187 Pa. 186 | Pa. | 1898
Opinion by
The nature of the title of defendants’ testator, Dr. John T. Christy, to the Gallitzin land of his father, Francis X. Christy, has been definitely settled by the final judgments of this Court in Christy v. Christy, 162 Pa. 485, and Same v. Same, 176 Pa. 427. He held the legal title, accompanied by an express declaration of trust in favor of his brothers and sisters as to their-respective shares. To his own share he had both the legal and equitable title; as to the other shares, the equitable was in the brothers and sisters, with the right to demand a conveyance-from the brother as soon as they did equity, that is, paid to him their respective shares of the purchase money. This was the situation of plaintiff and her trustee up until September 26, 1883, when for a consideration of $500 she remised, released
The evidence is abundant and uncontradicted, that the grantee sought to buy the interest, and that the grantor wanted to sell it. From the paper, on its face, the intention, by unmistakable and comprehensive terms, was accomplished. The deed, after its delivery, made John T. Christy the absolute owner of his sister’s land; he was no longer her trustee under the express trust; she was no longer a beneficiary entitled to a conveyance from him of the legal title, on paying her proportion of the purchase money; the legal and equitable title were united in the purchaser.
Two years after the date of the deed, she avers she discovered that she had been defrauded by her brother, in that he had induced her to execute it by false representations as to the value of her interest; that instead of being worth but $500, the consideration paid, it was really worth ten times that sum. As to the question, whether the deed was procured by fraud, found as a fact in favor of plaintiff by the court below, and which has been earnestly argued here by counsel on both sides, we do not pass upon it, because it is not necessary to a decision of the cause.
In the consideration of the questions on which the judgment depends, we assume, that the deed was obtained by fraud; further, we accept as facts the averments of this bill, that she discovered the fraud within two years of the date of the deed, and that for more than ten years thereafter she made no attempt to assert title, or to have the fraud judicially ascertained and declared. In the mean time, she knew the grantee was improving the land and developing the coal. She had in her possession the purchase money, $500 ; besides, before executing the deed, she refused to pay her share of the original purchase money paid by John T. Christy to the executor of his father. As to this last statement, the learned judge of the
Appellant’s counsel argues that this is a case of a trustee dealing with his cestui que trust; and that by all the authorities, while the release or quitclaim deed is good as a receipt for the amount paid, it is absolutely valueless as a conveyance, until the trustee shows affirmatively the actual fairness of the transaction. The argument does not take notice of the distinction between a cestui que trust under an active trust, where the trustee has active duties to perform, and a mere dry trust, which last is the case before us. The whole duty of the trustee was to advance the purchase money, take and hold the legal title for his sister; her duty was to pay him her share of the purchase money, and it then became his duty to convey to her. This was the whole scope of the trust. “ The position of such a trustee gives him no vantage ground, either of superior information or undue influence over the cestui quo trust, and the parties, therefore, deal as strangers, and are subject to the ordinary rule of buyer and seller: ” Bispham’s Principles of Equity, see. 237; 1 Lewin on Trusts, page 484; Perry on Trusts, sec. 521. There was nothing in the relation of the parties or the terms of the trust which imposed upon the trustee auy greater burden in proving his contract, or which relieved her of any burden in rescinding it, than if it had been made between strangers. The quitclaim deed must be taken, prima facie, for what it purports to be, an absolute extinguishment of the grantor’s title in the land. She was bound to move for its rescission within a reasonable time after she discovered she was wronged, and this she did not do. The court below does not sustain its decree on the ground of implied ratification, which, as we think we have shown, it might well have done, but it dismisses plaintiff’s bill, because she attempts to enforce an implied trust after the ex
The decree of trusteeship of Christy, because of the fraud upon his sister in procuring the deed, would not touch the trust under the express agreement. The last would rest on the writing, the other on an implication warranted by facts proved by parol. By her deed, the express trusteeship was at an end, and this by a writing as formal as the one which created it; it could not be revived until the establishment of an implied trust, resulting from the fraud in procuring the last writing. Until this was done equity could not restore to her that which she had parted with, her estate in the land; as the title and posses
We think the court below was right in holding that plaintiff’s bill was barred by the act of 1856.
The decree is affirmed at costs of appellant.