Circuit Judge.
The Massachusetts Commissioner of Correction appeals from an order of the district court entered in aid of its judgment rendered in an action brought by inmates of Boston’s Charles Streеt Jail (the “Jail”).
In the court’s judgment entered June 20, 1973, from which they took no appeal, all defendants, including the Commissioner, were enjoined from housing in any cell at the Jail after November 30, 1973, more than one inmate awaiting trial. The court remarked in its opinion that achieving single cell occupancy would likely require a reduction in the population, and that defendants should consider transferring inmates to other
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state and county institutions.
Id.
By mid-November, the court had been advised by the Suffolk County officials that they could not comply with the November 30 deadline for ending multiple cell occupancy since there was no place under their control to put the surplus inmates. Appellant Commissioner, doubtless hard pressed by budgetary and other constraints, offered no cooperation; yet it had become apparent that the unconstitutional crowding at the Jail could be relieved immediately only through thе use of space and facilities outside Suffolk County which the Commissioner alone had the statutory power to command. 1
Faced with the County’s dilemma, the district court ordered the Commissioner to cooperate with the sheriff to arrange for a transfer of female inmates from the Jail to other institutions. The situation remained static, however, and four days latеr the court, after calculating the maximum number that could be accommodated at the Jail under a single cell plan, and after ascertaining that there were sufficient vaсancies elsewhere for the overflow, entered the order from which the Commissioner has appealed. It requires the Commissioner to transfer all women confined at the Jаil to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Framingham, or to any other state or county facility for the detention of women inmates, pursuant to his statutory authority to effect statewide transfers. The order also requires male detainees with state felony records to be transferred to other state or county institutions whenever needed to ensure single сell occupancy at the Jail. In its memorandum accompanying the order, the court stated that the Commissioner was “the only person in the Commonwealth” in a position to arrange for the confinement of the women inmates elsewhere than at the Jail; and likewise that only the Commissioner had the necessary authority to transfer male detainees.
Aрpeal from the order was taken solely by the Commissioner. Suffolk County officials support it. We hold the order to be valid.
Appellant does not argue to us that unconstitutional cоnditions at the Jail could be better relieved by a different plan, or that facilities exist in Suffolk County for the surplus inmates. Indeed, he could scarcely do so, since the court enterеd the order only after the Commissioner and other defendants were unable to come up with any reasonable alternative. Nor does appellant claim that compliance is impossible.
Appellant’s contention is simply that the district court lacked power to order him to make transfers “without a showing of unconstitutional conduct on his part.” Hоwever, appellant underestimates his own statutory duties respecting the Jail and its inmates, as well as the district court’s equitable powers to remedy violations of the Constitution.
See, e. g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-burg Board of Education,
When thе inmates’ complaint was filed, the Commissioner, besides his *1199 unique state-wide transfer powers, had “general supervision of jails and houses of correction,” M.G.L. c. 124, § 1(a). This has recently been sharpened to present language directing him to “establish . . . minimum standards for the care and custody of all persons committed to county correctional facilities”, 2 and to sеcure compliance with such standards. M.G.L. c. 127, § 1A. See also M.G.L. c. 127, § IB; c. 124, §§ 1(d), (q). He is also authorized to inspect county institutions, and county officials are, in turn, to report annually to him. M.G.L. c. 127, §§ IB, 10. His powers at such facilities further extend to prisoner classification, id. § 21, and the furnishing of consultation services, technical assistance, and grants-in-aid, id. § 1A. In sum, while the day-today funding and management comes frоm the county, the Commissioner has major statutory responsibilities bearing precisely on the issues raised in the inmates’ suit.
It is apparent why authority has been so centralized. The county jails and institutions are part of a state-wide system of detention and corrections. The Jail holds those awaiting felony.trials in a major session of the state court. Many detainees will thеreafter serve their sentences in state institutions managed by the Commissioner. Inmates and their records are moved daily between state-managed and county-managed institutions. The Jаil cannot be viewed in splendid isolation from the rest of the Commonwealth.
Given both the practicalities of the situation and his statutory role, the Commissioner may not disavow any resрonsibility for conditions at the Jail or from reasonable measures to bring them up to constitutional standards. The question is not one of his personal fault; an official may be enjoined without proof of fault. “The result, not the specific intent, is what matters.” Rozecki v. Gaughan,
The Commissioner’s links with county institutions in the integrated system are more than enough to support remediаl relief of this nature.
See
Washington v. Lee,
The Commissioner’s legal position is additiоnally weakened by his failure to appeal from the judgment of the district court. There is independent merit to appellees’ argument that the Commissioner is now foreclosed frоm claiming that he is not a proper party to this action and that no injunction could be issued againt him. F.R.A.P. 3, 4. On appeal from a collateral order, the underlying judgment is immune from attack. 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice jf 110.14[1] (2d ed. 1973). Furthermore, prior to entry of the final judgment the Commissioner had unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on essentially the same *1200 ground advanced here; had hе wished to preserve the point, he should have appealed from the judgment. But whether the appeal is narrowed, or whether it is seen as raising the broader issue asserted by thе Commissioner, we find it to be without merit.
Affirmed.
Notes
. M.G.L. c. 27G, § 52A: “Persons held in jail for trial may, with the approval of the district attorney ... be removed by the commissioner of correction to a jail in anothеr county . . . . In addition, such persons, if they have been previously incarcerated in a correctional institution of the commonwealth under sentence for a felony, may, with the аpproval of the district attorney, be removed by the commissioner of correction to a correctional institution of the commonwealth, . . . . ”
M.G.L. c. 127, § 97: “The commissioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner . . . with the approval of the sheriff of the county . . . from any jail or house of correction to any such [state correctional] institution ... or from аny jail or house of correction to any other jail or house of correction.”
. Tlie term “county correctional facilities” covers jails as well as county houses of correction. M.G.L. c. 125, § 1(d), (f) ; c. 126, § 4.