165 Mass. 296 | Mass. | 1896
The respondents located anew the way in question, and prescribed the manner in which it should be made, and assessed the expense thereof in part upon the town and in part upon the county, in accordance with the provisions of the Pub. Sts. c. 49, §§ 9, 13. Under the statute and order of the commissioners it was the duty of the town of Lexington to construct and build the way in the manner prescribed in the order. Of the expense of construction $3,000 was assessed upon the county, and the balance upon the town. By the terms of the order this sum was to be paid towards the expense of the alteration out of the county treasury into the town treasury of Lexington whenever the road should be completed to the acceptance of the commissioners, and all claims for damages growing out of the alterations should be settled. The road never was completed by the town to the acceptance of the commissioners, and the town refused to construct it according to the order as the order was understood and interpreted by the commissioners. In regard to all matters of fact involved in the determination of the question whether such an order has been complied with, the decision of the county commissioners is final and conclusive. Rice v. Middlesex Commissioners, 13 Pick. 225, 228. Walker v. Orange, 16 Gray, 193. We see no error of law in their decision that the town failed to complete the work. Indeed, it seems clear that the decision was correct. By the terms of the order the town was not entitled to receive the sum of $3,000. This sum was to be paid only upon the performance of the whole work. The commissioners thereupon made an
It is contended that the order could not be complied with literally by the town or the county commissioners without a violation of the rights of the abutting landowners, or without their consent. If that be so, we think it does not affect the case in its present form. It is to be inferred that the landowners consented to the doing of the work in accordance with the order, and for aught that appears the method adopted was a good one, both for the public and the abutters. We are of opinion that the discretion of the justice who heard the case was rightly exercised in his refusal to issue a writ of mandamus.
Petition dismissed.