency
A principal-agent relationship exists “only if there has been a manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent may act on his account, and consent by the agent so to act.”
See Johnson v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
*672 Plaintiffs back up their position that defendant Brown & Williamson has acted as an agent of defendant B.A.T. with two unremarkable allegations. First, B.A.T. has profited from the commercial activities of its subsidiary in Wisconsin. Second, B.A.T. “ratified B & W’s actions within Wisconsin,” Dkt. # 117 at 31, a reference to the 1992 and 1993 policy guidelines issued by B.A.T. to Brown & Williamson. By this logic, virtually every parent-subsidiary relationship would be a principal-agent relationship as well. After all, it is unlikely that many parent corporations exert no influence over their subsidiaries or do not benefit financially from the economic success of their subsidiaries.
2. Conspiracy
Plaintiffs argue that this court may exercise jurisdiction over defendant B.A.T. becаuse it participated in a civil conspiracy to suppress scientific information regarding the adverse health effects of smoking and create a bogus scientific controversy regarding the addictive properties of nicotine and harmful effects of tobacco products. Wisconsin courts have not recognized a theory of specific jurisdiction based on allegations that a nonresident is part of a conspiracy.
See Stauffacher,
This conclusion is supported by Supreme Court precedent. In
Asahi,
In the absence of solicitation, physical presence or some other direct contact with a forum, purposeful availment may be established by showing that a defendant directed an act intentionally at the forum. For example,
Calder v. Jones,
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California.
Id.
at 788-789,
From this discussion of Supreme Court precedent, I am persuaded that plaintiffs cannot establish personal jurisdiction over defendant B.A.T. on the basis of B.A.T.’s alleged role as a conspirаtor. Defendant B.A.T. is not connected to the cigarettes sold by defendant Brown & Williamson in Wisconsin, whether as a manufacturer or as the principal of its indirect subsidiary. To the extent that B.A.T. participated in the alleged conspiracy to spread misinformation about the adverse health effects of smoking, the geographic focal point of its participation was not Wisconsin, but all of North America. B.A.T.’s “focus,” or lack thereof, is simply too diffuse to say that it could have anticipated being haled into court in Wisconsin. Even assuming that defendant B.A.T. could have foreseen that the actions it took in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy would eventually have some impact in Wisconsin, foreseeability is not a sufficient substitute for purposefully established contacts.
See World-Wide Volkswagen,
D. Additional Discovery
Plaintiffs have asked the court for more time to conduct additional discovery regarding jurisdiction.' Plaintiffs filed this case over a year and a half ago. As defendant B.A.T. has observed, about one year ago it produced more than 15,000 pages of documents related to its jurisdictional contacts throughout the United States, including Wisconsin. In other words, a decision on this motion is not premature and discovery in this case regarding this issue has been extensive, both in scope and time. At this point, with trial only six short months away, allowing further opportunity for plaintiffs to continue a search for jurisdictional facts would serve no legitimate purpose.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction of defendant B.A:T. Industries P.L.C. is GRANTED.
Notes
. Between 1995 and 1998, defendant B.A.T. underwent a thorough restructuring. Mercifully, the inevitable name changes and realignment associated with this event are not relevant to defendant B.A.T.’s motion to dismiss.