Innes v. TobinInnes v. Tobin
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- White
delivered the opinion of the court.
Thе Governor of Oregon honored a requisition made by the Governor of Texas for the delivery of the plaintiff in error for removal to Texas as a.fugitive from the justice •of that. State. The accused was taken to Texas, tried for murder and a conspiracy to commit murder and acquitted,. She was,- however, not released from custody because she was ordered by -the Governor of Texas under a requisition of the Governor of Georgia, to be held for delivery _to an agent of the State of Georgia fort removal to that State as a fugitive from justice. .
Alleging • these facts, an, application for release by
habeds corpus
was then presented jbb a state court upon the charge that The extradition proceedings and the: warrant, of - removal thereunder, were “wholly null and void” because “your petitioner was never a fugitive from justice from the State of Georgia to the State of Texas within the meaning and intent of the laws of the United States regulating extradition proceedings.” On the return to the writ, the court, finding the facts to be as above stated, refused‘to discharge the petitioner and the case is
All the Federal questions invоlve the meaning of § 2 of Article IV of the Constitution which is as follows: “A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on the demand of the executive authority of thе State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime;” they also depend on § 5278 of the Revised Statutes which is. but a reproduction of § 1 of the act of February 12,1793 (Chap. 7, § 1,1 Stat. 302), giving effect to and establishing the methods of procedure to be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Constitution on the subject to the extent that their execution was by the statute provided for.
Broadly, there is but a single question for consideration, Was the order for rendition repugnant to the Constitution and the provisions of the statute? But two inquiries are involved in its solution: First, was the rendition order void because under the facts there was no power to award it except by disrеgarding express prohibitions or requirements of the Constitution or statute or by necessary implication adversely affecting rights thereby created; and second, even although this was not the case, was the order nevertheless void because under the circumstances it dealt with a situation which, by the effect of the statute was taken out of the reach of state authority even although no express provision was made in the statute for dealing with such condition by any authority, state or Federal? We consider the, two inquiries under separate headings.
First.
For the purpose of the solution of the inquiry under this heading we treat the following proposition as beyond, question: (a) That prior to the adoption of the
Coming in the light of thesp principles to apply the statute, it is not open to question that its provisions expressly or by necеssary implication prohibited the surrender of a person in one State for removal as a fugitive. to another where it clearly appears that the person was not ánd could not have been a-fugitive from the justice-of the demanding State. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691; Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 392.
From this it results that the first inquiry here is,‘did it appear that the accused was a fugitive from the justice of the State of Georgia? -While the facts which we haye stated do not disclose affirmatively that she was ever in Georgia and the date, if аt all, of’ her flight from that State, we think that she was such a fugitive is.to be assumed for three‘obvious reasons: .because there was no question of - such fact made in the application for
habeas corpus
since it is apparent on the “face of the application that the ground of relief relied upon was not that there had
Was there a сonflict between the statute and the order for removal to Georgia arising by necessary implication from the fact that the accused had been brought into the State of.Texas on a requisition upon the State of Oregon and had nоt been released from custody or been returned to Oregon, is the only remaining question under this heading. While it is quite true, as pointed out in the opinion of the court below, and in that of the judge who dissented, that there are some decided cases and opinions expressed by text writers which sustain the affirmative view of this inquiry, the subject is here not an open one since it has been expressly foreclosed by the decision in
Lascelles
v.
Georgia,
148 U. S. 537. In that case the- issue for decision was whether a. person, аccused who had been removed to the State of. Georgia from another State on extradition proceedings for trial for a specified crime was liable’ in Georgia to be tried for another and different crime. Reviewing the whole subject and calling attention to the’ broad lines of distinction between international extradition of fugitives from justice and interstate rendition of such fugitives under the Constitution and the provisions of the act of Congress and the error of assuming that the doctrine of asylum applicable under international’ law to the one case was- applicable to the other, it was
We are thus brought to the remaining heading, which is;
Second.
Although the order for rendition was not in conflict either expressly or by necessary implication with any of .the provisions of the Constitution or statute, was it nevertheless void under the circumstances because it dealt with a subject with which it was beyond the power of the State to deal and which was therefore brought as the result of the аdoption, of the statute within exclusive Federal control although no provision dealing with such subject is found in the statute? To appreciate this question, the proposition relied upon needs to be accurately stated. It is this: The Constitutiоn provides for the rendition to a State of a person who shall have fled from justicé and be found in another State, that is, for the surrender by the State in which the fugitive is found. This, it is conceded, would cover the case and sustain the ‘authority exercisеd, as the accused was a fugitive from the justice of Georgia and was found in Texas. But the proposition insists that the statute is not as broad as the Constitution since it provides not for the .surrender of the fugitive
No reason is suggested nor have we been able to discover any, to sustain the’ assumption that the framers оf the statute in not making its. provisions - exactly coterminous with the.power granted‘by the Constitution did so for the purpose- of leaving the. subject so far as unprovided for beyond the operation of any legal authority whatever, state or national. On the contrary, when the situation with which the’ statute dealt is. contemplated, • the reasonable assumption is that by the omission to
It follows from what we have said that the court below was right in refusing to discharge the accused and its. judgment therefore must be and it is
Affirmed.
By stipulation of counsel a similar judgment will be entered in ease of Victor E. Innes v. Tobin, Sheriff, No. 533.