104 Me. 252 | Me. | 1908
This is an action of assumpsit brought to recover the expense incurred by the plaintiff town for pauper supplies furnished between February 21, 1904, and June 4th, 1905, to Frank M. Moody, his wife and four minor children. After the introduction of evidence was closed on both sides, the presiding Justice on motion of the plaintiffs’ counsel, directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed in the writ with interest. The jury thereupon returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $218.83. The case comes to the Law Court on exceptions to this ruling and also to the admission of certain evidence during the progress of the trial.
It is a well established and familiar rule of procedure in this State that the court may properly instruct the jury to return a
The question accordingly presented for the determination of the court in the case at bar, is whether the material and admissible evidence in the case afforded sufficient proof to support a verdict in favor of the defendant. If not, and it would have been the duty of the court to set aside such a verdict if it had been rendered, the ruling of the presiding Justice directing a verdict for the plaintiff was obviously correct.
(it was not in controversy that the supplies charged in the plaintiffs’ account were actually furnished by the plaintiff town, during the period above stated and that they were necessary for the relief of Frank M. Moody and his family, consisting of Mary J. Moody who was living with him as his wife, and their four minor children named in the declaration, and that the expenditures for which the plaintiff town seeks reimbursement in this action were actually made by the town for the supplies thus furnished. It was satisfactorily established by uncontradicted evidence that the supplies in question were received and consumed in the family of Frank M. Moody, composed of the members above stated, with full knowl
It is admitted that no answer was returned to these notices by the over-seers of the defendant town, within two months as required by section 40 of chapter 27, R. S., stating their objections to the removal; but the defendant town, besides interposing an objection to the sufficiency of the first notice, now invokes the rule of law settled in Turner v. Brunswick, 5 Green. 31, that while under the provisions of the statute last cited, the defendant is estopped to deny that the settlement of the paupers in question is in any other than the plaintiff town of Wellington, it is not precluded from showing that it was in fact in that town. The defendant claims that there is evidence showing that pauper settlement of Frank M. Moody was in fact in the town of Wellington during the period in question. But the defendants’ principal contention appears to be in accordance with the defense set up in his brief statement that even if the settlement of Frank M. Moody himself was in the defendant town, Mary J. Moody was not his lawful wife and had a separate settlement of her own, and the four minor children were illegitimate and had a separate settlement derived from their mother, and if such were the fact it is conceded that the defendant would not be estopped to show it by reason- of its failure to return an answer to the plaintiffs’ notices above specified. Glenburn v. Oldtown, 63 Maine, 582.
These objections urged by the defendants’ counsel in support of the exceptions will be considered in their order, and the conclusions of the court stated without extended discussion of the testimony.
With respect to the objection to the sufficiency of the notice from the plaintiff to the defendant town, dated March 28, 1904, the statute above cited provides that overseers "shall send a written
The notice in question of March 28, 1904, states that "Frank M. Moody, and wife and children” have fallen into distress, etc. It fails to give either the names or the number of the children, and in that respect is obviously an insufficient compliance with the statute as interpreted by the court. But as the authorized agents of the town, the overseers of the poor may waive any objection arising from such an informality, or defect in the notice. Unity v. Thorndike, 15 Maine, 182. Although the overseers of the defendant town failed to make any reply to this notice within two months, it appears that on the 4th of the following February, an answer was in fact returned by them, as follows, viz :
"We send you herewith check for amount of the enclosed bill for medical attendance on Frank Moody. Please receipt bill and return and in regard to the bill of $73.49 for supplies furnished said Moody and family, we will say that upon investigation it does not appear clear to us that Mrs. Moody and children are paupers of this town. It will be further investigated and what bills you have for the support of Frank Moody himself we will settle and investigate the other.”
It appears from this letter which was authorized by a majority of the overseers of the defendant town, that the notice to which this was a reply, was accepted without objection as a sufficiently definite statement of the facts to enable the overseers to investigate the question of the liability of the defendant town for the support of the "wife and children” of Frank M. Moody. The overseers thereby admitted that "Mrs. Moody and children” were sufficiently identified to them, and they must be deemed to have waived any objection arising from the failure of the notice to give a more definite description. York v. Penobscot, 2 Maine, 1; Embden v. Augusta,
The notice of March 22, 1905, was admitted without objection arising from any alleged defect or informality therein and it appears to be sufficient. It states that Frank M. Moody and his wife Jane Moody and their four minor children have fallen into distress, etc. Construed in connection with the information already possessed by the overseers, as disclosed by their letter of the preceding month- above quoted, this notice unquestionably afforded the defendant overseers all the information which they desired in regard to the Moody family at that time. Holden v. Glenburn, 63 Maine, 579; Woodstock v. Bethel, 66 Maine, 569.
The defendant further objected to the introduction of the notices on the ground that the record of the election in the plaintiff town for each of the years 1904 and 1905, fails to show that the overseers of the poor were elected "by ballot” or "by major vote.” The records for each of these years states that the town "voted and chose” the persons named "overseers of the poor.” Sections 12 and 14 of chapter 4 also provide that overseers of the poor shall be chosen "by major vote” and "by ballot.” In this case the record is silent as to the mode of choice; the town "voted and chose” the overseers of the poor. But in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it is to be presumed that the town proceeded in the usual and legal manner. Omnia presumuntur rite esse acta. If the record is not impeached, it imports a legal choice, and the overseers are presumed to have been legally elected. Mussey v. White, 3 Maine, 290; Blanchard v. Dow, 32 Maine, 557; Gerry v. Herrick, 87 Maine, 219.
But even if the record were not thus to be credited, it was sufficient for the plaintiffs to prove that the supplies were furnished by a majority of the acting overseers of the poor and that notice was given by one of the acting overseers. New Portland v. Kingfield, 55 Maine, 172; Belfast v. Morrill, 65 Maine, 580.
With respect to the second proposition, it satisfactorily appears from- uncontradicted testimony that from February 21, 1904, to June 4, 1905, the period during which the supplies in question
But as already noted the principal controversy between the parties arose upon the defendants’ contention that Mary Jane Moody, the woman who was living with Frank M. Moody when the supplies in question were furnished and was represented in the notices to be his wife, was not in fact his lawful wife, and that the four minor children mentioned in the notices were not his legitimate children.
Frank M. Moody, the pauper in question, was divorced from his first wife Lillie B. Moody in December, 1894, and November 26, 1896, married Mary Jane Mears, whose maiden name was Mary Jane Farrar, but she had a lawful husband living named John A. Mears, who was then serving a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison for ten years for the crime of rape, and this marriage to Moody was therefore unlawful and their children illegitimate. On the 7th of October, 1903, however, having learned presumably, that under our .statutes only a life sentence in state prison would dissolve the bonds of matrimony without legal process, Mary Jane Mears obtained a decree of divorce from John A. Mears, in the Supreme Judicial Court, and on the fifteenth of the same month was lawfully joined in marriage to Frank M. Moody. The four minor children in question were born after her supposed marriage to Moody in 1896, while John A. Mears was serving his sentence in state prison, and they were the progeny of Frank M. Moody and Mary Jane Mears, afterward Mary Jane Moody. Thereupon the plaintiff invokes paragraph three, section one of chapter 27, R. S., which declares that "Illegitimate children have the settlement of their mother at the time of their birth, but when the-parents of such children born after March, 24,1864 intermarry, they are deemed legitimate and have the settlement of their father. ” The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous and it must be presumed to mean what it has so plainly expressed. When clear and unequivocal language is used which admits of only one meaning, it is not permissible to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, section 4; Davis v. Randall, 97 Maine, 36. The justice and humanity of the statute have been illustrated in several instances which have been brought
But the counsel insists that this statute is not to be construed to apply to the pauper settlement of illegitimate children of parents who were living together in a state of adultery at the time of the birth of such children, and cites Sams v. Sams, 85 Kentucky, 396, in support of this contention. But the question before the Kentucky court in that case involved the rights of inheritance of illegitimate children and had no reference to their pauper settlement. The statute there construed reads as follows : " If a man having had a child by a woman, shall afterwards marry her, such child or its descendants if recognized by him before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate.” And it was held by the court that the statute did not apply to that class of cases where a husband has violated his marriage vows and become the father of children by an adulterous intercourse with another woman during the marital relation. The reason for this conclusion is thus stated by the court: " It can scarcely be supposed that any law would have been enacted by which the children of the adulterous intercourse would be made legitimate that they might inherit with the children of the lawful wife, equal parts of the estate. Such a statute if so construed would only invite the husband to desert his wife and the woman of easy virtue to encourage the violation of his marriage vows, that she might some day become his lawful wife and her children the rightful heirs of the estate.”
It is unnecessary to consider whether this court would have reached the same conclusion respecting the construction of a statute manifestly designed for the protection of innocent children who were not morally responsible for the conduct of their parents. It
But it may well be questioned whether the case at bar falls within the class represented by the Kentucky case. It is true that the marriage between Frank M. Moody and Mary Jane Mears Nov. 26, 1896, took place before the divorce was obtained from John A. Mears who was then in state prison. It appears, however, that all of the requirements of the statutes respecting the record of their intentions of marriage and its solemnization, were carefully observed. They lived together thereafter as husband and wife, and the four children in question were born after that marriage, and there is reasonable ground for the inference that they honestly believed that their first marriage was a legal one and their children legitimate at the time of their birth.
Finally the defendant denies the legality of the second marriage of October 15, 1903, on the ground that the decree of divorce obtained by Mary Jane Mears from John A. Mears in October, 1903, was invalid for the reason alleged, that the libel was not signed by her. It appears that the libelant was unable to write her name and was obliged to make her mark. It is stated in the libel that her maiden name was Mary Jane Farrar, and counsel inadvertently wrote the name of Mary Jane Farrar instead of Mary Jane Mears, so that the signature appears thus : "Mary Jane X Farrar.” The libelant is represented in the libel to be Mary Jane Meats and her counsel was. permitted to testify that in fact it was Mary Jane Mears, the person
All of the exceptions taken to the admission of testimony have been shown to be without merit. It clearly appears that October 15, 1903, Mary Jane Mears became the lawful wife of Frank M. Moody,' and although the four minor children in question were illegitimate at the time of their birth,- yet by reason of the intermarriage of their parents Frank M. Moody and Mary Jane Moody, after the divorce of the latter from John A. Mears, these children are to be deemed legitimate under the pauper laws of this State and have the settlement of their father in the defendant town of CorinnaTj
It is the opinion of the court that the legal evidence in the case would not support a verdict in favor of the defendant, and that the entry must accordingly be, —-
Exceptions overruled. //