This is a case of importance, as it concerns property of great value, in the lawful enjoyment of which each party is entitled to protection. But as the parties have opposite interests, and the free exercise of their rights and privileges, respectively claimed, is incompatible, it will follow that however the case may be decided, one or the other of the parties will be subjected to a loss of property, or other consequential damages, which may be very considerable. We have, therefore, taken time to look into the authorities cited, and to consider the case with attention and deliberation, in the hope that we might come to a decision, which would terminate the present controversy, and so settle and establish the rights and privileges of the parties as to prevent future litigation. We have, however, met with difficulties in our way, which are not to be overcome, without disregarding some of the rules and principles of equity which seem to be well established, and which in their general operation are just and salutary. These we are not at liberty to disregard ; for although courts of equity are invested with large discretionary powers, yet they are not to be exercised arbitra
■ The defendants are charged with the continuance of a nuisance to the plaintiff’s water mill and works for the manufacturing of cotton goods, from the 3d of March 1837, to the time of the filing of the bill, by polluting the waters of the stream on which the plaintiff’s mill was situate, and above the same, by impregnating the same with sundry noxious and unwholesome drugs, dye-stuffs, and other noxious preparations, whereby the water of the stream, running to the plaintiff’s mill, had become corrupt, unwholesome and unfit for use, and so that the plaintiff, with his workmen and tenants, and their families,- could not have the use of the same in so wholesome and beneficial a manner as he of right ought to have.
The plaintiff remained in the possession and occupation of his mill and works until the 1st of March 1839, when he demised the same to Horatio N. Ingraham for the term of three years ; and the first question is, whether the plaintiff is entitled, in this suit, to damages for the grievances alleged during this interval ; and we are clearly of opinion that he is not. Indeed oil this point there can be no doubt. For the recovery of damages the plaintiff has a complete and adequate remedy at law, and that is the proper and appropriate remedy. Where an injury will admit of a pecuniary compensation, a court of equity will never interpose. And this principle is applicable to the alleged injury to the plaintiff’s reversionary interest after his demise to H. N. Ingraham. Numerous cases were cited at the argument, to establish a principle, which no one can doubt, namely, that an action may be maintained by a reversioner for an injury done to his reversion. But his remedy is by an action
It is averred in the bill, that H. N. Ingraham, the tenant, threatens to abandon the mill and his lease, and to refuse to pay rent. But he has no right so to do; for if the defendants’ acts are unlawful, the tenant’s remedy is against them. The plaintiff’s covenant in the lease, that the tenant should quietly enjoy, free from all adverse claims, is only against lawful claims. 2 Saund. 178, note (8.) 6 Mass. 252.
The question then is, whether the plaintiff may have leave to amend the bill, by joining the tenant as a party. No motion for leave thus to amend has yet been made ; and at this stage of the cause there are obvious objections to its allowance, which it would be difficult to avoid or overcome. Objection was made for the want of parties, in the defendants’ first answer, and the plaintiff ought then immediately to have moved for the proper amendment, before issue joined and examination of the witnesses ; and most certainly, before a final hearing on the merits. And now there are also technical difficulties and objections to the amendment. The lease having expired, there is no longer
But supposing these difficulties might he obviated by an amendment of the bill, another objection remains, on which the defendants’ counsel rely, which appears to be sustained by the authorities. The defendants’ counsel maintain that they have a good defence at law ; and they contend that they have a good title by prescription, and by estoppel under the indenture between Dwight Ingraham and Royal Sibley, from whom the parties respectively derive their titles. And the defendants deny also, in their answer, that the impurity of the water in the stream, and the offensive exhalations therefrom, were caused by them, but that they arose from the stagnation of the water in the plaintiff’s ponds.
Whether, upon the facts proved or admitted, the defendants could maintain this defence, in an action at law for the nuisance alleged, is a question upon which we give no opinion ; but the right is sufficiently doubtful to entitle them to a trial at law. A court of equity is extremely unwilling, as Eden remarks, to interpose without a trial at law, especially where the alleged nuisance consists in the exercise of a manufacture. Eden on Injunctions, 236. More especially, it may be added, where the works complained of are of great value, and a perpetual injunction might be ruinous. And in all cases, where the right is doubtful, the court will direct a trial, and in the mean time, if there be danger of irreparable mischief, or if there is any other good cause for granting a temporary injunction, it will be ordered, so as to restrain all injurious proceedings ; and when the plaintiff’s right is fully established, a perpetual injunction will be decreed. 2 Story on Eq. § 925. Mitf. Pl. (3d ed.) 111.