Ingram v. Oneok, Inc.Ingram v. Oneok, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , , , ,
- Before:
- Doolin
The controversy in this novel case on certiorari is whether the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by
The Oklahoma Legislature enacted
No person, firm, partnership or corporation may discharge any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, or has retained a lawyer to represent him in said claim, instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the provisions of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or has testified or is to testify in any such proceeding. Provided no employer shall be required to rehire or retain any employee who is determined physically unable to perform his assigned duties.
The remedies for an employee discharged in violation of the Act are “reasonable damages,” including if appropriate, exemplary or punitive damages, and reinstatement to his/her former position.
There is no specifically prescribed statute of limitations for a cause of action under
I.
Delbert Ingram (appellee-employee) had been employed by appellant-employer Oneok, Inc., as a meter reader when he sustained a work-related injury in May, 1980. Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation and received payments for temporary total disability. Ten months later, on March 3, 1981, employer terminated employee’s employment.
On September 22, 1983, after more than two, but less than three years following his termination, employee filed an action for retaliatory discharge against employer. During the trial court proceedings, employer, after the opinion in
Mullins v. John Zink Co.,
The trial court further granted employer’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed employee’s claim based upon the
Mullins
decision, concluding that the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Employee appealed arguing his claim is governed by the three-year limitation period for “an action upon a liability
The Court of Appeals, Division 1, reversed the summary judgment in favor of employer, and specifically rejected its colleagues’ opinion in
Mullins.
In
Mullins,
the Court of Appeals, Division 2, placed great reliance on our characterization of wrongful discharge as a “civil tort” in
Webb v. Dayton Tire and Rubber Co.,
However in the instant case, the appellate court found that the liability imposed by
II.
In this case, our certiorari cognizance for review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion pursuant to the provisions of Article 7, § 5, Okl. Const., was not timely invoked. The pertinent terms of Art. 7, § 5, Okl. Const., provide:
... When the intermediate appellate courts acquire jurisdiction in any cause and make final disposition of the same, such disposition shall be final and there shall be no further right of appeal except for issuance of a writ of certiorari ordered by a majority of the Supreme Court which may affirm, modify or make such other changes in said decision as it deems proper ... [emphasis added].
The required cost desposit reached the clerk too
late
— after the maximum time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari had lapsed. See
Inasmuch as the object to be attained may be accomplished without affording relief to the
tardy
certiorari petitioner, we assume today certiorari cognizance conferred by Art. 7, § 4, Okl. Const. See also,
... The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts.... The Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, in criminal matters and all other appellate courts shall have power to issue, hear and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo war-ranto, certiorari, prohibition and such other remedial writs as may be provided by law_ [emphasis added].
Acting in the exercise of that superintendence, we promulgate our pronouncement on the dispositive issue for the general guidance of the bench and bar. See e.g.,
State v. Right,
III.
On certiorari, employer, relying on
Mullins,
argues unpersuasively that the principal issue is the characterization of employee’s action. According to employer’s argument, in
Hinson,
“this Court recognized that the basis of retaliatory discharge claims was a violation of public policy.” Since the basic character of § 5 is essential
First, the Workers’ Compensation Act,
Second and quite simply, our survey of national jurisprudence on liability for wrongful discharge and our evaluation and assessment of the appellant’s action under those nationally recognized exceptions in
Hinson
does not impliedly or expressly support employer’s contention that this Court took cognizance and adopted such public policy tort exceptions to an at-will employment relationship. As a matter of law, in
Hinson,
we specifically declined “to impose upon the employer a legal duty not to terminate an at-will employee in bad faith.”
Finally, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted the Retaliatory Discharge Act in 1981— six years prior to this Court’s decision in Hinson. Since the legislature had previously enacted its statutory exception to the at-will employment doctrine, our supposedly subsequent recognition of the same exception, cloaked in public policy, would be redundant and unnecessary. Accordingly, employer’s simplistic argument lacks sound reasoning.
Employer next alleges a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Employer contends that the appellate court’s “artifical classification” of a retaliatory discharge action treats similar wrongful discharge claims, such as wrongful termination because of race or whistle blowing, differently; thus, creating an unconstitutional distinction. Employer asserts that “it would make no sense to require one discharged because of his race to bring his action within two years while allowing an employee, discharged for filing a worker’s compensation claim three years.” Employer’s reliance on federal court decisions to support this proposition is misplaced.
Again, we lead employer back to the sound law. The “meaning of federal statutes is for the United States Supreme Court, and its interpretation will be followed by this Court.”
United States v. Home Federal S. & L. Ass’n of Tulsa,
IV.
Although this Court has characterized a retaliatory discharge action as a ‘civil tort’ in
Webb,
insofar as construing manifested legislative intent concerning the scope of damages under
We noted at the outset that the Oklahoma Legislature did not provide any specific limitation period to enforce the provisions of the Retaliatory Discharge Act. Consequently, “we must adopt for it the most analogous statute of limitations in the existing catalogue.”
Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
In 1895 the Oklahoma Legislature adopted the language of
V.
The test and “universally accepted definition of a ‘liability created by statute’ is a liability which would not exist but for the statute.”
Smith Engineering Works,
Prior to the statutory enactment of the Retaliatory Discharge Act, an at-will employee discharged for exercising rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act had no cause of action for retaliatory discharge against the employer. Even at common law, absent a breach of contract, an at-will employee had no cause of action to recover damages for wrongful discharge.
Thus, an employer was not liable to a former employee prior to the adoption of
The Retaliatory Discharge Act “is not one relating to remedy or procedure; it concerns the substantive rights of the parties and imposes an obligation where none before existed.”
Hollinger,
We find and hold the intent of the Legislature, embodied in
Having previously granted Certiorari, we OVERRULE the opinion of the Court of Appeals rendered in
Mullins v. John Zink Co.,