Ingram v. Joe Conrad Chevrolet, Inc.Ingram v. Joe Conrad Chevrolet, Inc.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Reed
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REED, District Judge.This is an action concerning alleged violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA). On April 4,1980, William R. Ingram filed a complaint alleging that Joe Conrad Chevrolet (JCC) and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) violated the TILA in eight separate ways. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at 4-5.
There are three motions currently pending before this Court. They are 1) the plaintiff’s motion for class action certification, 2) GMAC’s motion to file a counterclaim, and 3) the defendants’ motion to strike.
The prerequisites to a class action are that 1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
The Court must consider a variety of factors in determining whether the numerosity requirement has been met. The number of parties involved, the inexpediency of their joinder, and the inconvenience of trying individual suits all must be considered. The plaintiff asserts that there are approximately 1,100 class members. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Action Certification (Plaintiff’s Motion). Defendant GMAC does not challenge plaintiff’s contention of the size of the class. See Defendant GMAC’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (GMAC’s Brief in Opposition). Defendant JCC’s only comment on the numerosity of the class is a reference to plaintiff’s motion for joinder of party-plaintiffs. See Brief of Defendant, Joe Conrad Chevrolet, Inc. in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (JCC’s Brief in Opposition) at 7. That motion, now withdrawn, originally was made for consideration in the event class certification was denied. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Joinder of Party-Plaintiffs. The Court need not decide now whether the plaintiff’s motion for joinder of party-plaintiffs was well-taken. The present issue is whether joinder is impracticable. The record before the Court adequately demonstrates that numerosity has been shown. The exact number of class members is not known. The *131plaintiff, however, has adequately described the class. See Bishop v. United States Steel Corp., 76 F.R.D. 400, 402 (E.D.Mo.1977).
The next requirement is that there are questions of law or fact common to the class.
Plaintiff has asserted that his claims are typical of those of class members. “Any inquiry into typicality under
The last general prerequisite to any class action is that the representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
There are two criteria for determining the adequacy of class representation: 1) whether the representative has interests in common with the unnamed members of the class and 2) whether the representative, through qualified counsel, will vigorously pursue the goals of the class. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524-525 (6th Cir. 1976). The analysis of whether these criteria have been satisfied can be done by looking at a variety of factors.
The representative here has interests in common with the absent class members. This action is essentially one of statutory interpretation, particularly since the defendants have admitted that substantially similar contracts were used by all class members. The issue of the counterclaim is *132again reserved. One potential conflict is that the more people included in the class, the smaller the representative’s potential award. The plaintiff already has foregone a recovery of $1,000 which is almost certainly greater than that which he may eventually receive as a member of a class. See GMAC’s Offer of Judgment. This, combined with the representative’s proposed definition of the class, convince the Court that no attempt will be made to raise plaintiff’s potential recovery by unduly limiting the size of the class. The Court also notes that the issues of liability and the total amount to be awarded to the class can be separated from the issue of individual claims.
One of the factors to be considered in evaluating the adequacy of representation is the competence of the legal counsel acting on behalf of the class. Experience, and professional ability are the components of that competence. The plaintiff’s attorneys are well-versed in class action litigation, and two of them have specialized in bringing TILA cases. See Cross v. National Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1977). The counsel for the plaintiff also have demonstrated satisfactory ability, particularly in oral argument. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y.1968), rev’d on other grounds 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
The personal or financial interest of the representative should be considered in determining whether representation is adequate under
The plaintiff must have sufficient means to pay the expenses of prosecuting this class action. Although serious questions have been raised on this issue, the Court presently is satisfied that the plaintiff can maintain a class action. The Court notes that if financial difficulties impair the plaintiff’s ability to conduct this suit as a class action, the class may be decertified. See Hochschuler v. G. D. Searle & Co., 82 F.R.D. 339 (N.D.Ill.1978);
The plaintiff asserts that this action is properly a class action under
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the. class would create a risk of ... adjudications with respect to individual members of the . class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
The plaintiff has not explicitly relied on any specific theory to support the contention that this action properly may be maintained as a class action under
The plaintiff also has made a conclusory assertion that a class action is maintainable here under
A class must be certified here, if at all, in accordance with the requirements of
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.Fed.R. Civ.P. 23(b)(3) .
The primary issue here is whether or not the contract used by the defendants violates the TILA. This central issue, substantially similar for all class members, dwarfs the other, individual questions in this litigation. The more peripheral issues include whether or not the credit was extended for business or personal use and the counterclaim. It currently appears that a group of claimants, sufficiently numerous for class action treatment, exists in this case. The separation of the credit purchasers into business and personal use categories properly may await the determination of liability and damages, if any. The counterclaim will be discussed later. The common questions predominate over the individual questions.
The only plausible alternative to a class action by which this dispute could be resolved is to require that claimants pursue individual actions. This would require a massive duplication of effort. The gravamen of every complaint would be the same, violations of the TILA. The named plaintiff is an adequate class representative. There does not appear to be any valid interest in the conduct of separate lawsuits. See
The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions may be determined by considering the number of other suits filed, the number of intervenors in this action, and the practical likelihood that individual action would be filed. The Court is unaware of any parallel individual actions. See
This Court is a desirable forum for the litigation of these claims.
One of the defendants and probably the majority of the class members are within a short distance of this Court. The TILA is a federal statute, designed to remedy credit disclosure problems on a nationwide basis. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington is the best forum in which to litigate these claims.
The final factor specifically mentioned in
Defendant GMAC has tendered a counterclaim against William Ingram. This counterclaim matured after the filing of GMAC’s answer and is governed by the provisions of Rule 13(e). GMAC’s Motion to File Counterclaim. There is apparently a split among the authorities on whether a counterclaim for default in a TILA case is a compulsory or a permissive counterclaim. Reply to GMAC’s Motion to File Counter Claim. This Court need not decide this question. The counterclaim here matured after the service of GMAC’s pleading and is thus not a compulsory counterclaim. See
On January 26,1981, the defendants filed a motion to strike the affidavits of Reginald Leonard Thomas and Richard R. Melville which are in support of the plaintiff’s motion for class certification. These affidavits were filed on January 16, 1981, the date of a hearing before this Court on, inter alia, the issue of class certification. There is no certificate of service on these affidavits, although they were served on the defendants. Defendants’ Motion to Strike. There is a technical violation of Rule 6(d). The defendants, however, raised the issue of the expense associated with the notification of a class at the hearing and have had ample opportunity to file opposing affidavits.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
(1) That a class of all consumers who purchased automobiles from Joe Conrad Chevrolet, Inc. in a credit transaction financed through General Motors Acceptance Corporation using a contract substantially similar to that used by William R. Ingram, on or after April 4, 1979 is hereby CERTIFIED;
(2) That the motion of GMAC to file a counterclaim is hereby DENIED;
(3) That the motion of defendants GMAC and JCC to strike the affidavits of Reginald Leonard Thomas and Richard R. Melville is hereby DENIED.